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ALTA Law Research Series |
Last Updated: 7 October 2011
THE LAST GAP (GASP) IN NEGOTIATIONS. WHY IS IT
IMPORTANT?
HOW CAN IT BE
CROSSED?[*]
By Professor John H. Wade[⊗]
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to
reflect on the reasons why the last gap in negotiations is difficult to cross;
and
secondly, to set out in problem solving fashion a number of methods or
options to anticipate and cross the last gap.
The Last Gap
What is
the last gap in a negotiation? It is the last step necessary to reach an
agreement between the negotiating parties. Often
that last gap or last increment
emerges after long and exhausting negotiations which have led to agreement on
all issues but one.
For example, that one issue may be - Who gets the
grandfather clock? How should the last 10% of the pool of assets be divided? How
should the outstanding credit card debt be paid? How to cross the difference of
$ 600 or $ 1 million in the parties’ “final”
offers? Will the
lease have a five year renewal option attached?
Most lawyers and business
people can relate horror stories with humour and/or anguish about clients
becoming stuck on the last issue
of a lengthy negotiation. Some lawyers can tell
how they themselves have offered to write a cheque to cover the last gap in
order
to help disputants end the drawn out negotiations, and almost invariably
the disputants refuse the offer “as a matter of
principle”.
The Importance of the Last Gap
Why does the last
increment or last issue assume such importance and so often (anecdotally)
provide a stumbling block to a negotiated
settlement? There are a number of
possible explanations, which include:
How to Cross the Last Gap in
Negotiations
What strategies are available to cross this hurdle in
negotiations or mediation?
One aspect of an [no need to have
mediator’s voice in this essay] adviser’s role is to be an expert
in the dynamics
of negotiation and to educate the disputants concerning these
dynamics. Parties can then have some confidence, even though they may
feel in
the wilderness, that there are well trodden paths which they have some power to
choose between. A negotiator can give information
concerning the range of
options which are available. A negotiator can give this information before or
after the last gap has been
reached in the negotiation. What follows is a list
of options on how to cross the last gap. [would cut all of this since is for
mediator
or reframe for how negotiator could use]
Options for Crossing the
Last Gap in Negotiations
The sixteen methods are as follows:
A common response at the last one million dollars; or $10,000; or at last set of paintings; or last car, is for one or both disputants to talk - to rehash old arguments in an attempt to convince the other party to give in. These arguments take various forms:
Anecdotally, these
speeches rarely appear to be directly successful in crossing the last gap. The
listeners may become inflamed to
hear such a one-sided presentation (yet again)
so late in the day, and deliver a counter speech, or the speaker may back
himself/herself
into a positional corner. [change voice of following] One
negotiator strategy is to interrupt the flow of words with an attempted
educational comment, and redirect the disputants to the remaining list of
options on the board. “I don’t think that these
arguments are going
to convince any of us; we’ve all heard them before; the last gap is never
crossed by logical argument;
I’m going to ask each of us in turn, which
one of the other options on the board you could live
with”.
Nevertheless, some degree of managed speech making at the last
gap may serve latent functions of catharsis, boredom, the last dagger,
further
emotional pain, or attempted justification of perceived role and fees of a
skilled helper, or the farewell address. A managed
last speech may be important
given the complex psychological functions which the last gap appears to
serve.[1]
This method is commonly suggested where the last gap
consists of money or other divisible items - such as time with a child. It has
the merits of simplicity, that both parties “lose” equally and that
it is culturally commonplace.
However, given the complex psychological
dynamics surrounding the last gap, “splitting the difference” may be
seen as
too quick, part of an orchestrated plan of attack, or involving another
painful “loss”.
Double blind offers – split the
difference via formulae
This method is used in a number of computer
based negotiation programs. Each disputant agrees in writing to make one or more
confidential
offers to a mediator (or to a computer), on the condition that if
the offers are “close” (“close” being agreed
upon as a
percentage), then the mediator (or computer program) will split the difference
and both will be bound.
For example, the parties may be stuck at offers of
$300,000 and $200,000 with a gap of $100,000 between them.
They can agree
to each make pairs of confidential offers; and that there will be no agreement
unless and until one confidential offer
is say at least 75% of the other (or
perhaps unless and until parties are only $65,000 or less apart).
Thus if
each confidentially moves $10,000 and offer $290,000 and $210,000, then there
will be no automatic splitting the difference,
as 21/29 = 72%.
However, if
each agrees to another round of confidential offers, and one moves $5,000, and
the other moves $10,000, then there is
a settlement as $215,000/$280,000 =
77%.
Splitting the difference between $280,000 and $215,000 means that the
payout-figure is $247,500.
The last increment can sometimes be divided in ways apart from an equal split by dividing the time of use or time of payment. For example,
One party can attempt to overcome an impasse on the last increment by re-opening a “decided” issue, or adding another issue to the negotiating table. In these ways, there is an attempt to prevent the “last” issue from being the last.
For example,
Obviously, it is not always easy to re-open or to discover extra value to place on the bargaining table. One of the clear benefits of questioning and listening skills is that a negotiator can develop ideas on the needs concerns and interests of the other disputant so that extra value can be put on the table. Some negotiators begin bargaining with a positional style. When an impasse is reached, they switch (or have a fellow negotiator switch) to an interest based problem solving approach.
The impasse of the last item can be “resolved” by:
In mediation, the disputants may request that a
trusted mediator make a recommendation or a binding decision on
how the impasse should be resolved. Most mediators respond to such requests with
reluctance and make speeches about neutrality.
However, occasionally the parties
manage to persuade the mediator to accept one or both of those roles.
[I
think this explanation is not needed by our audience]
Chance provides an important option for deciding who gets the last gap. This is because flipping a coin:
This is an alternative version
of chance which avoids the all-or-nothing result of flipping a coin. The
disputants agree that several
solutions will be written out on slips of paper,
placed in a hat, and the one drawn out will prevail.
For example, if the
last increment is $20,000 then ten slips of paper can be placed in a hat
beginning with “$2000” and
ending with “$20,000” with
gaps of $2,000” written on each slip of paper. The person drawing the slip
receives
whatever number is on the drawn piece of paper; the residue of the last
gap goes to the other disputant. The writer and some colleagues
have used this
method successfully on several occasions in business disputes.
Of course
this method can be extended to a range of more complicated alternative
solutions.
This option involves both parties
agreeing to transfer the last gap to a child, a charity, to pay the fees of
skilled helpers such
as lawyers or mediators, or to pay for renovating a house
or business before a sale.
Thus for example, last increments from the
division of a pool of assets in a matrimonial or deceased estate have been
transferred:
Such transfers to third parties may have the clear benefits of mutually avoiding a “loss”, and of wedding a third party to the solution chosen.
Where a pattern of
incremental bargaining has been established, each disputant will usually be
concerned about the consequences of
initiating any offer across the last gap.
Why? Because any offer is likely to be whittled away by an incremental counter
offer. For
example, if the last gap between A and B is $20,000, and A offers to
split the difference ($10,000 to A) how is B likely to respond?
“B is
likely to respond, split the difference again - only $5,000 to A”. Thus
there is a reluctance to make the first
move, and the impasse remains
intact.
Accordingly, some negotiators make exploratory conditional offers in
an attempt to placate the fear of incremental counter-offers.
This works best if
there are at least two negotiators (eg. lawyer and client) on each negotiating
team.
Lawyer: “What if I could persuade my client to make a split-the-difference offer, would you guarantee that you wouldn’t try to cut down her offer?”
Opposing Disputant: “What do you mean?”
Lawyer: “Well I’m not willing to put the effort persuading my client against her wishes to modify her position if you’re going to try to cut her offer in half. She will then feel betrayed. I’m not willing to put in the work to attempt to persuade her unless I know what your response will be. And there are no guarantees I can persuade her”.
Opposing Disputant: “Let me talk to my lawyer about this in private for
a moment. We’ll be right back”.
Obviously, this option can be
manipulated by a negotiator attempting to discover the other side’s
willingness to settle for
a hypothesised offer. However, the offeree’s
response is also clearly conditional (“if your client makes that
offer....”)
and can be withdrawn readily. Moreover, raising any suspicion
of manipulation will usually be counter-productive at such a late stage
of
nearly successful negotiations. The writer has used, and seen conditional
split-the-difference offers in use, many times.
The intensity of a
negotiation session means that it is easy to become weary, to lose perspective
and to make “a mountain out
of a molehill”. Additionally, some
people are cautious and are accustomed to reflecting upon options available
before making
a commitment.
Accordingly, it is a helpful strategy to suggest
a break to consider one or more written options, with a clear appointment to
resume
negotiations, and with encouragement for each disputant to speak to
specified trusted third parties. Where a mediator is being used,
it is often
helpful for all disputants to make contact during the break to clarify,
brainstorm and hypothesise on negotiation dynamics
(eg. “What will be the
likely response if I make this offer......?”)
A skilled
“significant other” can also assist an entrenched person to work
through a visual risk analysis (again). What
are the risks if the gains from the
negotiation are “lost” due to a relatively minor last goal or
gap?[3] The writer has
found that a renewed, visual, and private risk analysis is helpful with parties
jammed on the last gap. “What
are your goals; what have you gained so far;
and what will be lost if you leave here without an agreement?” For
example, here
is a common “life goal” list prepared by the writer as
mediator while sitting with each disputant during family property
negotiations
which are “jammed” over a last monetary gap.
LIFE GOALS?
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THIS OFFER??
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Once the goals are visualized and reflected upon, anecdotally most clients are reluctant to lose the 14 dangling gains for the chance of acquiring one missing goal (the last gap).
As a variation on the
previous procedure, the parties can actually draft a precise or general form of
offer before the break is taken.
This may for example represent a predictable
outcome of “splitting the difference” which is too difficult to
swallow
during the negotiations.
A time and place is then agreed upon for
one party to contact the other and make the offer as drafted (eg. phone on
Wednesday night
between 6-8 pm). Both agree not to haggle, but either to accept
or reject the ritual pre-planned offer[Cite to Coben, chapter on Ritual]
and to return to the negotiation/mediation table at a specified time with the
result.
This procedure gives a concrete proposal, reduces the fear of
incremental haggling during the break, ritualises conflicted conversations,
provides a deadline, and allows the parties to return to the negotiation table
knowing what has been decided.
Where parties are in
dispute over a pool of assets, it is possible for a portion to be divided as
agreed, and for the last gap to
be set aside for division at some later time.
For example, a wife could take 50%; a husband 40% and the contested gap of 10%
be invested
in a joint account until the parties are “ready”
emotionally or otherwise to deal with that 10%.
This option
involves an agreement to sell the last contested item(s) at a without reserve
auction, usually with all parties free
to bid. The most determined bidder
“wins” the item and the net proceeds of the auction are then divided
in portions agreed
to beforehand.
Recently, the writer was mediating a
conflict which jammed on the last gap of who would receive an emotionally
important house. The
mediator offered to conduct an instant auction, if both
parties agreed that the highest bidder would receive the house. They did,
and
the negotiations concluded successfully.
Where
the last gap consists of a number of items such as “all the
furniture”; “all the stamp collection”;
“all the
paintings”, then the parties can be offered the “pick-a-pile”
option, which is well known to family
lawyers, and to parents cutting up
children’s birthday cakes.
One party agrees to divide the chattels
into two lists of approximately equal value and submit these lists to the other
party by
a deadline. The other party then has a specified time in which to
choose one list as his/her
share.[4]
Like
dispute resolution by chance, this pick-a-pile option is so filled with risk and
tension that some disputants quickly reject
it and return to the list of
remaining options with some relief.
This option is rarely chosen
by the disputants. However, some parties comment confidentially during or after
a mediation to a mediator
- “I wish you would apply more pressure to us
both; we are stuck”
Accordingly, when the last gap persists, some
mediators, lawyers, or other team members try this option from their box of
tools.
For example, with varying degrees of simulated anger, the mediator, or
other “helper” comments: “I cannot believe
it. We have all sat
here for three hours and patiently and successfully negotiated through four
issues. Now you’re about to
throw it all away on this miserable pile of
furniture. You all really disappoint me. I’m not going to let you out of
here until
we do the right thing and ...... etc. etc.”
This option may
cause the tantrum-thrower to lose reputation and clients, or may enable both
parties to avoid any loss of face by
making the last concession. They can blame
the ballistic person for “forcing” the last concession (and rescuing
them
both from their painted-in corners).
This dramatic option may be
particularly successful if the aggressor has gained the respect and trust of all
parties (both lawyers
and disputants) over a period of
time.[5]
Sometimes, the
last gap is too difficult to cross amidst the sense of loss arising from a day
or years of concessions. Accordingly,
one of the negotiators delivers a mixed
message of pain and hope “I believe that this dispute will settle; we have
made progress
today; in my opinion, we are not diagnostically in the 1-3% of
disputes which need a judicial decision; however we both may need
to suffer more
pain and expense of filing (further) court applications, open offers, and paying
lawyers; could we now agree to a
time to talk over the phone in say 14 days time
etc.” (Competent negotiators always organize face-saving methods to
re-open
negotiations.)
Various versions of this pain and hope speech have
sometimes led to awkward silences, and then positive responses to the question,
“Would you like to take a short break, then try for another 15 minutes to
see if this can be concluded today?”
Conclusion
Conflict and
transaction managers are becoming more sophisticated in their knowledge of
negotiation dynamics. This chapter has attempted
to systematise some of the
reasons for the difficulties experienced in crossing the last gap.
Sixteen
ways of crossing the last gap have been described. Visually setting out some or
all of these sixteen strategies is a useful
addition to a negotiator’s
repertoire for working with disputants and negotiators to cross the last
gap.
[*] See original version of this topic, John H. Wade, The Last Gap in Negotiations – Why Is It Important? How Can It Be Crossed? 6 AUSTRALIAN DISPUTE RESOL. J.92 (1995).
[⊗] Director, Dispute Resolution Centre, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia, john_wade@bond.edu.au.
[1] See previous discussion of “The Importance of the Last Gap.”
[2] eg. Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 20 L & SOC’Y REV 93 (1986); Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 L & SOC’Y REV. 737 (1988); John Griffiths, What do Dutch Lawyers Actually do in Divorce Cases, L & SOC’Y REV. 135 (1986); John H. Wade, The Behaviour of Family Lawyers and the Implications for Legal Education, 1 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 165 (1989).
[3] See John H. Wade, Systematic Risk Analysis for Negotiators and Litigators: But You Never Told Me It Would Be Like This, 13 BOND L. REV. 462 (2001).
[4] Precedent clauses for such agreements can be found in AUSTRALIA FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE (CCH) “Precedents” tab and in AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS (Butterworths) under “Family Law” tab, Volume 6, precedent 30.165.
[5] G. Richard Shell, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE (1999) 111-113; Robert B. Cialdini, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1984).
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