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Last Updated: 12 August 2010
AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF THE ROYAL ARMS IN CHURCHES
(2000) 5(27) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 408-416
NOEL COX
Barrister of the High Court of New
Zealand[1]
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1953 a number of parishes throughout England wished to commemorate the
accession and coronation of Her Majesty the Queen by placing
representations of
the royal arms in their churches. As the introduction of such devices into
churches may only be made with the
authority of a faculty from the diocesan
consistory court, a number of these petitions came to be considered judicially.
Two judgments
were
reported.[2]
The
consistory courts are bound by their own
decisions,[3] but not by
decisions of those of a consistory court in another
diocese.[4] Decisions of
other consistory courts are, however, persuasive, and these reported decisions
have since been the principal authority
relied upon for deciding such questions.
The reports however disclose a conflict. Chancellors Garth Moore and
Macmorran, in the Southwark and Chichester Consistory Courts
respectively, were
at odds with the Home Office over the legality of displaying the royal arms
without the consent of the Crown.
The Home Office believed that its leave was
necessary for the erection of royal arms. The Chancellors believed that if the
royal
arms were used to symbolise the royal supremacy, no leave, otherwise than
by faculty,[5] was
required.[6]
It is
submitted that the matter was not as clear-cut as the learned Chancellors' then
believed, due to the then state of knowledge
of the Law of
Arms.[7] The decisions
ought to be re-examined in light of new learning stimulated by the almost
contemporaneous decision of the long dormant
High Court of Chivalry, in the case
of Manchester Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties
Ltd.[8] This case
was heard on 21 December 1954 before the Earl Marshal and his Surrogate, Lord
Goddard, then Lord Chief Justice of England.
Both consistory court decisions
were decided earlier, Re West Tarring Parish
Church[9] on 30
March, and Re St Paul,
Battersea[10] on
26 May, and both without the benefit of argument from the Home Office.
In
Re St Paul, Battersea, the Chancellor of the Southwark Consistory Court,
the Worshipful E Garth Moore, considered an unopposed petition for the grant of
a faculty for the introduction into the church of various forms of decorations,
including a number of heraldic devices. He held:
(1) following Re West Tarring Parish Church, that the introduction of the royal arms, signifying the royal supremacy, was a matter within the jurisdiction of the consistory court, and that so long as the Crown claimed supremacy in the established church, it was unreasonable that the Crown should object to the badge of that supremacy being displayed;
(2) that the use for decorative purposes of the first quarter of the royal arms as a device signifying the kingdom of England involved different considerations, and that the consent of their bearer, the Sovereign, should be sought;
(3) that the arms of the borough of Battersea and of the London County Council could be introduced, both having consented to such use; and
(4) that no consent was necessary for the use of either the arms of the diocese or the arms of the province, or St George's Cross, signifying the Church of England.
It is respectfully submitted that the learned Chancellor was incorrect on findings (1), (2) and (4), for the reasons which will be shown.
2. THE NATURE OF COATS OF ARMS
The circumstances of both Re St Paul, Battersea and Re West Tarring Parish Church was the immediate aftermath of the coronation of Her Majesty the Queen. There was a desire in many parishes to commemorate this event in an appropriate, and permanent manner, by the erection of representations of the royal arms in their churches. In Re St Paul, Battersea, Chancellor Garth Moore was of the opinion, influenced by the earlier though almost contemporaneous judgment of Chancellor Kenneth Macmorran QC, that this was a matter solely for the consistory courts. But this view was not shared by the Home Office: 'So far as royal arms are concerned, I should have granted a faculty without more ado had it not been for the attitude adopted by the Home Office towards such applications. On April 2, 1953, that department circularized all diocesan registries claiming that the royal arms, the royal crown and the royal cypher are the personal emblems of the Sovereign and may not be reproduced without the Queen's consent, and that application for that consent should be made to the Secretary of State for Home Affairs'.[11]
The Home Office had not, however, produced any authority in support of its
claim.[12] Though
given the opportunity, the Home Office was not present in court on either this
nor any other occasion when faculties for the
introduction of royal arms were
heard. As a consequence, the learned judge was unassisted by argument. It is
respectfully submitted
that as a consequence, the decision was per
incuriam, because it did not have all the relevant authorities referred to
it before it gave judgment, and should not be followed.
The Chancellor began
by outlining his view of the relevant part of the Law of Arms: 'There is in
England- though not, I believe, in
Scotland- so far as I know no legally
recognised proprietary right in heraldic emblems. I carefully refrain from
stating the matter
more dogmatically than that, for it may still be a matter for
argument before the Court of Chivalry. But, on that assumption, no
one has an
absolute right to prohibit the use of his arms, and it is a matter of discretion
for the consistory court whether or not
to grant applications for the
introduction of heraldic
emblems'.[13]
Armorial
bearings,[14] as
dignities, have legal
standing.[15] But the
Law of Arms is not part of the common
law[16] and the common
law courts have no jurisdiction over matters of dignities and
honours,[17] such as
armorial bearings,[18]
or peerages.[19] In
this respect the Law of Arms may be regarded as similar to the ecclesiastical
law, which is a part of the laws of England, but
not part of the common
law.[20]
The
exclusive jurisdiction of deciding rights to arms, and claims of descent, was
vested in the High Court of
Chivalry.[21] As the
substance of the common law is found in the judgments of the common law courts,
so the substance of the Law of Arms is to
be found in the customs and usages of
the Court of
Chivalry.[22] The
procedure was based on that of the civil law, but the substantive law was
recognised to be English, and peculiar to the Court
of
Chivalry.[23]
Although the common law courts do not regard coats of arms either as
property or as being defensible by action, armorial bearings
are nevertheless a
form of property.[24]
Any dignity which is descendable- that is can be inherited by the action of law-
is within the scope of the Statute of Westminster
the Second
1285.[25] Such
dignities are descendable as an estate tail and not as a fee simple conditional,
although no place is named in its
creation.[26] The
estate in fee tail (also called estate tail) is limited to, and will be
inherited only by, a person and the heirs of his body,
or a person and the
particular heirs of his
body.[27]
Armorial
bearings are incorporeal and impartible
hereditaments,[28]
inalienable, and descendable according to the Law of
Arms.[29] Generally
speaking, this means they are inherited by the male issue of the grantee, though
they can be inherited by the sons of an
heraldic heiress, where there is no
surviving male heir.
To the common law real property comprises both corporeal
and incorporeal
hereditaments,[30] the
term 'hereditament' simply meaning property which at common law descended to the
heir on intestacy; real property as opposed
to personal property. Although the
terms real property and hereditaments may for most practical purposes be treated
as meaning the
same thing, they are not exactly
so.[31]
Corporeal
hereditaments are those hereditaments which are actual physical things over
which rights of ownership may be exercised,
such as land, buildings, minerals,
trees, and anything else which is either part of a piece of land or else affixed
to it. Incorporeal
hereditaments, by contrast, are not physical things at all,
but rights affecting land which the common law treated as real
property.[32]
As
with all property, the rights of the owner include the right of control. Hence,
the lawful owner of a coat of arms may prohibit
others from using their
property. Nor may coats of arms be used without the permission of the owner
thereof. This principle was clearly
stated in Manchester Corpn v Manchester
Palace of Varieties
Ltd.[33] So,
contrary to what the Chancellor believed, the lawful owner of a coat of arms
does have an absolute right to prohibit the use
of his arms.
3. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ROYAL ARMS INTO CHURCHES
It is not enough for a consistory court to follow Garth Moore's judgment
that: 'In general, I should be slow to grant such an application
where a
reasonable objection could be made by or on behalf of the bearer of those arms,
and I shall in future normally require notice
of any petition for the
introduction of heraldic emblems to be given to the bearers of those emblems, at
any rate where it appears
to me that an objection could be reasonably
entertained'.[34]
In
all cases the permission of the owner of the armorial bearings must be sought
and obtained. It is not a matter in which the consistory
court has any
discretion, though, even if permission is forthcoming from the owner, the court
may properly decide to reject the petition
for its own reasons.
Having
unfortunately begun on a misunderstanding of the Law of Arms, by no means
surprising given the lack of guidance from the Court
of Chivalry in recent
centuries,[35] the
Chancellor considered the special position of the royal arms. 'The royal arms
have been so displayed in churches now for about
four centuries. There is ground
for thinking that their introduction has sometimes been enforced at the
instigation of the Crown.
The matter has always been within the faculty
jurisdiction of the consistory court and has never till 1953, so far as I know,
been
treated as the concern of the Home
Office'.[36]
This
was a case where the owner of arms had, in effect, refused permission for their
use. Had the Chancellor correctly stated the
law with respect to the rights of
property in arms, the matter might have ended here. The Chancellor was, however,
also strongly
influenced by the judgment of the Worshipful Kenneth Macmorran QC,
Chancellor of the Diocese of Chichester in Re West Tarring Parish
Church.[37]
That latter case also concerned an unopposed petition for a faculty to
authorise the display of the royal arms over the vestry door
in the parish
church. This also was not a proposal to use the arms for mere artistic
embellishment. It was simply to implement the
desire to display the royal arms
as such, to commemorate the coronation.
In a succession of letters between
the Home Office and Chancellor Macmorran, the Home Office made its position
clear. In a letter
of 29 May 1954, its spokesman stated that:
The Home Secretary appreciates that the arms of previous Sovereigns are displayed in many parish churches, and he would not wish to raise any objection to the renewal or restoration of existing coats of arms. It appears, however, that the practice has very largely fallen into desuetude during the past hundred years, and the Home Secretary does not feel that the existence of this practice should be regarded as overriding the general consideration that since the royal arms and other emblems are personal to Her Majesty, it is only proper that her consent should be obtained for their reproduction in any form. It is observed that the applications to which you refer in your letter of May 4 both relate to proposals to place the royal arms in churches in commemoration of the coronation, and the Home Secretary feels that in these circumstances the application ought to be dealt with as applications for a new use of the royal arms rather than as a revival of the practice of exhibiting royal arms in churches.[38]
While the Home Office acknowledged that royal arms had formerly been used in
churches, its belief was that they had now fallen into
desuetude. Chancellor
Macmorran contended that the display of the royal arms in churches had not
fallen into disuse, and that: 'as
I read the law, the authority to decide
whether any furniture or ornament is to be admitted to consecrated buildings is
the ecclesiastical
court. In my view, therefore, the opinion of the circular
letter I have quoted above is an unwarranted interference by a department
of
State with a court of competent
jurisdiction'.[39]
It
is respectfully submitted that the learned Chancellor was mistaken. Whilst it is
within the jurisdiction of the consistory court
to decide whether or not any
armorial bearings will be put in a church, this must be subject to the consent
of the owner of such
arms. This is analogous to the court saying that it is
within its jurisdiction to approve the placing of a piece of stolen artwork
within a church. The court has no positive duty to introduce any armorial
bearings, and must exercise its discretion whether to do
so or not in light of
the external circumstances. The court must abide by the general law, as well as
ecclesiastical law. Whether
a special case might be made for the royal arms is a
question which can now be addressed.
4. THE ROYAL SUPREMACY
The matter might be dealt with simply by stating that the requisite royal consent was not forthcoming. But the matter is not quite so simple. The royal arms had indeed been used for centuries in churches, to symbolise the royal supremacy. But that does not mean that the royal arms were not used without the approval of the Sovereign. In the past such consent was implied, and at times the display of the royal arms was actually required.[40] But the Home Office made clear its view that such blanket consent would not now be forthcoming. Further, it is doubtful whether there is any basis in the claim that the display of the royal arms in a church has any special status, as both learned judges believed. Chancellor Garth Moore stated that:
their presence in a church, in the manner desired in this case, seems to me to be on a par with their presence in a court of law. In both cases it signifies the highest temporal authority. So long as the Crown claims supremacy in the established church, it seems to me to be unreasonable that it should object to the badge of that supremacy being displayed ... For this reason, though for a time at least I shall continue the practice of requiring notice of these applications to be served on the Home Office so that the Crown may continue to have an opportunity of appearing and arguing its case, until some valid argument is presented which will persuade me that these applications should not be granted, I shall in the absence of special circumstances grant them as I grant this one.[41]
The royal arms are displayed in a court of law to symbolise that fact that
the judges are the Queen's judges, and the courts are the
Sovereign's courts.
However, a church is not subject to the Crown in such a way. True, the Sovereign
is supreme head of the Church
of
England,[42] but it
would be dangerous to read too much into this. The royal supremacy was confirmed
by the Act of Supremacy 1558 which declared
the Queen to be: 'supreme Governor
of this realm ... as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as
temporal and
authorised the Crown to nominate by letters patent persons to
exercise on its behalf all manner of jurisdictions ... touching ...
any
spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction ... and to visit, reform, redress,
order, correct and amend all ... errors, heresies,
schisms, abuses, offences,
contempts and enormities
whatsoever'.[43]
This
idea was repeated in the Thirty-Nine Articles, enacted in 1562, and
confirmed in 1571.[44]
But this was merely an assertion of royal supremacy over the spiritual as
well as the temporal state. The ministers of the Church
were in no sense
servants of the Crown. It followed that they could only use the royal arms in
the same circumstances that any other
subjects of the Crown might. But as they
were not servants of the Crown, they could not display the ensigns of the Crown
without
express permission.
5. OTHER COATS OF ARMS
Different considerations applied in respect to the arms of the kingdom of
England. Their introduction was not sought in order to signify
the royal
supremacy, but rather as part of a general decorative scheme. As Chancellor
Garth Moore said: 'Their use in the circumstances
strikes me as harmless and
appropriate, but the consent of their bearer, that is, the Sovereign, has not
been given or, indeed, sought,
and on the principle which I have enunciated, I
think that this should be a condition precedent to their
introduction'.[4]
As
the principle that armorial bearings are the exclusive property of their bearers
has already been stated, it need merely be observed
that the consent of the
owner of any arms must always be sought. It is not merely a matter of courtesy,
but of recognition of an
exclusive property right.
Indeed, it can also be
argued that the arms borne by the Sovereign, both the full royal arms, and parts
thereof, are distinct from
ordinary armorial bearings. They are borne as an
attribute of the royal prerogative, and the consent of the Sovereign for their
use
is doubly necessary.
The local borough and county had both consented to
the use of their arms, and their armorial bearings might lawfully be introduced
into the church, if the consistory court granted a faculty. Chancellor Garth
Moore then considered the position of the arms of the
province and diocese:
'With regard to the arms of the diocese and the arms of the province, no
permission for their introduction
has been sought; but the church is part of the
diocese and of the province, and I cannot conceive the refusal of consent or any
reasonable
grounds on which such refusal could be based. I, therefore, grant
permission for their
introduction'.[46]
This
also is based on the initial misunderstanding of the nature of property in
armorial bearings. The consent of the archbishop and
diocesan bishop
respectively must be sought before a faculty is sought for the introduction of
such arms into a church.
The parish is subordinate in a hierarchical sense
to its bishop, and to the archbishop. But each is a distinct legal entity. In
the
parish, the churchwardens are a quasi-corporation for the management of
church property. The incumbent is a corporation sole, and
the parish itself
merely the circuit of ground committed to his charge. Neither incumbent nor
churchwardens are entitled to use the
arms of their bishop without his consent.
The same may be said for the archbishop.
However, the Chancellor, in his
capacity of Vicar-General, would have the jurisdiction to give consent on behalf
of the bishop, and
this might be the appropriate method for dealing with that
particular aspect of the petition. The appropriate metropolitan would
have to be
approached for his consent for the use of the provincial arms, though this
consent might also be given on his behalf by
the provincial vicar-general.
Chancellor Garth Moore continued: 'With regard to St George's Cross these
arms, so far as I am aware, do not in any sense belong to
anybody. Among other
uses to which they are put is that of signifying the Church of England. I see no
reason, therefore, why they
should not be introduced and I give permission for
their
introduction'.[47]
Unfortunately,
this view also is not wholly correct. St George's Cross is used by, among
others, the Royal Navy, in which it is used
to indicate the presence of a full
admiral. It is thus subject to control by the Crown. The same may be said of the
Union Flag, the
so-called Union Jack. But while it has been stated that the
Sovereign has no objection to her subjects flying the Union
Jack,[48] nothing has
been said about the use of the St George's Cross.
It would be extremely
unlikely however for the Crown to object to the use of the St George's Cross, in
view of its status as a national
flag, by churches in England, though what the
position might be in Wales or elsewhere is uncertain. As a national emblem, St
George's
Cross is in a different position to the royal arms, which have always
been personal to the Sovereign, as well as emblems of dominion.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Thus, in Re St Paul, Battersea[49] and Re West Tarring Parish Church[50] the respective Chancellors were in error, and their judgments, though only persuasive in consistory courts other than Southwark and Chichester respectively, ought not to be followed. It may be concluded:
(1) that the introduction of the royal arms, signifying the royal supremacy, is a matter within the jurisdiction of the consistory court, but that the permission of the Crown must still be sought and obtained as a condition precedent to the granting of a faculty;
(2) that the use for decorative purposes of the first quarter of the royal arms as a device signifying the kingdom of England involves different considerations, but that the consent of their bearer, the Sovereign, must be sought;
(3) that the arms of the local councils, corporations, or individuals can be introduced, if they have consented to such use;
(4) that consent is always necessary for the use of either the arms of the diocese or the arms of the province;
(5) that consent is not necessary for the use of St George's Cross.
Although the consent of the Crown must be sought for the display of the royal
arms, Chancellor Garth Moore was correct to observe
that: 'So long as the Crown
claims supremacy in the established church, it seems to me to be unreasonable
that it should object to
the badge of that supremacy being displayed'
...[51]
What is
reasonable, and what is lawful, are often divergent. Given the long tradition of
the display of the royal arms in churches,
it would be desirable if the
responsible Ministers of the Queen were to advise Her Majesty to confer
permission upon the Church of
England to display her arms whenever faculties
were granted for such use- in effect, to delegate responsibility to Her
Majesty's
judges in the consistory courts.
[1]LLM(Hons)
Auckland; Lecturer in Law, Auckland Institute of
Technology.
[2]Re
St Paul, Battersea [1954] 1 WLR 920, [1954] 1 WLR 920, Southwark Consistory
Court; and Re West Tarring Parish Church [1954] 2 All ER 591, [1954] 1
WLR 923n, Chichester Consistory
Court.
[3]Bishopwearmouth
(Rector & Churchwardens) v Adey [1958] 3 All ER 441, sub nom Re St
Michael and All Angels, Bishopwearmouth [1958] 1 WLR 1183, Cons
Ct.
[4]St
Nicholas, Plumstead Re (Rector & Churchwardens) [1961] 1 All ER
298, [1961] 1 WLR 916, Cons
Ct.
[5]It is clear
that such matters are not to be delegated to the archdeacons: see the Faculty
Jurisdiction Rules 1992, SI 1992/2882, r 6, App A, which covers inter alia
'external or internal decoration or redecoration except where in the opinion of
the [diocesan]
advisory committee it will result in a material alteration either
externally or internally to the appearance of the church' (App
A, para 1 (iii),
and repairs to movables (using matching materials) not including Royal Coat of
Arms, unfixed hatchments, heraldic
achievements, paintings, historic textiles,
historic silver and base metal work' (App A, para 3
(ii)).
[6]Re St
Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595, [1954] 1 WLR 920, Cons Ct; Re West
Tarring Parish Church [1954] 2 All ER 591, [1954] 1 WLR 923n, Cons
Ct.
[7]The Law of
Arms is regarded as a part of the laws of England, and the common law courts,
and ecclesiastical courts, will take judicial
notice of it as such: Paston v
Ledham (1459) YB 37 Hen VI, Pasch. p 18 per Nedham
J.
[8]Manchester
Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] P 133, [1955] 1 All ER
387, High Ct of
Chivalry.
[9]Re
West Tarring Parish Church [1954] 2 All ER 591, [1954] 1 WLR 923n, Cons
Ct.
[10]Re St
Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595, [1954] 1 WLR 920, Cons
Ct.
[11] [1954] 2
All ER 595 at 596, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 921 per Garth Moore Ch. The circular (as
quoted by Macmorran Ch in Re West Tarring Parish Church [1954] 2 All ER
591 at 591, 592, [1954] 1 WLR 923n at 924, Cons Ct) stated that: 'An instance
has recently come to our notice of the reproduction of the royal arms in a new
stained
glass window in a church, and we have reason to believe that the
position regarding the reproduction of the arms and other royal
emblems may not
be fully appreciated. The position is that the royal arms, the royal crown and
the royal cypher are the personal
emblems of the Sovereign and may not be
reproduced, in whole or in part, without the Queen's consent; such consent is
also necessary
in the case of emblems of past sovereigns. The Home Secretary is
the Minister who advises Her Majesty on such matters, and application
for
permission should be made to him. Permission is, in fact, granted only in very
exceptional circumstances, but where, for example,
it is desired to install a
stained glass window in a church in commemoration of a particular Sovereign or
of a State occasion such
as a coronation, it may be possible for the Home
Secretary to recommend the grant of permission to reproduce the personal cypher
of the Sovereign'.
[12]Re St Paul,
Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595 at 596, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 921, Cons Ct, per
Garth Moore
Ch.
[13] [1954] 2
All ER 595 at 596, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 921, per Garth Moore
Ch.
[14]These are
variously styled coat armour, armorial bearings, arms, or coats of arms. They
are by nature a form of personal insignia.
Although their original function was
to enable knights to identify each other on the battlefield, they soon acquired
wider, more
decorative uses. They are still widely used by countries, public and
private institutions and by
individuals.
[15]Manchester
Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] P 133; [1955] 1 All ER
387, High Ct of Chivalry, per Lord Goddard, Surrogate. As early as Scroop v
Grosvenor (1389) Calendar of Close Rolls, Ric II, vol 3, p 586 it was
established that a man could have obtained at that time a definite right
to his
arms, and that this right could be enforced against
another.
[16]R v
Parker [1793] EngR 803; (1668) 1 Sid 352, 82 ER 1151, sub nom Parker's Case [1793] EngR 803; 1 Lev
230.
[17]Manchester
Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] P 133, [1955] 1 All ER
387, High Ct of Chivalry, per Lord Goddard,
Surrogate.
[18]Duke
of Buckingham's Case [1794] EngR 610; (1514) 3 Dyer 285b, Keil 170, 72 ER
346.
[19]Earl
Cowley v Countess of Cowley [1901] AC 450,
HL.
[20]Bishop
of Exeter v Marshall (1868) LR 3 HL
17.
[21]Scroop v
Grosvenor (1389) Calendar of Close Rolls, Ric II, vol 3, p 586. The High
Court of Chivalry is the subject of a chapter by Sir Edward Coke, Coke upon
Littleton (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1979) vol 4 chap 17. See also
G.D. Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry, a Study of the Civil Law of England
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1959)
[22]Puryman
v Cavendish (1397) Close Rolls 21 Ric II p 1 m 5. The opinion among lawyers
is good evidence of what the law is: Isherwood v Oldknow [1815] EngR 459; (1815) 3 M &
S 382 at 396, 397[1815] EngR 459; , 105 ER 654, per Lord Ellenborough, applied in Manchester
Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] P 133, [1955] 1 All ER 387
at 393, High Ct of Chivalry, per Lord Goddard,
Surrogate.
[23]Cases
were tried secundum legem et consuetudinem curie nostre militaris:
Puryman v Cavendish (1397) Close Rolls 21 Ric II p 1 m 5. This was
recognised by the common law courts; Paston v Ledham (1459) YB 37 Hen VI,
Pasch. p 18, per Nedham
J.
[24]They were
generally described as tesserae gentilitatis or insignia of
gentility.
[25]De
Donis Conditionalibus (13 Edw 1, st
1).
[26]Re
Rivett-Carnac's Will (1885) 30 ChD
136.
[27]Particularly
meaning those who are specified in the words of the grant.
[28]For a
discussion of corporeal and incorporeal property see an article by the author in
(1997) 17 New Zealand Universities Law Review
379-401.
[29]Arms
descend with due and proper differencing, to male descendants of the grantee in
the first instance, and through females as heraldic
heiresses in the event of
the failure of the male line, as quarterings: Wiltes Peerage Case (1869)
LR 4 HL, 126 at
153.
[30]See eg the
Settled Land Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo 5, c 18) s 67, replacing Settled Land Act
1882 (45 & 46 Vict, c 38), s 37.
[31]Sir Robert
Megarry and Sir Henry Wade, The Law of Real Property (4th edn), ed MP
Thompson (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1975), p 788, note
6.
[32]For other
types, found in England, see Megarry and Wade, A Manual of the Law of Real
Property (4th edn), p 789. 'Land' includes manor, advowson, rent, and other
incorporeal hereditaments; real property which, on an intestacy
might, before 1
January 1926, have devolved on an heir: Law of Property Act 1925 (15 & 16
Geo 5, c 20), s 205
(1).
[33]Manchester
Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] P 133, [1955] 1 All ER
387, High Ct of
Chivalry.
[34]Re
St Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595 at 596, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 921, Cons
Ct, per Garth Moore
Ch.
[35]Manchester
Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] P 133, [1955] 1 All ER
387, was the first sitting of the High Court of Chivalry since 1737. For the
last cases heard before then, see Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry pp
107-117.
[36]Re
St Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595 at 596, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 922, Cons
Ct, per Garth Moore
Ch.
[37]Re West
Tarring Parish Church [1954] 2 All ER 591, [1954] 1 WLR 923n, Cons
Ct.
[38] [1954] 2
All ER 591 at 592, [1954] 1 WLR 923n at 924, per Macmorran Ch, quoting the Home
Office letter of 29 May
1954.
[39] [1954] 2
All ER 591 at 592, [1954] 1 WLR 923n at
924.
[40]In 1660 an
Act of Parliament required the royal arms to replace any example of the arms of
the Commonwealth in churches, but there
was no requirement for the use of the
royal arms where they were not previously
displayed.
[41]Re
St Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595 at 596, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 922, Cons
Ct.
[42]Act of
Supremacy 1534 (26 Hen 8, c 1), repealed by the See of Rome Act 1554 (1 & 2
Php & M, c 8), and the repeal confirmed
by the Act of Supremacy 1558 (1 Eliz
1, c 1), s
4.
[43]Act of
Supremacy 1558 (1 Eliz 1, c 1), ss 8,
9.
[44]Articles of
Religion, art XXXVII, 'Of the Civil Magistrate': 'The King's Majesty hath the
chief power in this Realm of England, and
other his Dominions, unto whom the
chief Government of all Estates of this Realm, whether they be Ecclesiastical or
civil, in all
causes doth appertain, and is not, nor ought to be, subject to any
foreign Jurisdiction.
Where we attribute to the King's Majesty the chief government, by which Titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended: we give not to our Prince the ministering either of God's Word, or of the Sacraments, the which thing the Injunctions also lately set forth by Elizabeth our Queen do most plainly testify; but only that prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy Scriptures by God himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil-doers ... '.
45Re St Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595
at 597, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 922, Cons
Ct.
[46] [1954] 2
All ER 595 at 597, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at
923.
[47] [1954] 2
All ER 595 at 597, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at
923.
[48]Its use at
sea is, of course, subject to greater
restrictions.
[49]Re
St Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595, [1954] 1 WLR 920, Cons
Ct.
[50]Re West
Tarring Parish Church [1954] 2 All ER 591, [1954] 1 WLR 923n, Cons
Ct.
[51]Re St
Paul, Battersea [1954] 2 All ER 595 at 596, [1954] 1 WLR 920 at 922, Cons
Ct.
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