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Australian Federal Police - Platypus Journal/Magazine |
Transnational crime, police peace operations and Asia-Pacific security
By Mick Keelty, Deputy Commissioner
In its relatively short existence, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has played a very significant role in informing Australian policy makers how to have an effective voice in the Asia-Pacific region and as the AFP becomes more engaged in the region, the role of organisations like CSCAP will become far more important.
One reason for the AFP's increasing involvement with the region is the growing salience of transnational crime, much of which either derives from the region or is staged through it.
This increase in levels of transnational crime is now perceived as a threat to security. In December 2000, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released the latest version of its global trends survey titled Global Trends 2015. In a highly significant move, the CIA adjusted the so-called 'drivers of global change' between the 1997 version and the latest version of the Global Trends document to include what they called the growing reach of international criminal and terrorist networks.
While cynics might remark that the CIA is simply looking for a new role in the aftermath of the Cold War, I would respond that the time for that is well past, with the Cold War having ended a decade ago. On the contrary, the national security agencies have generally tried to hold the line against so-called transnational issues as legitimate subjects for the security agenda. If anything, the recognition accorded to transnational crime as a security problem has been somewhat belated.
In this article, I will examine what this more prominent role for transnational crime means for the work of an internationally oriented police force such as the AFP.
I will also discuss the growing recognition in Australia and abroad of the vital role of police in peacekeeping. This role is especially important in Australia's near region - a region that some have come to refer to as a zone of crisis, or arc of instability.
It is also worth noting the close inter-relationship between the two themes of this article - transnational crime and peacekeeping. This comes about because of the propensity of transnational crime to flourish in weak or failed states, and the important role of peacekeeping in helping to return such states to stability.
The nexus between poor governance and crime is obvious in countries like Afghanistan, Burma and Colombia - all with civil wars and all with significant drug production and trafficking problems. But it is also evident in the case of some of our Asian neighbours, where weak and sometimes corrupt regimes have become havens for all kinds of criminal entrepreneurs.
This relationship between governance and transnational crime was graphically described by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in a speech delivered at the signing ceremony of the new UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime in Palermo. In the words of the Secretary-General:
Arrayed against these constructive forces [of civil society] … in ever greater numbers and with ever stronger weapons, are the forces of what I call uncivil society. They are terrorists, criminals, drug dealers, traffickers in people, and others who undo the good works of civil society. They take advantage of open borders, free markets and technological advances that bring so many benefits to the world's people. They thrive in countries with weak institutions … [emphasis added]
I might add in passing, that the Transnational Crime Convention promises to change significantly not just the ground rules by which countries currently deal with each other on criminal matters, but also the normative values we bring to bear on the problem of working against transnational crime across jurisdictions. Indeed, over time it may prove a significant milestone in creating the type of international jurisdiction that will be needed to deal with a problem that is truly global in its dimension.
But I digress, and will return to the connection between police peacekeeping and transnational crime, and focus the argument from the global to the operational.
At the operational policing level, both kinds of demands - that of fighting transnational crime and of providing peacekeeping forces - require a similar kind of person. This is a person who can operate confidently and sensitively in a range of cultural milieus, who is educated about our region, and who has had experience overseas. I will say something more about the implications of this requirement a little later.
A third area of linkage between transnational crime and peacekeeping is that in both cases the AFP has found it necessary to work far more closely within the Canberra policy framework than in the past. This engagement between police and policy was not always assumed to be necessary or desirable. Traditionally, the Westminster system has required a separation of the powers between the police and judiciary on the one hand and executive government on the other. However, the logic of this separation is largely dictated by the need to ensure that domestic prosecutions are not influenced by political considerations. In matters pertaining to external policing policy, there is no reason why police should not be more engaged in advising on policy.
That is not to say that police will necessarily be setting policy; but they will certainly be actively consulted in the process, with a far better policy outcome as a result.
Now let me turn to examine briefly the two types of activity.
The three main areas of transnational crime of interest to the AFP at the moment are
• illicit drug importations;
• people smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and
• fraud and money laundering.
Heroin is imported into Australia predominantly from the Golden Triangle region of South East Asia, where it is mainly produced in Burma. It is trafficked throughout the region predominantly by Chinese organised crime networks - usually loose affiliations of convenience rather than rigidly hierarchical organisations. Most of the principals of these networks are located outside Australia, and since they are very 'hands off' in their operations they are difficult to attack in terms of prosecution outcomes.
Heroin growers and traffickers in the region are also now massively involved in the production and trafficking of methamphetamines - known as yaa baa in Thailand. An estimated 600-700 million amphetamine tablets are exported annually from Burma. A significant proportion of this amount goes to Thailand. As pointed out by Professor Ball, the trade has even seriously undermined the relationship between the two countries.
For some time now, the AFP has been concerned about importation of Asian methamphetamine into Australia. We now have some evidence - both epidemiological and investigative - that this is occurring. However, the product involved to date is 'ice' (crystaline methamphetamine) originating in East Asia, rather than yaa baa (pills) from Burma. Methamphetamine can be a dangerous drug that can spread quickly through a community and the AFP is watching developments with some concern.
Some MDMA (also known as 'ecstasy') is produced in Asia, including in Burma, but most MDMA imported into Australia is still sourced from Europe. However, there has been a growing trend for Asian criminals, particularly from South East Asia, to be involved in these importations. Should high quality ecstasy ever be produced in Asia, I have no doubt it would soon be exported to Australia. I should also mention that new research has identified ecstasy as a potentially harmful drug, which can cause brain damage from sustained use and even loss of performance from short-term use.
People smuggling into Australia also largely derives from Asia, and from two sources in particular - China, particularly the province of Fujian, and the Middle East. Illegal arrivals from the Middle East are mostly Iraqis and Afghans, and they are mostly staged through Indonesia.
Recently there has been increasing cooperation against people smuggling throughout the region. You may have noticed recent press references by Senator Vanstone to our cooperation with the Royal Malaysian Police, leading to the arrest of two alleged major people smugglers of Iraqi origin. We have also been cooperating extensively with the Indonesians.
But in response to this additional cooperation and more effective interdiction, the AFP has also noticed higher levels of organisation and greater criminality emerging. Chinese organised crime groups have also been observed broadening their field of activities to include both people smuggling and drug smuggling. We expect these levels of criminality to increase as regional law enforcement agencies become more proficient in meeting the threat.
The most noticeable trend relating to the crime of fraud is credit card fraud. This activity is now highly sophisticated. It involves manufacture of false cards, 'swiping' of legitimate cards to steal the electronic data from them for transfer to the illicitly manufactured cards, and insertion of gangs into places like Australia to use the cards for high value purchases or withdrawals of money. In our region, Chinese Malay and more recently mainland Chinese gangs are prominent in these activities. West Africans, and especially highly organised Nigerian criminal gangs, are also involved.
There are many other kinds of frauds perpetrated throughout the region, such as Internet scams, pyramid schemes and advance fee frauds.
These activities can sometimes prove extremely damaging when perpetrated against small Pacific island countries. And I should also say, since you might have the impression that transnational crime is all one way against Australia, a number of Australians have been involved in these activities, especially in the Pacific.
The Pacific is also a noted venue of money laundering. The activity is fostered by island countries with few resources to sell other than their financial names. We have also noticed a growing presence of Russian organised crime in the region, particularly for purposes of laundering money.
However, we are working closely with organisations like the Asia-Pacific Group (an affiliate of the Financial Action Task Force) to address this problem and there has recently been a growing awareness in the region of the harms associated with money laundering.
Of particular concern also, is the possibility that Asian organised crime groups are becoming entrenched in some of the less stable of the Pacific island countries. Often these countries have very lax immigration regimes, in the sense that officials are usually poorly trained and resourced and sometimes corrupt. Such regimes provide opportunity for Asian criminals to base themselves on Pacific islands and become involved in activities like illicit drug smuggling and people smuggling, without being recorded or noticed elsewhere.
A warning bell was sounded last August when an Asian group allegedly attempted to stage a 1.2 tonne shipment of amphetamine precursor chemicals through Papua New Guinea. And just recently the AFP was involved as part of an international task force with the dismantling of an Asian syndicate using Fiji as a staging post for heroin, people smuggling and credit card fraud. There is also evidence of major criminal activity in other comparatively weak Pacific island countries.
These external operations have highlighted for the AFP the difficulty of staging off-shore operations in countries where the regimes are weak and the law enforcement resources poorly developed. Not only are such activities costly in resource terms to Australia, but technical and legal difficulties are also evident. For example, extradition to Australia is extremely difficult in situations in which the legal and technical framework in the external country concerned does not support the kinds of forensic demands made in Australia. Joint operations are also difficult where there is a substantial technological and training gap between Australian law enforcement and police in the Pacific. There can also be problems with maintaining confidentiality of operations in very small communities.
These problems and issues mean that it is imperative for Australia to remain closely engaged concerning issues of governance, law and order and stability throughout the Pacific region.
This nexus between regime weakness and transnational crime in the Pacific leads me naturally to consider our role in peacekeeping throughout the region, because peacekeeping by civilian police plays a key role in reasserting good governance regimes where they have broken down.
Historically, police have been seen as the 'poor cousins' of the military when it comes to the peacekeeping. This status arose because the grand peacekeeping projects that followed the end of the Cold War, such as occurred in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, were seen as ways of resolving military problems. Increasingly, however, we are realising the important role of peacekeeping in situations of civil breakdown short of full-scale war - the preventive role, if you like. In such a role, police have as much to offer as the military, and in some cases more.
Police frequently go into such situations unarmed and can often be used in a less politically threatening way than a military force. They can play a direct role in the practical detail of peacekeeping, often working in small groups at the grass roots. They are trained not so much to deal with situations that have become violent (although that is an element of their training) but rather to prevent violence through negotiation and mediation. And they are less costly than the military.
Given the often opaque legal situations in which police peacekeepers are required to operate, they are frequently likely to encounter situations of political sensitivity. Difficulties can also arise because they are usually part of a much larger contingent operating under the auspices of a much larger bureaucracy with all of the attendant tensions and barriers.
For example, in East Timor there are 42 countries providing over 1400 civilian police to UNTAET. The major players are Jordan (223), Portugal (165), The Philippines (104) and Australia (100). Of these 100 Australians, 73 are provided by the AFP and the remainder by State police services. Each of these countries will likely have a different approach to policing, depending on the way policing is conducted in their home service.
Within this structure, Jordan and Portugal provide a 'sharp edge' rapid deployment capability fully equipped with riot gear. Their police are perhaps also more philosophically inclined to use the full extent of force that this provides than Australian police would be.
This means that they tend to be seen by some - including the Timorese leadership - as more relevant and able to deal effectively with emerging law and order issues and issues of group control, especially in Dili.
I mention this because it provides an excellent illustration of the cultural and political complexity that is inherent in international policing, whether in the context of peacekeeping or dealing with transnational crime.
This complexity arises because of the diversity of international views about the role of police in society. In Western democracies, police are empowered by virtue of the fact that they are 'owned' by the community to maintain law and order on the community's behalf. In some other countries, however, the police are perceived as an arm of the government, or are actually embedded within the military. In a country like East Timor, it will clearly take some time before the community 'owns' its police force.
This diversity of attitudes to policing throughout the Asia-Pacific raises the question: should Australia be asked to adapt its police culture, if you like, to meet the perceived needs of nations that have a history of somewhat more direct use of force by police, or should we stick to our own norms? While the answer in my view is clearly the latter, we need to be mindful both of the perception that our culture can create in the minds of others - for example that we are weak or uncommitted - and the effect working in other circumstances is likely to have on our own people.
Similar problems are sure to be encountered in terms of our commitment to the Solomon Islands. There we currently have 20 AFP officers deployed on a three-month rotation with the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). Other members of the team include civilians and military from Australia and New Zealand.
These people are disbursed throughout the country as part of small, mixed teams. They encounter highly complex cultural and political circumstances without the benefit of a clearly defined role or special powers. For them it is a totally new experience, outside anything they would likely encounter in policing in Australia.
The short duration overseas peacekeeping postings we are involved with - usually from three to six months - provide an opportunity for a considerable number of our people to encounter this work. The experience teaches them to be highly versatile in their approach to other cultures and systems and strengthens their sense of self-reliance. This, in turn, provides excellent background for our growing interface with Asian and Pacific cultures in the context of our crime fighting role. And this leads me, in the final part of my paper, to say a little more about what international policing is likely to mean for the AFP in future.
Because Australia is a country of predominantly European ethnicity and distinctly Western liberal values located within the Asia-Pacific region, the nature of the dynamic established by our experience with international policing is likely to be especially interesting. It also highlights the requirement for us to work closely with organisations such as CSCAP in our endeavours to interpret Asia and the Pacific so we can operate more effectively.
Over the past few years, the AFP has put considerable effort into those areas of expertise that will help us work more effectively in the region. The nature of the change is evident from the fact we have recently added, or are shortly to add, seven liaison officers to our cadre of officers in the Asia-Pacific (not including North America), a rise of almost 30 per cent in total numbers. The number of training activities conducted in Asia and the Pacific, or involving Asians or Pacific islanders coming to Australia, has grown from virtually none to a very healthy rate today. The number of major joint operations with Asian and Pacific law enforcement agencies has risen sharply, as has the number of regional visits by AFP people.
At least to an extent, some of these changes are due to the AFP benefiting from fresh funding in recent years. However, it is notable that we have chosen to spend a considerable portion of that funding in inter-acting far more closely with our Asian and Pacific neighbours. We recognise that if we are to address the issue of transnational crime in this region, we will need to do so by engaging far more fully with it than we have in the past.
That such engagement has benefits is patently obvious. Our escalating rate of seizures of illicit drugs is fully recorded in the press and Parliament, and I won't re-canvass the figures here. What is less well known, however, is the role of our liaison work with fellow Asian law enforcement agencies in helping us to increase our seizures, and also the rate of seizures by counterpart law enforcement agencies in Asia.
The same can also be said in relation to people smuggling. Regional cooperation, both at the multilateral and bilateral levels, has been the hallmark of our efforts to prevent the illicit flow of people around the region, and especially into Australia.
And to underline the point I made earlier about our growing involvement with the formation of policy, the problem of people smuggling is now dealt with in Australia on a whole-of-government basis. We have established a highly successful people smuggling team comprising investigation and intelligence from the AFP, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) and Coastwatch. A number of other government agencies are also involved in supporting the work of this team. In support of the whole-of-government approach, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has played a key role in providing its services and liaison capability throughout the region. The whole-of-government approach is, I believe, an excellent model to use in attacking a range of crime types.
As well as benefits, closer engagement with the region also carries some risks. In working more closely in the Asia-Pacific, the AFP will increasingly encounter other cultural and legal attitudes to policing and the rule of law. We will often be working in environments in which the cultural attitude to the giving of gifts and corruption is very different to our own. We will also be working with systems in which the role of law enforcement is not just about protecting citizens from criminals, but also protecting governments from their citizens.
To work in such an environment successfully we will need to provide our people with excellent training and education relating to Asian and Pacific cultures and languages. We will also need to broaden our recruitment base to include those with Asia and Pacific-related skills, whether derived from education, work or cultural background. And we will need to ensure that we have mature and dedicated people who can understand, and hence manage, the situations they are likely to encounter.
A hierarchical, traditionally structured police service can neither recruit nor retain such people. In that regard, I'm happy to say that the AFP has led the field - at least in Australian policing - in moving from a traditional disciplined service structure to a teams-based, professionally-oriented organisation.
Such a structure is necessary not only in terms of recruitment, but also of dealing flexibly with the need to accommodate the constant comings and goings demanded of our people as they engage in their peacekeeping and liaison functions in the region.
The role of an international police service like the AFP in supporting regional security derives from two mutually supporting activities - providing the means to counter transnational crime and supporting good governance through peacekeeping and peace monitoring activities.
In providing that service to the region, Australia is doing no more than strengthening its own security, since regional peace and security is essential if we are to prevent a spill over of problems like illicit drug trafficking and illegal migration into Australia.
The emergence of such an international role for a police service like the AFP, however, itself raises a number of new issues. To learn to operate in such an environment, we need to acquire a set of skills very different to those usually required by the policeman or policewoman on the beat in suburban Australia. We are also likely to encounter a whole new set of risks by operating in such an environment.
This work will be extremely challenging. At the heart of it we will need to gain a far better understanding of the region and its security concerns. It is here that organisations like CSCAP - which provides a bridge between the wealth of academic knowledge about the Asia-Pacific region and the bureaucratic decision making environment - can be very useful.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUFPPlatypus/2001/4.html