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Court and Tribunal Decisions - Australia
Federal Court of Australia (Drummond, Sackville and Kiefel JJ)
5 February 2001
(2001) 108 FCR 543; 181 ALR 490; [2001] FCA 36
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 31 — disqualifications for office as ATSIC Commissioner on the basis of criminal conviction — jurisdiction of Federal Court of Australia to lift such disqualification — whether s 31 invalidly confers non-judicial power on the Federal Court in breach of Commonwealth Constitution Chapter III
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) (‘the Act’) makes provision for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders to elect members of Regional Councils. Members of the Regional Councils thus elected within a zone elect one of their number to represent that zone. Those elected are appointed by the Minister to constitute the Board of Commissioners at the national level.
The applicant was a member of a Regional Council. On 14 December 1999 he was elected as a representative for the zone by the combined votes of the Regional Councils in that zone. But on 10 December 1999 he had been convicted on certain criminal charges in the District Court and sentenced to probation and community service. The sentence was set aside by the Queensland Court of Appeal, which substituted a sentence of eighteen months imprisonment, suspended for a period of four years. From that time, 10 December 1999, he was disqualified for appointment as a Commissioner.
He applied to the Federal Court for an order pursuant to s 31(3)(c) of the Act declaring that, in spite of his conviction, he ought not to be disqualified from being appointed Commissioner.
Dowsett J held that the jurisdiction given to the Federal Court by s 31(4) of the Act represented an invalid conferral of non-judicial power on the Court. The applicant appealed to the Full Federal Court.
Kiefel and Drummond JJ (Sackville J dissenting) held that the appeal should be dismissed.
1. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Kiefel J and Sackville J. It is unnecessary, in view of what their Honours have written, to restate the circumstances in which this appeal comes before the Court or the relevant provisions of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
2. In my opinion, the learned primary judge was correct in holding that s 31(3)(c) of the Act is invalid because it confers non-judicial power on the Federal Court. The cumulative effect of the following considerations, in my opinion, shows that the statutory power in question cannot be characterised as judicial:
(1) it is a discretionary power to be exercised in circumstances where there are no criteria for its exercise discernible in the legislation;
(2) the power involves the creation of a new right as opposed to the determination of existing rights;
(3) the exercise of the power does not involve an adjudication between disputants; and
(4) it involves the exercise by the Court of a new power neither inherently judicial in character nor a power with that character because historically it has been exercised by courts of law.
3. As to point (1), the disqualifications imposed by s 31(2) of the Act operate because the person has been convicted of and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence. It follows that an important consideration for the Court in deciding whether to make a declaration of non-disqualification under s 31(3)(c) could be expected to turn on the nature of the offence. By ‘the nature of the offence’, I would include the legislative statement of the offence and the range of penalties prescribed in relation to the offence, the circumstances in which the person in question committed it and the light thrown by those two matters on the person’s fitness for appointment to the Commission. I agree, however, with what Kiefel J has said at paras [107] to [113] of her reasons for thinking that neither by reference to the nature of the disqualifying offence nor to any other consideration identifiable in the legislative scheme can the Court construct criteria for the exercise of the discretion in a legally principled way.
4. There is, I think, a further difficulty in identifying criteria based on the nature of the offence by reference to which the power is to be exercised, not in itself decisive, but which supports this conclusion: Parliament considers that no matter how serious the offence that attracts disqualification under s 31(2) of the Act, the person ceases, by reason of s 31(3)(b), to be unfit for appointment as a Commissioner once he or she has been out of jail for only two years. If, for example, a person commits a serious offence of misappropriation of public moneys and receives a long sentence of imprisonment, it would be difficult to say that person was objectively fit to be appointed Commissioner at all, or at least not until fitness was demonstrated by a long period of honest living. Yet Parliament has said that such a person is not disqualified from appointment once a short period of two years passes after release. This indication by Parliament of the limited significance of a relevant conviction cannot be ignored by the Court in seeking to develop criteria for the principled exercise of the discretionary power. Section 31(3) of the Act is to be contrasted with s 228 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and s 206B of the Corporations Law which both impose a five year disqualification period corresponding to the two year periods in s 31(3)(a) and (b). It is also to be contrasted with legislation, of which the Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 (Qld) is an example: in a limited range of circumstances, a person or authority charged with the function of assessing a person’s fitness to be admitted to a profession, occupation or calling or for any other purpose must disregard any conviction suffered by a person only once the rehabilitation period of ten years commencing on the date of the conviction or on the date of release from prison has expired: s 9(1) and s 3 (definition of ‘rehabilitation period’).
5. As to point (2), in Precision Data Holdings Limited v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167 at 189, it was said that:
... if the object of the adjudication is not to resolve a dispute about the existing rights and obligations of the parties by determining what those rights and obligations are but to determine what legal rights and obligations should be created, then the function stands outside the realm of judicial power.
6. But the Court observed at 190–191:
In some situations, the fact that the object of the determination is to bring into existence by that determination a new set of rights and obligations is not an answer to the claim that the function is one which entails the exercise of judicial power. ... where a discretionary authority is conferred upon a court and the discretionary authority is to be exercised according to legal principle or by reference to an objective standard or test prescribed by the legislature and not by reference to policy considerations or other matters not specified by the legislature, it will be possible to conclude that the determination by the court gives effect to rights and obligations for which the statute provides and that the determination constitutes an exercise of judicial power. ...
7. A person convicted and dealt with so as to come within s 31(2) of the Act has no right to require the Minister to appoint him or her to the office of Commissioner. But such a person who obtains a declaration from the Court under s 31(3)(c) thereby acquires, pursuant to s 27(2), the right to compel the Minister, by public law remedies if necessary, to make that appointment. Even if the legal effect of a declaration under s 31(3)(c) is to treat the person as never having been disqualified, that does not tell against the fact that prior to the declaration, the person had no right to be appointed and after the declaration, he or she has an enforceable right to be appointed. (I do not, however, think that is the effect of the declaration: it is not a result which is required by the proper construction of the Act, since the legislative intent with respect to s 31 can be achieved if s 31(3)(c) is read according to what I think is the ordinary meaning of the words, so that the declaration has a prospective operation only. Nor is it dictated by what Gibbs J said in Talga Ltd v MBC International Limited [1976] HCA 22; (1976) 133 CLR 622 at 629: that is a decision that turned on the proper construction of a quite different statutory provision, as is apparent from the majority decision at 633–634.)
8. In my opinion, it can fairly be said that the object of the Court’s inquiry and determination under s 31(3)(c) of the Act is to determine whether a legal right that did not previously exist should be created, ie, to do something which generally stands outside the realm of judicial power.
9. Points (3) and (4) can be considered together. There are some decision-making functions that are ‘exclusive and inalienable exercises of judicial power’: Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245 at 258. Examples are ‘the ascertainment of existing rights by the judicial determination of issues of fact or law’: Brandy, ibid, and ‘the determination of criminal guilt and the trial of actions for breach of contract and for civil wrongs’: HA Bachrach Pty Limited v The State of Queensland [1998] HCA 54; (1998) 195 CLR 547 at 562. But a decision-making function can also be judicial in character even though no adjudication in a lis inter partes is involved, where the particular function is ‘conceived as forming part of the exercise of judicial power as understood in the tradition of English law’: The Queen v Davison [1954] HCA 46; (1954) 90 CLR 353 at 368 per Dixon CJ and McTiernan J.
10. The power conferred on the Court by s 31(3)(c) of the Act is a new power associated with the creation by statute of a new office of ATSIC Commissioner. Legal history cannot justify its characterisation as judicial. Nor is there any analogy between the decision-making function or power in question and the inherently judicial function of adjudication in a lis inter partes which might justify it being so characterised.
11. The Act does not require notice of an application under s 31(3)(c) of the Act to be given to the Minister or to anyone else. This is to be contrasted with the position under the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and the Corporations Law broadly cognate with s 31(3)(c): see s 232(2) and (3) the Workplace Relations Act and s 206G(2) the Corporations Law. By force of s 27(1) and (2) of the Act, the Minister has a non-discretionary duty to appoint to the Commission each zone representative elected by others, unless that representative is disqualified by force of s 31. If a zone representative is so disqualified, the Minister is given no power to appoint a substitute Commissioner to represent that zone. I therefore do not think that the Minister, whose role in the appointment of Commissioners is so limited, has standing to participate in a proceeding under s 31(3)(c), whether to oppose or support it.
12. The election of a zone representative by the relevant Regional Councillors is determined according to which of the councillor-candidates receives an absolute majority of votes (which are required to be cast preferentially): ss 131, 132, 137 and Sch 3 to the Act. The functions in selecting their zone representative of the members of the relevant Regional Councils are spent once they have elected their representative pursuant to s 131. A ‘casual vacancy in the office of Commissioner representing the zone’ must be filled by ‘supplementary election’ conducted by the Electoral Commissioner from those candidates who then nominate: see ss 132(2) and (4), 138(1)(b) of the Act and Rules 47 and 50 the Zone Election Rules. (The Act does not mention casual vacancies in the office of zone representative, perhaps because such an official has, as such, the sole role of being an appointee to the Commission). The term ‘casual vacancy’ usually connotes a vacancy in an office supervening after it has initially been validly filled: cf In re Wood [1988] HCA 22; (1988) 167 CLR 145. Rule 45 contains a definition of ‘casual vacancy’ consistent with this. Accepting that the appellant was validly elected zone representative in December 1999, if, by reason of his conviction and ultimate sentence, he could be removed from that office, there would be a ‘casual vacancy’ in that office. In that event, it is possible (though not clear) that persons interested in nominating for the position at the supplementary election (though not the members of the relevant Regional Councils who elected the original zone representative) might have a sufficient interest to participate in the s 31(3)(c) application and to oppose it. But there is no procedure in the Act for creating a vacancy in the office of zone representative similar to that contained in s 122, whereby, after election, a Regional Councillor can lose office upon conviction and sentence. Even if Rule 45(1)(c) of the Zone Election Rules is effective to create a casual vacancy in the office of zone representative on the occurrence of an event within s 39(2), it has no application to the present situation. In the events which have happened, the appellant would appear to be entitled to retain office as zone representative, though disqualified pursuant to s 31(2)(a) from appointment as a Commissioner.
13. A Regional Councillor, who was himself an unsuccessful candidate for zone representative or who was keen to promote some other replacement for the disqualified representative, can achieve nothing by opposing the representative’s application under s 31(3)(c) since rejection of that application will not lead to a new zone election. Councillors who voted for the zone representative would not be likely to oppose an application under s 31(3)(c).
14. Though there may be councillors opposed to the elected zone representative who might wish to participate in the hearing, it is difficult to identify anyone with sufficient standing to act as a contradictor in an application under s 31(3)(c). The exercise of the decision-making power in question does not for this reason involve anything analogous to the typically judicial function of making an adjudication inter partes.
15. Some functions neither inherently judicial nor bearing that character for historical reasons ‘are more aptly seen under a ‘functional’ analysis of separation of powers as taking their character from the nature of the body dealing with them’. HA Bachrach Pty Limited at 562. That is, it is recognised that there are functions, not necessarily judicial, which may take their character from that of the tribunal in which they are reposed, so that if such a function is entrusted by Parliament to a court, it may be inferred that it is to be exercised judicially but, if given to a non-judicial tribunal, then there will be ground for inferring that no exercise of judicial power is involved. See The Queen v Hegarty; Ex parte The Corporation of the City of Salisbury [1981] HCA 51; (1981) 147 CLR 617 at 628. There, Mason J, with whom the other members of the Court, apart from Murphy J, agreed, identified the reason by reference to the dictum of Kitto J in The Queen v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation [1957] HCA 81; (1957) 100 CLR 277 at 305:
The reason for concluding in some cases that the judicial character of the repository imparts a judicial character to the power is simply that the former provides a ground for an inference, which in those cases there is nothing or not enough in other considerations to preclude, that the power is intended and required to be exercised in accordance with the methods and with a strict adherence to the standards which characterise judicial activities.
16. The indication in the fact that Parliament has conferred the power in s 31(3)(c) on a Ch III court that it intended the power to be judicial in character is not sufficient, in my opinion, to outweigh the other considerations that indicate that the proper characterisation of the power is non-judicial.
17. The circumstances giving rise to the appeal and the relevant provisions of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) (‘ATSIC Act’) have been explained in the judgment of Kiefel J. I shall endeavour not to repeat what her Honour has said, although I shall briefly set out the background to the appeal.
18. It is not in dispute that, as Gaudron J said in Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30; (1999) 199 CLR 462, at 514:
Ch III of the Constitution is the source of an implied prohibition which prevents the conferral of any power on this or any other federal court which is not judicial power or a power ancillary or incidental to the exercise of judicial power.
19. The issue presented by the appeal is whether the primary Judge was correct in holding that s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act is invalid because it attempts to confer non-judicial power on the Federal Court. The judgment at first instance is reported, sub nom, Re Yanner [2000] FCA 975; (2000) 100 FCR 551.
20. The appellant was elected as a member of the Mt Isa Regional Council in October 1999, in accordance with Div 4 of Part 3 of the ATSIC Act. The Mt Isa Regional Council is one of the thirty five Regional Councils established by s 92 of the ATSIC Act: see s 91; Schedule 1, Column B.
21. On 30 July 1999, prior to his election to the Council, the appellant was convicted in the District Court of Mt Isa on two counts of wilful damage and four counts of assault occasioning bodily harm. The offences occurred in May 1997. Orders were made that he be admitted to probation for three years, perform 240 hours of community service and pay compensation. The Queensland Attorney-General appealed and on 10 December 1999, the Queensland Court of Appeal, by majority, upheld the appeal. The orders for probation and community service were set aside and the appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for eighteen months, suspended for a term of four years.
22. On 14 December 1999, four days after the Court of Appeal delivered judgment, the appellant was elected, pursuant to s 131 of the ATSIC Act, as zone representative for the Queensland (Far North West) Zone. This zone includes the Mt Isa and Cooktown regions. The election was contested.
23. The appellant could only have been elected as a zone representative if, at the date of the election, he was a member of the Mt Isa Regional Council: s 131(1). His Honour considered that there was some doubt as to whether this was the case, having regard to s 122 of the ATSIC Act. Section 122(1) provides that where the Commission is satisfied that a member of a Regional Council, since becoming a member of the Council, has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer, it must make a declaration to that effect. The member ceases to be a member of the Council on the making of the declaration: s 122(2). Despite his Honour’s doubts, the case was conducted before him on the basis that the appellant was not affected by s 122, since his conviction (although not his sentence of imprisonment) pre-dated his election to the Council.
24. Whatever the effect of the Court of Appeal’s orders on the appellant’s membership of the Regional Council, it seems clear that, in consequence of the orders, he was ‘not qualified to be appointed as a Commissioner’ of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (‘the Commission’). So much follows from s 31(2)(a) of the ATSIC Act, which provides that a person is not qualified if he or she has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer. The appellant did not suggest that the suspension of the term of imprisonment rendered s 31(2)(a) inapplicable to his situation. It was therefore not open to the Minister to appoint the appellant to the Commission under s 27(2) of the ATSIC Act (as it then stood), notwithstanding the latter’s election to represent the Queensland (Far North West) Zone.
25. The appellant commenced proceedings in this Court on 16 December 1999 seeking a declaration, pursuant to s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act, that in spite of his conviction he ought not to be disqualified from being appointed as a Commissioner. The application filed by the appellant did not name a respondent, although it appears to have been served on the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (‘the Minister’).
26. At the first directions hearing, both the appellant and the Minister appeared by counsel. After some discussion, his Honour directed the appellant to serve notice of the proceedings and all supporting material upon each member of the Mt Isa and Cooktown Regional Councils (Mt Isa and Cooktown regions being within the Queensland (Far North West) Zone). Despite the notice, no member of either Council sought to appear before the primary Judge or, for that matter, on the appeal.
27. The primary Judge subsequently raised the constitutional question on his own initiative and directed that the appropriate notices be served pursuant to s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). At the hearing, the appellant and the Minister appeared, while the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth intervened in response to the s 78B notice. All, however, made submissions supporting the constitutional validity of s 31(3)(c) and s 31(4) of the ATSIC Act. His Honour therefore did not have the benefit of a contradictor.
28. In the result, the primary Judge made an order dismissing the proceedings. Since there was neither a contradictor nor a cross-claim, his Honour had no occasion to make a declaration that s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act was invalid. Nevertheless, it is clear from his judgment that his Honour regarded s 31(3)(c) as an invalid attempt to confer non-judicial power on the Federal Court. It is also implicit in his Honour’s reasoning that he considered s 31(4) of the ATSIC Act to be invalid, at least to the extent it purported to confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court to make a declaration in terms of s 31(3)(c).
29. The notice of appeal named the Minister and the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth as respondents. It identified only one ground, namely that the primary Judge had erred in determining that s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act was invalid.
30. On the hearing of the appeal, Mr Jackson QC appeared with Mr Kelly for the appellant. The Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth appeared with Ms Philippides and Mr Stelios for the Attorney-General. Both Mr Jackson and the Solicitor-General contended that s 31(3)(c) was a valid law of the Commonwealth. Despite the Court inviting the Attorneys-General of the States and Territories to put a contrary argument, none was willing to assist the Court by making any submissions in support of the conclusions reached by the primary Judge.
31. Mr Jackson submitted that the appeal should be allowed and that the Court should proceed to determine the application for a declaration in favour of the appellant, thereby removing his disqualification from appointment as a Commissioner. In the alternative, Mr Jackson contended that the proceedings should be remitted to the primary Judge to determine the application on its merits.
32. The primary Judge considered in some detail the principal authorities dealing with the nature of the ‘judicial power of the Commonwealth’ as that expression is used in s 71 of the Constitution. His Honour then addressed the validity of s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act.
33. His Honour’s starting point was that s 31(2) and s 31(3) should be construed as disqualifying a person from appointment as a Commission only if he or she has been convicted and sentenced as prescribed and the Court has not exercised its discretion pursuant to s 31(3)(c). On that basis, he considered that the case raised three issues (Re Yanner, at 589):
| • | whether the role, function and structure of ATSIC are such that questions that the Parliament cannot confer jurisdiction in relation thereto upon a Ch III court; |
| • | whether, even if such matters can properly be the subject matter of such judicial determination, the absence of express or implied criteria for the exercise of the discretion conferred by par 31(3)(c) renders it inappropriate for conferment on such a court; and |
| • | whether exercise of that discretion inevitably involves consideration of matters of policy (rather than factual and legal matters) so as to render it inappropriate for judicial determination. |
34. The primary Judge reasoned as follows:
| • | While the role and objects of a ‘substantial organ of government’ such as ATSIC might be relevant to identifying the nature of the discretion in question, they will not be decisive in determining the validity of the purported conferment of jurisdiction (at 589–590). |
| • | The Commission’s functions were entirely, or at least substantially, executive in nature. As such, if the issue were to be addressed without regard to the fact that the discretion in question had been conferred on the Court, the suitability of persons for appointment to the Commission should be a matter for the executive ‘although that would not preclude the electoral process prescribed by the Act’ (at 590). |
| • | Nonetheless, there was no reason why jurisdiction could not be conferred on a federal court, by an enactment framed in terms appropriate to s 76(ii) of the Constitution, to exercise a discretion to relieve a person from disqualification for appointment to the Commission. For such a discretion to be conferred validly, it could not be an arbitrary discretion. It had to be a ‘judicial discretion proceeding upon grounds that are defined or definable, ascertained or ascertainable, and governed accordingly’: The Queen v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation [1957] HCA 81; (1957) 100 CLR 277, at 291, per Dixon CJ. In considering whether the legislation provides sufficient criteria to govern the exercise of discretion, it is appropriate to give weight to the fact that Parliament has chosen the Court as its ‘preferred repository’ (at 593). |
| • | If consideration were given to the preamble to the ATSIC Act and the objects stated in s 3 in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 31(3)(c), the Court would have to take account of ‘political’ considerations such as the provenance of a particular individual in the indigenous community. Such considerations were ‘quite inappropriate for assessment in the judicial process’ (at 594). Similarly, to override the will of the relevant constituency would seriously compromise the Court by drawing it into the ‘purely political sphere’. Decisions as to the appropriate means for achieving the goals identified in the ATSIC Act were also matters of value judgment ‘quite removed from the proper ambit of the judicial process’ (at 594–595). |
| • | • If these considerations were excluded, there was little left in the ATSIC Act from which to identify factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act. For example, considerations such as the seriousness of the offence and the personal circumstances of the offender had already been taken into account in the sentencing process and it is unlikely that Parliament intended them to be reconsidered under s 31(3)(c) (at 41). Any assessment of the candidate’s particular skills or qualities was also inappropriate for assessment in the judicial process (at 596). |
| • | Consideration of other provisions in the ATSIC Act similar to s 31(2) and 31(3) (such as s 102 (disqualification of persons seeking election as a member of a Regional Council); s 122 (cessation of membership of a Regional Council)) did not assist in identifying criteria that might be applied to s 31(3)(c). His Honour regarded the legislation as a ‘Byzantine muddle’. Anomalies in the operation of similar provisions suggested that there was no consistent rationale for the various provisions. Accordingly, it was unlikely that Parliament had implicitly prescribed any relevant considerations for the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 31(3)(c) (at 597–599). |
| • | No assistance could be derived from provisions such as s 206G of the Corporations Law and ss 229–231 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), which permitted courts to grant relief against disqualification from office as a director or from holding office in an industrial organisation, since these were not analogous to s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act (at 36–39). |
| • | The exercise of the discretion conferred by s 31(3)(c) would undermine the criminal law, by potentially treating a serious offence as not justifying disqualification from appointment to the Commission (at 599). |
| • | The legislation failed to prescribe appropriate criteria for the exercise of the discretion purportedly conferred by s 31(3)(c). |
[His Honour reviewed the case law on the separation of judicial power under the Constitution and the factors that the High Court regards as relevant to the classification of a power as judicial or non-judicial.]
...
50. It is now necessary to consider whether the discretionary power conferred on the Federal Court by s 31(3)(c) and s 31(4) of the ATSIC Act can be construed in a manner compatible with the exercise of judicial power. If so, the grant of power will not contravene Chapter III of the Constitution.
51. Section 31 disqualifies a person from appointment as a Commissioner if he or she has been convicted of certain offences. The effect of s 27(2) of the ATSIC Act is that members of the Commission are appointed by the Minister. The Minister is, however, obliged to appoint the seventeen persons who have been elected under Div 7 of Part 3 to represent the zones: s 27(1)(b). Of course, the Minister can only appoint a person who is not disqualified from appointment as a Commissioner.
52. Ordinarily, a member of a Regional Council who has been convicted of an offence described in s 31(2) of the ATSIC Act will cease to a member of the Council in accordance with the procedure prescribed by s 122. If that procedure is invoked before the election of zone representatives takes place, the convicted person will be ineligible for election since a person can be zone representative only if he or she is a member of a Regional Council: s 131(1). In this situation, it seems that the convicted person cannot seek an exemption from the Court, since s 102(2) (which is in terms similar to s 31(3)) is directed to exemption from the disqualification of a person from ‘standing from election’ or ‘being elected’ as a member of a Regional Council, not the termination of his or her membership.
53. One unusual feature of this case is that, although the appellant’s conviction and sentence predated the zone election, his term as a member of the Mt Isa Regional Council was not brought to an end. He was therefore eligible for election as a zone representative, but not for appointment as a Commissioner, at least in the absence of a declaration granted by the Court pursuant to s 31(3)(c). The same position would have applied had the appellant been convicted and sentenced after the zone election but before appointment to the Commission. As the primary Judge pointed out, even if a candidate for appointment as Commissioner is liable to be removed from a Regional Council pursuant to s 122, the legislation does not provide for his or her removal from the position of zone representative.
54. The significance of this statutory scheme for present purposes is that an application under s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act in practice will be made to the Court after the zone election but before the zone representative’s appointment as a Commissioner. Thus, one of the circumstances before the Court on such an application will be the fact that the applicant has successfully stood for election as a zone representative. I shall return to this later.
55. There are two particular features of the power conferred on the Court by s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act that might suggest that the power is non-judicial in character. The first is that s 31(3)(c) provides no express standards to guide the Court in the exercise of its discretion. If any such standards are to be formulated, they must be elaborated and refined by the Court itself. The second is that the legislation makes no provision for any particular person or body to be notified of the application and does not contemplate that a contradictor will appear to oppose the grant of relief sought in the application.
56. A useful starting point in considering these objections is the legislative history of the provisions under scrutiny. They were proposed by the Opposition in the Senate as amendments to the ATSIC Bill and ultimately accepted by the Government: see Cth Parl Deb, Senate, 6 September 1989, 1052–1057, 1124–1126; 29 September 1989, 1508–1509. As explained by Senator Baume, who moved the amendments, the Opposition was concerned that the original disqualification provisions in the Bill were too lenient. Among the concerns was the fact that persons actually incarcerated for periods of up to five years might nonetheless be eligible for appointment to the Commission. Senator Baume proposed more stringent disqualification provisions in respect of criminal convictions, to be counter-balanced, inter alia, by a power in the Court to relieve from disqualification, thereby permitting the convicted person to argue his or her case for relief. Senator Baume referred by way of analogy to the existing powers of courts to relieve convicted persons from disqualification as directors or officials of industrial organisations. Although not specifically identified in the debate, the legislation Senator Baume had in mind was presumably s 227 of the Companies Code (see now s 206G of the Corporations Law) and ss 229 and 231 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (see now Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), ss 229, 231).
57. The legislative history is significant at least to the extent that it shows that s 31(3)(c) and s 31(4) of the ATSIC Act were drafted with an eye to similar powers conferred on courts in other fields, especially in relation to companies and industrial organisations. Unlike the legislation addressed in the WWF Case, it was clearly not contemplated by Parliament that the Court would act in a manner inconsistent with the judicial process.
58. In view of this legislative history, the principles applicable to similar provisions in other fields provide guidance in construing s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act. ...
...
60. As the decisions of the High Court to which I have referred make clear, it is common for courts to supply the standards missing from the terms in which Parliament has conferred discretionary powers on a court. This occurs both where legislation uses very general expressions to define the court’s powers (such as allowing it to make any order that is ‘just and equitable’) and where, as in the case of the Companies Act and its counterparts, the legislation sets out no standards at all.
61. In my view, the approach taken by the courts in relation to other statutory powers to relieve convicted persons from disqualification for particular offices should be applied, with necessary adaptations, to the construction of s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act. It is true that the functions of the Commission (set out in s 7) are wider in some respects than those discharged by a company director or an official of an industrial organisation. But there is no special difficulty in ascertaining the functions a Commissioner is required or expected to perform. To the extent that the ATSIC Act is imprecise or incomplete, it is open to an applicant to adduce evidence to explain the position (as occurred in the present case). Nor does it seem to me to be beyond the familiar role that courts perform to make a judgment as to whether the particular applicant, despite his or her conviction, can safely be entrusted to discharge the functions of a Commissioner. And once it is accepted that the Court’s powers are to be exercised in a ‘protective’, not punitive manner, in accordance with the analysis in Re Magna Alloys, no issue arises as to conflict with the criminal law.
62. In some circumstances the decision to be made on any application brought pursuant to s 31(3)(c) will be easy. If, for example, the applicant will actually be in prison for a substantial period of time, it is hardly likely that he or she will be able to ‘hold office [as a Commissioner] on a full-time basis’ (s 30(1)). If, as in the present case, the applicant’s term of imprisonment is suspended or has been served, the inquiry is likely to be more difficult. The nature of the offence committed by the applicant and the circumstances of his or her involvement will plainly be important. For example, a person who has been convicted of a serious offence involving dishonesty and breach of trust may find it difficult to persuade the Court that he or she can adequately discharge those functions of the Commission that manifestly require financial probity (see, for example the powers to make grants or loans (s 14) and the power to subscribe for shares in corporations (s 17)). A person who has been convicted of a serious sexual assault and only recently released from prison, depending on the circumstances, may not be able to show that he can perform his role as a Commissioner without creating an unacceptable risk to the safety of staff of the Commission or to the general public. On the other hand, a conviction for certain kinds of offences, once the particular circumstances are examined, may not be incompatible with the proper discharge of a Commissioner’s functions, notwithstanding that the candidate was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
63. I do not think that any particular difficulty is presented by the fact that s 31(2) of the ATSIC Act covers a potentially wide range of offences. The fate of each application will depend on a careful evaluation of the particular facts, including the nature and circumstances of the offence, and an assessment of the risks posed by the applicant’s appointment to the Commission. In discharging its protective functions the Court will need to consider the interests of the Commission, of the communities intended to be served by the Commission (not merely the candidate’s own community) and of the general public.
64. As I have explained, the structure of the legislation is such that an application under s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act will be made after a zone election but before the zone representatives’ appointment to the Commission. In the present case, the application was made to the Court after the applicant had been elected as a zone representative by members of the Regional Council. The primary Judge was clearly uncomfortable with what he saw as the ‘political’ judgment required of the Court in these circumstances. But the Court is not required to choose between the merits of competing candidates for election as a zone representative, any more than the High Court, sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns, has to assess the virtues of competing candidates for election to Parliament. (As to the courts’ historical jurisdiction over disputed electoral returns, see Australian Law Reform Commission, The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth (Discussion Paper 64, 2000), pars 2.63 ff.) Indeed, it is not the Court that prevents a candidate chosen by the electors from taking up his or her position as a Commissioner. That consequence flows from the grounds laid down by Parliament in the ATSIC Act for the disqualification of a candidate. In any event, as Sue v Hill demonstrates, there is nothing unusual in a Court making a decision that effectively prevents a candidate chosen by electors taking up his or her elective post.
65. Given that the Court is to exercise a protective function in exercising the power conferred by s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act, the fact that a candidate has been elected by members of a Regional Council is likely to be of limited significance in determining the outcome of the candidate’s application for relief against disqualification. If the Court were satisfied by evidence that the electors were fully aware of the conviction and the circumstances of the offence (as was said to have occurred on the present case), the applicant would still need to demonstrate that, despite the conviction, he or she is able to discharge adequately the statutory functions of a Commissioner. If the Court were not satisfied that the electors were aware of the conviction and the circumstances of the offence, either because they had not been told or because the relevant events post-dated the election, the applicant would not have the advantage of the informed endorsement of the electors. In either event, the Court would not be concerned to choose between the merits of competing candidates. Nor would it have to make judgments on ‘political’ grounds or by choosing between different means of implementing the objectives of the ATSIC Act.
66. The ultimate question in any application brought pursuant to s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act is whether, in the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that, notwithstanding the applicant’s conviction and sentence, he or she can be expected to discharge the statutory responsibilities of a Commissioner. This seems to me a task that can properly be entrusted to a Chapter III court.
67. I do not think that the fact that the ATSIC Act makes no specific provision for a contradictor to oppose a candidate’s application for relief from disqualification detracts from this conclusion. There are, of course, many examples of courts making orders on the basis of ex parte applications. More importantly, a court exercising the powers conferred by s 31(3)(c) can be expected to act in accordance with the judicial process and to ensure that notice of the application is given to all those who might have a legitimate interest in its outcome. Precisely this course was adopted by the primary Judge in the present case. Notice was given to the Minister and to the members of the two relevant Regional Councils, presumably including those candidates who were unsuccessful in the zone election.
68. Drummond J’s judgment shows that the legislation is far from clear as to the consequences of a zone representative being disqualified from appointment as a Commissioner. Whatever the correct construction of the legislation on that issue, I see no reason to doubt that a member of a Regional Council would have standing to oppose an application by the elected zone representative for a declaration pursuant to s 31(3)(c). If validly appointed to the Commission, the elected representative is to represent the zone: s 27(1)(b). I would have thought that the interest of a member of a Regional Council in not being represented on the Commission by a convicted person who is prima facie disqualified from appointment would be sufficient to give that member standing to oppose an application for a declaration. I also think it strongly arguable that the Minister, who is empowered to give general directions to the Commission (s 12(1)), has a sufficient interest in the composition of the Commission to oppose any such application. The question of standing must be resolved having regard to the objects and structure of the ATSIC Act: see Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 996; (1994) 49 FCR 250, at 280, per Gummow J.
69. It is true that none of the persons served with notice of the application chose to adopt the role of a contradictor in the proceedings. But even if legislation provides for notice of an application to be given to a particular body (see, for example, Corporations Law, s 206G(2), requiring a disqualified person applying for leave to manage a corporation to give notice to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission), that body might choose not to oppose the application. In such a situation, as in the present case, the court may then have no choice but to determine the application without the benefit of a contradictor. The absence of an active contradictor is not incompatible with the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
70. I should add that nothing in the ATSIC Act empowers the Court to act of its own motion in relation to relieving a convicted person from the disqualification imposed by s 31(2) of the ATSIC Act. The legislation is therefore different from that considered in The Queen v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation, where Dixon CJ considered (at 289) that the fact that the Court was empowered to disallow rules of an organisation of its own motion told ‘rather strongly against the view that it [was] intended to exercise part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth’.
71. Drummond J has pointed out that the better construction of s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act is that any declaration made by the Court pursuant to that provision operates prospectively. In my view, this characteristic of the legislation does not, either alone or in combination with the other factors to which I have referred, result in the conferral of non-judicial power in the Court. As s 206G of the Corporations Law and s 231 of the Industrial Relations Act demonstrate, it is not unusual for courts to be given power to make orders prospectively relieving a person from the consequences of a statutory prohibition. The legislative history of s 31(3)(c) shows that it was enacted with the forerunners of these provisions in mind.
72. For these reasons, s 31(3)(c) of the ATSIC Act can and should be read in a manner that conforms to the requirements of the exercise of judicial power by a Chapter III court. To take this course, in my view, involves no threat to civil liberty, nor to the perceived legitimacy or standing of federal courts.
73. It follows that neither s 31(3)(c) nor s 31(4) of the ATSIC Act confers non-judicial power on the Federal Court. Neither provision is invalid. I think that the appropriate course is that the proceedings should be remitted to the primary Judge to consider the merits of the application for a declaration pursuant to s 31(3)(c).
74. Section 27 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (‘the Act’) provides that the Commission is constituted by nineteen members, seventeen of whom are to be the persons elected by members of the Regional Councils in a zone, to represent the zone. Those members, plus the other two, are then appointed by the Minister (subsection (2)). Section 31 provides the qualifications for appointment as a Commissioner:
(1) A person is not qualified to be appointed as a Commissioner unless the person is an Aboriginal person or a Torres Strait Islander.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), a person is not qualified to be appointed as a Commissioner if he or she:(a) has been convicted of an offence against a Commonwealth, State or Territory law and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer; or
(b) has been convicted of an offence against a Commonwealth, State or Territory law involving dishonesty and sentenced to imprisonment for 3 months or longer.
(3) Subsection (2) does not disqualify a person from being appointed as a Commissioner if:(a) where the person was never actually imprisoned for the offence — at least 2 years have elapsed since the person was convicted;
(b) where the person served a term of imprisonment for the offence — at least 2 years have elapsed since the person was released from prison; or
(c) in any case — the Federal Court of Australia, on application by the person, declares that in spite of the person’s conviction, he or she ought not to be disqualified from being appointed as a Commissioner.
(4) The Federal Court of Australia has jurisdiction with respect to matters arising under subsection (3).
75. Mr Yanner (‘the applicant’) was a member of the Mt Isa Regional Council. On 14 December 1999 he was elected as a representative for the Queensland (Far North West) zone by the combined votes of the Regional Councils in that zone. He was then able to be appointed a Commissioner, subject to the provisions of s 31 of the Act. The applicant had been convicted on 30 July 1999 in the District Court at Mt Isa, on two counts of wilful damage and four counts of assault occasioning bodily harm with a circumstance of aggravation, namely that they were committed in company. The orders then made by a District Court Judge, for probation and community service to be performed, were set aside on appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland and in lieu the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen months, with that sentence suspended for a period of four years. From that time, 10 December 1999, he was not qualified to be appointed as a Commissioner. Shortly afterwards the applicant applied to the Court for an order pursuant to s 31(3)(c) of the Act declaring that, in spite of his conviction, he ought not be disqualified from being appointed Commissioner. At the first adjourned hearing of the application Dowsett J expressed concern as to whether the jurisdiction given by s 31(4) of the Act was an exercise of judicial power within the meaning of ss 71, 76 and 77 of The Constitution (Cth). His Honour heard argument from the applicant, the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (‘the Minister’) and the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth, to whom a notice had been given. Each of the parties’ arguments supported the constitutional validity of the provisions in question, and that position was maintained on the appeal. His Honour held that the provisions did not confer upon the Court any part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
76. Section 3 of the Act provides:
The objects of this Act are, in recognition of the past dispossession and dispersal of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and their present disadvantaged position in Australian society:
(a) to ensure maximum participation of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders in the formulation and implementation of government policies that affect them;
(b) to promote the development of self-management and self-sufficiency among Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders;
(c) to further the economic, social and cultural development of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders; and
(d) to ensure co-ordination in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders by the Commonwealth, State, Territory and local governments, without detracting from the responsibilities of State, Territory and local governments to provide services to their Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander residents.
77. These objects reflect the matters contained in the preamble, one of which recognises the need to establish structures for the representation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
78. As his Honour noted, the explanatory memorandum concerning the Act stated that the Commission was to supersede the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and the Aboriginal Development Commission. Section 8 of the Act provides that the Prime Minister may confer a departmental function on the Commission. The Commission is obliged to perform its functions and exercise its powers in accordance with any general directions as are given by the relevant Minister, with some qualifications (s 12). The functions of the Commission, in addition to those which may be expressly conferred upon it, principally involve it in the development of policies and programs for Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders; advising and acting with communities at various levels; advising the Minister; and protecting cultural matter (s 7). The Commission has power to negotiate and co-operate with Commonwealth, State, Territory and local government bodies to enter into agreements for loans and guarantees, to act as trustees of property, and to subscribe to shares.
79. Section 31, set out above, deals with the qualification of a zone representative to be a Commissioner. A zone representative is elected from amongst the members of the Regional Councils by the Regional Councils included in the zone: s 131(1). Section 102 concerns the qualification of a person to stand for election to a Regional Council. Subsection (1) lists the factors which may result in the disqualification. They include a sentence for the same term as that referred to in s 31:
102(1) A person is not qualified to stand for election, or to be elected, as a member for a Regional Council ward if:
(a) the person is not entitled to vote at the Regional Council ward election concerned...
...
85. It is apparent from the objects of the Act and the duties and powers of the Commission that a Commissioner will take part in some financial and business dealings of the Commission. A Commissioner’s principal role would appear to be concerned with the making of policies and their implementation and co-ordination in conjunction with, and at times at the direction of, the Minister and his department. The role requires responsibilities to both the Minister and the Department and to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community, whom the Commissioner represents.
86. So far as concerns the qualification or potential disqualification to the position of Regional Councillor or Commissioner, the scheme of the Act is that a person convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more or, in the case of an offence involving dishonesty, three months or longer, is not able to stand for election to a Regional Council, save by order of the Court. That is not, however, necessary if specified periods of time have elapsed since conviction or release from prison. Once elected to a Council, if the Councillor is convicted and sentenced to the abovementioned terms they cannot continue to be a Councillor. All that is required in this connexion is a declaration as to the fact of conviction by the Council. The Court is not involved in this process. If a person remains elected as a Regional Councillor and is convicted and sentenced to those terms, subject to the same provision for the lapse of time as earlier referred to, they cannot be appointed as Commissioner by the Minister, unless the Court declares otherwise. Section 31 contemplates that a person has been elected by the Regional Council and is otherwise entitled to appointment. If, following their appointment as a Commissioner, the person is convicted and sentenced for the same periods, or if they are absent from duty or fail to comply with the statutory disclosure provisions, the Minister is obliged to terminate their appointment.
87. The scheme of the Act, so far as concerns offences involving dishonesty or offences carrying a substantial term of imprisonment is not entirely clear. If conviction and sentence occurs whilst in office, a person is disentitled from continuing in that position by force of the statute but with a requirement that Parliament be informed of these cases, as with cases involving removal for misconduct. The Court’s involvement is at the point of qualification of a candidate for election to Regional Council or of a Councillor elected by the Council for appointment as a Commissioner.
88. From the case law concerning judicial power, which his Honour reviewed, his Honour determined that there were a number of factors which pointed to the power in question being non-judicial. Of most importance was the absence of any appropriate and objective criteria by which the Court could determine whether the conviction and sentence should not operate to disqualify a person. In that regard, no assistance could be gained from the preamble or the objects of the Act in the exercise of what was a very general discretion. His Honour considered the role of the Commissioners, who were both representatives and advisers to government, and whether tests such as those requiring a person to be of good character, or a fit and proper person to hold office or profession, were suitable and his Honour determined they were not. His Honour also identified a problem with a perception of political involvement on the part of the Court. It is this aspect of the decision upon which much of the submissions on the appeal focussed. The Commission was effectively a department of government, the question for the Court would involve the structure of a body set up by legislation to carry out functions in respect of which the Parliament is authorised to legislate. Public confidence in the independence of the judiciary might be undermined.
[Kiefel J reviewed factors relevant to determining whether a power conferred on a Chapter III court is judicial or non-judicial, in light of the precedents.]
106. With this background it is necessary to consider the Act in question, and s 31.
107. One may discern from s 31(2) that there was a concern held about the appropriateness of a person to be appointed as a Commissioner where they have been found to be dishonest or where they have been found guilty of a serious offence, one which has commanded a substantial period of imprisonment. One may accept that for some reason a Commissioner was considered to be automatically disentitled if the conviction occurred whilst they held office, but only to be potentially disqualified if it occurred prior to election or appointment. Unlike other statutory provisions, the Act does not identify the offences giving rise to the specified sentence, which might operate as disentitling to a candidate, save for those involving dishonesty. I apprehend that the reason for the lack of specification is that the role of a Commissioner is multi-faceted, such that it is difficult to identify offences which might in every case be thought to be a prima facie disqualification.
108. Even where the offences considered to be potentially disqualifying are not specified in a statute, the Courts are often able to identify those offences by reference to the functions or duties to be undertaken. So far as concerns the business and financial aspects of the Commission under the Act and the role of a Commissioner in that connection, it is obvious that offences involving dishonesty or impropriety are marked out. The difficulty which arises for the Courts, as it may have for the legislature, is that a Commissioner wears a number of hats and the role of a Commissioner extends beyond dealings with money and property and to areas of policy-making and implementation of policy, in concert with and sometimes at the direction of, the Minister, whilst at the same time acting as a representative for the people in the area from which the Commissioner was elected, ensuring that their interests and those of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples generally are taken into account and acting as a co-ordinator between those peoples and various levels of government.
109. It is not possible, in my view, to identify offences which could objectively be said to reflect upon a person’s ability to conduct themselves in these roles. Within the community, of which the Commissioner is a representative, views will likely differ concerning what amounts to disentitling conduct. So much will depend upon the applicant’s standing within the community. Whether that is something the Court can test in a judicial way is a matter I shall turn to shortly. Some offences are known to occur more regularly in some Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander communities than elsewhere, and are of great concern to community leaders. Domestic violence in particular comes to mind. Violence against women generally was an example identified by the applicant in submissions. The submission however seemed to me to highlight the fact that the Court was unlikely, in most cases, to be able to participate in an identification of offences as disentitling. The question whether one offence ought to be regarded as disqualifying and another not, is one for society and the legislature, taking into account community views. These are matters upon which the Minister may also have views, but from a different perspective. In addition to the Commissioner’s role as a community representative, the Commissioner has a responsible position which has a close connexion to the Minister and the department.
110. It would seem to me to follow from there being no list of offences prescribed by the Act itself, and a Court being unable to supply them by the exercise of some judicial function, that the Court will be unable to take the nature of the particular offence into account, except where it involves dishonesty. It seems clear though that a conviction or sentence for a serious offence was thought to be sufficiently important to disqualify a person in some cases. If it is to be a relevant consideration, it is necessary for the legislature to decide, as a matter of policy, what offences are prescribed.
111. It remains to consider whether the Court may nevertheless apply an objective test based upon the applicant’s personal qualities or characteristics.
112. A test assessing whether a person is ‘fit and proper’ directs the Court towards the office or function involved. As already discussed, with respect to a Commissioner, the test would have to extend beyond the duties of management and business, and to enquiries about their fitness as advisers, policy-makers and representatives, areas incapable of independent and objective assessment by the Court.
113. The question which then arises is whether a ‘good character’ test might be applied to an applicant, regardless of the various roles which would be undertaken by them in their capacity as a Commissioner. Lee J in Irving v Minister of State, to which reference is made above, considered that assessment might be undertaken objectively and by reference to proven facts, which is to say it may involve a judicial function, but that it is different from an enquiry as to whether someone has good standing in a community, which would involve a review of subjective public opinion. There is nothing in the Act to indicate which assessment is appropriate. It might be said that the Court, being expected to act judicially, would simply choose the objective assessment of good character, but two problems would remain. In the context of the Act and s 31, a person has been elected by the community. The importance of their representative role is underscored by the objects of the Act. There is therefore no warrant for the Court ignoring this as a factor, as the submissions on the appeal recognised. That is to say, the question before the Court becomes one both as to character and standing in the community. What weight should be given to each and in some cases ought one to prevail? If importance was to be attributed to one test over the other it could, in my view, only be determined by a policy decision — one to be made by the legislature — one which considered and gave effect to the various interests involved — government, the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander peoples and perhaps even the public interest. So far as concerns the problem created by the Commissioner being an elected representative, it may be recalled that provisions of the Workplace Relations Act involve the potential disqualification of elected persons, in some cases. The distinction to be drawn as between that Act and the Act here in question is that one is there able to infer, from the prescription of offences and the specified criteria, that the fact of election is not a matter of significance if even a relevant factor. The second problem which would remain is that the good character test would be almost impossible to apply without reference to the nature of the offence. That is something about which the Act offers no guidance, although clearly it was intended to be relevant in some way.
114. The jurisdiction given to the Court by s 31(4) of the Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) is not one which permits the exercise of a judicial function. The particular difficulty arises under the Act because of the number of disparate roles of a Commissioner. It is not possible to limit an assessment to their role in business and management, an assessment which might be undertaken objectively. The lack of specification of potentially disqualifying offences, together with an uncertainty as to the extent to which standing in the community is to be weighed if applying a test involving personal qualifications, means that there is no discernible test or criteria which might be applied by the Court in the exercise of a judicial function. It is possible, were the matter not left at large and some criteria provided, that the Court might be able to exercise its proper function, but that would require decisions such as one limiting the operation of disqualification to particular aspects of the role of the Commissioner; identifying what are the disqualifying offences; specifying whether the person’s standing as an elected representative in the community was to be taken into account in connexion with any test as to personal qualities; and whether such a test was intended. These are decisions which are not appropriate to a Court.
115. The appeal should be dismissed. l
[The court’s order was that the appeal be dismissed.]
Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr DF Jackson QC with Mr DA Kelly
Solicitor for the Appellant:
National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Legal Services Secretariat Limited
Counsel for the Second Respondent:
Mr D Bennett QC Solicitor-General with
Ms A Philippides SC and Mr J Stellios
Solicitor for the Second Respondent:
Australian Government Solicitor
With the lapse of time, the applicant has now joined the ATSIC Board.[1]
[1] ATSIC News Spring 2001 p 3
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUIndigLawRpr/2001/33.html