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Indigenous Statements – International
John Ondawame and Peter King
Position Paper Number three
The West Papua Project
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
The University of Sydney May 2002
Editors note: This version of ‘West Papua: Reconciliation as a Way of Promoting Peace Dialogue’ has been edited for publication in the Australian Indigenous Law Reporter. It also contains an update of Workshop III, convened by the West Papua Project in the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney on 2-3 September 2002. More information on the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies can be found at <www.arts. usyd.edu.au/cpacs>.
Over the course of the past two years human rights activists and supporters of the West Papua cause became concerned with the increase in violence and violations of civil rights in Papua, and recognised the need for a convening of interested parties, with the goal of promoting reconciliation and peaceful dialogue within Papuan civil society foremost on the agenda. To facilitate the brainstorming and clarification of ideas on reconciliation, the West Papua Project organised a workshop, the second of its kind, on December 12-13, 2001, through the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at Sydney University, with the title: Promoting Reconciliation as a Way Towards Peace Dialogue. Its major objective was to determine under which circumstances a promotion of reconciliation as a way towards peace dialogue could occur, and to highlight the difficulties in conducting social justice dialogue in an unpredictable political atmosphere. Our specific aim was to bring together key West Papuan leaders with a view to analysing and ‘mapping’ intra-Papuan conflicts and their causes, considering strategies and processes for reconciliation with the Papuan community in West Papua and abroad, and also continuing discussion of a workable peace plan for West Papua.
The workshop was well attended. Forty participants, from various groups representing civil society in Australia, Indonesia and West Papua, took part in the discussion. This included academics, support group representatives, politicians, non-governmental organisation activists and individuals from both West Papua and Indonesia.
The original agenda presented some practical difficulties, which forced the organising committee to redefine the subject of the discussion and reduce the number of presenting participants. Our initial goal of addressing broader subjects of discussion and bringing together 13 key leaders representing the full spectrum of Papuan society was not attainable. Funding responses came too late, presenting administrative problems. But most importantly, the crisis in the domestic political situation with the death of Theys Eluay on November 10, 2001 threatened the security of all the proposed participants from West Papua. Another difficulty was that the workshop was held during the holiday season when travel costs were greatly inflated. Three key players, John Rumbiak, supervisor of the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, Jayapura (‘ELSHAM’), Theo van de Broek from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Jayapura and Tom Beanal, vice chairman of the Papua Presidium Council, were all unable to attend the workshop.
Despite these challenges, the committee was able to bring Dr Ben Giay to the workshop. He is an academic, a leader of the Kingmi Church in West Papua, one of the founding fathers of FORERI (the Reconciliation Forum for Irian Jaya) and a former moderator of the Papua Presidium, who is now chairperson of ELSHAM. As a result of direct intervention on the part of the workshop organising committee, in cooperation with ELSHAM-Jayapura, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta provided an entry visa for Ben Giay in just two days. Papuan participation was also enriched not only by the presence of the Director of ELSHAM in Jayapura, Johannes Bonay, who is now under serious threat for his advocacy work, and Henry Wainggai, representative of Aliansi Student Papua Barat, but also by other Papuans living in exile. The discussion became extremely stimulating when two Indonesian colleagues, Ian Siagian and George Aditjondro, who have two sharply different views on the future of West Papua met and were able to share their opinions in an atmosphere of mutual respect.
...
As a follow-up to Workshop II and especially its shortcomings in participation, the West Papua Project Steering Committee decided in principle to hold a third workshop, again focused on internal reconciliation, in Sydney during September 2002. Reflecting on the last workshop, one may conclude that the voices of the Papuans were not clearly heard, not only because of the lack of wide Papuan participation, but because our striving to achieve common perceptions and recommendations for the future did not fully reflect the complexities of the Papuan situation.
The primary objectives of Workshop III were to:
Specific aims of the workshop were to:
This paper will examine the situation, attitudes and social behaviour of members of the civil society of West Papua, focusing on power relationships between potential stakeholders in the horizontal conflicts in West Papua itself and in the wider vertical conflict between Indonesia and the people of West Papua. Moreover, by reflecting on the views that were presented at our Workshop II on December 12-13 2001, future strategies for constructive intervention in the above conflicts will also be discussed.
...
The West Papua Project seeks to promote peaceful dialogue between the people of West Papua and Indonesia, and to promote conflict resolution as a viable alternative to the current escalating conflict. The Project aims to put in place concrete strategies to achieve the goal of peaceful dialogue between Indonesia and West Papua. These strategies consist of strengthening networks, addressing the information deficit on West Papua through research and a public awareness campaign, and promoting education on conflict resolution relevant to the West Papuan issue. The project seeks to co-ordinate its work in collaboration with various key players in West Papua and in other countries.
However, such objectives cannot be achieved until the culture of dialogue and reconciliation is ‘socialised’ among key stakeholders, or unless they can find another appropriate way to solve the fundamental problems that exist within Papuan civil society itself. Problems of national disunity, conflicting perceptions and incoherent strategies are perceived as major hindering factors in the peace and reconciliation process.
In the past two years, notably in August 1998, in an effort to obtain a genuine reconciliation among groups in Papuan civil society, and to formulate a common position on the ongoing conflict, the Forum for Reconciliation of the People of Irian Jaya (FORERI) was established in Jayapura by civil society groups such as churches, traditional councils, women’s groups and student organisations.
In an attempt to promote reconciliation among the West Papuans as a vital step towards peaceful dialogue, the West Papua Project organised its second workshop in December 2001 with the following two key aims in mind:
(a) between the main rival parties (Highlanders and coastal dwellers);
(b) in intertribal relations;
(c) between urban and rural Papuans;
(d) between the OPM (Free Papua Movement) and the Papua Council Presidium;
(e) between OPM factions (abroad and at home); and also
(f) between academics and politicians, men and women, et cetera.
(a) identify and advance new key role players in the peace and reconciliation process;
(b) develop international links and collaborations; and
(c) allocate rights and responsibilities among key groups.
The primary workshop objective was to find ways and means of setting in motion a reconciliation process that would lead to negotiated solutions of both micro and macro conflicts. But first the workshop discussed the current socio-political situation in Papua in a broad perspective.
The power relationships between major actors within Papuan civil society, on one hand, and the relationships of these actors to the state of Indonesia, on the other, have been problematic. Democratic values and human rights have not been well understood in the political vocabulary of Indonesia or West Papua. One of the simplest ways to grasp a conflict is to imagine it as a triangle with three points: situation, attitude and behaviour, with a causal relationship between these three. Situation refers to the objective position that causes conflict, while behaviour refers to the actions of the people and attitude refers to actors’ perceptions of other people. Each of the three can be a root cause of conflict.
The situation in West Papua today is characterised by violence and increasing intolerance. Widespread human rights abuses abound and economic and social disparities and accompanying political pressures grow. Most often, groups in civil society blame the OPM or the Indonesian State for failing to take responsibility for social and political chaos. However, horizontal conflict within civil society itself, including relations between Papuans and non-Papuans, is well known and problematic, as we have seen. This is perceived as a major hindrance to peaceful dialogue.
The workshop participants identified the following groups as major source of the current conflict in West Papua — groups that often suffer breakdown in communication and need to build a common foundation for peace and reconciliation.
The OPM (Free Papua Movement) is the only organisation that has operated in West Papua since 1965 with a clear national political agenda: self-determination and an independent West Papua. Its strategy includes both military and peaceful approaches, and it has both political and military wings as important campaign tools. Membership is varied, but most Papuans are associated with the OPM in one way or another.
The Papua Council Presidium is the executive body appointed at the Second National Congress 2000 in Jayapura. The credibility and legitimacy of the body is still doubtful as far as the OPM is concerned, for many reasons. The OPM accuses the Presidium of accommodating Indonesian agents and promoting incorrect historical facts. However, the Presidium, which is only two years old and has attracted wide local and international support, regards itself as a legitimate body and condemns violence, calling for peaceful dialogue as a viable alternative to armed conflict.
Divisions arise not only on the basis of geographical location but also social and physical differences. Those who live over 1000 meters above sea level are regarded as Highlanders. Two thirds of the Papuan population are Highlanders and living in a most inaccessible landscape. Their development has lagged. This affects their social status seriously. Despite this, in the last 40 years Highlanders have shown a political will to catch up with the other Papuans. On the other hand, Coastals have been contacting the outside world for approximately 500 years. They fear that the advancement of Highlanders may see them take over power in a new West Papua.
The majority of Papuans are living in the rural areas. Traditional culture remains strong and the traditional keeping of livestock continues, but many traditional customs are vanishing, overshadowed by new, imported cultures. Unlike urban dwellers, who depend on wage income and trade, rural people depend on cultivation, hunting and fishing. Urban dwellers have power, money and communication networks. Conflict is often started when urban dwellers seek control over traditional land and resources, most often without permission. The urban dwellers use state law to over-ride the traditional landowner.
West Papuan men, as in many other traditional Third World societies, still demand control over women. Most West Papuan traditional societies are patrilineal. Women have been seen as objects to be exploited. This traditional view of women is still strong among both rural and urban dwellers. Domestic violence is very common also, given high levels of alcohol consumption among men with traditional values. Women are regarded as second class citizens and ‘baby factories’; they are also seen as objects that can be sold or bought. Under this view, men often attempt to keep women far away from power centres. In traditional society, this behaviour is hard to break down.
Landowners are people affected by mining, oil and gas exploitation, logging, dam projects, road making, tourism, public building and fisheries in their traditional lands and waters. Social values are also affected by unwanted intruders. Over 100 companies, both domestic and foreign registered, operate in West Papua. Indonesian law provides certain privileges, tax haven status for example, to over-ride traditional rights. In the absence of any form of negotiation process, the companies exploit the resources without paying any form of compensation to traditional landowners. The case of the Freeport mine and the Amungme and Kamoro people is a classical example. This is a source of conflict at micro level.
Non-Papuans here may refer to immigrants and their descendants, to foreign workers or to missionaries, all of whom have affected Papuan’s lives. According to the last population census in 2001, the total population of West Papua is 2.1 million, of which the Papuan proportion is unknown, but commonly estimated at about 60 per cent. The relationship between Indonesian immigrants and Papuan Indigenous people has always been unhealthy, overshadowed by strong sentiments entertained against each other. In line with government policy, West Papuans are regarded by many immigrants as a lazy, primitive and underdeveloped people who should be ‘civilised’. Social mockery is used to undermine the Papuans, in order to continue Indonesian control over them and, in particular, to exploit their land and its resources. The infiltration of new culture and traditions has also brought devastating effects for the Papuans in many fields — a contributing factor in the increase of intolerance and inter-ethnic strife.
Analysing major problems facing the Papuan cause, particularly in the state-civil society nexus, workshop participants concluded that six major causes of conflict must be addressed.
The first problem is the denial of the Papuans’ rights. Their right to live, preserve their culture and way of life and claim their basic democratic freedoms have been denied and violated since the 1960s. The serious violation of Papuans’ human rights begins even before what was called the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969, continues in many parts of West Papua today and represents a major stumbling block in the quest for a peaceful dialogue. To understand the root causes of the problem from a historical perspective, ‘straightening’ West Papuan history has been seen as a crucial step towards a peace process. However, the issue was not deeply discussed at the Workshop due to key speakers not being able to attend.
The power relationship between Freeport Indonesia and the landowners — the Amungme and Kamoro — who live around mining areas in the southern part of West Papua was taken as a case study to look specifically into the intensity of local sentiment and levels of resistance. Chris Ballard and Denise Leith, who analysed the denial of the Papuans’ rights in this area, concluded that the vertical conflict in the mining region is caused by:
One possible scenario is that PT Freeport Indonesia and the landowners will be in conflict for years to come unless there are great changes in the company’s social-economic policy. The workshop consensus was very sceptical that any likely policy change will not benefit the landowners, or change their position on the need for fundamental political and social change. The offer of ‘special autonomy’ for the province and its regencies will not buy off the Papuans either, for Amungme and Kamoro people, like other Papuans, see this policy as paying only lip-service to self-determination. In order to promote peace in the region, in the view of many workshop participants, only ‘straightening’ the history of West Papua and then reviewing the special autonomy law can avert further escalation of conflict in the future.
Speaking about the origins of the conflict under the heading Major Problems Facing the Papuan Cause, Ben Giay and Peter King identified the lack of a culture of dialogue in Indonesia as a major problem, but also Jakarta’s own acute fear of Indonesia breaking up — Balkanisation of the whole Indonesian archipelago. These two speakers speculated that Jakarta is reluctant to engage in a peaceful dialogue because of fear that such involvement may give the Papuans an opportunity to support the idea of Balkanisation through independence. This fear was clearly stated by President Megawati Sukarnoputri in her speech in the front of Indonesian military in December 2001.
President Megawati, unlike her predecessor, Gus Dur, has shown little interest in peaceful dialogue with the Papuans, but several participants argued that for its own best interests Jakarta should get involved in such dialogue. Director of ELSHAM-Jayapura, Johannes Bonay, elaborated this view. According to him, the policies of transmigration, militarisation, direct foreign investment and centralised power, and the empty promises of ‘special autonomy’, together with social injustice, are key causes of Papua’s problems. The people of West Papua interpret the government’s policies as subjugation of the people that cannot be tolerated. The influx of transmigrants and discrimination in the educational system and other public institutions combine with the additional factors of mistreatment of the Papuans and arrogant behaviour of the administrative power to negatively influence local sentiments. There is no Indonesian development paradigm visible yet that can reduce tension and restore peace and democracy in West Papua today as far as the Papuan representatives at the workshop were concerned.
The promotion of divide and rule policy in a fragmented society such as West Papua with 250 ethnicities has created a climate of hatred and violence with problematic and serious side effects. The deployment of large numbers of military in the region has not helped people in settling their differences in a peaceful manner or in improving their relationships with each other. A very dangerous development in the security area is the encouragement of pro-Indonesia and pro-independence militias in West Papua, both orchestrated by the military. This has already sparked violence in many places. The recent provocative activities promoted by the Laskar Jihad group in Fakfak have fuelled more religious tension.
Mistrust among the Papuans towards the policy of the government of Indonesia has been well known for many years. This attitude is built on many years of experience in the past and present. At the macro level, for example, as already noted, the Papuans have very little trust in Jakarta’s promises on special autonomy:
We do not want autonomy, but independence. This is why many West Papuans are still suffering and have died.
Thus spoke Henry Wainggai, representative of Aliansi Student Papua (and the son of Thomas Wainggai who was sentenced to a long prison term for raising an independence flag and died in a Jakarta gaol) at the workshop. But Ian Siagian, who represents President Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in Australia, defended Jakarta’s policy on autonomy:
I think the government’s special autonomy proposal is good for the Papuans. The Papuans needs to accept the autonomy proposal, and try it. If within a few years, they feel it does not accommodate their wishes, they may review it.
Actually, he said, the proposal (which is now law) was supported by a fraction of PDI-P, which had strongly endorsed the original, much more radical, provincial proposals on special autonomy, which were elicited from local intellectuals and officials and submitted to Jakarta by the Papuan regional government.
Most workshop participants seemed to believe that in the absence of any new peace commitment on the part of the central government, the escalation of violence is likely to continue in the near future. The fact is, so the arguments went, violence against civilians has greatly increased in many parts of West Papua. Pro-independence Papuan leaders have become a primary target of secret military operations — which will not restore either law and order, or peace: indeed social chaos is likely. The death of peace advocator and Papua Presidium chairman Theys Eluay, murdered by unknown persons on November 10, 2001 in Jayapura, and death threats to human rights advocates John Rumbiak and Johannes Bonay in recent months, demonstrate that the peace initiatives already promoted by the OPM, FORERI and the Papua Council could be undermined completely. ‘In such a situation, how can we trust Indonesia to engage in peaceful dialogue?’ asked Johannes Bonay.
Many speakers suggested that the lack of these principles in current government policy has been antagonistic to democratic values and peace initiatives and a better relationship between the state and the Papuan civil society. Honesty and openness are two of the most important grounds for building trust. But the history of West Papua shows that they have frequently been neglected and crumbled. Each party to a conflict must have an ability to ‘open up’ about past wrongdoing, take steps forward to overcome it and be able to take risks and be accountable for what is actually said and promised. In the absence of these basic principles, West Papua is seen merely as a paradise for gaining wealth and power while the people of West Papua become an object of exploitation. As one workshop participant said, ‘We are not a real partner in the discussion on development, peace and justice. This is a major obstacle to building trust and reconciliation.’
... [H]orizontal conflict occurs when the relationship between communities breaks down and mistrust develops. Despite the lack of a fully unified view on the basic reasons for disunity it was generally agreed that the most important core problems are struggle for power and leadership, regional sentiment, lack of shared perceptions, ‘party’ antagonism and strong local loyalties in all aspects of life. These issues were discussed in the workshop under the title Demystifying the Issues. Participants reached general conclusion as follows.
Power and leadership struggle has often characterised relations between the OPM and the Presidium and between factions within each of them. The accumulation of power and wealth can result in strong influence for individuals, and thus increased chances of surviving and prevailing politically, which is a significant motivator in the Third World context. Power struggles include those within the OPM, for example between Nicolaus Jouwe and the late Marcus Kaisepo in the 1960s; between Jacob H Prai and Zeth Rumkorem in 1976 and after; within regional commands of the National Liberation Army of the OPM in the North in 1984 and 1998, and in the South in 1988; between the OPM and the Fourteen Star movement of Thomas Wainggai in the 1980s and subsequently; between the Tom Beanal and Theys Eluay groups within the Papua Presidium; between FORERI and the churches which set it up; and between ELSHAM and the Presidium. There has also often been an unhealthy relationship between NGOs, the Presidium and the OPM, and gender imbalance is a neglected dimension of power struggles too. Another problem is opportunistic behaviour on the part of some individuals who may seek to exploit their access to money and other resources and the weaknesses of others.
Current leadership problems are acute. Dr George Aditjondro pointed out the difficulty of finding a charismatic and consensual leader, such as Xanana Gusmao of East Timor, in the West Papuan context.
West Papua is a multicultural society. From a language perspective, West Papuans are divided between Papuan and Melanesian phyla. Each language group has its own unique characteristics. Moreover, development is unbalanced. Two thirds of the country, mainly in the highlands, is still underdeveloped, while the coastal areas, particularly in the north, are quite well developed due to the earlier contact with the outside world compared to the rest of West Papua.
This development standard is often used as a main criterion to develop stereotypes. Many groups feel that their original social and political structures are ‘superior’ to others and so if one of them becomes more ‘developed’ than the rest, it feels power should be in its hands. Domination of one ethnic group over others, or of non-Papuans over Papuans, with discriminatory practices at many levels, has already fuelled serious resentments. During the leadership election at the Second National Congress 2000 in Jayapura, for example, a group led by the late Theys Eluay threatened to boycott the congress. They believed leadership must be in the hands of northerners, not southerners or highlanders. Self-appointed leader, Theys Eluay, declared himself the new Chief, undermining the more popular prospective leader, Tom Beanal, who comes from an undeveloped highland region in West Papua. There was an immediate response by the highlanders (Dani and Ekagi peoples) who expressed frustration and anger, and demanded respect for the democratic rule of law. They then formed the Dewan Masyarakat Koteka (DEMAK) or Highland Consultation Council, altering the balance of power in the Presidium.
Another cause of problems here is the influx of both regional and internal transmigrants and the consequent destabilising of Papuan society. With new influx of ‘alien’ culture, and free movement of capital, population and social systems, local culture has been undermined. Fear of losing their own culture manifests itself often in the form of increasing regional sentiment, with discriminatory and intolerant behaviour as a consequence. The Amungme people in the mining region in the south, and the Arfak people in Manokwari regency, for example, have felt their culture threatened by influx of immigrant workers from other parts of West Papua as well as Indonesia. In many instances these sentiments become explosive, with casualties on both sides. Several episodes involving the Amungme, and the expulsion of Ayamaru people from the Arfak region last year, exemplify this.
The failure to make real progress towards national unity is, according to workshop participants, the result of a lack of unifying vision. The OPM emphasizes the relevance of both military and peaceful approaches as a means of addressing the political struggle, while the Presidium uses peaceful approaches alone. The two can be highly critical of each other. The OPM, for example, has criticized the Presidium as a puppet of the Indonesian government, arguing that peaceful dialogue alone will not solve the problem. And they suspect the other side of a double game. Conversely, the Presidium condemns the OPM’s association with violence. The following are seen as key issues:
One topic of concern keenly discussed at the workshop was the role of women in the reconciliation process. Clearly West Papuan women have the potential to fulfil this role. But the constraints imposed upon them by the male-dominated society, with its tight traditional controls over women, make any immediate change unlikely. Women become victims of both state oppression and domestic violence. Effecting any change in the attitude of men will be a slow process. The lack of participation by women in the reconciliation effort is obvious. Women should be given an opportunity to play a key role in any peace and reconciliation process. There is also an urgent need to improve the quality of life for women and resolve the regional conflicts between highland women and coastal women. There is an overall need to resolve these differences and achieve recognition of woman’s role as an equal in the society. The following steps may help change men’s attitude towards women:
• provide equal opportunity, and promote the participation of women in fields such as education, politics, law and social reform;
• engage in dialogue not only for breaking down isolation but also to lift up women and help them gain new skills and knowledge in wider fields;
• support women’s development agencies inside West Papua; and
• support exchange programs between Papuan women and women in foreign countries.
Prejudice is the mistaken perception that one social group is less valuable than another, and results in attempts by dominant groups to impose their own values on subordinate groups. A dominant group, believing itself superior, feels it had the right to decide over the future of the others, as we have said.
Highlanders often refer to the coastal ethnic groups by stereotyping labels such as ‘two tongues’. This ethnic slur implies that there is a difference between one’s words and one’s deeds, and implies inconsistency. The coastal groups are seen as being responsible for the Highlanders’ suffering, because they supposedly invited Indonesia to come to West Papua. On the other hand, Coastals may condemn the highlanders as backward, and unable to manage themselves.
At the micro level, reconciliation has traditionally been practiced, however. Compensation is the most common method, with ritual ceremonies. But when inter-tribal warfare is involved, or in conflicts with the state, this type of reconciliation is insufficient. Ben Giay commented that
We have tried hard in this area of concern, by forming FORERI, but failed because of the lack of accountability of the people in charge. Now, church leaders are tying to revise it, and organise regular ecumenical prayer for reconciliation.
The evidence indicates that reconciliation is not yet taken seriously. Many of the parties involved feel that such a process may threaten their original status. Any promotion of reconciliation and peace can be seen as a threatening challenge, which becomes a stumbling block for a genuine peace and reconciliation process.
In the Papuan civil society problem behaviours that have appeared include unwillingness to compromise, non-cooperation, failure of empathy and emotional unwillingness to resolve problems. The bad relations between the OPM and Presidium, for example, have resulted in loss of trust among the people, solidarity groups and sympathetic governments. The rejection of a Papuan delegation to the last Pacific Island Forum in 2001 by the Nauru government was a clear example. The competing groups declared themselves the only legitimate representatives, which confused the Forum.
Nevertheless reconciliation talks within the Papuan community and between the Papuans and non-Papuans remain important. The question is how to achieve a minimal reconciliation.
There is no magic medicine for patient recovery. Because the nature of the problem of West Papua is complex, sensitive and difficult, what is required are systematic, effective and accountable strategies. In discussing the strategic issue the workshop focused on two major possibilities:
Non-violence refers to liberating and creative behaviour, which contributes to understanding, influence and inspiration in politics and in interpersonal relationships (King 1992; Suu Kyi 1995). Promotion of peace with justice is a paramount objective. As Mahatma Gandhi said:
A non-violent society can be built only on the foundation of harmony and cooperation, without which society is bound to remain violent.
This aspiration can be expressed through language and other symbols, cultural and educational development, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, civil disobedience, power sharing, empowerment and building solidarity through alliances.
Leaders who have this vision can transcend the problems we have identified. However, such visionaries are hard to find in West Papua today, as Jim Elsmlie said at the Workshop. Power struggles have caused problems in finding a single Papuan leader who can project a clear vision and mission for the future. Empowerment of Papuan leaders is therefore vital. Reconciliation among Papuan leaders should be encouraged, so that they will continue to address the importance of the dialogue for peace by presenting a serious peace plan with a clear substance and time scale, identifying major key players and resources. The Workshop participants continued discussion of the strategic problem under the following headings.
Because the Papuans have been subject to exploitation for several decades, we must acknowledge that many have lost their own identity, culture and ways of life. ‘Towards a New Papua’ is Ben Giay’s formula for the struggle to reverse this situation. According to Giay ‘the government should pass new laws to protect Papuan values’. He also urges adoption of the following priorities in the struggle:
The relationship between NGOs in West Papua and the OPM has been unhealthy. Each has accused the other for bringing about social chaos and many casualties. Churches, for example, have been blamed for years for not playing a key role in the reconciliation and peace process. The Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (ELSHAM) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, both in Jayapura, are the only NGOs that have spoken out loudly over the last six years. We in Australia should support their work. Many NGO workers fear above all losing their status and positions, which is wrong, according to Ben Giay and Johannes Bonay.
Consultation and negotiation among these key players are vital. There is urgent need to proceed to this in the near future. In any peace plan, essential components such as cease fire, national peace dialogue, demilitarisation in the region, the end of transmigration, the intervention of third parties, respect for the Papuans’ rights, democratic freedom and a fair balance of power in Papua must be addressed. The following preconditions must also be met:
Each of these organisations is still very weak. They all lack a clear structure, vision and mission and are racked by power struggles. To improve this chaotic situation, these organisations should take up the following tasks:
In the spirit of achieving co-operation and developing common understandings, it is a vital need to develop partnerships among and with key players in Papua and with other solidarity groups outside. So far, groups tend to address matters of concern in an isolated manner. Thus the following tasks should be shouldered:
Previous attempts to set up such a congress did not accommodate the aspirations of all Papuans. One of the problems was lack of consultation and preparation. The primary objective must be to overcome the differences among Papuans and present a common platform and strategies for a peace process. To facilitate this possibility, the following tasks should be taken up:
Internal conflict within Papuan civil society, with its devastating effects, has been one of the major problems for promoting peaceful dialogue between Papuans and Indonesia. Deeply concerned with this situation, calls for reconciliation among Papuans have been a priority of the political agenda in the last two weeks. In an attempt to bring together divergent views and positions, the West Papua Project organised a one and a half day Workshop (III) bringing 12 Papuan leaders from West Papua abroad to the University of Sydney to discuss these immediate concerns.
The Workshop not only produced general conclusions and strategic options, but also utilised mass media effectively. In line with the primary objectives of the West Papua Project (the promotion of peaceful dialogue between the government of Indonesia and the people of West Papua) the participants condemned the root causes of ongoing problems in West Papua, particularly concerning the killing of innocent people in the bloody events in Tembagapura on August 31, 2002 by unknown military gangs. The Indonesian military blamed the OPM for the killings and also accused delegates from West Papua at the Workshop of having some link with the attack. The OPM categorically rejected any involvement and labelled the Indonesian military as responsible. Papua’s police chief has cast doubt on military claims that separatists were responsible for the killing (Moore 2002).
Five major topics were covered in the Workshop discussions:
Developing an understanding of the skills and knowledge of non-violence was seen as a vital theoretical basis for peace advocates in West Papua.
Peaceful dialogue was given a central focus in the discussions. In this respect, special autonomy, ratified by Jakarta last year, was debated from different perspectives. Reflecting on the history of the ‘Act of Free Choice’ of 1969, denial of the rights of Papuans was seen as one of the root causes of continuing violence. Despite polarised views on autonomy the participants were united in calling for a review of the Act under the direct supervision of the United Nations.
The need to treat all Papuans with dignity and to emphasise traditional values of generosity, tolerance and non-violence was another point raised. A careful monitoring of democratic processes in Indonesia, increasing the level of tolerance between Papuans and non-Papuans and respecting fundamental human rights for all were seen as the bases for achieving a common consensus towards peaceful dialogue.
Recognising the existence of organisational obstacles, the need for coherence among Papuan groups and dialogue with human rights organisations throughout Indonesia and Southeast Asia are important steps in gaining sympathy and co-operation as well as to increase public awareness of problems concerning people in the region. The establishment of such alliances should be broadened to include partnerships with groups in the US, West Papua and Australia. The mass media can play an important role in gaining attention for issues relating to peaceful dialogue and resolution of problems in West Papua.
Finally, in discussing negotiation strategies, a few optional strategies should be discussed. It has become apparent that continuing to speak on dignity, clarifying history and emphasising the moral, social and artistic bases of Papuan society, as well as creating solidarity among the people, are important means of restoring dignity and respect for West Papuans. At the same time it is also important to keep open the values of inclusiveness for Indonesians, non-Papuans, commercial interests and even members of Laskar Jihad and the military in order to create partners in peaceful dialogue.
Briefly, these concepts, values and strategies cannot be implemented if there is a continuing escalation of violence, lack of respect for and recognition of human rights, and a well educated population which understands the importance of the peace process and its outcomes. Perhaps an optimistic negotiation strategy is to highlight the importance of education. Education at all levels is, therefore, one of the long term strategic priorities of the West Papua Project.
A third party intervention role in the process of peace negotiations can be very helpful ...
The West Papua Project is now working to establish terms of reference for an International Consultation Group on West Papua (ICGWP). A statement of aims, potential membership and future plans will be formulated. One of the objectives is to demonstrate the importance of raising national and international concern over West Papua and accelerating efforts to promote mediation and peaceful dialogue.
... [T]o renew peace talks between a people and a government where relationships have broken down is a global responsibility. Since West Papua is a potential global citizen, the success or failure of peace talks will clearly and dearly affect global and regional interests. Against this background and in the spirit of helping forward a peace process in Papua, an International Consultation Group on West Papua will be established. Its major objectives will be to:
Membership is open to those with real expertise and relevant experience in the fields of political, economic, social and legal conflict resolution, with particular reference to peace negotiation and third party mediation. Representatives of governments, corporations, solidarity groups and other NGOs and voluntary organisations will be eligible, both Papuans and Non- Papuans.
Developing a common understanding between the two conflicting parties in Papua — the people of West Papua and Indonesia — is a key issue in the efforts of the West Papua Project to help resolve the conflict between them peacefully. Official Indonesian representatives with an interest in the Project are concerned about the ‘lack of a culture of dialogue’ in their own history and experience. There is therefore a commitment to addressing this issue and to work together on a ‘peace plan’ for improving not only the situation in Papua but also Australia’s regional relationship. There is therefore interest in organising yet another workshop on the culture of peace dialogue. This workshop may be held either in Indonesia or in Australia later in the year 2002 in accordance with a suggestion made by the retiring Indonesian Ambassador to Australia.
...
A major problem we face is that leading figures in Indonesia perceive peace calls from and on behalf of West Papua as a new threat to the Indonesian state, and thus take a hostile stand against them. However, there is some political will in Jakarta to engage in peace talks with the Papuans and their supporters in Indonesian civil society — an encouraging point which has emerged in the Project’s own dialogue with the outgoing Indonesian ambassador and Consul General over the last two years. Mobilising public opinion within civil society in Indonesia, particularly among academics, university students, and NGOs, remains essential.
In this particular context the December Workshop was generally perceived as successful despite the problems we have identified. Perhaps the most important, but problematical, outcome of the Workshop was the response it drew from the Indonesian parliament, some of whose members, on the basis of an intelligence report circulated after the Workshop, accused Australia and the Australian government of supporting West Papuan independence. It seems that what happened at the Workshop was seen as direct support for the independence movement. This is only partly true, but it shows that the West Papa Project’s efforts to promote peaceful dialogue can be readily misunderstood, and that it may be necessary to achieve a higher level of tact and political sophistication in the future if Indonesia is to be won over as a partner for peace-making in Papua.
However, promotion of peace cannot be facilitated as long as the problem of internal conflict among Papuans is not addressed and assisted by a third party. Such an unhealthy situation will be used by the Indonesian military to divide the national unity of Papuans. A truth, reconciliation and consolidation process among Papuans can lay the foundation for the achievement of peace in West Papua. ?
Rosario Sanabria, Jamil Raza, Jayadeva Uyangoda and Zainab Wahidin. ‘Civil Society and Conflict Resolution’ in Lindgren G, Wallensteen P and Nordquist K A (eds), Issues in Third World Conflict Resolution, 1990 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala.
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Direktorat Intelejen dan Pengamanan Kepolisian Derah Irian Jaya (2000) ‘Perkiraan Keadaan Intelejen Khusus Tentang Pelaksanaan Operasi Tuntas Matoa’ (2000), No.Pol: R/Kirsus-19/X/ 2000 in Rencana Operasi ‘Tuntas Matoa 2000 POLDA IRJA. A compiled secret document: No.Pol.R/Renops/640/XI/2000, Jayapura.
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Matthew Moore ‘Police Chief queries military story of killings’ 16 September 2002 Sydney Morning Herald p 9.
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