Editors --- "Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage, [2003] FCA 627 - Case Summary" [2003] AUIndigLawRpr 21; (2003) 8(2) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 35

• Williams V Minister For The Environment And Heritage, [2003] Fca 627
• Facts:
• Held, Dismissing The Appeal:

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Court and Tribunal Decisions - Australia

Williams v Minister for the Environment and Heritage, [2003] FCA 627

Federal Court of Australia (Lindgren J)

3 June 2003

[2003] FCA 627

Facts:

Williams filed an appeal on the grounds that the decision that the Court had no power to grant interim relief pursuant to Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 16(1)(d) was wrong at law and, further, Wilcox J erred in applying the principle of the majority in Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56; (1993) 178 CLR 408 that he had no power to grant relief against the second respondent.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

1. The Federal Court has inherent or implied power to make an interlocutory order, which is necessary to enable it to perform its function as such a court [16].

2. A Full Court, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the Court, has implied power to grant an interlocutory injunction as an incident of the appeal [25].

3. The appeal jurisdiction of the Federal Court is to be exercised as a Full Court, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Exceptional circumstances, in which the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised by a single judge, do not include the granting of an interlocutory injunction for the purpose of preserving the subject matter of an appeal to a Full Court [26].

4. Relief can rise no higher than the relief that would be available in the appeal proceeding [28].

5. An interlocutory injunction will be granted in the present motion only if there is an ‘arguable chance that the appeal will succeed’ [30].

6. There was not an arguable case that Wilcox J erred in his view that Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56; (1993) 178 CLR 408 obliged him to refuse the interlocutory injunction against Barrick [31].

7. If there is no right to relief against a person under the general law, that person does not become liable to have an adverse order made under s 16(1)(d) merely by reason of being joined as a respondent in an application to the Federal Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) [35].

8. The appellant’s only claim to standing was as an Aboriginal, which does not disclose a general law right. The general law does not recognise an Aboriginal person as having an interest in the specified area protectable by injunctive relief. The right given by s 9 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) does not constitute such an interest [44].