

New thinking on disasters; the link between safety culture and risk-taking

Introduction

Disasters are often tragic outcomes of high-risk technologies such as mines.

In Australia, more mines are being developed every day, and the risk of disasters is ever increasing.

No matter how effective our conventional safety devices are, there is a form of accident that is inevitable. This relates to accidents that result from 'interacting failures' in a way that could not be foreseen by the designers. In so-called 'tightly coupled production systems' (processes that happen very fast, such as on a high producing mine) the risk is even higher and our risk controls mostly introduce some sort of a technological fix. While we are on the one hand attempting to control the risk, we are also introducing another level of complexity. Are we really controlling the risk?

This is one of the fundamental questions that will be addressed in this paper: Do we have the ability within the Mining Industry and other industries to effectively prevent these catastrophes, or are we, on the contrary, faced with an increasing risk as a result of increasing complexities of our technology, management systems and practices.

This paper will contend that perceived improvements in risk control is an illusion of activity, and that the likelihood of mining catastrophes may be exponentially increasing. Although the paper focuses on the mining sector many aspects may be applicable across a range of industries.

This paper will further contend that we are applying the right solutions to the wrong problems. Our focus is technological and procedural, while our problem is one of *production cultures ripe for error and failure*.

Disasters in the mining industry.

It is impossible to determine the total number of mining employees killed in disasters. In the USA alone, it is estimated that more than 13,000 miners were killed in disasters during the past 200 years, while internationally the figure could be

By CJ Pitzer,
Managing Director, Safemap

in excess of 100,000 people. It would not include single fatal accidents.

Mine Disasters in Australia

Over the past 100 years, 438 mine emp-

loyees lost their lives in 28 mine disasters, and many more have been injured.

Table 1 is a list of such disasters in which two or more persons lost their lives in Australia in mining disasters.

Death is part of the process, it has been said many times. The mining industry is very much under public scrutiny for its

Location	State	Year	Type of Incidence	Fatalities
Creswick Gold Mine	VIC	1882	Mine flooded	22
Bulli Colliery	NSW	1887	Explosion	81
Mount Kembla	NSW	1902	Explosion	94
Mount Mulligan	QLD	1921	Coal dust explosion	76
Bellbird Colliery	NSW	1923	Fire & explosion	21
Metropolitan Colliery	NSW	1925	Outburst of CO ₂	2
Redhead Colliery	NSW	1926	Gas explosion	5
Hart's Aberdare	QLD	1936	Gas explosion	4
Wonthaggi Mine	VIC	1937	Explosion	13
Ebbe Vale No 3	QLD	1945	Gas explosion	4
Aberdare Extended	QLD	1954	Gas explosion	2
Metropolitan Colliery	NSW	1954	Outburst of CO ₂	2
Collinsville Mine	QLD	1954	Outburst of CO ₂	7
Bulli Colliery	NSW	1965	Underground fire	4
Wyee State Colliery	NSW	1966	Fall of roof	5
Blockman's Flat	NSW	1972	Fall of roof	3
Box Flat Ipswich	QLD	1972	Gas & dust explosion	17
Kianga Mine	QLD	1975	Gas & dust explosion	13
Agnew Mine	WA	1977	Fall down shaft	5
Leichhardt	QLD	1978	Gas outburst	2
Appin Colliery	NSW	1979	Explosion	14
Laleham No 1 Colliery	QLD	1982	Fall of roof	3
Moura No 4 Mine	QLD	1986	Explosion	12
Emu	WA	1989	Mine flooded	6
Western Main	NSW	1991	Roof fall	3
South Bulli Mine	NSW	1991	Gas explosion	3
Moura No 2 Mine	QLD	1994	Explosion	11
Gretley Colliery	NSW	1996	Shaft flood	4
Total				438

Table 1: Mine disasters in Australia, 1882-1996. Compiled from Dept of Mineral Resources in various states

poor safety records, in Australia and in every mining country in the world. Why is it that we seem to have more disasters than many other high-risk industries? Are we inherently more risky than, say, chemical and construction industries, or are we simply not managing safety as well as they do?

Risk—In the Eye of the Beholder

Risk is like beauty—it exists in the eye of the beholder.

We make a fundamental mistake when we, as safety managers, deal with risk as a 'fixed attribute', something physical that can be precisely measured and managed.

The misconception of risk as a fixed attribute is ingrained into our industry and is a product of the so-called science of risk management. Risk management has created the illusion that risk can be quantified on the basis of probability, exposure to risk, and from the likely consequences of accidents occurring. Risk management science can even produce highly technical and mathematically advanced models of the probabilistic nature of a risk.

The problem with this is that risk is not a physical quantum. It is, instead, a social construction. Everyone has a unique set of assumptions and experiences that shape their interpretations of objects or events. People tend to ignore, 'misperceive' or deny events that do not fit their worldview. People find what they expect to find.

Management Stands Accused

This is not a game of semantics. How we look at risk is extremely important. If we accept risk as a physical quantum, we are inevitably led to the view that management, as an 'amoral calculator', is responsible for accidents—an accusation that is hard to escape or disprove.

What happens when a post tragedy analysis is conducted? Management stands accused of culpability by unions and the public: 'They knew about the risks, they violated safety rules, yet they pursued economic goals at the cost of workers' lives'.

If, instead, one accepts the argument that risk is a social construction, a totally new perspective on disasters and accidents emerges. This will be explored in detail later on.

Three high profile disasters pointed to management culpability:

- the Challenger Shuttle disaster of 1986;
- the Piper Alpha disaster of 1986;
- the Moura disaster of 1994.

In each of these events, the blame was squarely placed at the door of management. By looking at one of these

events—the Challenger disaster—in some detail I would like to demonstrate or, at least suggest, other explanations for the Moura disaster and possibly for many other mining disasters where the common accusation was that of gross neglect and poor attitudes. This paper asks why.

I would also like to offer an alternative approach of preventing accidents and, when accidents do happen, I propose another way of inquiring into them.

Lessons from Challenger

An organisation is a complex set of dynamics, systems, power plays, actions and reactions. Organisations are able to take risky decisions because of the large quantity of expertise available to them, and they are willing to take these decisions because the responsibility for them is often absolved and dissolved (Janis 1973).

The Challenger disaster offers an excellent case study of these influences.

Countdown...

On 26 January, the date the Challenger space shuttle was scheduled for launch, the weather forecast predicted poor conditions and the launch was rescheduled for 27 January.

On 27 January, during countdown, alarms indicated that an exterior latch locking mechanism had not closed properly. Launch was postponed for a few hours to fix the problem.

During that time wind speeds at the launch pad increased above an acceptable level and launch was rescheduled for 28 January.

The weather forecast predicted that the temperature would drop below 20F and the engineers attached to Thiokol, the contractor who manufactured the solid rocket boosters, were asked via teleconference to assess the risk.

The Thiokol engineers expressed concern about the low temperatures (below 56F was their threshold), and recommended that the launch be postponed for a few hours.

NASA reacted harshly with one senior administrator asking over the phone 'My God, when do you want us to launch, next April?'. The meeting was adjourned with Thiokol being asked to review their decision. A recorded teleconference was arranged a few hours later to listen to Thiokol's 'reviewed response'.

In those few hours Thiokol changed their recommendation to 'OK to launch'. The four top administrators in Thiokol had met to discuss NASA rejection of their original recommendation and three of the four changed their vote to launch, with the

fourth, more junior, person still dissenting. He was told to 'take off his engineer's hat and put on his management hat'.

He changed his vote.

Their decision was communicated during the second teleconference and the launching procedure recommenced (President's Report 1986).

Launch...

On 28 January, 1986 at 11.38am, Challenger was launched. Seventy-three seconds later a huge fireball erupted and Challenger disappeared in a cloud of smoke. The seven-crew members trapped in their seats were apparently still alive as they fell back to earth, dying instantly when the capsule hit the water at 200 miles per hour.

A cheap O-ring had failed causing a multi-billion dollar rocket to fail. But was it that simple?

Of course not. NASA had known for a long time about the O-ring problem. A year earlier, a budget analyst wrote a memorandum warning about the risks associated with the O-ring and seal failures.

Even worse, a NASA internal memorandum prior to the disaster warned about suspect seal technology. Seal erosion on rocket boosters had occurred 12 times since 1977!!

The night before the fateful Challenger launch, Thiokol had warned NASA about the possible risks associated with O-ring failure. Charts and graphs were produced clearly showing the serious doubts Thiokol had about launching.

A separate contractor, Rockwell, builders of the shuttle, did a launch pad inspection just prior to the launch. They found ice on the rocket outlets and equipment and they also recommended that the launch be postponed. This was overridden by NASA mission management who recommended launch to senior NASA management.

The final recommendation that these NASA managers made to the senior NASA management the next morning was simply: 'OK to launch'.

This communiqué said nothing of the cold weather or the launch postponement recommendations the previous night, and Thiokol's concerns about the O-ring problem (President's Commission Report, 1986).

The President's Commission of Inquiry into the Challenger disaster discovered these glaring anomalies and deficiencies during its investigations. The Commission's conclusions are summarised below.

Enormous pressure to launch...

NASA was under enormous pressure

to launch. This pressure arose from numerous associated events:

- budget cuts by Congress;
- commercial concerns that the European space program was gaining on them;
- the need to prove that the shuttle program was viable for commercial and military reasons (this was the time of the Reagan Star Wars program);
- previous postponed launches;
- inability to sustain the high launch rate needed to demonstrate and justify the economic viability of the shuttle program;
- the massive publicity accompanying this launch because of the first civilian (teacher) astronaut on board;
- the media linking the timing of the launch to an important presidential speech by Reagan that was scheduled to take place during the mission.

Structural causes...

Structural causes were identified as:

- budget cuts and compromises to safety to meet cost constraints;
- a widening gap between NASA goals and the means to achieve them;
- flawed decision making processes;
- substantially reduced work forces;
- managers overriding engineers' concerns and warnings.

In short, production pressures and managerial wrongdoing appeared to be the culprits.

The structural origins of the disaster—competition, scarce resources and production pressure—permeated NASA and dominated decision-making on the eve of the launch. The NASA managers were highly competent people who thoroughly understood the engineering and managerial issues involved.

But in order to secure resources for their organisation's survival, and to please their shareholder the U.S. Government, they took a calculated risk, violated safety requirements, and they lost.

Afterwards, all their decisions could be shown as flawed, and some even as callous.

Why Do Good People Do Such Dirty Work?

The pressures and structural problems experienced by the NASA managers happen routinely in most, if not all, organisations.

If any organisation were analysed with the same intensity and magnification of the Challenger Inquiry the conclusion would be the same: production pressures compromising safety, and middle managers and workers routinely taking risks.

Risks are taken as a matter of routine

in most organisations for who is to know exactly what the level of risk is—how safe is safe enough? Despite the best intentions and commitment to safety, trade-offs have to occur.

Why do competent experienced managers make decisions that lead to accidents and the loss of lives and property? Why do good people do such 'dirty work'?

Managers are normally well-qualified and experienced, and most have positive intentions to further the goodwill of the organisations they work for. Why do these law-abiding citizens violate rules, laws, and regulations, knowingly risking the lives of their subordinates or workmates?

Are managers conscienceless 'amoral calculators' of risk?

If we accept the majority of public inquiries into mining and industrial disasters they certainly seem to be. In the past five to ten years almost all public inquiries have blamed management. Prior to that, blame was cast on human error and, before that, God got the blame.

Mine Managers - Amoral Calculators of Risk?

Let's return to the question posed in the beginning of this paper: are mine managers 'amoral calculators of risk'?

Despite the apparently overwhelming evidence against management, the answer is emphatically 'no'.

There are at least two reasons to assert this. Let's go back to the Challenger example to explain.

Anecdotal evidence...

The first reason is a peculiar one. It concerns anecdotal evidence and the powerful influence it has over the judgment process. A disaster inquiry should be a scientific analysis of an event, performed by highly qualified and experienced people. The flaw in the process is the quality of information the investigators use.

Not only are inquiries restricted to information that is available at the time, but this information is:

- often very distorted, twisted or slightly changed by the 'accused'—intentionally or unintentionally;
- incorrectly assessed as linked to the disaster event. Information that seems to offer clues or indicate problems contributing to the event may in fact not be linked at all. It is seldom possible to link prior incidents or events to a disaster event in a way that would withstand scientific scrutiny.
- ignored if it doesn't fit into the paradigm of 'managerial wrongdoing'.

As an example of the last point, NASA

management stood accused, and was found guilty, of safety and production trade-offs. Production demands overrode safety (recognise this accusation?). Yet, what was not scrutinised was the number of times safety was *not* traded off against production demands. The reality was (and is in most companies today) that the vast majority of daily production decisions are made with a clear focus on safety. A comprehensive review of the NASA decision-making processes found only exceptional cases of such trade offs and these were always done within a context of a competent consideration of opposing facts.

The problem that eventually led to the 'flawed decisions' prior to the Challenger disaster was that the engineers and managers together developed a definition of the situation that allowed them to carry on as if nothing was wrong even though they were continually faced with evidence that something was wrong.

The logic behind the statement that safety/production trade-offs were made is flawed. If an organisation is heavily production-oriented it makes no logical sense for managers to make decisions that risk the very existence of a whole project, such as the Space Shuttle program.

In effect, the critics are saying that the management would risk the project for the same reasons that they would not risk the project.

Why would a mine manager, knowingly and willingly risk his job, his career, the lives of fellow employees and the very future of his organisation to win so relatively little? He would have to be very stupid indeed!

When examining the Moura disaster in Australia, what was *not* scrutinised was the hundreds and thousands of times management made routine decision in the interest of safety.

However, in the Challenger disaster, the President's Commission found a host of decisions that supposedly demonstrated cost/safety trade offs. But an intensive revision of the very same Commission's report shows that many, if not most, decisions were made in the interests of safety (Cook 1986).

A similar review of the report on the Moura Disaster shows numerous decisions were made in the interests of safety or as precautionary measures.

Most training dollars, most dollars spent on systems and controls, and most of the money spent on most activities on a mine is inherently meant to ensure safety. Unfortunately so much of this spending has become 'routinised' that it is hard to

identify its contribution to safety. To make this clearer, think of driving your car and try to identify any action which is *not* designed to ensure your or others' safety. Except for stepping on the accelerator to 'make the car go' (production) everything else is focused on safety.

Honest errors...

The second reason why the 'manager as amoral calculator' theory does not hold water is the complex question of risk evaluation and the possibility of making honest errors in risk calculation.

The risk management discipline often gives the impression that the probability of an event is calculable and that it can be classified on the basis of the likelihood of it occurring.

From a statistical point of view this approach is correct; it is possible to calculate the likelihood of any event occurring, say at 2 times per million per annum. However, any manager individually faced with a single event is in no position whatsoever to make any sense of that statistical number. It is humanly impossible to work with a figure of the magnitude of 2 per million per annum. How can a manager judge whether a task is 'too risky'? He simply cannot, unless the probability of an accident approaches 1 (100%), like jumping off a cliff.

Unfortunately most work place accidents are on the category of highly unlikely and can approach a likelihood so small (0.0000002%) that no human mind can come to grips with it. Managers, like everyone else, use 'gut feel' in these circumstances.

Even the highly specialised engineers of NASA could not agree afterwards on the likelihood of the Challenger disaster. Their estimates ranged from 1 in 100 launches to 1 in 100,000 launches (Dala, Fowlkes and Hoadley 1988). These differences are, in statistical terms, enormous. The difference between the two is one failed launch every ten years or one failed launch every ten thousand years!

In summary, the assertions that managers are 'good people doing dirty work', and that their actions may actually be classified as 'criminal' is seriously flawed, yet these assertions are widely accepted, even by managers themselves. The many events that make up a catastrophe can be so trivial and banal by themselves that they are routinely overlooked, underestimated or ignored. In the catastrophic interaction of these events, however, the accusations of dirty work and management wrongdoing are often inescapable.

Who is to be blamed?

It is unfortunate that an inquiry or even a simple accident investigation is a blaming process. If it is not the human operator, then it is his/her superior or, more likely today, the manager or management, that gets the blame, often for events over which they had little or no real control.

If none of the above can be blamed, and God can't be blamed, who then is responsible for the event? Someone or something must be!

There are two main reasons why operators, supervisors or managers cannot automatically be blamed for these events.

Firstly, it has to do with the complexity of even the most trivial events, a complexity that renders any operator or manager instantly incompetent to deal with the situation at hand.

Secondly, it has to do with a situation in which people, whether they are operators or managers, often find that they are forced to carry on as if nothing is wrong even though they are continually faced with evidence that something is wrong. In other words, a process in which abnormalities are 'normalised'.

Interactive Complexity

Let us look at the first reason for fixing the blame elsewhere than the operators or managers, namely the issue of complexity and operator/managerial incompetence.

Virtually every type of industry rates operator error high on its list of causal factors, generally at a level of about 60 to 80% (Peterson, 1989).

Is this valid and is it logical? I shall argue 'no' to each question.

From the beginning of human time, we have had natural disasters, and for many centuries, our definition of a disaster was that it was God-made. As we marched ahead in the process of industrialisation we built devices that could crash, sink, burn or explode and, when these events happened, our answers were relatively simple and effective: We prevented accidents by removing the causal factors and, through trial-and-error, we eliminated most of the problems, for example safety relief valves became a requirement for pressurised vessels.

Our focus then turned to the actions of people. (This factor had, of course, always been there but had not been as noticeable because of the preponderance of technical accidents). We declared war on human error and did this, at least since the 1920's, by treating workers as chimpanzees that needed to be trained, conditioned, rewarded and regulated. This has continued to modern times

through the proliferation of vast volumes of safety and health legislation, and through the advent of risk and/or loss control management systems. Combining this with a huge increase in technology over the last 25 years we have added a new cause of accidents: 'interactive complexity'.

The production system within a large coal mine industry today is extremely prone to these 'interactive complexities'. This occurs even though the mining methods may be less complex than underground mining, simply because of the speed and volume of production activities.

Perrow (1984) provides a classification systems of types of industries, which in many ways is a useful framework to identify high-risk or disaster prone circumstances.

The two continuums used are Complexity—Linearity, and Tight and Loose Coupling.

Complex systems are characterised by features such as tight spacing of equipment, proximate production steps, personnel specialisation, unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops, many control parameters with potential interactions and limited understanding of associated process in the organisation.

Tightly coupled systems are characterised by having time-dependent processes e.g. in chemical plants, reactions are instantaneous and cannot be allowed to be allowed at certain stages of the process, as with underground mines. Sequences of activities are invariant, and the production processes are fixed. There is little 'slack' in tightly coupled systems. (*Figure 1*)

The mining industry, especially the underground and high volume surface mines, belong the highest risk category for potential disasters, by design and by organisational structures. (But even so, the incidence of disasters in the mining industries is far higher than the in higher risk industries such as the nuclear, chemical and space industries. Perrow, (1984) concluded that the mining industry is simply 'not managing safety well enough'.

Furthermore, in the social environment of employees, they are subjected to increasingly complex systems of management, engineering and legislation.

We have placed the operator in a production environment in which he/she is expected to:

- make rational and logical observations of his/her environment;
- rationally interpret events, requirements and procedures; and
- act and react rationally on those interpretations.

	Linear	Complex
Tightly Coupled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rail transport Airways 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nuclear plants Space shuttles Oil rigs Chemical plants Deep underground mines
Loosely Coupled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assembly line production Most manufacturing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Underground coal mines High volume mines Military

Figure 1: A classification of different types of organisations (based on Perrow 1984)

Yet it is very seldom possible for the average operator to really know all the possible links between systems and the effect of one on the other. Of course the same operator would, after an accident has occurred, be able to recognise his mistakes and correctly identify the alternatives he should have selected.

It can therefore safely be concluded that the operator made a mistake, and that a repetition of the error can be eliminated with better training, simpler systems, or with another more back-up systems or alarms.

But, of course, these things are only possible *after* the event. *Before* the event the possibilities can be complex, or at least confusing, and in a tightly controlled high volume work environment you don't need much more than this to create havoc.

Something else to bear in mind is that great events have small beginnings. On the Piper Alpha oilrig, the small beginning was an inadequately tightened flange on a gas pipeline which leaked causing gas to ignite, followed by explosions and fire and the death of 167 people (Cullen 1990).

In modern organisations the following 'layers' of complexities often exist:

- The basic skills and **engineering knowledge** of the management and supervision introduce numerous requirements;
- Management and **administration systems** are implemented on top of that;
- Legislative requirements** are to be maintained on top of that;
- The **quality management system** is implemented on top of that, bringing with it its own volumes of standards, inspections and audits.
- The **safety management system** is

implemented on top of that, with safety requirements and regulations to be maintained, and another level of auditing.

- Risk management process** are implemented on top of that with new risk controls to be maintained.

The level of complexity of each of these systems on their own is often mind-boggling. The level of interactive complexity could be disastrous.

Over-trained, over-rewarded and under-punished...

Is the only way to avoid disasters attributable to human error, like Piper Alpha, to train them to tighten flanges, punish them if they don't, reward them if they do, and put the problem in the 'too hard basket' if none of these work?

This is an approach followed in the coal mining industry to the point where we now probably have a workforce that is over-trained, over-rewarded and under-punished. And we're not winning the war against accidents because we are fighting it with more and more risk assessments, involving Bayesian probabilities, ALARA principles, discounted future probabilities, F-curves and isopleths and the like. All this results in more rules, alarms, systems, and more interactive complexities.

Ironically, the more risk assessments and analysis we throw at the problem, the more we *increase* the risk.

Risk assessments can seriously lead us astray. Consider the following scenario at a board meeting of a large corporation.

As low as reasonably achievable...

The Financial Director announces that he has received advice from his risk assessors: If the Company does not install a planned safety device the outcome is

likely to be the death of one more worker per year in a business employing 130,000. With a depressed labour market and an attitude amongst workers that fatalities always happen to someone else, the Company is not facing a lot of pressure to install the device.

On the benefit side, by not installing the device the Company will save \$50 million dollars. This saving will enable the Company to avoid a \$20 million price rise in their products and allow it to retain this year's \$30 million merit bonus. Against a statistical probability of one worker death this year, the customers, the shareholders and the workers will greatly benefit. What is a life worth? Well, the Board considers that \$50 million is pretty high for the possible loss of a random anonymous worker and the safety device is scrubbed.

If this story appals you, just remember that the risk analysis presented by the Financial Director is correct. It is a good bargain. Risk assessment is, after all, about getting risk down 'as low as *reasonably* achievable'.

If you consider the story as immoral and irrelevant and refuse to believe that no one could think like that, you will be surprised to learn that a similar decision was made at the Ford Motor Company during the 1970's when they decided not to buffer the fuel tank in the Pinto car. This led to a significant increase in fatal accidents where crash victims, trapped in their cars, were burned to death. Ford Pintos were known to easily catch fire during rear-end accidents (Dowie 1977).

This type of thinking is encouraged, even facilitated, by risk assessment procedures. Most companies, at some stage, try to quantify the cost of accidents, if only to express concern that accidents are costing money, or substantiate a statement that safety is good business.

I am not criticising this thinking, but I am expressing concern that assessing physical risk without also assessing sociological risk, the thinking patterns of the organisation, the forces, and the influences within the organisation all lead to the creation of a very poor, restricted and potentially damaging definition of risk.

And of course risk is one step away from disaster. That is the focus of this paper.

Can the situation be so desperately bad as portrayed here?

In practical terms and looking at our day-to-day operations the situation is not so bleak. We produce coal in greater volumes more efficiently, and with fewer accidents.

Risk management, however, still seems to be the 'beast' within our organisations.

Management still seems to make amoral decisions and ignore risks. So why is there a perception of 'risk-taking amongst management'?

The answer to this is not simple.

Normalisation of Abnormal Events

Earlier I said that there were two reasons why operators, supervisors and managers cannot be blamed for a disaster. We have looked at the first one, namely the complexity of events.

The second factor is called the 'normalisation of abnormal events', and I said that such a process commonly exists within organisations, as it did in the NASA management prior to the Challenger launch.

Three factors explain this process of normalisation:

- the production of culture;
- the culture of production;
- structural secrecy.

The production of culture...

A culture is a set of solutions produced by a group of people to meet specific problems which they commonly face. These solutions become institutionalised and passed on as the rules, rituals and values of the group.

It is falsely assumed that each large organisation has a common culture. Most organisations are segmented and frequently have as many cultures as they have sub-units. Although there may be some commonalities between sub-unit cultures, the degree to which sub-units hold these commonalities will always differ.

The culture within a workgroup, or sub-unit, may be even more focused. People in a unit, or from different units, may be drawn together because they have a certain task to perform, and they develop a culture that is unique to that specific task. When the task ends the group and its culture dissolves, while new ones form around new tasks.

The work groups develop and share certain definitions of each situation, definitions that often persist (Robbins 1991).

The creation of work group cultures ensures that new information is interpreted in terms of the culture concerned.

To illustrate this point, I'll return to the Challenger disaster.

As reported in the President's Commission Report (1986): Prior to the shuttle program early tests showed that the solid rocket booster (SRB) joints (which contained the O-rings) had unexpected performance deviations. The engineers alerted management in accordance with procedures, who reinterpreted the deviation and officially labelled it

'acceptable risk' (Naturally there was no risk in this decision, because the shuttle program had not been launched yet!).

The workgroup accepted this new standard and treated each new program deviation within the wider band of acceptable risk thus created.

Between 1977 and 1985 the first abnormality was normalised to accept that the primary O-ring would withstand erosion by hot gases, and in the unlikely event it did not, the secondary O-ring would. Although problems with the O-ring were identified twelve times, and there were discussions and disagreements about mechanics, the workgroup culture that the O-ring joint was an acceptable risk was never questioned. For 10 years this 'culture' prevailed, until that fateful morning in January 1986, despite the occurrence of a new problem; cold temperatures never before experienced. This is the fatal effect of culture.

At most coal mines in Australia a very fixed and pronouncedly negative culture existed between the levels of the organisation. There existed little trust between operators, supervisors and management.

A report on culture surveys conducted previously by CJ Pitzer (1996) in the coal mining industry showed extremely negative safety attitudes, largely influenced by a negative industrial relations climate in the industry. Moura probably did not escape this.

So why did they continue to 'normalise' these abnormalities despite all of the evidence? The answer lies in the culture of production.

The culture of production...

The engineering and production professions give the impression of precision, rule-making and qualified thinking. The reality, often overlooked, is often the opposite.

When accidents do *not* happen the opportunity to investigate the engineering process in depth does not often present itself. If an organisation, any organisation, were subjected to an on-the-spot investigation, the public would discover the real messy inside story of 'normal' engineering practice which, after a disaster investigation, looks like an accident waiting to happen.

There are some powerful processes in organisations, focused on creating satisfaction and minimising stresses, strains and conflict.

No dynamic organisation (and that includes individuals) can constantly function under stress. There is therefore

a powerful drive towards equilibrium.

Vaughan (1996) shows that NASA had two formal processes in the organisation designed to facilitate the management of launches, namely the Acceptable Risk Process (ARP), and the Flight Readiness Review (FRR).

The ARP process classified all risks, to enable a comprehensive analysis of risks and a proper classification record. The O-ring joints were investigated, tested and reviewed over many years and, although they were accepted as a risk, there was never any serious doubt about their resistance, because:

- the Apollo programs had, for many years, operated with the same design on Titan rockets;
- a secondary O-ring was added as a back up should the primary ring fail. Plus, many laboratory tests showed that the O-ring would hold;
- most of the Challenger and SRB parts and systems could only ever be fully tested under real flight conditions. When the SRBs' of previous launches were disassembled (a routine process) no problems with the O-ring were found;
- 'flying with flaws' was not abnormal in the culture of NASA. It was normal, acceptable, even essential. While outsiders may have seen them as 'known flaws', insiders saw them simply as 'residual risk' which they had analysed and rationalised through the Acceptable Risk Process;
- organisations that constantly have to deal with high risks develop the means (or mindsets) to deal with them. If they don't, the continuous risk will destroy them;
- the high level of risk analysis, and the qualification process, created an 'impression of invulnerability' in the organisation—which it wanted to assume as quickly as possible. The more risk assessments were done, and the more successful the organisation became at managing the risks, the less they expected risks. (It is folly to argue that risks are under control as soon as they are qualified and quantified and a control measure introduced - because, as discussed earlier, risks are a social phenomena.)
- no one in NASA had the ability to recommend that the whole Space Shuttle program should be put on ice until the SRBs joint was redesigned. Those pressures would have been simply too excessive for any team or individual to handle. And, despite all the numerous attempts to flag the issue, no-one was ultimately brave enough to

go against the production culture.

All this created a powerful culture, which accepted the risk and proceeded with the flight.

Piper Alpha

- On the Piper Alpha Oil rig, the water deluge system, its main fire fighting capacity, was seriously deficient for four years. It is difficult to understand why this could occur, but on the oil rig, it had become 'acceptable and normal'.
- An engineer warned the management of Occidental Petroleum, owners of Piper Alpha, that the gas outlets on Piper Alpha were extremely dangerous and exposing the workers on the rig to enormous risks. These warnings were ignored, and everybody accepted the risks associated with it. They even considered to get rid of the emergency ship.

They were 'flying with flaws'.

Moura disaster

Let us look at the Moura mine, and the prevailing 'culture' prior to the explosion. The following are extracts from the Warden's Inquiry report (1996):

- The Mine manager was informed that the increase in CO was linear not exponential and they concluded that no problem was evident – no different than 'flying with flaws'.
- 'The background of sealing panels at Moura No.2 was that, apart from a couple times, practice rather than exception was to continue to work underground as sealed panels passed through the explosive range'. The risk is known, defined and accepted, in the same way the risk of O-ring failures were.

The following deficiencies and practices all became 'normal' and 'acceptable' to the people dealing with and working in these conditions every day.

- 'Ventilation was sluggish...'
- 'In practice there was evidence that these appliances were affected by roof falls or local strata stability and that their function was, at times, compromised...'
- 'There was evidence of ventilation problems...'
- 'The likely compound effect of all these ventilation alterations was considered undesirable...' (by the Inquiry)

In an underground coal mine the lifeline is ventilation, and this lifeline was compromised. They also were 'flying with flaws...'

Belief in margin of error

All the risk assessment processes and engineering history of the SRB's pointed

to one thing: there is margin for error. They have had many successful launches, many laboratory tests showed that the secondary O-ring provided a margin of error which did not exist before, and the engineers of Thiokol and NASA turned their attention to more immediate and more urgent problems.

With that, the next critical ingredient for a disaster has been created: the redundancy of risk.

As soon as this cultural feature becomes fixed in the organisation, the 'bandwidth' for accepting risk slowly increases, and every day, the potential for a disastrous failure looms closer...

Many times in its history, there will be 'no failure and no event', but only if they heeded the warnings!

An analysis of the launches of all the shuttle missions after the event produced a graph which was almost damning: It showed that of all flights launched *above 65 degrees (Fahrenheit)*, 17% of these had anomalies during launch. Of the flights launched below 65 degrees, 100% showed anomalies (Vaughan 1996).

On 28 January, NASA launched at 27 degrees.

But this graph was never drawn and an opportunity to avert the disaster was lost.

At Moura, a similar graph was never drawn, namely the ones mentioned above on the increases in CO and the ones on the so-called Graham's ratio, which had it been used in context with other information, 'may have tipped caution in the right direction'.

Further examples of the gradual acceptance of risks through a continuing belief in margin of error at Moura:

'Reliance on incubation period as primary determinant of likelihood of spontaneous combustion led to some false sense of security...and some complacency...'

'It was widely believed that a slow steady rise in CO production could not constitute a problem and that an exponential rise was required to indicate a heating ...'

'However none could recount the source of such impression' (Warden 1996).

The belief in a margin of error is a result of all high-risk work environments. In organisations such as this a 'mindset' develops over time that risk can and should be conquered. In fact the most fundamental purpose of organisations such as NASA, oil rigs and mining companies is to conquer risk. And they do that through a belief in their ability to achieve a culture of 'can do' and a belief in the redundancy of risk.

An organisation that does not believe in the redundancy of risk will find it impossible to continue as a business. And there in lies the irony—what makes us successful as a mining company is also our undoing, our weakness.

Structural secrecy...

It was later revealed that on the eve of the Challenger launch, the higher levels of NASA were not informed of the initial concerns expressed by Thiokol about launch. According to Centre Director Lucas' testimony NASA's directors were only afterwards informed of Thiokol's and Rockwell's warnings. He said that he had been told that 'an issue concerning the weather had been resolved and that the launch had been discussed very thoroughly by the people at Thiokol and the Space Flight Centre and it had been concluded agreeably that there was no problem'. He said further that he had a recommendation by Thiokol to launch and the 'most knowledgeable people and engineering talent had agreed with the recommendation' (Vaughan 1996).

The President's Commission found that communication problems existed (heard that before?) and, because the engineers failed to express their doubts about the issues surrounding the launch, it was concluded that the lower levels of management had deliberately withheld information flowing to the senior levels.

Was it just a question of deliberate withholding of information, something that can be described as human, and therefore both understandable and punishable? Or on the other hand, was it something senior management could be blamed for, if it was their autocratic, aggressive behaviour that led to the suppression of communication or to the faulty communication systems?

The answer, as always, is not that simple. Secrecy is built into the very structure and fabric of organisations.

The division of labour between sub-units, levels of management, geographic location and so on, actively segregates knowledge about tasks and goals. Specialisation further inhibits this knowledge. The functional focus of organisations (production, engineering etc) is such that almost every organisation has departments at loggerheads. Communication systems in most modern organisations have grown so complex that *more* communication frequently results in *less* knowledge. Secrecy in organisations is on the increase.

Top people do not get all the information churning around in their organisations.

In fact they get very little—by design and by necessity. The sheer quantities of information, especially in our electronic age, are such that we cannot make sense of it all unless it is severely edited.

Decision-makers have to rely on 'signals' developed based on experience. The bulk of the information remains unknown to them.

Secrecy also develops as a result of weak signals. Often in organisations warnings about any course of action are many and diverse. No activity, program or project is done with absolute certainty and risks are never completely understood and calculated.

Even if people overcome their reluctance to voice opinions about danger, risks or threats to an intended course of action, their signals be may simply too weak to be heard in the organisation and they get lost in the static. For example, one engineer at NASA explicitly recommended that launches should be terminated until the problems with the O-ring failures were sorted out. This signal, although highly significant in hindsight and apparently indicating criminal inattention among those who should have heard it, was simply not heard!

The signal was not given to anybody with sufficient authority to do anything about it.

Systematic censorship...

Adding to secrecy in the organisation is the process of 'systematic censorship', common to all organisations.

At every level of all organisations a process of information censorship takes places continuously and at varying rates. It is a process over which management has no clear control.

There is a natural tendency at every level to withhold as much bad news as possible if it can be done unnoticed. Although this can lead to catastrophic consequences it is essentially a very functional and necessary process in most organisations. It ensures that top levels are not overwhelmed by paperwork, that decisions are taken at the appropriate level of the organisation, and that only critical exceptions are communicated to senior management.

One of the most important reasons why 'structural secrecy' has developed in mines in Australia today is the untenable situation developing on the IR front. Strategically, we have modern approaches to people management sweeping through the industry, with a new and positive emphasis on the critical interfaces of

management and supervisor-operators.

Against this we have an industrial relations arena where the battleground and the battle rules are antiquated, and where unions have been unable to establish a new and modern role for themselves. It seems that the unions' most basic point of departure is still that management is exploiting workers and they see their role as fundamentally that of protection. This outdated notion has no links with the reality of mines implementing benevolent, and very participative, management systems. The result is a high degree of emotional and philosophical conflict between the opponents. This, in turn, has profoundly increased secrecy at the lower organisational levels.

It is certainly true that trade unions played an important role in organisational communications in the past and ensured that management were 'kept honest' in balancing capital goals with social needs of workers. But modern organisations are highly participative and flexible and unions, in their failure to adopt a flexible approach to modern organisational practices, may themselves be contributing to the very processes that foster a high-risk culture.

A high degree of job specialisation is also contributing to the loss of information in organisations. The people occupying the many new specialist positions are experiencing great difficulty in sharing information amongst themselves. Add to this the tendency, at middle and senior management levels of organisations, for engineers to become managers and administrators, losing their hands-on engineering exposure and their day-to-day understanding of production and engineering processes. This may inhibit their ability to effectively understand, challenge or reject the technical information they receive from lower levels.

Another factor is the creation of highly specialised safety departments in many organisations from which managers must often accept information and interventions on face value. Most companies today operate some kind of safety and/or risk management system. These systems create blizzards (even cyclones!) of paperwork, terminology and jargon which managers have no option but to accept and visibly support.

This was the process typical of the NASA management structures.

Quite often—as happened with the O-ring—warning signals may be only weakly received in the organisation and lost sight of. Combine these weak signals

with the mixed signals that managers in the real world have to contend with and you have, at the very least, a confused situation.

It is practically impossible for any management team to act on each of the multitude of signals that reach them. One reason for this is that the levels of probability of any of these possible events often fall in a range where it is physically impossible for managers to logically and rationally prioritise them.

An example of this was the NASA manager who was accused of neglect because he spent most of his time prior to the launch on the problems of the SRB's parachutes, instead of working on the O-ring problem. But at that stage, the O-ring was regarded as a classified and acceptable risk, and the parachute problem (it continuously tore and had the potential to cause the large boosters to fall back to earth unrestrained) was an acute, very urgent and very realistic problem to deal with—and he dealt with the problem with great commitment. The critical issue here is that the manager could not possibly make a rational judgement about two risks of equal probability but of different perceived urgency.

At Moura, management was dealing with safety problems far removed from the one of spontaneous combustion. Of sixty six risk assessments conducted on the mine site just prior to the disaster, only one dealt with the problem of spontaneous combustion. The management of that mine was, like all managements of mines all over the world, just dealing with urgent problems, reacting to signals which they receive about the relative importance of these events. They could not possibly be expected to weight one risk against another, and make a 'mathematically correct' decision. No one can do that.

Nor, sensibly, can mine managers make similar judgements before the event—and be expected to make them logically. Yet in hindsight, it is all too easy to demonstrate that their failure to do so was neglectful and wrong.

On Piper Alpha, it was 'regretfully evident' to the inquiry that 'management failed in some very basic duties' (Cullen 1988). Even a decision the manager of the oil rig made to reduce the risk to divers in the water was slammed by the inquiry as a 'wrong decision'.

What the inquiry overlooked in this case was that it was a decision in the interest of safety, in as much as NASA managers made similar decisions and also at Moura, where several decisions they made can only be seen as 'in the interest

of safety' or as precautionary.

Yet in hindsight, these decisions appear flawed, but they were not. They were realistic decisions made at the time under realistic circumstances.

Systematic distortion...

A close relative of structural secrecy is the concept of 'systematic distortion'. At the same time systematic censorship in the organisation reduces the information available to the top levels, unfavourable information—that is information that does not support the ambitions, goals, or survival needs of the organisation—is also filtered out.

This unfavourable information is not lost by malicious intent, or purposeful concealment, or even just because of a reluctance to tell superiors things they do not want to hear. The information is lost because that is the way organisations tend to function: people deliberately seek out favourable information, often to the exclusion of negative information. The resulting distortions can have disastrous consequences.

A source of distortion which prevents risk experts and decision-makers from coming to grips with the likelihood of failure lies in the tricky area of 'failure probabilities', also called 'disqualification heuristic'. In simple terms, if you hold a conviction that, for example, it is safe to fly, or mining is a safe activity, you neglect contradictory information and focus selectively on confirming information.

Going back to the Challenger Disaster you will recall that there was evidence that the probability of a disastrous failure of the shuttle varied from 1: 100,000 to 1:100 (there was even one estimate of 1:25!). The higher probabilities came from engineers and safety officers and the lower probabilities from NASA managers.

The engineers' estimates varied so markedly from the managers' because they had access to a variety of tasks, calculations and risk reviews, information the managers did not have as readily available.

In mining, as in other organisations, the same inherent problem exists: It is easy to see how a 'can do' culture can develop in organisations, especially in mining companies, where high production volumes continuously demands a high achievement culture.

Very few mining organisations have the internal structures, processes or units to foster or force self-criticism and critical self-review, but almost all of them are inherently focused on survival and therefore information distortion

thrives. At some point these intangible forces in the organisation may become so powerful that, if the right physical conditions and deficiencies exist, a disaster becomes almost inevitable.

The organisation that produces a disaster has not done so out of neglect, wrongdoing or criminal misconduct. Yet so often our own inquiries into such events, even those that look at minor work accidents and incidents, fall prey to the 'politics of blame'. We need to put the blame somewhere but, in our hurry to do so, we generally fail to identify the real organisational and cultural causes and influences on such events.

We demand straightforward, simple answers, but the answers are seldom simple.

The heart and mind of organisations are beyond the control of individual managers, because mistakes are socially organised in a highly complex, unpredictable manner.

At Moura, they were criticised by the inquiry because: 'Not one person or group of persons at any time had all the facts available to them on which to base their decisions'. In normal circumstances, at normal mines and companies on a normal day, this is just normal. It is normal in any organisation where complex processes exist, where decisions are being made at all levels of the organisation, and where the fundamental aim is to conquer risk. And many other communication issues appeared suspect or seriously flawed from the outside, such as the various reports on 'benzene-type' smells underground that failed to raise concern, the assumptions made by several individuals at the mine, for example, the *assumption* that workers knew of the risk of spontaneous combustion on the day of the event, etc. All these issues point to another feature of the high risk organisation, namely the *distortion of information*.

At Piper Alpha, the manager stated in the inquiry that he 'knew that everything was all right because he never had any report of anything being wrong' (Appleton). The statement may appear to be extremely naive, or even stupid, but there is a message in there: the information that reached him was simply distorted to the point that his only impression of it could be this one—that everything is all right. It was no different at NASA (e.g. what was reported to the NASA launch director on the morning of the launch!) and it was no different at Moura. The inquiry of *the Moura* incident reported that the 'Mine Manager on

return from leave was not aware of the condition of the panel even after discussion with the Safety/Training Manager' (Warden 1996).

Our willingness to accept risk is a phenomenon that is often underestimated or not even taken account of at all. The factors which make it possible for us to accept risk—and the possibility of disastrous breakdowns—include:

- risk assessment processes;
- the culture of production;
- a margin of error which develops misplaced confidence;
- organisational pressures;
- the probability that an accident may happen to the individual are incomprehensibly small;
- illusions of invulnerability that develop over time as a result of a 'can do' culture.

The Social Organisation of Mistakes

The Challenger disaster, like all others, happened because mistakes were made. It is however not a simple case of human error—the mistakes themselves were 'socially' organised and systematically produced.

Disasters have systematic origins that transcend individuals, organisations, time and geography. Their source of disasters can be found in the routines and the taken-for-granted aspects of organisational life.

Those key questions about Challenger—why did they launch despite their knowledge of the O-ring deficiencies, and despite the pre-launch warnings by engineers?—can be asked about most disasters and accidents.

The answer lies in the processes already described: *production of culture, the culture of production, systematic complexities* and *structural secrecy*.

Each factor on its own cannot explain the Challenger disaster, or any other disaster. But combine these three factors, add to that the mixture the right combination of circumstances, and mistakes will happen, some of them leading to disasters.

In looking for causes of disasters we need to shift our attention from the technical (such as the O-ring) to the managerial, and then to the psychological and beyond - to the organisational and cultural factors. By doing this we highlight the influence of culture on risk assessment. Even if risk assessments are done daily they can be fatally flawed, the biggest flaw being the impression they create of being scientifically complete and sufficient to manage risks. It needs to be

stressed that risk is not a 'quantity of threat'. It is a social construct that changes continuously and cannot be captured by simplistic categories or 'levels' of probabilities.

Routine decisions in organisations are taken every day without resulting in disasters—but they do routinely result in mistakes. When disasters are analysed after the event many of these routine decisions can be demonstrated to be rationally flawed and blame is cast on those making the mistakes. But decisions are taken within the context of an environment, a paradigm, and a culture in the organisation. They cannot be divorced from that culture.

It can be argued that organisations suffering disasters generally suffer from failures of foresight, that these disasters had long incubation periods during which warning signals were ignored, rationalised or accepted as normal. And this is true. Organisations need mechanisms to counteract these organisational influences.

In Conclusion

We are not talking of guilty people who should 'carry the can' for disastrous events. We are talking of people who are doing their job as diligently and honestly as they see fit at that moment in time, and as they are permitted by the circumstances.

Combine this with honest mistakes, misplaced risk perceptions, widespread organisational failures and a touch of coincidence, and the risk of disaster increases exponentially. It may never happen. But on the day it does...

Right now, on the shop-floors of companies, employees are going about their tasks in exactly the ways described in this paper. And if one or more of our controls falter, such as happened with Challenger, Piper Alpha and Moura, disaster will strike again—a disaster that has been created over a period of time and is in the process of creation now, by us, by our organisations.

Is it then true, as stated in the Moura report, that we can expect another spate of disasters in about ten years time, as soon as the current shock and reactions have waned? History shows that it is true.

It is not a question of *when*, it is a question of *who* will be the next victims...

Learning from mistakes...

In 1995, the Discovery space shuttle was successfully launched. It was lauded as one of the most successful shuttle missions to date.

The following was reported in Avion, Summer 1995:

'Discovery's safety was brought into question by an examination of the solid rocket boosters retrieved after the launch of the space shuttle Atlantis two weeks prior to the launch of Discovery... Burning rocket propellant had burned one of the primary O-ring seals in one of the booster rockets of Atlantis. This problem was not discovered until four days after Discovery's launch... The problem was particularly worrisome due to the fact that it was a similar leak that had caused the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986.'

To their astonishment, engineers discovered that the seals in the Atlantis solid rocket boosters had failed, in the same way, but without the disastrous consequences of the 1986 Challenger O-ring failure. After many years and many millions of dollars, exactly the same failure re-occurred.

Organisations have very poor memories. Whole industries have no memory at all.

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