Social Class Relations: Elites, Plebeians, and Patronage

A. Preliminary

In the context, first, of origination relations, social roles or civil statuses are always historical facts. As to their bases, they may be deemed at least formally, the results of social, political, and economic value-structures and experiences; they are, consequently, no less symbolic of them. This is borne out, for instance, by the existence of property ownership and class divisions in a given society. As the antecedents of revolution, they are then susceptible to logical or contingent cause-and-effect analysis. Besides this, secondly, they may be also evaluated and understood in relation to some given principle or policy standards; that is, according to their correlative bearing in bringing about certain desired conditions or goals. With such functionalization, however, they may be deemed as means-to-ends factors--more or less rationally determined--of societal moral-cultural development, or for other purposes. And they will have been based upon social or collective habits (that is, of acting and thinking), or customary norms and values (such as those involving religion and morality). Such is the case with kinship ties and patron-client relations. But in both viewpoints, that is, origination and functionalization, they may be said to have 'centripetal' tendencies insofar as social roles and statuses conduce to--or are as much the products of--social ordering and enable individuals to co-exist, although not necessarily without occasional or even habitual disharmony. This would be true when they did not view (or were unaware of) their so-called vital interests as irreconcilable with each other. And in effect, there would tend to be what could be called 'hegemony' or
'vertical friendship'.

Among the Filipinos (as, of course, with other societies as well), their social roles and statuses were deeply rooted in the historical evolution of their society. Specifically in fact, this evolution had spanned over five centuries of pre-conquest, colonial, and post-colonial social ordering; and such experience had resulted mainly in the development of multi-functional patron-client relations between the broad-based elite and plebeian classes. They were not Gemeinschaft-like relationships, however. Yet, the latter's (plebeian classes') characteristically communitarian attitudes had none the less sustained their traditional 'follower-roles' vis-a-vis the more or less Gesellschaft-oriented 'leader-elites'.


2 The Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are two conceptual types of social grouping. The former is based on understanding and concord between individuals which brings about a real and natural unity; and thus they are able to share in the sentiments, hopes, aspirations, beliefs, and similar forms of consciousness of each other. These characteristics are to be found in such natural relationships as kinship, neighborhood, and friendship. In other words, Gemeinschaft is community. On the other hand, the latter is brought about by agreement. Its highest form is realized in commercial relations and in the existence of such collectives as corporation, society, association. It is an artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings which superficially resembles the Gemeinschaft in so far as the individuals peacefully live and dwell together. They are, however, opposed to each other. Very briefly, we may conceptualize this contradiction as follows: whereas understanding and concord is indispensable to the Gemeinschaft, in the Gesellschaft this is replaced by agreement; natural will in the former is likewise replaced by rational will in the latter; status in the former, by contract in the latter; customs and traditions by convention; authority and fellowship by power and domination.
had been at least three important results: first, the plebeians' obedience to the elites' charismatic authority; and, secondly, their submission to their fate even as it tended to be sublimated in folk-Catholic faith. (How they came about is the subject-matter of the present chapter.) If this was true, then, thirdly, the elites' interests in these terms had accordingly been given de facto validity by plebeian values. (How this was so is worked out in chapter 8.)

As understood in this book, by 'folk-charismatic' relations is meant the homeostatic blending of customary values (folk) of the masses and the leadership qualities (charismatic) of the elites, whether or not the latter have similar values and beliefs. They may refer to the 'basic value orientations', 'paedic narratives', and like beliefs and usages all of which constitute the context of dependence of the masses and in which the justification of charismatic leadership by the elites (or their 'being in authority') is located. And the purposes or conflicts of class and status groups (or of persons within them) are thus deemed individualistic and structurally

With the Gesellschaft--particularly, the open or general--two broad classes of people will consequently emerge. On the one hand, there will be the traders, capitalists, landlords, etc.; and on the other, the peasants, workers, and the propertyless masses of people. To the first group can be attributed the characteristic motivation to make profit, such as in the market in which to purchase and sell, or a loan transaction in which to earn interest on the capital, and so on. Their dominance always has industrial production as the specific and natural sphere; and thus the market (that is, the commodity, labor, or retail) too is no less controlled by them. To the second group the chance to earn money (or its equivalent) is not so much in order to make a profit as to satisfy the necessity of subsequently exchanging it with needed consumption goods. It is evident that in the interaction between the two classes the latter is (as a group) at a disadvantage. Among others, they are disadvantaged by their urgent need for the commodities to be exchanged for it (money, consumption, or services). For the higher the (subjective) value of the commodity in demand, the lower necessarily the (subjective) value of the commodity offered in exchange, and the more violent and stronger the desire to sell it. But the complications involved in this statement will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that, as Tonnies observes, they are in effect left with two alternatives, i.e., by appropriating by violence what they desire or by acquiring it by way of exchange, i.e., by selling their labor power. The second alternative ensures the continuation of the Gesellschaft. See, among others, Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Association (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955).
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non-contradictory. With Filipinos in this *folk-charismatic* sense, there had arisen a more viable social unity and the consolidation of status differences through the maintenance of particularized social values (e.g., religious rituals, ethics) and the dissembled structuring of class interests (e.g., a 'paternalistic' land ownership and tenancy). Folk-charismatic relations, then, are a form of centripetal tendency—a 'moving towards a center', or a joining together. Thus we might also say that, 'there is, consequently, a reproduction of common experiences and values from one generation to the next'. In substance this had always been the case as much with the elites among themselves as among the plebeians.

B. Aspects of Folk-Charismatic Social Roles

a. Origins in Conquest

Long after Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines had ended, habitual and customary folk-charismatic social relations and structures changed but little. A strongly traditional world view and *nomos* remained the bedrock of common and unifying social consciousness. Except for some parts of Mindanao and Sulu as well as pagan hinterlands, social and economic relationships among Filipinos were largely based on the kind of economy, religion, and other beliefs and customs which the *conquistadores* and missionaries had long brought or since introduced into the archipelago during colonial times. (At any rate, some influences, e.g., the *encomienda*, gave rise to other forms of disparate access to available resources.) Indeed, as Wernstedt and Spencer have rightly noted: 'After some three centuries of political controls and overlords, the Filipinos rebelled in the late nineteenth century, but never was an effort made to overthrow Spanish cultural traditions'. The essence of these innovations from pre-conquest times was the 'Hispanization' and especially the 'Catholization' of the natives.

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In the meantime, however, other developments were also underway, which in general were the effects of customary practices before and after these innovations had become established. All of these are our 'preconditions'. And in explicating such issues as, *inter alia*, the *what* and *why* about the results (that is, e.g., why a political, not social, revolution in the 1980s?), we may look back far into the origins and developments of specific social relationships or their formative causes and effects.

The first attempt at Hispanic colonization of the islands was made in 1521 by the famous, Portuguese-born explorer Ferdinand Magellan who with five ships was on his way to the Spice Islands (Moluccas). The would-be conquerors were defeated in battle by Visayan warriors (the *Orang lauts*) led by their chieftain Lapu-Lapu. As a result, the expedition to the Philippines was unsuccessful. After several other disastrous attempts including Ruy Lopez de Villalobos's in 1543 (who gave the island group its present name in honor of the Spanish King Philip II), the expedition by the *adelantado* Miguel Lopez de Legazpi with Fray Andres de Urdaneta finally succeeded in establishing Spanish settlements, first in Cebu in the Visayas (1565) and eventually in Manila in Luzon (1571). Combining the campaigns with proselytizing early on, they turned away the growing Islamic (Moro) influence in Luzon, the Visayas, and in parts of Mindanao. Scattered resistance on the islands (such as those of Sulayman's, and Lakandula's in Maynilad [now Manila] as well as others in the Bicol, Laguna de Bay, and Ilocos regions) was soon pacified or broken apart. Meanwhile, and also due to this, more reinforcements had arrived including Legazpi's grandson, Juan de Salcedo, the so-called greatest *conquistador* of the Philippines. In all, among the forces of the *conquista*, according to Morga, were mainly the prelates, religious and ecclesiastical ministers, encomenderos, settlers, and conquerors, soldiers and other officials of war, merchants and traders, and the Crown's agents for government, justice, and administration of the royal revenue.5

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Before the end of the sixteenth century, Roman Catholicism and Spanish sovereignty had already been firmly established in Luzon, the Visayas, and in parts of Mindanao. And in installing colonial sovereignty on the islands, they had also instituted the 'union of church and state'. What did this mean then? The Spanish Crown since 1492 had an agreement with the Papacy under which the king acquired rights of royal patronage (*patronato real*) over the Church in Spain and in her colonies. He chose his appointees to colonial missions and determined mission territories. This union of civil and religious authority gave the king the power to interfere in religious and ecclesiastical matters. This power was in turn delegated by the Council of the Indies to the governors of the colonies. Thus, the Church during the Spanish rule of the Philippines became 'a peculiarly Spanish Church serving the ends of Spanish empire'.

The eminent Filipino historian Fr. Horacio de la Costa claims that, as soon as the *conquista* was secured in the sixteenth century, Spain already had a definite policy—though much abused during the next 300 years:

First, that the Spanish Crown possessed a just title to the Indies chiefly by virtue of the undertaking it had entered into with the Papacy of seeing to their evangelization; second, that the native peoples, by virtue of the natural law and the law of nations, had certain individual and social rights which the conquerors were bound to respect; third, that it was possible—indeed, necessary—for the colonists and the Crown to profit materially from the manpower and resources of the Indies and at the same time preserve inviolate the rights of the natives as men and Christians.

Anyhow, given these ends and other much more

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6 Helen R. Tubangi et al., *The Filipino Nation: A Concise History of the Philippines* (n.p.: Grolier Int’l, 1982), 43. See also Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Manila, 1975), 20-21, 66-67. Distinguished legally from 'private patronage', the *patronato real* was a 'public or crown patronage wherein the sovereign endows the spiritualities of the land and is vested with quasi-religious rights over the royal territory'. Eugene Shiel's, *King and Church: The Rise and Fall of the Patronato Real* (Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1961), 21.

immediate motives, the colonists worked out such tactics as *divide et impera*, forced labor, tribute-laying, and other impositions. And within a few decades certain sectors of the native communities had already been 'transformed into pillars of colonial administration and intermediaries between the rulers and the ruled'. (Meanwhile, almost from the beginning of colonization conflicts between Church and State—especially between the archbishop and governor—flared continually and at times led even to bloody or tragic results.) In due course they transformed the various primitive rank societies—that is, autonomous barangay communities--into a nationwide society marked by quasi-feudal distinctions between what may be called the 'elite' and 'plebeian' social classes. How so?

### b. Social Classes: Emergence of Elite-Plebeian Relations

In those pre-colonial barangays the relations of the social classes (or status groups) were not so much adversarial or competitive as communal and fiduciary. These groupings generally consisted of no more than a hundred or so households and a few thousand people clustered together.

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8. Constantino, op cit., 54.
9. The word barangay is the Hispanized form of the original balangay which meant a 'boat'. The Malays who migrated to the archipelago came in their balangays. After their conquest of the islands and in marking off political subdivisions, the Spaniards adopted the word (but changed the 'l' to 'r') to mean the nayon or barrio which is the equivalent of the Malay kampong. See Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Filipino Nationalism, 1872-1970* (Quezon City, Phil.: R. P. Garcia, 1974), 88 n. 1. The natives were divided into barangays... the name of the boat, preserving the name from the boat in which they came to settle these islands. See Francisco Colin, 'Native Races and their Customs', in Blair and Robertson, op cit., 40: 83. The term refers to the 'Indo-Malayan community... before or shortly after the Spanish conquest'. Eufronio M. Alip, *The Barangay Through the Ages* (Manila: Alip & Sons, 1975), 4. A barangay was a kind of clan or tribe, consisting of thirty to one hundred related families. See Tubangsi et al., op cit., 17. And it was a 'political entity': Perfecto V. Fernandez, *Custom Law in Pre-Conquest Philippines* (Quezon City, Phil.: U.P. Law Center, 1976), 4-8. Government in the village was 'aristocratic'--there were many magnates (either maginos or datos) among whom the entire government was divided. See Juan Francisco de San Antonio, 'The Native Peoples and their Customs', in Blair and Robertson, op cit., 40: 347.

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They were dependence-oriented; that is, by kinship and common rituals. And they might be either allied with other barangay or else mutually hostile and at war. They had survived mainly upon subsistence—slash-and-burn and wet-rice—agriculture; but coastal and lowland communities were flourishing through trade and exchange with the overseas Chinese, Malays, Arabs, and other races. As is always the case with any class-divided society, however, a privileged minority was locked in characteristic interdependent relations with the less privileged (and including the dis-privileged) majority. According, at the top of the hierarchy were the datu (chief) or in Tagalog, maginoo, or occasionally hari (king) and his family (e.g., wives, children, etc.). Next below them were the other nobility or maharlika (Tagalog), and also the timagua or timawa (freemen or commoners) who constituted the great majority of inhabitants. And at the bottom could be found various types of dependents (alipin), but mainly the namamahay (Tagalog) and tumaranpoc (Bisayan) who had less dis-privileges, and the saguiugilid (Tagalog) and ayuey or halon (Bisayan) who had more. The former could have been sharecroppers, while the latter were debt peons. But both were set apart by their want of franchise: they could neither change customary patron-client relations (of which they were a part); nor did they have capacity at law.

10 For instance, it is observed that, '[t]he so-called social classes were distinguished from one another principally by their economic condition'. Fernandez, op cit., 19. And whether as an 'analytical tool' or as an 'instrument of social and political conflict', the notion of class, according to Perkin, 'was inherent in the very act of analyzing society in its economic aspects'. Perkin, op cit., 27-28. Morga seems to distinguish the maharlika from the timagua: the former were the 'nobles' and the latter 'plebeians'. See Morga, op cit., 119-120, 121. The 'slaves' comprised the greatest wealth and capital. See ibid., 124. Cf. Juan de Plasencia, 'Customs of the Tagalogs', in Blair and Robertson, op cit., 7: 174-176. For a comparative analysis of Visayan and Luzon (esp. Tagalog) sixteenth-century class relationships, see William Henry Scott, Cracks in the Parchment Curtain (Quezon City, Phil.: New Day, 1985), 96-126.

11 As to the distinctions between the various kinds of slaves--ayuey, tumaranpoc and tomataban, and between these dependents and the timagua, see Miguel de Loarca, 'Relation of the Filipinas Islands', in Blair and Robertson, op cit., 5: 143-147. Cf. Colin, op cit., 93-97, in which mainly the namamahay and sanguiguilir (or, more properly, sanguiguilid according to Dr. Jose Rizal). According to Colin, however, even 'the timawa (or freemen)
Among the various grades of chiefdom, the chief typically had nearly absolute authority over his subjects; but actual power depended more upon his merits such as wealth, blood, might, or other virtues. He decided all suits at law with the aid of some tribal elders whom he had chosen. But he must still have abided by established customs and traditions, as well as secured the needs and interests of his followers. The other classes held him in great esteem and did service whether in wars or by tilling his fields. They also paid him tributes (buiz) according to their status and the purpose of payment. The village's lands were often held in common, but they were tilled according to usufruct rights. They were not owned in individual and indivisible fee simple. Yet these social classes were generally 'amorphous and mobile' depending on distinctions of wealth and others. Nonetheless, the economic interests of any individual or class of individuals did not generally prevail over customary values. As Colin observes, 'their laws and policy . . . consisted wholly of traditions and customs, observed with so great exactness that it was not considered possible to break them in any circumstance'. Among other customs, the method of trading was by barter in food, cloth, cattle, and other goods; but payment by other means as in gold could be made. Interest rates were usurious and when debts could not be paid, the debtor and his family became slaves. Crimes were punished upon request of the aggrieved parties, for instance, in cases of theft. However,

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12 According to Colin, there were 'no kings or rulers worthy of mention, throughout this archipelago; but there were many chiefs who dominated others less powerful'. Colin, op cit., 83. Also see San Antonio, op cit., 83; and Morga, op cit., 119.

13 See San Antonio, op cit., 355. Also see Morga, op cit., 119-121; and Scott, op cit., 102-103, 115.

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concubinage, rape, and incest were not usually punished. Thus, as another writer observes, the ultimate source of rule over the people was in custom and usage, called *addat*; and the Tagalogs summed up the matter in a phrase, *ang ugali*—'such is the custom'. On the whole, their relations (especially 'social roles') were based on close kindred and patriarchal concern of leader and follower. Values had 'priority' over interests.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century--more specifically between 1679 and 1692--the system of pre-conquest dependence relations underwent qualitative changes. The civil and ecclesiastical authorities had always opposed native servitude, but their efforts had met with resistance in the *barangays*. Following the end of the Hispano-Dutch war and vigorous enforcement of *audiencia* policy, however, the *saguiguilid-ayuey* finally disappeared, even as the *namamahay-tumaranpoc* still remained. In fact, sharecropping based on debt peonage turned out as the prevailing labor system. It soon evolved into other forms such as the *casamajan* in the eighteenth century. Important as this had since become, one European scholar describes it as follows:

The nucleus of the kasama relationship [i.e., *casamajan*] was the contract between landlord and sharecropper, whereby the former supplied land, advanced seeds and expenses for planting and harvesting, while the kasama tilled the land with his own draft animal and often his own farming tools. After deduction of advances and expenses paid by the owner (hence the expenses were also divided equally between the two parties) the harvest was divided according to a specific ratio, usually 50-50, sometimes 55-45.

In addition, the owner was obliged to lend his

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15 See Morga, op cit., 128-129; and also Pedro Chirino, 'Relation of the Filipinas Islands', in Blair and Robertson, op cit., 13: 56-58.
kasama some assistance; namely, an advance of rice when the kasama was appointed bugnos, a yearly rice advance rasyon without interest (meant for the lean months before the harvest), and possibly cash loans if the kasama was in financial difficulties. The landlord, in turn, could ask for miscellaneous personal services; for example, assisting in house repairs, constructing rice field dikes, gathering firewood, and running errands. The kasama relationship was based on mutual moral obligations which were asymmetrical in character. This was the patronage aspect in the relationship. To a certain extent the landlord adopted a paternalistic attitude towards his kasama with whom he had a personal relationship. The kasama had a feeling of personal loyalty towards his landlord, a feeling of dependency and humbleness. Both the symmetrical and asymmetrical aspects of the term emerged linguistically since the term kasama (with the stress on the second syllable; literally: companion, fellow worker) was not only used by the landlord to refer to his tenant but also by the tenant to refer to his landlord, while the term kasama (with the stress on the last syllable; sharecropper) was only used to refer to the tenant.18 (Emphasis mine.)

The barangays themselves were not dismantled, but their kinship groupings dissolved into the fief-like encomiendas. In legal terms, the encomienda (i.e., the private encomienda) was 'a right conceded by royal bounty (a merced y voluntad del Rey) to well-deserving persons in the Indies, to receive and enjoy for themselves the tributes of Indians who should be assigned to them, with a charge of providing for the good of those Indians in spiritual and temporal matters, and of inhabiting and defending the province where these encomiendas should be located'.19 As practised in the

18 Willem Wolters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon (Quezon City, Phil.: New Day, 1984), 24-25.
19 E. D. Hester (ed.), The Robertson Text and Translation of the Povedano Manuscript of 1572 ([Chicago]: Univ. of Chicago, 1954), vii, citing the definition of Sir Arthur Helps's. See also Wilhelm Roscher, The
Philippines, the *encomiendas* were of two kinds--royal and private. A royal *encomienda* belonged to the Spanish Crown, such as the 'chief towns, ports, and dwellers of the cities and towns'. Any other area could be assigned as a private *encomienda*, the expanded duration of which since 1636 was no more than three generations. The essence of the latter was the grant of the inhabitants of a territory, from whom the holder of the grant could collect tributes as reward for his services to the Crown. Nevertheless, they also set the pattern of exploitative class relations based implicitly on such policy of the Crown as 'that it was possible--indeed, necessary--for the colonists and the Crown to profit materially from the manpower and resources of the Indies', and on the *Leyes de Indias* and other laws. There would now be an inclusive, drastic, and sharp dyadic relationship—that is, incipiently between the elites and plebeians, or, specifically, the Spanish encomenderos and the natives. And yet despite any benign intentions which might have accompanied the Crown's policies, so many abuses and atrocities by encomenderos were perpetrated on the inhabitants. And as this much-abused private *encomienda* system was abolished (under Philip V's reversion order) in the eighteenth century (or having ended in the first decade of the next, according to Zaide), such class relations continued on in other forms and upon different bases--cultural, economic, political.

Amongst themselves the natives may also be distinguished in colonial times. The native elite classes were earlier dominated by the old *principalia* or the so-called descendants of the ancient datus and maharlikas--and others were possibly a later addition but whom Zaide mentions alongside them such as--the rich landowners, the teachers, and the local officials or ex-officials. They acted as 'buffer' between the conquerors and a conquered people. 'The members of this class', according to the elitist historian, Dr. Gregorio F. Zaide, 'constituted the town aristocracy. They enjoyed many social and political privileges, including the

*Spanish Colonial System* ([New York]: G. E. Stechert, 1944), 4: It was more a 'public office' than 'landed estate'. And see Wernstedt and Spencer, op cit., 123-125.

right to vote in local elections and the right to hold public office'. The datu (now called, e.g., cabeza de barangay) collected the tribute and organized corvee labor levied by the Spaniards. But he and his family as well as others (such as the caciques or owners of large landed estates) who could pay the falla were exempted from these impositions.

On the other hand, the plebeians or masses consisted of the 'poor commoners, such as the laborers and the peasants'. As Zaide further observes: 'They could not be elected gobernadorcillo (town executive), juez (judge) or cabeza de barangay (barrio lieutenant)'. They paid the tribute (plus additional taxes) which was among others meant as 'recognition of their vassalage to the king of Spain'. The practice of tribute collection (1571-1884) and the personal tax (1884-1898) had been an onerous imposition upon the plebeians. It also gave government officials (e.g., encomenderos, gobernadorcillos, etc.) plenty of opportunity to enrich themselves through graft and corruption, such as collecting more than that allowed by law and malversing the excess, torturing and imprisoning those who could not pay, and underpricing goods given in payment. Other taxes had also been levied for the support of the Church and protection against the Muslims' depredations. Alongside the polo (forced labor), bandala (annual quotas), and abuses by the officials and clergy, the levying of the tribute and taxes had been the

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21 Zaide, The Pageant of Philippine History (Manila: Phil. Educ. Co., 1979), 2: 114-115. For our purposes, the distinction between the 'classes' is primarily a means or tool of analysis by which we may explain certain aspects (e.g., legality) of 'authority' relations. It is a question involving 'force' and 'consent', and could thus be expressed in such a way as, What does it mean for one to say that 'X has authority'? (that is, where X may stand for the datu-maharlika, principalia, and ilustrada dominant classes). Dr. Zaide's historiography is not particularly relevant to our problem, although his 'elitism' may be based on Dr. Prudente's typology. See Prudente, op cit., 14.

22 Zaide, op cit., 2: 115. They include those social classes that suffered most from colonial 'oppression and immiseration'. See, e.g., Joaquin Martinez de Zuniga, Status of the Philippines in 1800 (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1973), 383.

continual cause of uprisings by the plebeian natives against the colonial government. Thus the social classes were formed in such ways. Yet the functional beginnings of this sharp role-differentiation lay mainly in the specifically quasi-feudal mode of land holding and ownership which the Spaniards had installed in the archipelago. It was a long and bloody way from the *encomienda* down to the *hacienda*, the large landed estates.

c. Centripetal Tendencies: Towards Both Diversity and Integration

Accordingly, since the sixteenth century indigenous communal lands were transformed into legalized private properties. A number of *principales* assumed exclusive ownership of these lands and sold or donated them especially to the religious orders. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the old *barangay*-based *principalia* dwindled and waned due to the loss of their lands and thus also the dependents' labor supply; and a new sub-ruling class came to mean 'anyone of means, not merely the son of a former datu or chieftain'.24 Meanwhile, debtpeonage and share-cropping became exploitative relations of production, while Spanish feudal values, increases in population, and a desire of investment contributed much to the rise of the large landed estates.25 And so the primitive economies accelerated towards exchange and profit.26

By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, three major economic systems had already developed; namely, (1) a 'Western economy' of the Spaniards based upon the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade and the *obras pias* loan funds, (2) the 'native economy' still characterized mainly by subsistence agriculture, and (3) a 'Chinese economy' based on maritime

25 Ibid., 23-24. Elsewhere (p. 35), the author observes that, 'by the eighteenth century the religious orders had become the largest single group of landed estate owners'.
26 See Constantino, op cit., 40-41, and ch. 8.
trading (mainly between China and the Philippines), artisanry, and others.27 The galleon trade, which was a government monopoly and meant for the sole benefit of the Spanish ruling-class colonists, had militated against and all but foreclosed any early development of the whole, colonial (or 'national') economy. Indeed, until the mid-eighteenth century, the Spaniards were uninterested in the production or cultivation of cash crops in the colony. Their exports from the Philippines were Chinese luxury goods to Mexico and Mexican silver to China; their imports, silver from the latter and staple and luxury goods from the former. The Chinese also did much provisioning of Spanish settlements. But despite its localized scope the native economy could not but be affected especially in areas near these settlements inasmuch as the Spanish settlers drew upon them for their provisions too, and also exchanged Chinese cloths and Mexican silver for them. In time, after some bloody incidents of persecution and revolts but having long acted as intermediaries between the Western and native economies, the Chinese (also called Sangleys) came eventually to control the colony's retail trade and number themselves among the new principalia.28 These developments were further pitched high by Spain's hegemonic and mercantilist policies according to which the colony had been closed to foreign trade—though often circumvented by the English—for more than two centuries (from the sixteenth to the eighteenth), but allowed only China and Mexico to trade with the Philippines.

Wherever the Spaniards and Chinese had settled (mainly in Manila and certain Luzon provinces), this diversity in economic interests harmonized largely through profit-oriented cultural attitudes (e.g., ethnic inter-marriages, Philippine-Mexican exchanges) and the natives' non-aggressive beliefs and habits (e.g., Catholic piety, hospitality). Elsewhere,

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28 See, e.g., Zuniga, op cit., 216-217; and Constantino, op cit., 59. Also see Fedor Jagor, Travels in the Philippines (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1965), 250. Elsewhere (p. 252), Dr. Jagor comments: 'No nation can equal them in contentedness, industry, perseverance, cunning, skill, and adroitness in trades and mercantile matters. When once they gain a footing, they generally appropriated the best part of the trade to themselves'.
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however, the baranganic social consciousness of the plebeian-masses remained unmitigated, that is, both economically and culturally. In due course, their relationship (that is, between migrants-natives, elites-masses) took on a twofold tendency: On the one hand, towards greater economic differentiation, and on the other, towards closer socio-cultural integration. The former set the early basis of institutionalized class distinctions based on wealth and concomitant power; namely, between the principalia (elites) on the one side, and the indio (masses) on the other. And as the production of material wealth accelerated, its distribution became even more unequal. The latter brought about narrative-based social roles, but fixed by the hegemony of one class over the other—for instance, as typified through the reciprocal roles of the individual patronus (patron) and his clientes (clients). In many ways their further development depended upon or became a function of increasingly transformed economic relationships; that is, towards the capitalist-dominated mode of production.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, governors Simon de Anda (1770-76) and Jose Basco y Vargas (1778-87) and other groups and corporations (e.g., the monopolistic Royal Philippine Co.) made unprecedented efforts to develop agriculture and industry. A number of other monopolies (e.g., tobacco, wine) were created; and foreign trade (e.g., exports of sugar, coconuts) intensified. Correspondingly, European traders had become interested in the country's products since the short-lived British Occupation of Manila in 1762-64. The galleon trade, however, continued to militate against these schemes until it folded up during the first quarter of the next century. And though repeatedly exceeded, before its demise the Manila-Acapulco trade was limited earlier to P250,000 (forward voyage) and P500,000 (return trade); and direct trade between Peru and the Philippines was abolished in late sixteenth century. But this Philippines-Mexico trade was eventually increased (ca. 1734) to double the amounts until the last galleon voyage in 1815. Afterwards, commerce with America (i.e., since 1820) was carried on by merchants up to P750,000 in export goods from
the Philippines. In addition, long-standing abusive and corrupt practices (e.g., by Spanish officials, churchmen, and Chinese traders) continued; the Moro slave-raiding expeditions in Luzon and the Visayas were frequent; and the colonial treasury had been continually empty. A few reformers had denounced such venal practices, among whom were Anda himself, another governor Francisco de la Torre, and the Jesuit priest Francisco Javier Puch.

Nevertheless, this period marked a new threshold in the economic development of the colony. Among other instances, Governor Jose Basco revoked the last expulsion order of the Chinese in 1778, and organized the 'Economic Society of Friends of the Country' a few years later. He also made efforts to make the Philippines independent of the subsidy from Mexico by encouraging agricultural production. Meanwhile, shortly after the British evacuation of Manila in 1764 direct trade was established between Spain and the Philippines by way of the Cape of Good Hope. All this also led to the enfranchisement of foreign commercial houses in the nineteenth century. And as Wickberg observes:

In the late eighteenth century the two systems of 'native economy' and 'Western economy' began to move closer together. This was the period of the earliest Spanish attempts to encourage cash crops for export: sugar, indigo, and tobacco in particular. Neither of the first two products proved very important during the eighteenth century. But tobacco as a government monopoly was, along with customs receipts and indio tributes, a major source of revenue for the Spanish government. The Western economy was changing in other ways. Although some of the old dependence on the Manila Galleon system remained, even this system was being modified, losing its entrepot character. More

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and more Philippine products were being loaded for Mexico, cutting into the silks-for-silver exchange. Of more importance, Spain was beginning to take the initiative in its economic relations with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{31} With such growing linkage between the colonial economy and world capitalism, landownership and its commercial exploitation became even more profitable due to the increasing demand for cash and export crops. Meanwhile the Catholic religious orders, well-off Spaniards, creoles, urbanized natives, and Chinese mestizos continued to amass vast estates of land. With the decline of the \textit{encomienda} landholding this was carried out mainly by means of royal grants, purchase of royal estates or \textit{realengas}, the \textit{pacto de retroventa}, and land-grabbing schemes (that is, including those done under the notorious land laws of the nineteenth century.)\textsuperscript{32} A number of ports were then opened to foreign commerce, for instance, in Manila (1834), Iloilo, Zamboanga (1855), Legazpi, Tacloban (1873). The government now allowed foreigners, including the British and Americans, to engage in agriculture, manufacturing, banking, and other business ventures. Since the last expulsion of the Chinese in mid-eighteenth century, the mestizos (\textit{Sangley}) had made huge inroads—that is, in wholesaling, retailing, moneylending. But as unrestricted immigration was restored in the nineteenth, the migrant Chinese were now able to make much of their habitual 'business acumen and experience' within the growing colonial economy. Thus, the displaced mestizos, according to Sturtevant, 'engaged in a race with established principales and newly arrived Spaniards to amass farm holdings. After 1880, the rivalry deteriorated to the level of rampant land grabbing'.\textsuperscript{33} At any rate, increasing amounts of revenue went into the colonial treasury, even as the colony had already lost the \textit{situado real} (subsidy) from Mexico.\textsuperscript{34} The export-crop

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Wickberg, op cit., 21.
\item \textsuperscript{32} See Constantino, op cit., 129-130.
\item \textsuperscript{33} David R. Sturtevant, \textit{Popular Uprisings in the Philippines 1840-1940} (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976), 38.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Until 1821 when Mexico won its independence, the colonial government in the Philippines had repeatedly incurred chronic deficits necessitating the annual subsidy. This was in turn raised from duties levied
\end{itemize}
economy also expanded and prospered, and with it, specifically, both the Western economy and Chinese economy. Thus, such classes consolidated their economic ascendancy through the export trade and agro-industrial capital as well as, subsequently, through the United States' preferential fiscal policies in their favor—that is, after Spain had 'ceded' the colony to the Americans towards the end of the nineteenth century.

Meanwhile with the rise of the middle-class *ilustrados* in the nineteenth century, the old and new *principalia* classes had come to dominate Philippine society—that is, culturally, economically, and politically. Before long they evolved into the composite social class which may be called *clase ilustrada*. Already endowed with quasi-feudal privileges, they sought merely to maximize their class and social-role opportunities and rewards, even as they were not any less able to co-opt the dependent masses in determining the direction and scope of the country's agricultural economy. Among many other instances, we may cite the fact that besides members of the clergy, there were a few Spanish and Filipino laymen who had taken doctoral degrees from schools in the Philippines, notably, the University of Santo Tomas (UST). The first two Filipino lay doctors were Chinese mestizos—Doctor Don Pedro Leon de Arcega (PhD, 1785) and Doctor Don Mariano Henson Paras (LLD, 1824). (The latter happened to be the great-great-great grandfather of Benigno A. Aquino Jr., an arch-rival of former president Ferdinand E. Marcos and who was assassinated in August 1983.) Then in 1843 a creole Don Jose Maria Manuel Jugo became a doctor of laws (LLD). In 1868 and 1871, eleven other Filipinos took doctorates in civil law from the UST, including Drs. Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, Antonio Ma. Regidor, and others. In 1872, however, the UST abolished the doctorate for Filipinos, priests and laymen alike, since the colonialists 'equated [it] with a


35 The expression is Constantino's, and refers to those who 'occupied a social and economic position between the peninsulares and the masses'. See Constantino, op cit., 159. For further discussion of class strata towards the end of the nineteenth century, see chapter 5, *infra.*
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tendency to sedition'.

(Yet, those who were sufficiently wealthy could still go to Europe to study.) Eventually during the United States Occupation, however, the elite classes developed their own private school system to preserve exclusive access to the colonial bureaucracy and used school expansion (e.g., new buildings, teacher appointments) as means of patronage.

On the other hand, the plebeian-masses had been inescapably obliged to pay the tribute and other impositions which had been levied from beginning to the end of Spanish rule. Work gangs called *polistas* were regularly drafted to render forced labor in public works such as the construction of bridges, churches, and the galleons. Now as a result of changes in landholding and ownership, many small landholders--or peasant farmers--lost their holdings; and other natives (e.g., the Tagalogs) were dispossessed of communal lands. Typically with the increasing number of landless Filipinos, they then became tenants, sharecroppers, or agricultural laborers. And as the shift in commercial production of export crops--primarily, hemp (in Southern Luzon), sugar (Pampanga and Negros), and tobacco (Cagayan and La Union)--intensified in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the remaining acreage and manpower for the production of domestic staple food (such as rice) diminished. Nation-wide shortages of supply ensued and regular importations had to be made. As a result, the peasants--who now largely planted what they could not eat--had to borrow at usurious interest to buy food and keep themselves from starving. They thus became even more dependent upon the wealthy landowners and traders. To their added disadvantage, even before the end of the nineteenth century foreigners were already monopolizing the export-import

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Thus, suffering as they already had been from such socio-economic hardships as the distitling of their lands, abuses of *encorderos* and then *hacenderos*, deprivation resulting from the monopolies, and graft and corruption in Church and government, they sank deeper into a 'new form of peonage . . . under which system the worst aspects of landlord-tenant relationship flourished'. All in all, this led to the further disruption of the natives' baranganic economy.

Even as the United States supplanted Spain in the twentieth century, the masses' economic condition was by no means any better or different from what it had been. Whatever the Americans afterwards might have meant (*ex aequo et bono*), they were still unable generally to benefit from government initiatives such as the sale of friar estates, Torrens titling, and homestead policies. Moreover, there were oppressive tariff and tax policies; and worse, there had been no adequate agricultural infrastructures like credit, irrigation, and the like. Inevitably, whereas all this further benefited the big moneyed *hacenderos* it was inversely at the expense of poor peasants, especially those who were no longer producing their staple food. As noted by the nationalist historian, Teodoro A. Agoncillo, 'while a few families prospered, the majority lived a hand-to-mouth existence, forever haunted by poverty and pursued by the cruelty and greed of those charged with the material and spiritual uplift of the natives'.

The Americans had, in fact, deliberately nurtured this elite-plebeian, folk-charismatic relationship as a convenient set-up in which to promote their own interests; namely, the early annexation and pacification of the islands (though eventually in the form of neo-colonial domination of an independent Philippines). In the same way as the Spaniards had

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38 Constantino, *op cit.*, 143.
39 Agoncillo and Guerrero, *op cit.*, 96. See also Quirino, *op cit.*, 125-154, on various instances of corrupt practices.
40 See Foley, *op cit.*, 81.
42 In his account of his decision to retain the Philippines, U.S. President McKinley observed thus: '. . . to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we
exploited baranganic forms, so now they were just as anxious to reconcile with the elites (that is, during and after the Filipino-American War, 1899-1902) in order to consolidate their colonial rule. And the effects were comparable. As one American writer has observed: 'If the *ilustrados* had not existed... it would have been necessary for the Americans to invent them'.

What this amounts to is that the United States' hegemony was to work through them in tutelary relations and by *divide et impera* strategies. On the other hand, leadership over the *tao* and collaboration with the Americans had worked to their aggrandizement effectually and irrevocably. All the same those quasi-feudal haciendas or landed estates became the *fons et origo* of the pseudo-patriarchal system of socio-economic relations—an offshoot of capitalist development and a principal source of bourgeois entrepreneurship. They would now determine, through comprehensive landlord-tenant relations, the future long-term economic relations of production as well as of distribution.

d. Effects: Defeat of the Masses' Resistance and Integration by Patronage

But be that as it may, the plebeian classes also evolved such a world view in their collective social role which was different from the elites'. It bespoke their subordination. Characteristically, they remained incapable of integrating—or socializing—their experiences, that is, of the bases or causes of their poverty and ignorance—'poor because ignorant and ignorant because poor'. Even when at times, some lower-class groups rose in arms against the powerful and wealthy, whether

could for them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died'. Horacio de la Costa, *Readings in Philippine History* (Manila: Bookmark, 1965), 250.


Spanish, American, or native *principalía/ilustrado*, they were invariably defeated and suppressed. And there were numerous such risings; among others, Sumoroy's Rebellion (1649-50), the Agrarian Uprisings in Southern Luzon (1745-46), Ilocos revolts (1762-63, 1807, 1811, 1815), religious revolts (e.g., 1840-41), the *Katipunan* (1896-97)--all of them local or regional except one, the *Katipunan*, which towards the end of the nineteenth century precipitated the abortive 'Philippine Revolution'.

Among these armed struggles--over a hundred according to Zaide\(^4\)---the uprising of the *timawas* in Pangasinan (a province in Northern Luzon) is the most and highly instructive. We may set out some historical details in order to understand its outcome, namely, defeat and suppression. In late 1762 the lower classes were increasingly alienated from the Spanish provincial government, even as other uprisings were being mounted contemporaneously elsewhere--such as in Southern Luzon (e.g., Laguna, Camarines), the Visayas (Panay, Cebu), and, more notably, by Diego Silang and his wife Gabriela in nearby Ilocos. Spain and England being then at war in Europe, British forces showed up the Spaniards' vulnerability when they invaded the Philippines and overran Manila on October 5. But Joaquin de Gamboa, the *alcalde mayor* (or provincial governor) of Pangasinan, persisted in the collection of tributes and in his demand of forced labor in highways and forests under pain of imprisonment and flogging. Many of those among the lower classes now refused to comply. And when most of the *principalía* chose not to join them a freeman named Juan de la Cruz (better known as Palaris) led many thousands of *indios* in the rebellion. They expelled Spanish residents from the province and deposed loyalist *cabezas de barangay*, *capitanes*, and other officials, all belonging to the *principalía*. One after another, the friars tried to pacify the natives and restore order to the province. But their efforts were unavailing.

Meanwhile, Governor Anda's troops were concentrated in some provinces around Manila to resist further British advance. Thus, only small numbers of Spaniards and native conscripts from other provinces could be sent up to

\(^4\) Zaide, op cit., 1: 558.
Pangasinan. But as soon as hostilities with the British had ceased late the following year, a ruthless Spanish soldier, Pedro de Bonnardel, commanded new troops and finally suppressed the insurrection. Scores of rebels including Palaris and Andres Lopez (the elitist *maestre de campo*) were executed in a most horrifying manner. According to Quirino: '[Palaris] perished in the gallows on February 26 [1765], and his quartered remains were left publicly to rot for the carrions to eat. Thus ended the most extensive and bloodiest revolt against Spain in the century'.

It relived the brutal defeat of the encomendero Don Andres Malong's rebellion a century before. And over 10,000 having died now in this uprising, the impact of the *timawas*' losses and suffering would have been overpowering to Pangasinenses. At any rate, Pangasinan did not join the Revolution of 1896.

Other efforts made by plebeians were also unavailing. Even by other means (e.g., by so-called non-violent or everyday resistance forms of individual action) or with changes in circumstances (e.g., with the shift from the old share tenancy to leasehold or the emergence of a so-called new

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46 Carlos Quirino, *Filipinos at War* ([n.p.], Phil.: Vera-Reyes, 1981), 82.

47 The causes of such earlier rebellion were comparable: '... relentless litany of colonial injustices committed against them. The Spaniards had utterly failed to compensate them for their multifarious services, such as supplying rice to the capital, fighting battles for them against other natives, felling and hauling trees in the forests, and building, repairing and manning ships for the Mexican trade'. Luciano P. R. Santiago, 'The Filipino Indios Encomenderos (ca. 1620-1711)', *Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society* 18 (Sept. 1990): 175. And the effects were likewise similar: 'Malong and 132 other leaders and followers were condemned to ... brutal forms of execution. ... Don Andres ... was ... shot from behind. His head was cut off, impaled on a stake. ... His headless body was suspended from another stake and exhibited in his residence'. Ibid.

48 Quirino, *Filipinos at War*, op cit., 82.


kasama system in the 1970s after martial law was proclaimed they had failed to mitigate their subordination. Until the twentieth century and in our times, they continued to fail to 'take their chances' and 'make their choices' in order to re-structure elite-plebeian exchange within the existing system of socio-economic relations. In fact, even though some tenants and their families might profit from such 'resistance'—for example, by such means as lugas, betsing, thievery, and others—in individual cases, as an Australian scholar says: 'Individual stratagems that allow tenants to survive by cheating on the overt terms of the tenancy relation may work to demobilise collective action to resist or change those terms. That the stratagems are illegal robs the tenants of that sense of outrage cherished by the just man unjustly treated, against the terms of tenancy and the landlords. It invites mutual distrust among tenants themselves for each must beware lest his neighbour secretly report his cheating in the hope of seeing him evicted and gaining the farm'. What is left when violence and cheating become ineffectual and self-defeating? What was—or rather, would be—a necessary and sufficient causation? From habitual acquiescence or fear and dependence attitudes, however, they even came to regard the elites' guidance and leadership as both natural and proper.

As a result, since the Americans had put them under tutelage and onwards, the elite classes had kept their customary mandate (that is, as the taos' natural leaders) while they pursued their own interests; all the while the masses (as the followers) were effectively pacified by their 'faith'—that is, in the other classes' leadership and in their own folk-Catholic values. And as a result of long-standing social-role structuring, one class—from the datus and principalia to the

51 Wolters, op cit., 207 et seq.
52 Fegan, op cit., 104.
53 This may also be expressed in terms of 'hegemony', i.e., as 'the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes'. See Femia, op cit., 31.
54 This 'faith' (or ethos) may be, following Owen's 'structural-dependency' theory, 'as much a product of colonial conditioning as a reflection of indigenous values'. Norman G. Owen, Prosperity Without Progress, (Quezon City, Phil.: Ateneo de Manila Univ. Press, 1984), 249.
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*ilustrada*—had installed itself with superordinate privilege and authority. And by their monopoly of productive resources, they thereby secured the profitability of their capital and other investments, that is, largely in land ownership or by rent and interest on loans. But on the other--the *tao*--devolved the reproduction of value-based subordination and consent. By their productive labor, the plebeians were either better or worse according to the pressure of the priority of their values over their interests and the vicissitudes of social disvalues and the dysfunction of institutions.

Such a condition of inequality and the disparate outlook between them that went with it had remained largely unchanged, that is, even, with the upsurge of urbanization and industrial growth in the Greater Manila, Cebu, and other regions after World War II. In fact, internal migration (especially to Manila), massive increases in population, and prevailing standards of education made the distinctions--economic, cultural--between the classes inevitably much more aggravated. In substance as much with the elites (i.e., since the *conquista*) as with the masses (since pre-*conquista*), changes to their folk-charismatic relationships down to post-colonial times had been by no means in kind but only by degree--both in terms of the quality and quantity of *origination* and *functionalization*.\(^{55}\)

C. Vertical Friendship: Social Roles and Class Values and Interests in Patronage Relationship

a. Patron-Client Relations

Accordingly, in spite of their experiences--or rather because of them--the masses had remained without a consciousness of the contradiction between their own class's values and the elite's interests. Much less would they have realized their exploitation and oppression by the other. In fact, long after the Americans had 'gone', the foremost Filipino educationist Dr. Nemesio E. Prudente could still write:

\(^{55}\) See Guerrero, op cit., 132-156, in which 'class' is used to analyze 'the relationship between the exploiters and the exploited'.

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'Hegemonic domination exercised by the ruling elites (local and foreign) through the structures of society has made the people accept as a matter of course their own oppressed and exploited condition'. On the contrary, their parallel experiences--specifically, landlord-tenant--set the physical and cultural basis of vertical friendship or the reproduction of centripetal 'patron-client' patterns of dependence relations. All this may be formally in keeping with Eisenstadt and Roniger's characterization of such relations, among the most important of which are: (1) they are usually particularistic and diffuse; (2) the interaction between patrons and clients involves the simultaneous exchange of different types of resources: on the one hand, instrumental and economic as well as political (support, loyalty, votes, protection), and on the other, promises of reciprocity, solidarity, and loyalty; (3) this exchange is usually arranged by 'package-deal', that is, in combination which includes each type of resource; (4) aspects of unconditionality and long-range credit are strongly involved; (5) there is also a prevalent sense of binding inter-personal obligation such as strong personal loyalty or reciprocity and attachment between patrons and clients; (6) their relations are not fully legal (in fact, often illegal) or contractual, but are based more on 'informal' understandings; (7) in principle at least, they are entered into voluntarily, and can, officially at least, be abandoned voluntarily; (8) they evolve in a vertical fashion between individuals rather than between corporate groups, and tend to undermine horizontal group organization and solidarity of clients and patrons alike--but especially of the clients; and (9) finally, they are based on marked inequality or difference in power--of which the most crucial is the monopolization, by the patrons, of certain positions which are important to the clients such as access to the means of production, major markets, and centres of the society.

Since long past, distinctly plebeian values (what may, for instance, be called the bakya sub-culture) such as a

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'fatalistic' outlook (e.g., bahala na) and 'tribalistic' attitudes (e.g., kinship, regionalism) by no means played a minor role. Indeed lacking in self-confidence (e.g., out of habitual shyness, humility, ignorance), they were usually indifferent or contemptuous of 'challenges' (especially in elections and litigations) by others like them (that is, because they are deemed to be over-ambitious, lacking capacity, hopeless, etc.) against members of the elite classes. By force of habit, however, the former usually sought satisfaction (e.g., in terms of security or protection, advancement) even against one another through their varied, personal links or connections with the latter. Noting some of these values and attitudes the same American writer remarks further: 'The dyadic patron-client relationship was given a particularly Filipino flavor and intensity through such concepts as utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and such institutions as compadrazgo (ritual coparenthood)'.

Such distinctions as all this had long since dominated the dynamics of Philippine society—through to the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s. It took on specific, dyadic forms of exchange in various conditions (e.g., the bata-bata [protege] system, palakasan, etc.); but it was still based, in general, on 'property' and 'patronage'. (As vertical friendship is practised, however, patrons and clients in the various forms of exchange may or may not belong to the same social class although their social roles towards each other are always different. We are, however, mainly concerned with differences not only of social role but, even more importantly, of social class as well. All in all, they were the basic components of the long-term preconditions to the revolutionary developments in the late

58 In generalizing so-called Filipino world-view as 'personalistic', Dr. Andres asserts that 'his [i.e., the Filipino's] fatalism leads him to believe that one's life is shaped and directed by superior forces beyond one's control'. Furthermore, within 'alliance systems' (e.g., kinship, regional, etc.), 'status . . . authority and power differentials are ranked and observed'. Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach (Quezon City, Phil.: New Day, 1981), 15-27.

For centuries, then, the elite classes' *de facto* domination of the plebeian-masses had taken shape within the wide parameter of indigenous baranganic civilization: the folkways and values of the *Gemeinschaft*-like communities—their 'folk' world view. Despite various foreign influences (e.g., Chinese, Spanish, etc.), certain aspects of this world view had had a distinct continuity down to the present (especially in the rural areas and remote hinterlands). The *ilustrado* sub-culture, however, had been mainly a reproduction of the Spanish *conquista*, and was inextricably Americanized as well. All in all the Philippine society had had a peculiar cultural pluralism, the main strands of which were the 'cosmopolitan-Western' and the 'folk-communal'. Between the social classes its significance lies, among others, in centripetal patron-client attitudes and exchange relations. Closer cultural integration is thus instantiated.

More specifically, in every one-on-one exchange relations patron-client practices served to re-condition the effects of (as well as various reactions to) unequal social and economic needs and expectations. In fact, patron-client attitudes pervaded every friendship relationship in which those involved had disproportionate capacities toward each other. In varying degrees the patrons would be wealthy, powerful, or otherwise had access in high places—that is, in business, government, and the like. To the extent that these attributes were known and their effects felt by those concerned, patronage was equivalent to charismatic leadership. There could thus be a number of varying charismatic manifestations.

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60 More specifically, this 'world view' is exemplified in 'folk-Catholicism', which refers to 'beliefs and practices which . . . are obliquely derived from, or manifested in the context and under the name of Catholicism, regardless of orthodoxy . . . but only where the belief is of popular derivation and use, and is sanctioned as traditional in the community where it obtains'. See Frank Lynch, 'Folk-Catholicism in the Philippines', in *Philippine Society and the Individual: Selected Essays of Frank Lynch, 1949-1976*, ed. Aram A. Yengoyan and Perla Q. Makil (Ann Arbor: CSSAS, Univ. of Michigan, 1984), 198.

61 In the context of 'dependence relations', this leadership is based on 'a hierarchical relationship of a superior caring for inferiors, and inferiors gratefully acknowledging the superior's authority and yielding to his will'. Cf. Bushman, op cit., 79.
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On the other hand, the others (or clients) who had little or none of these qualities vis-a-vis their patrons might have been related to them as, say, loyal political supporters, relatives in blood or by affinity, or as ritual co-parents (*compadres*), or yet in some other ways. We may cite Zaide in giving a classic example:

Our *cacique* in those days [Spanish times] was similar to the feudal baron of Europe or to our present-day *hacendero*. He was, owing to his wealth and social position, an influential figure in the town. He exercised patriarchal authority over the tenants of his lands. He looked after their material and spiritual welfare and was sponsor in their weddings or in the baptisms or confirmations of their children. In return for his paternal aid and guidance, the tenants held him in high esteem and cheerfully performed any work for him.62

Much more recently, in May 1972 Wolters reports from Barranca, Nueva Ecija, that some tenants had planned to apply for leasehold and discussed it with the landlord who replied: 'You . . . what do you want? . . . You have a cement house, you earned that by growing tomatoes on my land (during the dry season). I have always allowed you to use it, I've treated you like a son, and now you apply for leasehold behind my back'.63

Depending as much on the clients' needs as on the patrons' influence, the former would obtain employment, contracts, and other favors from government and other entities through the latter's good offices. The latter also granted loans of money or in kind, and provided for health, education, and other amenities. The clients in turn were customarily expected or were morally bound to reciprocate in various ways (such as doing service in patrons' households or fields). Among the most important, however, was their unconditional electoral support for him if he ran, or at his behest, for his political party and candidates. All in all whether it was justified by the patron's paternalistic image or character or the respect given him due to his wealth, privilege, and influence, vertical friendship and harmony was realized only because of the plebeian-clients' habitual moral values—*utang na loob*.

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62 Zaide, op cit., 2: 115.
63 Wolters, op cit., 74.
pakikisama (neighborliness), and their dependence attitudes, sublimated as they were in folk-Catholic faith.

**b. Other Relevant Practices: Dominant Charismatic Interests**

Amongst the elite classes, however, such inhibitions, though not without meaning, were not as much generally and strongly felt or observed. In many cases they were even explicitly devalued and impugned. Where they were not patrons to one another but treated each other more or less as 'equals-in-power' (that is, having similar roles to different clientele, or belonging to the same social class), their Gesellschaft-like relationships would be governed by ad hoc conventions (e.g., social clubs, joint ventures) as well as different standards and expectations (e.g., competition, profit, pacta esse observanda). To a great extent, their relationships were determined by equivalent property exchanges. For instance, they would at once be highly competitive in their business undertakings (e.g., among bankers, traders), but be jointly supportive of eleemosynary projects (e.g., fund-raising for typhoon victims), and also collaborate with foreign interests (e.g., the compradors with transnational corporations). No more than contractual in significance, for them to form factions or switch sides as well as break and change alliances would appear to be only a matter of their privileged self-will or an exercise in individual freedom or gamesmanship.

Underlying all this was an ever-present motive; that is, minimally to exchange value for equivalent value, or if practicable, to make the most profit at the least cost, or to avoid or (if unavoidable) to minimize losses.64 (It is also according

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64 In general, Filipino attitudes towards 'commercialization' and 'industrialization' might be explained with Professor Kunio's remarks that, 'the absorption of mestizos into Filipino society exposed Filipino culture to the values of their immigrant ancestors and made it more money-oriented . . . [and] the American policy of fostering Filipino entrepreneurship'. See Yoshihara Kunio, Philippine Industrialization: Foreign and Domestic Capital (Quezon City, Phil.: Ateneo de Manila Univ. Press, 1985), 143. Industrial entrepreneurs are a third foreigners, another third Chinese, and the remaining third Filipinos--half Malay and the other half mestizos. See ibid., 142-143. Among relevant practices, for instance: 'Del Monte was paying the incredibly small amount of P1.00 [Philippine Currency] per hectare from
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to comparable attitudes that we may explain the acquiescence of many ilustrados to the annexation of the Philippines by the United States, and conventional party-switching or 'turncoatism' among politicians in post-independence partisan politics.) All this would ultimately signify that patron-elites' interests had determined without recourse the relevance and efficacy of values whatever they might happen to be—to safeguard their charismatic domination over the masses. It is thus with the elites that we could see more than any other the 'priority' of policy interests over value principles. But more specifically, their interests—freedom, profit, status quo relations of production—and their overlaying domination 'had taken shape within the parameter of the habitual moral values among plebeian-clients.

c. Other Relevant Practices: Folk Dependence Values

Institutionally, then, the clients' habits and attitudes would have been instilled with the folk-communal values. In fact, as observed by the earliest writers down to modern times,
we could cite a few at random—for instance, habitual slothfulness, folk-medicine, superstitions (such as the *penitencia* or flagellation), as well as some positive attributes—for example, *bayanihan* (mutual help), and so forth. Functionally, such as in socio-economic terms, they would have specific yet multiple (if not fully understood) remedial significance: in particular, to moralize and sublimate plebeian-clients' deprivation. (Significantly, it implies that in effect values would have priority over interests.) Thus, for instance, the Filipino peasant would have what might be called a 'subsistence orientation'. This is explained by the so-called safety-first principle—that is, that a concern for safety and reliability of technique takes precedence over long-run profit, while peasant struggle for subsistence is usually carried out in the context of a shortage of land, capital, and outside employment opportunities. In socio-religious terms too, customary Catholic piety was usually measured by the degree of passivity and resignation to one's status and 'God-given' fate. Among others, teachings which praised 'poverty', 'obedience', 'self-denial', and the like served to lift plebeian lifeprivation to heights of spiritual worth. Thus, as some writers have aptly commented:

Religious missionary and civil conquistador teamwork resulted in the successful implantation of Spanish sovereignty with friar support. The natives were taught the virtues of obedience, and resignation, as though the


divine mandate was in the custody of the conqueror-ruler; disobedience to them meant disobedience to God. They had to accept their fate as the Sermon on the Mount taught them; the poor will inherit the kingdom of heaven. Life was to be understood as a calling and a duty assigned to them by God; hence implicit trust in Him, and resignation to His will. No doubt, it bred a servile people conditioned to passivity, and obedience without question.  

A semi-religious trust and dependence on 'Messianism' had also conditioned the quasi-political consciousness of the masses, even as they habitually looked up to the elite classes (as their patrons) for leadership and guidance. Says another writer:

The Filipino idea of leadership residing in one man with broad powers exercised in a highly personal manner became the dominant idea of the constitution. The constitutional grant of power has been extended in practice through an emphasis on 'political' considerations. Congressmen and senators regard presidential powers as almost unlimited. The powers of the presidency have been determined largely by the political skills of the man who held the office.  

Professor Roth calls this attitude an 'optimistic personality cult'. Indeed, more than any other the masses' outlook towards 'persons in authority' had long been rooted deeply in folk-charismatic relationships. It was government by patronage. And they individually were its clients. Correspondingly, the elective officials acted habitually as individual patrons—the president, senators, and others who were themselves 'wealthy, powerful, or otherwise had access in high places'. And so, following Jocano in noting that Catholic precepts became integrated with social, economic, and cultural

activities, we may also say that especially to so-called rural folks, 'the rituals and the basic beliefs surrounding them not only draw together all the separate strands of traditional practices and lore, but also provide the outline from which the people themselves may acquire a clear picture of the way their activities blend with local concepts and an example of the manner in which the practice rites strengthen the central values of their lives'. All in all, in their various manifestations—social, economic, and political—the masses' attitudes followed their sublimated awareness of a dis-privileged way of life but which they learned to regard as natural and fateful.

D. Some Corresponding Disvalues and Dysfunctions

a. A Few Remarks Concerning Other Problems

These social roles and the patterns of cultural pluralism had been further reinforced—or more accurately, aggravated—by a few endemic but none the less urgent societal disvalues and dysfunctional circumstances. Among the most critical of these were the high population growth rate and the neo-colonial (or anti-nationalistic) system of education and teaching. There had, of course, been others of comparable seriousness; among others, there were the worsening crimes rate, pollution, drug addiction, and malnutrition. But, by and large, these two problems of overpopulation and educational imbalance certainly dominated or surpassed all the others (e.g., in scope and in consequence), even as they also over-determined the degree of their urgency. This may be made clearer by citing a few relevant pro forma situations. We may, for instance, agree (without need of much formal proof) that there are certain crimes (especially those 'against property') which may have been at least partly the result of poverty or economic disadvantage or lack of education. Now, although poverty is not always the result of overpopulation, in an economically underdeveloped society a rapid and massive increase in population directly results in a greater number of

72 Jocano, op cit., 43.
poverty-stricken families. Yet, among others, increased unemployment and serious ecological problems are either caused or aggravated by overpopulation.

On the other hand, the kind and degree of education that any one gets always influence as well as restrict his values and choices—or his capacity to understand and be productive. In fact, authoritarian and liberal modes of education and training produce different behavioral patterns; and, in consequence, also lead to the constitution of distinct types of state-society. Of singular importance with these differences is, among others, the understanding (that is, the acquiescence or opposition) or the lack of it by the people of their predetermined social roles and statuses. Even more important is the strength of their moral consciousness of individual civil rights and obligations. Or, what amounts to the same thing, rhetorically, could they surmise or discern the state's *raison d'être* as a function of power and authority relations among themselves, or as the source and basis of a collective (nationalist) sense of justice, freedom, and the like?

b. Population Growth Rate:73 Dysfunctional Circumstances

At the end of World War II—or more precisely in 1948—the population of the Philippines stood at 19,234,182. In 1960 it rose to 27,087,685; and in 1970 it was 36,684,486. By 1980 it already reached 48,098,460. In fact, from an estimated half a million people occupying the islands in the late sixteenth century (ca. 1570) the population climbed to more than 54,600,000 shortly before the *people's power* uprising in February 1986. Incidentally, in 1975 and in 1980 the rural-urban population ratio was 2.2:1 and 1.7:1, respectively. Growing at a faster percentage rate than many other nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the Philippine intercensal growth rate indicated an increase of an average of 2.0 and 1.9 per cent before and after World War II, and a little more or less than 3 per cent in the 1950s, the 1960s, and

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73 The data in this sub-section (unless otherwise specified) were taken from *Philippine Yearbooks* 1983 and 1985 (Manila: NEDA and NCS) and *Philippine Statistical Yearbook* 1988 (Makati: NSCB).
And while it had taken less than ninety years from the first census (1877) to the 1960 census to notch up a 483.9 per cent increase in the population, it took a mere twenty-five years (that is, from 1960 to 1985) to have a 100 per cent increase. The latter would then be compounded much more in the tens of millions before the same number of years (i.e., ninety) should have passed. So much so that one Filipino sociologist has estimated that based on present trends the population by mid-2000 would be a massive 89.5 million. According to recent statistics the Philippines is the eighth largest in Asia and the seventeenth most populous in the world.

Since 1903 the population had grown younger. The median age had changed from 20.2 years in 1903 to 17.1 years in 1960 and then to 16.9 in 1970. In 1980 it was up to 17.6 years. In 1973 forty-seven per cent of the population were under fifteen years. Persons aged eighteen belonged to the 'older half' of the population. And those who were sixty-five years or more comprised only three per cent of the population. It may also be said that (as in 1973) the average Filipino couple is estimated to be raising seven children each. The present birth rate is 45.0 per thousand while the death rate is 11.0 per thousand. Such a growth rate as the three per cent (from the 1950s to the 1970s) may be deemed alarmingly high, especially when it is compared to previous increases in the Philippines or to those of most other countries. All in all, this high growth rate is attributed mainly to a relatively high fertility rate, a decline in the mortality rate, and an increasing life expectancy. Also contributing has been the notable advance in medical and health care, and the opposition by the Catholic Church to 'artificial birth control' policy proposals.

Notwithstanding these developments, the public authorities had not shown so much concern and initiative at this high growth rate until the late 1960s. In fact, there had been no proposals or schemes—with one administration after another—which might have effectually regulated it or otherwise correlated it to the economic planning of the government. It was not until 1967 that the then president, Ferdinand E.

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75 Ibid.
Marcos, signed the United Nations Human Rights Day Declaration which acknowledged the population problem as a principal element in long-range national planning. (Government programmes, however, had been no more than 'voluntary and non-coercive'. And this was so even after martial law was installed!) This lack of concern by the government paralleled (as well as fostered) an ethical complacency and unconcern among Filipinos, especially in the rural areas and among those who had little or no education.76 Besides such variables as this, the strongest impact on prevalent attitudes was related to such other factors as ethnic grouping and religious beliefs.77 Significantly, the incidence of 'fertility' in the rural areas and among women with low or no education (which thus involved mostly plebeians) was characteristically higher than in the urban centres or among women of higher educational attainment.

As a result, in the several decades after World War II the 'population problem' and its implications (including internal migration to Metropolitan Manila) became worse or more intensified. More importantly, as the national economy declined poverty also spread among the masses. Among other findings, from 1961 to 1975 the lowest income brackets had the highest number of families. In 1975 a total of 4,923 thousand families (or 71.6 per cent of total families) got only 27.1 per cent of the total income. But on the other extreme 4.1 per cent of the total families took 36.8 per cent of the total family income—with one-fifth or 23.13 per cent going to families with an annual income of P50,000 or over. And with the mean income of families fixed at P6,698 in 1975, urban families posted a mean income much higher than the national level and rural families much lower. Needless to say, it was not the very elite classes but the poorest among the plebeians who

bore the brunt of these dysfunctions. It had, indeed, become a 'tremendous challenge' which the Aquino government would later on recognize 'in alleviating poverty and improving the quality of life of the Filipino people'. But then and now they had continued to reproduce their poverty and subordination. And so they also continued to be dependent—economically and socio-culturally—upon the elite classes.

c. What Kind of Education?

Dysfunctional Circumstances

The other main problem—broadly, educational standards—is a more indeterminate issue, unlike that of overpopulation. To be sure, one will scarcely find uniform principles which may be applied in all cases. Neither can one easily find absolute or clear-cut criteria in order to measure specifically the usefulness or effectiveness of educational policies. Moreover, there will be a need to set priorities depending on the State's regulatory powers as well as financial support that may be available. And thus among other approaches, we may wish to adopt as wide an overview of such standards as our situation may call for—a 'weak version' of the concept. In broad terms we may consider, however, both of what we call 'weak' and 'strong' versions. For our purposes, in particular, we may say that the former concentrates on the means (or method) of imparting knowledge or on the instrumental uses or ends of knowledge imparted. The latter, on the other hand, stresses the substance of knowledge and aims at persuading or converting its recipient—regardless of the means or uses of such knowledge. Thus, one approach puts emphasis on such formal aspects as 'guidance' and 'method'. As with Marohombsar, for instance, we may also take 'education' to mean 'any systematic influencing of people's knowledge, skills, and attitudes'. It thus appears to include both formal and informal modes of teaching and learning—as long as there is deemed to be 'systematic influencing'.

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Moreover, it does not exclude any particular form of knowledge or of value—as long as 'guidance' of people is served. Marohombsar's emphasis, however, lies in the instrumental or utilitarian aspect of education; even as her proposals seem too general (and indefinite) despite her chosen theme.\textsuperscript{80}

But just as it is as true here as with any other approach, it may not be unreasonable to stress the 'systematic' or 'methodical' aspect of the educational process. Obviously then, we must exclude all other modes of learning based on 'random or casual experience'; for example, Bourdieu's 'mythico-ritual oppositions',\textsuperscript{81} and what Snell calls the religious change by the Greeks to the Homeric 'creed of the Olympian Gods'.\textsuperscript{82} But both of what another writer describes in the Modernistic 'pluralism within the intellectual life' and the Medieval 'cooperative structure' of knowledge are to be included.\textsuperscript{83} Thus we may generally understand this process as both purposefully formal and informal in methodology. In addition, its content for guidance may systematically foster

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\footnotetext{80} It is the author's thesis (in the context of the Muslim problem in the Philippines) that only through education can the readiness and ability to live in peace . . . be engendered, and that 'common unity . . . is to be produced primarily by education'. More specifically, education promotes 'social and economic development' and involvement by Muslims in 'national or government affairs' as well as resolves the 'divisiveness' between Christians and Muslims. In sum, education serves a twofold purpose, viz., as 'means of acquiring skills and technical know-how' and as 'means of developing proper attitudes and intellectual knowledge that can lead to understanding'. She thus proposes a 'new educational system' that is based 'squarely on the realities and the cultural and religious values of the people of the Southern Philippines'. In all, however, it is not explained how 'education', as she conceived of it, could guarantee 'peace' or at least make its attainment more probable or realistic. One's 'understanding' does not necessarily lead to his 'acceptance and respect', nor is it logically relevant to 'nationalism' and 'patriotism'. Moreover, while she discards the notion of 'perfect peace' but admits 'there will always be conflict', we remain at a loss for what she must mean by 'peace'.


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practical training (e.g., for a craft, vocation) or theoretical learning (e.g., to cultivate rationality, sound moral judgments). In any case, it should mould in us a world view—a Weltanschauung—which can 'turn our enormous problems into equally tremendous opportunities'.

Many criticisms had been levelled at the country's system of education and training. Some had referred to its various levels (e.g., primary, secondary, and tertiary); others, to widely disparate standards between various schools (e.g., public, sectarian, and other private institutions) or to the 'overproduction of graduates' and 'devaluation of credentials'. And as could be traced back to Spanish and American colonial times, the 'stratified school system' also reflected the students' socio-economic background and predetermined their future strata of work. President Marcos himself admitted the system's deficiencies on the whole in no uncertain terms: 'Educational reforms will be the work not of one generation but of several generations working together. We have not yet, in this respect, offered a complete and challenging program for the youth of our country'. Very significantly in this regard, writes one Filipino bureaucrat: 'How then, can the schools become genuine contributors to social change?'

84 Mary Anunciata, 'Wanted: A Weltanschauung', Improving College and University Teaching, summer 1967: 145. Also see Russell, op cit., 202 et seq. He observes thus: 'This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve'. Ibid., 207.


87 He also mentions 'numerous and grave problems' in his context of internal revolution; e.g., national identity, reorientation and administration, etc. Marcos, op cit., 248.

88 'Social change' is taken as 'equalization of opportunity and acceleration of mobility'. Manalang, op cit., 66, 68. See also Leo A.
SOCIAL CLASS RELATIONS

To be sure, there had been no dearth of proposals on various issues; that is, from the need to integrate Chinese and Muslim minorities into the mainstream of Filipino society, to a flexible and pluralist system for both Christians and Muslims according to their own religious and cultural values, and so forth. From an even more important viewpoint—namely, 'nationalism'—we find more scathing criticism. To Prudente the 'school system' is an ideological mechanism of oppression. Likewise, observes economist Alejandro Lichauco:

Our educational system . . . is far from being merely a hangover from colonialism. It has evolved into a positive instrument serving the strategy of neocolonialism. And nowhere is this more evident than in the teaching of economics in our schools and the thinking of the more prominent academicians in this field. The situation is aggravated by the importation and presence of American exchange professors who along with their Filipino colleagues make it a point to (1) ignore imperialism as a factor in our economic problems, (2) propagate the notion that without foreign investment, our economic growth would be hampered (even while they remain silent on the exploitative aspects of foreign-owned enterprises), (3) discredit the value of protectionism, and (4) continue with their apostleship of free enterprise.

In view of all this, perhaps, a more fundamental question to look into is whether the existing system itself could afford (or tolerate) a result in 'social change'. Can it accommodate the radical forces of change? Correlatively, we might also ask whether formal indoctrination ought to be based on the 'priority' of value-theories over the maintenance of interest-practices. Or, what amounts to the same thing, how we could transform the system to revolutionize, inter alia, the 'long-standing oppressive economic structures that have retarded our


Prudente, op cit., 11.

growth as a nation and demeaned our dignity as individuals'.

It is clear in all this that not only the weak but, even more importantly, the strong version is also called for.

From still another angle, we may note the lack of balance between the 'training' and 'education' aspects in some fields of formal study and research. At the tertiary level, for instance, curricular emphasis on training courses might have decisively contributed to an unpromising non-articulation of otherwise useful educational (or theoretical) consciousness. This was at least the case with 'legal education'. Under its Rules, the Supreme Court has set out compulsorily the minimum technical curriculum for all accredited law schools. It had held annual, nation-wide Bar examinations on such prescribed 'substantive' courses as civil law, criminal law, taxation, commercial law, and others in order to assess the technical competence of graduates before their admission to legal practice. The schools' reaction over the years had been narrow and unchanging. Since they were instituted early under the American Occupation, these schools (especially 'private institutions') had mainly geared their teaching to enable their graduates to pass the annual tests. The method was strictly authoritarian and formal; and, almost exclusively, tuition had been limited to practical training and application (e.g., exposition of Philippine statutes and judicial decisions as well as U.S. constitutional precedents and Spanish and other civil law authorities).

It had been common thinking that more than anything else, the Bar held the key to success (i.e., in terms of career prospects and reputation) for both schools and graduates. In effect, the higher the average mark the examinee got—or if he made it to the 'top ten' (i.e., the Supreme Court's list of ten topnotchers)--the better his chances of being co-opted in the more prestigious law firms or of being given high position in the bureaucracy. And the school which consistently got its graduates among the 'top ten' and more or less 100% passing average among them took top honors. Expressing the 'consensus', Professor Quisumbing observes that, 'the traditional curriculum of Philippine law schools puts undue emphasis on preparing students for passing the bar examinations and

91 Bernas, op cit., 11.
acquiring skills in handling court litigation. "Topping the bar" became prestigious by itself and law schools have been observed to use all means (not always legal or ethical) to gain the distinction of being the alma mater of successful candidate No. 1 to No. 10. This is exacerbated by the undue publicity given to the "topnotchers". In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s such honors were consistently recognized in such schools as the Ateneo de Manila, San Beda, and the University of the Philippines, all in Metro Manila where most of the more high-standard schools were located.

With so much emphasis thus laid on the teaching of Bar subjects, most students came rigorously to adapt to the new, enforced discipline. And they thus became much more sensitive to legal fictions, forms, and techniques (or lex-prescribed policies), even as they also tended to reproduce a strongly conservative ethos and attitude towards social issues and controversies. Theoretical or moral issues (such as concerning justice, right, etc.--or jus-oriented principles and rules) were either minimized or misunderstood by both teachers and students. Down to the mid-1970s most schools continued to overlook such courses as 'human rights', 'comparative law', and other 'non-substantive' subjects (but a 2-hour weekly introductory course on 'legal philosophy' was required for only one semester in the whole bachelor of laws [LLB] degree.) Thus, rote learning or memory work prevailed over comparative research; and formalistic, context-free instruction made society-based 'critical studies' appear marginal or irrelevant.

Needless to say, the development of such uncritical attitude typifies how 'education and training' remained prey to ruling class hegemonic legislation and de-moralized doctrines legitimized through elitist control of the judiciary's 'jurispathic' powers and its statutory constructions. By focusing conservatism in legal studies they also over-determined the specific forms of effective legal consciousness. As a result, down to the 1970s lawyers had formed the hard core of conservative socio-political outlook. Only the elite classes

benefited from all this—not only formally but substantively as well; among others (i.e., benefits), only they could afford to pay the brightest and best-trained lawyers to serve them in their 'private law' (e.g., contract, property, succession), and defend their ideology and practice of equality and liberty in the 'public law' (e.g., constitutional, electoral). (Among the most prominent abogados de campanilla, Recto, Tanada, the Laurels, Marcos, Manglapus, Tolentino, Salonga, and a host of others were also staunch Establishment politicians.)

And how about the masses? Formally, they had their de jure rights because, among whatever other bases, 'no person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws'. Subject to certain conditions, they could cast votes during elections, organize for mutual benefit, learn a craft or study for a degree, and do many other things. But many other questions remained—what (or who) to vote for, how (or why) beneficial, which to learn. Most importantly, how could they redress their degradation—poverty and ignorance, sub-human in some cases—which had filled their consciousness for many centuries? Perhaps the answer lies in Education—that is, in generalizing the knowledge of 'intrinsic values' and in relation to 'extrinsically valuable . . . which supports and sustains . . . intrinsic value'. In any case, whether they had been subject to the ruling classes' interests more than the moral priority of value-principles, we may be reminded of S. E. Finer's admonition as follows:

Do not let us be misled by the alleged existence among certain peoples of the notion that some higher moral power exists which transcends positive law. That notion is well attested and well-nigh universal. Thus, Indian kings and princes are said to have been subject to constraints of 'Dharma' ('righteousness'), and the

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93 As provided in the Constitutions: 'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws'. Philippine Constitution (1935), art. 4, sec. 1(1), and Philippine Constitution (1973), art. 4, sec. 1(1). As used here, a 'formal' right is a matter of definition (as when there is statutory recognition of such a right or a legal remedy is provided for its infringement); the same right is at the same time also 'substantive' when it is effectual (as when the aggrieved party has the means or the resources to obtain relief from the courts).
Egyptian Pharaohs subject to 'Ma’at' or 'Justice', and Chinese Emperors to 'Ti’en' or 'Heaven'. But as none of these terms were specific, they had no cash value. (The Egyptians did not even have codes of law!) A belief in the existence of a transcendent criterion like the above only acquires a cash value to the extent that it is expressed in detailed and specific terms. The Mosaic Law was quite specific, and to the extent that it was so, it limited the monarch. Similarly with the Islamic Sharia law. But both . . . covered only a limited area of human activity.

Some care to think that such transcendent values or conceptions do indeed have a cash value in that they establish standards of justice or fair play in the ruler, his associates, possibly even in the community. This may readily be granted, but to make this equate with or even approximate to a constitutional limitation is the reverse of the truth. For though the 'higher law' be unwavering, not so the rulers' responses. While one ruler feels morally obliged to follow the notion, his successor flouts it . . . [or] a ruler might follow . . . for fear of alienating . . . his subjects . . . with varying fortunes. In brief: the outcome of such vague transcendent ideals is not the consistency of rule which we associate with the supremacy of a constitution but just the reverse—a series of arbitrary decisions via a fluctuating succession of rulers.

And so with no 'cash value', the masses continued to be dependent—legally and educationally—upon the elite classes; that is, specifically, in the enactment and construction of laws as well as the study of them, determined by the de facto exigencies of folk-charismatic relationships. Could education make their 'transcendent criterion . . . [be] expressed in detailed and specific terms'? And yet to functionalize the State towards promoting the priority of values (for the masses) over interests (of the elites), is such an origination structuring 'a problem that was, in legal terms, insurmountable'?

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