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Men as a group are not comparably disempowered by their reproductive capacities — no one forces them to impregnate women or to bear children — and they are not generally required by society to spend their lives caring for children to the comparative preclusion of other life pursuits.[29]
and
that:
Laws cannot alter the reproductive capacities of men and women, but they can and do prescribe the social and legal consequences which attach to them.[30]
These
sorts of assertions or claims seem to rest on fairly broad brush claims about
‘women’ and ‘men’. It
is difficult in a litigation
context to reflect a more nuanced understanding of the recent challenges to
‘white’ feminism
by Aboriginal women and women of non-English
speaking background. So would it be possible to include the experiences of a
wide variety
of women in a litigation context? Could you point out that women do
not unequivocally control their access to contraception? (It
is costly,
particularly for poor women.) Could you emphasise that Aboriginal women have
been subjected to forcible use of contraceptives
such as depo
provera?[31] How about women with
disabilities who have been sterilised, often for eugenic
purposes?[32] It is unclear to us
whether there would have been an opportunity, even if WEL had been granted
intervener status,[33] to make any
of these arguments. The equality arguments in Canada have been developed in a
context where the Canadian constitution
contains a guarantee of sex equality and
LEAF has been challenged to become more coalitionist in its politics and include
issues
of race, disability etc in its argumentation on behalf of
‘women’. In Australia, given the difficulty of getting the
court to
see a connection between reproduction and women’s equality, Australian
feminists may be even more wary of muddying
the waters by representing a more
nuanced approach to women’s diverse equality claims.
It is unclear
to us whether the next 25 years are likely to see more feminist engagement in
litigation, especially as interveners.
Will we have a constitutionally
entrenched bill of rights? Will the granting of intervener status to the
Catholic Church in CES lead
to a broader range of voices being heard in that
court? Specifically, will this (or any future) government fund a National
Women’s
Justice Program of the type recommended by the Australian Law
Reform Commission in its 1994 report ‘Equality before the Law:
Justice for
Women’? Or are Australian feminists more likely to stay in the legislative
arena where so much of the activist
energy has to date been focused? That the
legislative arena can, on occasion, provide a sympathetic environment for
feminist arguments
in the abortion area is illustrated by events in Western
Australia in the past year.
Early in 1998 the West Australian DPP charged
two doctors with performing an unlawful
termination.[34] The termination had
come to the attention of the authorities as the Maori woman concerned had asked
to take the foetus home so she
could bury it in accordance with her religious
and cultural beliefs. She had kept it in her fridge and her child described this
at
‘show and tell’ at his
school.[35] The Western Australian
Criminal Code, while it had some similarities to the Victorian and New South
Wales legislation, was not the
same and there was some doubt whether the Levine
and Menhennit rulings applied in that jurisdiction. When the charges were laid,
doctors in that State threatened to cease performing abortions, and newspapers
reported that some women were attempting to abort
themselves, with tragic
results. The opportunity of the prosecution was seized upon by long time
campaigner, the Hon Cheryl Davenport
to introduce legislation which would have
removed abortion from the Criminal Code altogether. After a lengthy debate, the
original
criminal offences were abolished but they were replaced with a new
provision in the Health Act that provides, in effect, that an
abortion is lawful
if the woman concerned has given ‘informed consent’. While the
informed consent provision requires
two doctors to be involved (a doctor other
than the one to perform the abortion must ensure her ‘informed
consent’),
there is no restriction on where abortions can be performed.
Most importantly, the decision is expressed to be one for the woman
rather than
for a medical practitioner.[36]
As with involvement in the CES litigation, feminist activism on abortion
in WA was also reactive: while Davenport had sought reform
of the law for some
time, it was the crisis generated by the apparent ‘banning’ of
abortion that ultimately concluded
with a new, more permissive, legal regime.
There is real doubt whether this progressive legislation would be achieved in
other jurisdictions
in the future; that is, there is no reason to assume that
because, in 1998, the Western Australian parliament passed progressive
legislation, feminist activists should turn their attention to their own
parliaments. Feminist activists in Western Australia had
no choice and, as
indicated by the CES litigation, feminist interventions in law both at the
parliamentary level and in the courts,
are often going to be at the dictates of
others.[37] However, the legislative
arena in Western Australia did provide at least some opportunity for abortion to
be recognised as an equality
issue for
women[38] and while we occasionally
envy our feminist colleagues in Canada able to intervene frequently in
constitutional litigation, it may
be that the legislative arena will continue to
offer a more fertile ground for feminist legal interventions in Australia,
despite
the prevalence of conservative governments.
What does the return of abortion to the front pages and the return of
feminist activists to the front lines tell us about what to
expect in the
future? As we mentioned earlier, the range of issues in law that feminists have
identified as operating in a gendered
manner has expanded well beyond the first
wave of concern about rape law, domestic violence, and women’s control
over their
fertility. But at the same time, hard-earned reforms are constantly
under challenge. We have referred to the work of feminist legal
activists in
Canada where the equality guarantee under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has
provided a framework within which feminist
arguments are made (and sometimes
heard) in the Supreme Court of Canada. Yet in the first few months of this year,
the Attorney-General
of one province has recalled brochures for women survivors
of domestic violence on the grounds that no comparable literature is available
for male ‘victims’ and we have already discussed the attacks on
feminism in the Supreme Court of Canada.
In Australia, as in Canada, the
struggle in the context of sexual assault has moved to the issue of
counsellors’ records. Women’s
right to control their fertility,
including their right to safe, affordable abortion, once considered relatively
settled, has re-emerged
as an issue that can be used by those who oppose
women’s equality to try to limit their autonomy.
While no-one can
predict with any certainty what the next quarter century will bring women
involved in the law and legal issues, it
is sobering to reflect how much has
changed but how much has remained the same in the past 25 years. Twenty-five
years ago, a course
in feminist legal theory or law and gender at an Australian
university law school would have been unthinkable; now such courses are
relatively common. Yet many areas of legal doctrine are still taught, practised
and pronounced upon by courts as if women remain
‘fringe dwellers of the
jurisprudential
community’,[39] or as if law
schools and the courts were still the sole domain of white anglo heterosexual
men (though ones who occasionally are
sufficiently generous to ‘allow
in’ a few token women).
What will an article like this one say in
25 years from now? Will 50% of superior court judges in 2024 be women? (Well,
there is no
law against fantasising.) The history of the past quarter century
suggests that the same issues will continue to resurface; that
25 years from now
we will still campaign around rape and sexual assault, and reproductive freedom.
As well, our 25-year-old colleagues
will identify their own priorities and
agendas and hopefully these will take a more prominent place on the legal stage.
References
[1] See now Question of Law
Reserved on Acquittal Pursuant to Section 351(1A) Criminal Law Consolidation Act
(No 1 of 1993) [1993] SASC 3896; (1993) 59 SASR
214.
[2] See Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC), Equality Before the Law: Justice for Women, Report No
69, Part I, Sydney, 1994 and ALRC, Equality Before the Law: Women’s
Equality, Report No 69, Part II, Sydney,
1994.
[3] Fehlberg, B., Sexually
Transmitted Debt: Surety Wives and English Law, Clarendon, Oxford,
1997.
[4] Graycar, R.,
‘Hoovering as a Hobby and Other Stories: Gendered Assessments of Personal
Injury Damages’, (1997) 31 University of British Columbia Law Journal
17.
[5] See, for example,
Stewart, M., ‘Reforming Tax for Social Justice’, (1998) 23 Alt LJ
157.
[6] See, for example, A.
Edwards and S. Magarey (eds), Women in a Restructuring Australia, Allen
and Unwin, Sydney, 1995 and Spender, P., ‘Exploring the Corporations Law
Using a Gender Analysis’, (1996) 3 Canberra Law Review
82.
[7] See Family Law
Reform Act 1995 (Cth). In relation to family law, see also the 1999
Discussion Paper, Property and Family Law: Options for Change,
Attorney-General’s Department, 1999 which seems to suggest that
women’s increased workforce participation means that
‘marriage is
becoming increasingly recognised as an economic partnership’ (para 5)
without noting the part-time and casualised
nature of that participation.
See article in this issue of Alt LJ by Renata
Alexander.
[8] Thornton, M.,
Dissonance and Distrust, Oxford University Press, Melbourne,
1996.
[9] Law Society of NSW,
Profile of the Solicitors of NSW 1998, Research Report 2, 1998 Table
7.
[10] Victorian Bar Council,
1998. See Hunter, R. and McKelvie, H., ‘Gender and Legal Practice’,
(1999) 24(2) Alt.LJ
57.
[11] Harvey, C.,
‘All Rise, Women in the Law Set a New Benchmark’, Australian,
16 April 1999, p.3.
[12] See
Bird v Free and Others (1994) 126 ALR 475 and see generally Graycar,
‘The Gender of Judgments: Some Reflections on Bias’, (1998) 32
UBCLR 1.
[13] R v
Ewanchuk (1999) 169 DLR (4th) 193, www.droit.umontreal.ca/doc/
csc-scc/en/rec/html/ewanchuk.en.html
[14]
See National Post, 27 February 1999 and subsequent issues: www.
nationalpost.com
[15]
‘Heroines of Fortitude: The Experiences of Women in Court as Victims of
Sexual Assault’, Department for Women, Sydney,
1996; Heenan, M. and
McKelvie, H., ‘Evaluation of the Crimes (Rape) Act 1991’,
Attorney-General’s Legislation and Policy Branch, Department of Justice,
Melbourne, 1997.
[16] See MCCOC,
Discussion Paper, Model Criminal Code: Chapter 5 — ‘Sexual Offences
Against the Person’, November
1996.
[17] See Evidence
Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997 (NSW) and Evidence
(Confidential Communications) Act 1998 (Vic) and Cossins, A., ‘Tipping
the scales in her favour: The need to protect counselling records in sexual
assault trials’
in P. Easteal (ed), Balancing the Scales: Rape, Law
Reform and Australian Culture, Federation Press, Leichhardt,
1998.
[18] Smart, C.,
‘Feminism and Law: Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy’, (1986)
14 International Journal of the Sociology of Law
109.
[19] See R v Davidson
[1969] VicRp 85; [1969] VR 667 (the ‘Menhennit ruling’) and R v Wald
(1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25 (the ‘Levine
ruling’).
[20] CES v
Superclinics (1995) 38 NSWLR
47.
[21] Graycar, R. and Morgan,
J., ‘“Unnatural Rejection of Womanhood and Motherhood”:
Pregnancy, Damages and the Law
— A Note on CES v Superclinics’[1996] SydLawRw 16; ,
(1996) 18 Sydney Law Review
323.
[22] See Superclinics
Australia Pty Ltd v CES and ors, In the High Court of Australia, No S88 of
1996, Transcript of Proceedings, 11 September
1996.
[23] Kirby J did not sit:
he had been a member of the Court of Appeal when it considered the matter. When
the application for leave to
intervene was made, Brennan CJ said: ‘... I
have asked the Senior Registrar to inform counsel that I know Father McKenna, a
deponent to one of the affidavits in support of the application to intervene, or
to appear amicus curiae, and a number of members
of the Australian Catholic
Bishops’ Conference’, Transcript of Proceedings, 11 September 1996,
at p.4.
[24] This contrasts quite
sharply with the situation in Canada where the Women’s Legal Education and
Action Fund (LEAF) has intervened
in a series of cases, including before the
Supreme Court of Canada, on behalf of women. Some of this work is described in
Razack,
S., Canadian Feminism and the Law, Second Story Press, Toronto,
1991 and see LEAF, Equality and the Charter: 1985–1995, Emond
Montgomery, Toronto, 1996.
[25]
See Superclinics Australia Pty Ltd v CES and ors, In the High Court of
Australia, No S88 of 1996, Transcript of Proceedings, 12 September
1996.
[26] See Wainer, J.,
‘Abortion before the High Court’, (1997) 8 Australian Feminist
Law Journal 133.
[27] See ref
26 above.
[28] Cf for Australia,
Ansett v Wardley (1984) EOC 92-002, and Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cth).
[29] See Factum of the
Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), in Daigle v
Tremblay, at para 35 (reproduced in Equality and the Charter, ref 24,
above).
[30] See Factum of the
Intervenor, The Elizabeth Bagshaw Society, Everywoman’s Health Centre
Society (1988), The BC Coalition for
Abortion Clinics, The BC Women’s CARE
program and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund in R v
Lewis, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 1996, para
28.
[31] Bunkle, Phillida,
‘Calling the Shots: The International Politics of Depo Provera’, in
Second Opinion: The Politics of Women’s Health in New Zealand ,
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1988, at
n.13.
[32] See the discussion by
Brennan J (as he then was) in Marion’s Case [1992] HCA 15; (1992) 175 CLR 218 at
275.
[33] There was a suggestion
at the time that the Abortion Providers’ Federation would be raising the
same issues as WEL and therefore
WEL’s application might have been
refused.
[34] These charges were
eventually dropped.
[35] See
Cica, N., ‘Ordering the Law on Abortion in Australia’s “Wild
West’’’, (1998) 23 Alt LJ
89.
[36] See Acts
Amendment (Abortion) Act 1998 (WA). Compare this with the recent ACT
amendments. In 1998, the ACT parliament enacted the Health Regulation
(Maternal Health Information) Act 1998. The Act provides that where an
abortion is proposed, a medical practitioner should provide a woman with
information about the medical
risks of termination of pregnancy and carrying a
pregnancy to term, any risks specific to her, any particular medical risks
associated
with the type of abortion procedure proposed and ‘the probable
gestational age of the foetus at the time the abortion will
be performed’
and offer referral to appropriate counselling (s.8). However, non-compliance
with these provisions does not affect
the lawfulness of the abortion performed
for the purposes of the Crimes Act
1900.
[37] See Sheehy, E.A.,
‘Feminist Argumentation Before the Supreme Court of Canada in R v
Seaboyer; R v Gayme: The Sound of One Hand
Clapping’[1991] MelbULawRw 27; , (1991) 18
Melbourne University Law Review
450.
[38] See Teasdale, L.,
‘Confronting the Fear of Being ‘Caught’: Discourses on
Abortion in Western Australia’[1999] UNSWLawJl 41; , (1999) 22(1) University of New South
Wales Law Journal 60.
[39]
See Thornton, ref 8, above.
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