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We are on the verge of a revolution that is just as profound as the change in the economy that came with the industrial revolution. Soon electronic networks will allow people to transcend the barriers of time and distance and take advantage of global markets and business opportunities not even imaginable today, opening up a new world of economic possibility and progress.[15]
In
summary, the fundamental premises of the new society include the notion that
information is currency, there is an intangible delivery
of products, there is a
non-territorial and decentralised nature to the way we do business. Time, space
and physicality disappear
into the background.
We stand on a precipice
overlooking one of the most significant shifts in the distribution of
commodities within our market, wondering
just how the physicality that we now
experience, and take so much for granted, will transform into intangibility.
Some things are
easy to conceptualise as going digital. The creative arts and
associated products that we now enjoy and that can be delivered as
audio or
visual commodities are things that we can conceptualise as turning to
intangibility. The potential exists more broadly though
to move our social,
cultural and economic existence from a physical base to an intangible
base.
The revolution currently under way in the music industry is an
example that (while easy to conceptualise for some) gives insight into
the
potential intangibility of distribution. Although it has been developing over
the past few years the mp3 format that is now used
to allow the free and easy
copying of digital quality music from the Internet onto a digital CD player,
downloaded also from the
Internet, highlights how the distribution chain has
gone digital.[16] In this instance
we are seeing the delivery of digital player and digital CD through digital
means. We have already seen the delivery
of software and other recreational
items across the Internet. Now we are seeing the delivery of the music that we
will listen to
across the Internet on a CD player that we will download as well.
More and more will change. This is just the start to the greatest
revolution in
the distribution of commodities that we have ever seen. And this turn to digital
distribution will be based on the
dissemination of digitised information through
the discourse of software.
As prisoners of the past, we will conceptualise the constitutionalism for
information society with traces of tradition very much embedded
in our thought.
We will look initially at institutional structure and seek to find what public
institutions will dominate this new
landscape.
States, even though their
sovereignty continues to dissipate in the sea of transnational civil society and
international governance,[17] will
still play a major role as it is their compulsory coercive powers (courts,
police forces, armies, and goals), as the Pinochet
case[18] so ably shows, that at the
end of the day are needed to implement policy. In short, the state at least in
its coercive capacity is
still vital to the functioning of transnational civil
society and international institutions. The state will no doubt take direction
from the United Nations, World Intellectual Property Organisation, World Trade
Organisation (WTO), UNCITRAL, OECD etc on a range
of informational issues. The
sleeper in terms of international institutions is the WTO. In this emerging
structure is a constitutional
system backed by compulsory coercive dispute
resolution that promises to act as a mechanism for universalising substantive
norms
of international law.[19] The
great concern is that the WTO is too one eyed and that trading interests
especially the trading interests of the hegemon will
dominate. Nonetheless as
the WTO has already embraced intellectual property law through TRIPS it has the
potential to exert great
influence over information society. This will result in
a push for more legitimacy and representation within the trade system. There
will inevitably be a push for individual (including corporate and group)
representation before and within the primary institutions
of the WTO. This push
will arise from the view that as the trade structure evolves into much more of a
constitutional system as happened
in the European Union, greater accountability
to and representation of individuals will be
demanded.[20]
These
traditional public institutions are obvious components of governance in the
information society. However, it has also become
obvious that large private
organisations will perform formal governance roles. While large private groups
such as MNCs, non-government
organisations (NGOs), employer and employee
organisations have exerted influence over public governance structures it has
been rare
for them to be involved as part of the formal governance
structure.[21] The Internet, which
is very much the centre of information society (at the moment) is unique in that
it has arisen largely through
coordination by private organisations albeit ones
that are close to government. The allocation of Internet domains or space which
has been described as an issue of public
trust,[22] has taken on great
significance due to the collision between domain names and
trademarks.[23] The great movement
now is towards developing a body that will exhibit sufficient legitimacy and
representation to undertake Internet
space allocation. An elaborate process is
currently under way for the development of a private organisation called the
Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which promises to
represent the interests of the architects of the Internet and Internet
users in
a form of privatised governance.[24]
It will be interesting to see how long the states of the world remain (formally)
absent from this apparently private structure.
Also the MNCs, the NGOs
and industry collectives are being asked to take on a governance role that will
be sanctioned by the state.
This has happened before through codes of conduct
but not to the extent that we are likely to see in the information society.
President
Clinton explains this in his Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce:[25]
1. The private sector should lead.
Though government played a role in financing the initial development of the Internet, its expansion has been driven primarily by the private sector. For electronic commerce to flourish, the private sector must continue to lead. Innovation, expanded services, broader participation, and lower prices will arise in a market-driven arena, not in an environment that operates as a regulated industry.
Accordingly, governments should encourage industry self-regulation wherever appropriate and support the efforts of private sector organizations to develop mechanisms to facilitate the successful operation of the Internet. Even where collective agreements or standards are necessary, private entities should, where possible, take the lead in organizing them. Where government action or intergovernmental agreements are necessary, on taxation for example, private sector participation should be a formal part of the policy making process.
...
4. Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet.
The genius and explosive success of the Internet can be attributed in part to its decentralized nature and to its tradition of bottom- up governance. These same characteristics pose significant logistical and technological challenges to existing regulatory models, and governments should tailor their policies accordingly.
Australia has endorsed this approach in the
Australia–United States Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce of December
1998.
What will emerge, as a key component of information
constitutionalism will be an integrative institutional structure that glues
together
these multi-layered governance or intersecting order-creating
mechanisms. It will be the norms that emanate from such an institutional
structure that will play an important role in shaping the constitutionalism for
informational postmodernity
Laws governing relations in the private sphere between individuals will be
key elements of the constitutionalism for informational
postmodernity. Private
law has always been important in constructing our social existence. However,
it will become even more dominant
in this regard in information society. I
wish to take one example to illustrate my point, that of software as
discourse.
If a software engineer has the tools to fully or partially
construct discourse and identity in the digital world then the principles
of law
that mediate power need to mediate such an occurrence otherwise technological
determinism will see me as simply another cyborg
programmed to mediocrity and
slavery. Laws that will play an important role in this process are laws that
will govern the construction
of this new discourse known as
software.
Already battle lines have been drawn but major choices that
will impact on the value of our lives are being hidden beneath the veil
of
private law rhetoric.
The role and function of software will initially be
mediated by a blend of intellectual property law, contract law, competition law
and privacy law, which I would term ‘informational law’ or
‘informational constitutionalism’. It is the development
of the
principles of these areas of law in their relation to software that will
determine much about the way I live in the future.
Intellectual property law in the form of copyright protects computer software
as if it were a literary text allowing the copyright
owner exclusive rights in
relation to the reproduction of that text: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth),
s.31. The rationale of copyright is that it will protect the expression of
information but not the ideas supporting such expression. An
example of the way
in which copyright law will serve to shape our identity through the way it
treats the expressive language of software
is found in the context of reverse
engineering and decompilation of software.
If a software engineer or
developer constructs software that becomes industry standard so that the
software acts as architecture for
communication, it becomes in essence a
discourse which allows me to speak to you. Copyright law then bears on its
shoulders the need
to mediate the power given to the copyright holder to
monopolise rights in discourse that may have become an industry standard, in
other words become common form, with the needs of the user or speaker. Herein
lie the battles over reverse engineering and the decompilation
of software. In
order to develop complementary and improved software products (speech) software
developers have reverse-engineered
the industry standard software in attempts to
make software that can be interoperable (conversant) with the industry standard.
In
many cases in order to reverse engineer software you need to copy (and in
some cases ‘borrow’ parts of) the software
which is technically an
infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights over reproduction.
In the United States, courts[26]
have employed fair use doctrine[27]
to mediate this issue while in Australia we are promised a (part) legislative
solution through amendment to the Copyright
Act,[28] and await the High Court
decision in Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd. Fair
use is designed to define the appropriate balance between a monopoly right given
as an incentive for innovation and the public
interest in the free flow of
information for a variety of cultural
reasons.[29] In Australia, the
CLRC[30] has recommended we adopt a
more broad-based fair use right similar to the US model in place of our narrower
and more specific fair
dealing exceptions: see for example ss.40, 41, 42
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
A patent gives a very strong form of protection (monopoly right for up to 20
years) over the using and selling of inventions. It is
now clear that software
(in the form of algorithms and data structures) can be
patented[31] even though under the
TRIPS Agreement the preferred form of protection is through
copyright.[32] The role of copyright
in this area has now been overtaken by events.
During the last decade,
the number of software patents granted in the United States has increased
tremendously. Over 13,000 software
patents were issued in 1997, 17,500 are
estimated for 1998 and 22,500 are estimated for 1999. In fact, ten times the
number of patents
granted in 1992 and 1993 will be granted in 1998 and
1999.[33]
In recent times
there have been more and more extensive claims to (monopoly) patent rights in
software that acts as the basic architecture
of electronic commerce. There have
been a number of claims in the United States that methods of transacting
electronic commerce (including
digital cash) are patented and cannot be
replicated without a licence.[34]
Here we have the very foundations of the information society, the commercial
structure or architecture, being monopolised by the
patent holder. The patent
monopoly is something we aspire to in order to reward inventors for the public
good but the patent monopoly
is difficult to fathom where the basic building
blocks of action or speech are being patented. In defining the patenting of
software
we will be defining the accessibility to new forms of discourse. How
much do I have to pay to speak?
The main form of distributing software is through a software licence —
shrink-wrap or click-wrap. Software is not distributed
through a sale of a
tangible good but rather through a licence of an intangible commodity. The
licence is the
product.[35]
‘Shrink-wrap
licences’ normally used where the software is sold in a store are those
shrink-wrapped around the software
product and disclosed usually after opening
the package containing the software. ‘Click-wrap licences’ normally
used
in an online environment such as the Internet involve the acceptance of the
terms and conditions of a software license by clicking
on a button before first
using a program. The decision of ProCD, Inc v
Zeidenberg[36] held that
shrink-wrap, and arguably click-wrap, licences are enforceable in the United
States.
In the digital world, licensing of information commodities is
the essential transaction, not the sale or transfer of a tangible product.
The
value of the commodity is the information, and the right to control and exploit
it. In this regard, the rights that are assigned
in conjunction with the
licence, set out as terms of the contract, are crucial, as they define the
product the licensee receives.
The more restrictions placed on the
licensee’s use of the software, the less its value, and the greater the
value retained
by the licensor to use the same information in future
transactions. The proposed UCC Article 2B in the United States (now to become
Uniform Computer and Information Transactions Act (UCITA)) is an attempt
to provide guidelines for the appropriate scope of software licensing. To this
point in time it has not achieved
widespread support.
This licensing
mechanism said to be necessary to protect investment in innovation is mooted to
allow privately legislated informational
property rights to arise. In some
instances it is even suggested that public domain rights currently recognised by
copyright law
can be ousted by the contractual software licence. Contract law
then, needs to be infused with some notion of public interest in
relation to
informational goods such as software. And if software is discourse we need to
factor that into the rights that private
ordering will allow.
In an ideal world competition law will act to balance the monopolies
copyright, patent and contract create in software. It will act
to define the
scope of the grant of intellectual property rights. Originally the approach in
the European Union was that dealings
within the scope of the intellectual
property rights granted by the relevant intellectual property law were immune
from competition
law, while other dealings were subject to competition law. The
continuation of such an approach has been questioned in a decision
that looks
primarily at the anti-competitive effect of intellectual property rights; in
other the words the scope of the grant as
defined by intellectual property and
competition law. [37]
The
appropriate interplay between competition law and intellectual property law is
of utmost importance to the construction of our
identity and is currently being
played out in the US v Microsoft
case.[38] In Australia much focus
has been placed on s.51(3) Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) which exempts
certain intellectual property rights from the full application of the Act.
Section 51(3) is set for reform in accordance with the Draft
Report[39] published by the National
Competition Council.[40] The
proposal is to remove intellectual property rights from the s.51(3) exemption
which will mean that competition lawyers will be much more eager to look at the
monopoly imposed by intellectual property
legislation. Even more so, the
monopoly imposed by a contractual licence of intellectual property such as
software.
In 1995 the United States Department (DOJ) of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property which govern the interaction of
intellectual property and competition law. The guidelines contain three main
principles:
(a) for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies [the DOJ and FTC] regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any other form of property;
(b) the Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust context; and
(c) the Agencies recognize that intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is generally procompetitive.
These guidelines along with the European
approach and the call for reform in Australia are a good indication that
competition law
will act to inform the scope of intellectual property rights in
the future and in so doing serve to mediate attempts by any one entity
to
dominate the construction of informational discourse and identity.
Privacy is a most important principle that is set to dominate information
society. Even more so when we are told software will open
our hearts for the
world to see. More and more software developers are realising the capacity of
software to gather information from
connection points without anyone
knowing.[41] If our discourse cannot
be discrete, we lose much of our identity and therefore privacy laws will play
an important role in the (public
and private) power relations in the information
society.
Another big issue arising from the conceptualisation of software as discourse
is the mandating of software standards by government.
To give an example let me
recount a submission I made in response to the exposure draft of the Electronic
Transactions Bill,[42] which aims to
give electronic documents a similar legal status to hard space documents:
My other concern is much more abstract. In sections 9(1) (b), (2) (b) and (3), and 11 (1) (c) it is provided that the government can dictate a particular form of software before it will recognise the equivalence in legal terms of the digital document. There is currently a great deal of debate over software standards (eg the debate between open and closed code, the US v Microsoft antitrust case) and it is fair to say that a government’s endorsement of a particular software could in the future be tantamount to a government endorsing a particular ideological standpoint. In the future legislation implementing a government endorsed software standard could be conceptualised as amounting to a restriction on freedom of speech. In the United States where the speech right is much broader this is more likely however such legislation could with some imagination and foresight be seen to fall foul of the Australian implied immunity from disproportionate legislative interference with political speech: Lange v ABC (1997)189 CLR 520. It would seem prudent that this requirement of a software standard be worded in such a way to accommodate within reason the specific political or social views of individuals.
As we speed towards the digital millennium, it is ever more pressing for us
(especially those of us who are lawyers) to fathom the
genetic structure/code
(natural and manufactured) of life. Here I have highlighted how software will
act to construct us and how
the (private) law will facilitate such a process.
The task is now ours to appreciate.
References
[1] Thurow, L., ‘Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights’, (1997) Harvard Business Review 95 at 96.
[2] Towards an Australian Strategy for the Information Economy: Preliminary statement of the government’s policy approach and a basis for business and community consultation, July 1998 < <http://www.noie.gov.au> >.
[3] Webster, F., Theories of
Information Society, Routledge, 1995,
p.136.
[4] Fitzgerald, B.F.,
‘Principles of Australian Constitutionalism’, (1994) 1(2)
Proceedings of the 49th ALTA Conference 799; Fitzgerald, B.F.,
‘Australian Constitutionalism’, 20 June 1997, unpublished manuscript
on file with author; Hutchinson,
A., Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and
Rights, University of Toronto Press,
1995.
[5] See generally Poster, M.,
The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context, Polity Press, UK,
1990; Gergen, K.J., The
Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary
Life, Basic Books, NY, 1991; Derrida, J., Of Grammatology, trans. G. Spivak,
John Hopkins University Press, 1977; Derrida, J., Writing and Difference, trans.
A Bass, Chicago University Press, 1978; Lyotard,
J-F., The Postmodern Condition:
A Report on Knowledge, Minnesota University Press, 1979; Balkin, J.,
‘Deconstructive Legal
Practice’, (1987) Yale Law Journal 743 ;
Gadamer, H-G., Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. D. Linge, University of
California Press, 1976; Feldman, S., ‘Diagnosing
Power: Postmodernism in
Legal Scholarship and Judicial Practice’, Northwestern University Law
Review 1046; Baudrillard, J.,
Simulacra and Simulation, 1981, trans. Sheila F.
Glaser, Michigan University Press, 1994; Foucault, M., Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, C. Gordon ed. and C. Gordon et al
trans. 1980.
[6] Clinton, President
Bill, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, July 1997
<
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov>
>; Alston, Senator R.,
Australian–US Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, December 1998
<
<http://www.dcita.gov.au>
> <
<http://www.pub. whitehouse.gov>
>.
[7] On the
notion of firmware see: Alcatel USA Inc v DGI Technologies Inc (5th
Circuit Court of Appeal 26.2.99)
<
<http://www.findlaw.com>
>.
[8]
Lessig, L., ‘Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach’,
<
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/lessig.html>
>; ‘Tyranny in the
Infrastructure’ (1997) Wired Magazine <
<http://www.wired.com/ wired/5.07/cyber_rights.html>
>.
[9]
On this notion see Habermas, J., Toward a Rational Society, 1971;
Communication and the Evolution of Society, Polity Press, UK, 1984;
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Polity Press, UK,
1990.
[10] Thurrow, L., above,
ref 1. ‘With the advent of the information revolution — or the third
industrial revolution (call
it what you will) — skills and knowledge have
become the only source of sustainable long-term competitive advantage.
Intellectual
property lies at the centre of the modern company’s economic
success or failure ... What used to be tertiary after raw materials
and capital
in determining economic success is now primary. Major companies such as
Microsoft own nothing of value except
knowledge.’
[11]
Fitzgerald, B.F., ‘Life in Cyberspace: A Simulating Experience’,
(1997) 3 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 136–9 ; Turkle,
S., Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1995.
[12]
Towards an Australian Strategy for the Information Economy: A preliminary
statement of the government’s policy approach and a basis for business and
community consultation, July 1998
<
<http://www.noie.gov.au>
>.
‘In Australia, and in many places around the world, students now use
computers at home and school to research projects;
governments supply
information and services online, so that citizens needn’t leave home to
lodge forms or get the help they
want; farmers access product information and
markets by internet; people do banking — borrowing, transferring and
investing
money — electronically; businesses offer their goods and
services for sale on websites, and consumers make purchases by browsing
virtual
shops and sending orders and payment over the net
...’
[13] Webster, F.,
Theories of Information Society, above,
pp.6-29.
[14] Webster, F.,
Theories of Information Society, above, ch 7, ‘Information and
Restructuring: Beyond Fordism’,
p.135ff.
[15]
<
<http://www.iitf.nist/elecomm/ecomm.htm>
>.
[16]
See further:
<
<http://www.mp3.com>
>.
[17]
See generally, Teubner, G. (ed), Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth
UK, 1997.
[18] Regina v Bartle
and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others ex parte Pinochet,
25 November 1998 and In re Pinochet, 15 January 1999,
<
<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/ pa/ld/ldjudinf.htm>
>.
[19]
Fitzgerald, B.F., ‘Trade Based Constitutionalisms: A Framework for
Universalising Substantive International law’, 5 (1996-97)
University
of Miami Yearbook of International Law 131; Evans, G.E., ‘Issues of
Legitimacy and the Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes in the
Supercourt of the World
Trade Organisation’, (1998) 14 Journal of
International Trade Law and Regulation
81.
[20] Weiler, J., ‘The
Transformation of Europe’, (1991) 100 Yale LJ
2403.
[21] See eg Comalco v
A-G Qld [1976] Qd. R 231; cf Texaco Overseas Petroleum v Libyan Arab Republic
(1978) 17 ILM 1.
[22] See Generic
Top Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding (gTLD MOU, 1997)
<
<http://www.wipo.org>
>.
[23]
Fitzgerald, B., Gamertsfelder, L. and Gulliksen, T., ‘Marketing Your
Website: Legal Issues Relating to The Allocation of Internet
Domain
Names’, (1998) UNSWLJ
549.
[24] See further at
<
<http://www.icann.org>
>.
[25]
<
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov>
>.
[26]
Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade, Inc. [1993] USCA9 19; 977 F. 2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992);
Computer Associates International Inc v Altai Inc 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (2d
Cir. 1992). See also s.1201(f) Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998,
USA) 17 USC
<
<http://thomas.loc.gov>
>.
[27]
Section 107, Copyright Act 1976 (17 USC); Fitzgerald, B.,
‘Underlying Rationales of Fair Use: Simplifying the Copyright Act’[1998] SCULawRw 8; ,
(1998) 2 Southern Cross University Law Review 153. On reverse engineering
and decompilation generally see: Fitzgerald, A. and Cifuentes, C.,
‘Interoperability and Computer Software
Protection in Australia’,
(1998) 4 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 271; Cifuentes, C.
and Fitzgerald, A., ‘Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs: Comments on
the Copyright Law Review Committee’s
Final Report on Computer Software
Protection’, (1995) 6 Journal of Law and Information Science
241.
[28] Williams,
Attorney-General D. and Alston, Senator R., ‘Copyright Changes to help
Australian Software Industry’, 23 February
1999,
<
<http://www.dcita.gov.au>
>; see proposed ss.47 D-F Copyright
Amendment (Computer Programs) Bill 1999; cf s.1201(f) Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (1998, USA) 17 USC
<
<http://thomas.loc.gov>
>.
[29]
Fitzgerald, B., ‘Underlying Rationales of Fair Use: Simplifying the
Copyright Act’[1998] SCULawRw 8; , (1998) 2 Southern Cross University Law Review
153.
[30] Copyright Law
Review Committee, Report on the Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968 Part 1
Exceptions to the Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners, 1998
<
<http://www.agps.gov.au/clrc/>
>.
[31]
Fitzgerald, A., Fitzgerald, B., Cook, P. and Cifuentes, C., Going Digital:
Legal Issues for Electronic Commerce, Multimedia and the Internet, 1998,
Prospect Publishing
<
<http://www.prospectmedia.com.au>
>.
[32]
Article 10(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, part of the World Trade Organisation
Agreement of 1994 and binding on all members of the World Trade Organisation
provides that: ‘Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall
be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention
(1971).’ Further
on this issue see: Fitzgerald, B.F., ‘Lotus Development Corporation v
Borland International Inc: Is
the Lotus 1-2-3 Menu Command Hierarchy
Copyrightable?’, (1995) 6 Journal of Law and Information Science
277; Fitzgerald, B.F., ‘Computer Copyright: Same Words, Different Source
Code: Data Access v Powerflex’, (1996) 2 Computer and
Telecommunications Law Review
120.
[33] Aharonian, G., Internet
Patent News, 18 October 1998; Fitzgerald A. and Cifuentes, C.,
‘Interoperability and Computer Software
Protection in Australia’,
(1998) 4 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review
271.
[34] See eg State Street
Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group Inc 149 F. 3d. 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) patent on computing financial data; Cybergold patent on paying to
view Internet advertisements and Sightsound
patent for downloading audio or
visual material for a fee transmitted over the network:
<<http:/www.nytimes.com/library/tech/
99/02/biztech/artciles/01digi.html>>.
[35]
Evans, G., and Fitzgerald, B., ‘Information Transactions Under UCC Article
2B: The Ascendancy Of Freedom of Contract in the
Digital Millennium’[1998] UNSWLawJl 46; ,
(1998) 21 UNSW Law Journal
404.
[36] 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996).
[37] See further: Radio
Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v ECCommission(
Magill Case) [1995] EUECJ C-241/91P; [1995] 4 CMLR 718; Arts 85, 86 Treaty of Rome (European
Union); Morgan G. and Wilson, A., ‘Restrictions on the Transfer of
Software’, (1996) 3 CTLR 82; Art 40
TRIPS.
[38]
<
<http://www.microsoft.com>
>
[39]
‘Review of ss.51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act
1974’ pp.93–132
<
<http://www.ncc.gov.au/nationalcompet/section%2051 %20review/ section%2051.htm>
>.
[40]
<
<http://www.ncc.gov.au>
>.
[41]
See Gunning, P., ‘Legal Aspects of Privacy and the Internet’, in
Going Digital: Legal Issues for Electronic Commerce, Multimedia and the
Internet, Prospect Publishing, 1998, p.169 and Kirby, Justice M.,
‘Privacy in Cyberspace’[1998] UNSWLawJl 47; , (1998) 21 UNSWLJ 323. See further
<
<http://cyber.harvard.edu/privacy.html>
>.
[42]
<
<http://www.law.gov.au>
>.
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