Paramilitary Surveillance: S11, Globalisation, Terrorists and Counter-Terrorists

JUDE McCULLOCH*

It is important that their [counter-terrorist] training be theoretical as well as practical as political activists are a special breed of criminal - John Wolf (1989:x).

Introduction

The article discusses the way the threat or fear of terrorism has been used to justify significant changes in the relationship and role of the police and military and to justify violence against and surveillance of protesters and activists. It briefly examines the history of political surveillance in Australia before describing contemporary trends in political surveillance in the context of the S11 protest against the World Economic Forum meeting held in Melbourne in September 2000. It argues that new technologies are contributing to a change in the nature of surveillance and that globalisation is creating the context for increased internal repression, particularly the intensification of state surveillance of protesters and activists. One aspect of this growing repression is the increasing convergence in the role and function of the military and the police.

S11 protest against globalisation and the World Economic Forum held in Melbourne

In the months leading up to the World Economic Forum in Melbourne, S11 (short for September 11) organisers, through their website, put out ‘a worldwide call to action for people who are concerned about violence and greed of corporate globalisation’. Under the heading ‘why protest?’ the site reads:

Using groups such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and the World Economic Forum, corporations have become the default world leaders. While they profit from the earth’s environmental decline and cruel labor practices, governments become paid-off protagonists, lowering standards to attract investment dollars in a global race to the bottom that affects us all (http://www.s11.org/s14/home.htm).

* Jude McCulloch is a Lecturer in Police Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, 3217. jmcculloch@deakin.edu.au
On the first day of the forum, held at Melbourne’s Crown Casino, blockades by more than ten thousand protesters prevented up to one third of the delegates entering the venue. On the evening of the second day, police wearing riot helmets used batons to break the blockade and allow the delegates to enter and exit. Police horses with visors were also used. Twenty protesters were taken to hospital by ambulance on the night of the baton charge and close to four hundred were allegedly injured by police over the three days of protest (Lawson 2000:14; Age 15 September, 2001:4). Legal commentators have questioned the legality of the police action, pointing out that no attempt was made to arrest protesters at the blockade and that there is no clear legal power to disperse picketers or blockaders using force (see, for example, McCulloch 2000; and comments by Marcus Clayton, ABC 7.30 Report 13 September, 2000 and Age 27 October, 2000:13). 1 Police justified their action by referring to missiles thrown and assaults on police members (see, for example, ABC 7.30 Report 13 September 2000). However, in the months after the protest until the present time only ten people have been charged with minor offences, only one of which was an assault (by spitting) (Age 7 March, 2001:2). Individual protesters and protest organisers have complained to the Ombudsman about the police tactics and a public interest inquiry is currently being conducted into allegations including excessive use of force, the use of pressure point neck holds, failure to wear name tags, and alleged assaults on members of the media engaged in filming or photographing the baton charge and other instances of police use of force (Age 14 September, 2000:1; Age 15 September, 2000:4). It is anticipated that at least fifty injured protesters will pursue civil actions for damages against the Victoria Police (Age 27 October, 2000:13). 2 However, in the immediate aftermath of the use of batons by police, Premier Steve Bracks, staunchly defended the police action, maintaining that they had ‘shown extraordinary restraint’ and that the protesters had ‘deserved everything they got’ (see, for example, Age 15 September, 2000:4).

The S11 protest was the subject of intense media interest. Much of the coverage, especially that of Melbourne’s tabloid newspaper, the Herald Sun, represented the protesters as violent and outside the normal community. Protesters were described variously as ‘clowns’, ‘bozos’, ‘an ill-assorted rabble’, ‘thugs’, ‘biff and bovver boys’, ‘human ferals’, with ‘unwashed dreadlocks’, and ‘cowards’ engaging in ‘un-Australian behaviour’ (see, Barrett 2000, for a detailed description of media coverage relating to the S11 protests). One of the images that dominated the media coverage of the S11 protests was that of protesters with their faces obscured by balaclavas or scarves (see, for example, Herald Sun 12 September, 2000:3; Age 12 September, 2000:6). The specter of terrorism embodied in this image is a focus of popular anxiety—conjuring up shadowy purveyors of irrational carnage: bombers, hijackers, and assassins. Since the 1970s, internationally and in Australia, terrorism has become a major pretext for the intensification of the state’s coercive capacities (Brown & Merrill 1993; Hocking 1993). Surveillance is an important aspect of this capacity.

1 Section 462A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) states ‘A person may use such force not disproportionate to the objective as he believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary to prevent the commission, continuance or completion of an indictable offence or to effect or assist in effecting the lawful arrest of a person committing or suspected of committing any offence’. Picketers, by their actions, generally commit only summary offences. The police authority arguably extends only to arrest, rather than to actions, like baton charges, more specifically designed to prevent or stop the offence taking place.

2 Victoria Police have paid more than three hundred thousand dollars in damages to more than thirty protesters injured in a similar baton charge by police in 1993 (see Age 27 October 2000:3; Herald Sun 28 October 2000; for allegations of police use of excessive force in these cases see, for example, writ and statement of claim no. 19996499, issued in the Country Court 13 December 1999).
Counter terrorism and political protest

In Australia, extreme and relatively rare acts of politically motivated violence, such as bombings and assassinations, have typically been used as a platform to announce ‘counter-terrorist’ measures, such as the greater involvement of the army in ‘internal security’ or the establishment of paramilitary police units within state police forces. The Hilton bombing in Sydney in 1978 during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, for example, was used to announce joint training initiatives between the police and the military (Hocking 1993). The bombing was also used to justify the establishment of paramilitary counter-terrorist units in state and territory police forces in the late 1970s, although in reality these groups had been secretly established approximately one month prior to the bombing (Coxedge et al 1982:188). Yet it is abundantly clear that in police and security circles terrorism and its counter-measures extend well beyond politically motivated, violent, extreme and, at least in Australia, relatively rare incidents like bombing and assassinations to encompass political, industrial, and environmental activism of all types. A Detective Inspector, for example, explaining the Victoria Police approach to protective security in the mid-1980s portrayed terrorism, demonstrations and political activism as part of a continuum; he said that:

Over the past twenty years Australia has lost its safety ... Terrorism in one form or another has reared its ugly head; political activism has come out into the open; and organised crime has filtered through the community leaving no section of public life unscathed (Barclay 1986:6).

In the counter-terrorist’s worldview it is but a short step from a protest march to a bomb (see, for example, Crown 1986:90). Consistent with this logic the paramilitary counter-terrorist groups within state and territory police forces are inevitably located within a division that includes ‘crowd control’ groups and an intelligence group which conducts surveillance at demonstrations and monitors the activities of a whole range of political activists and organisations. Victoria Police’s paramilitary counter-terrorist Special Operations Group (SOG), for example, is located in the same division as the Force Response Unit which regularly attends demonstrations. The same division also includes the Protective Security Intelligence Group (formerly the Counter Terrorist Information Section), members of which are regularly present and active at demonstrations. Former members of the SOG are heavily involved in the training of crowd control groups and members of the SOG sometimes move into and operate as part of the crowd control groups (see McCulloch & Clayton 1996). This is significant as police exposed to counter-terrorist training are likely to regard protests and demonstrations as potential sites for politically motivated violence, and thus may develop negative or critical attitudes towards protesters and dissenters, regarding them as subversives or quasi-terrorists (see, for example, Hocking 1995:2).

The perceived link between political activism and terrorism provides the pretext for spying on a whole range of community organisations, trade unions and activists. The former head of Australia’s Protective Services Co-ordination, explaining the security sector’s rationale for considering terrorism a logical extension of political activism, argued that:

What we are finding is more often the lunatic fringes are infiltrating movements where ordinary people are honestly pursuing their ideals and exercising, quite properly, their democratic rights. They are moving into organisations such as the anti-uranium movement, Greenpeace and even the animal welfare movement. They lie low and pursue their terrorist tactics, which have no connection with the objectives of these organisations (quoted in Hocking 1993:181).
A series of articles in the *Age* in 1997 revealed that the Victoria Police Operations Intelligence Unit (subsequently absorbed into the Protective Security Intelligence Group) had:

- infiltrated and spied on community organisations, kept detailed dossiers on hundreds of individuals and bugged civil liberties groups campaigning for an independent inquiry into the force. Undercover officers also infiltrated community radio station 3CR, covertly producing and helping to present shows ... to win the trust of groups on which they spied.
- Groups targeted by the unit included the Victorian Council of Civil Liberties, the Federation of Community Legal Centres, Greenpeace, the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, the Women’s Information and Self Help Group and the Koorie Information Centre (*Age* 6 October, 1997:1).

Individual targets included former Members of Parliament, as well as church leaders. According to the *Age*, police continued to use Special Branch files after 1983 when the Cain Labor government ordered that the unit be disbanded and its files destroyed (*Age* 9 October, 1997:1).

The then Chief Commissioner, Neil Comrie, defended the legitimacy of this spying maintaining that police:

- must have information on the background, capabilities and intentions of the vast number of groups in the community based around political, environmental, ethnic, religious and other beliefs ... Some apparently innocuous groups are nothing but front groups for terrorist activities overseas (*Age* 10 October, 1997:19).

Spying on individuals and organisations characterised as progressive, left or dissenting is not new. Since at least World War I the Federal Government has been harassing radical and socialist organisations. During the war unions and Left organisations campaigned vigorously and successfully against conscription. Under the *War Precautions Act* the government banned socialist literature, engaged in widespread surveillance, and persecuted those involved in the anti-war struggle. State police forces, through their links with military intelligence, became heavily involved in the surveillance of Left organisations as part of the administration of the Act (Cain 1983:142-43). Furthermore, because radical groups were seen as responsible for ‘stirring up trouble in the unions’, political surveillance led naturally to industrial surveillance (Cain 1983:155; 179). By the end of the war all state police forces were firmly experienced in the political surveillance of the Left, which they continued into the 1920s when one of their main tasks was spying on, and infiltrating, the newly established Communist Party of Australia (Cain 1983:59-61). During the 1930s police forces throughout Australia (except for New South Wales, which had set up a Branch in 1916) established Special Branches, co-ordinated through the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), to spy on ‘subversives’. Victoria’s Special Branch was established in 1931 and operated until 1979 without any publicly available guidelines; it was disbanded in 1983 when its functions were taken over by the Operations Intelligence Unit (Victoria Police 1979; Victorian Ombudsman 1990). Despite the secrecy surrounding its operations, it is now firmly established that it was individuals and organisations on the Left that were overwhelmingly the target of Special Branch surveillance (Hall 1978; Cain 1983; McKnight 1990). The Left has continuously been the target of political surveillance, despite forces on the Right posing greater threats to elected governments in Australia and being responsible for more of the type of acts, such as bombings, popularly associated with terrorism (see, for example, Mack 1981:218-21).
Police surveillance of individual activists and activist groups serves a number of political purposes: it attaches the stigma of criminality to political activism and dissent and it deters involvement through fear. When, as it often does, it involves harassment and provocation it undermines the cohesion and effectiveness of groups; and it undermines relationships within groups by promoting paranoia (see, for example, comments by the late High Court Justice Lionel Murphy in The Church of Scientology v Woodward ALI 1983, 53). The consequences to individuals of coming to the attention of state and territory police intelligence agencies, and by implication ASIO, have historically included the denial of public service, private industry and academic jobs or promotion; the denial of citizenship and re-entry visas to migrants; and the denial of grants to writers (McKnight 1994:126-44). Special Branch police have also been implicated in the frame up of politically active individuals, such as Tim Anderson, who, along with two others, spent seven years in prison on politically motivated false charges before being pardoned (Anderson 1985; Anderson 1992).

**Political surveillance in the new millennium**

While the who and why of political surveillance has remained consistent over time, technology has added a new dimension to its intensity. The increasing sophistication of devices and techniques is enhancing the capacity for surveillance and identification of individuals (Fox 2001). The closed-circuit television cameras now ubiquitous in public space, made their Victorian debut in 1981, when heads of government from around the world visited during Australia’s hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting. Twenty-five cameras were installed to protect the VIPs from ‘terrorism’ and — despite the objections of civil liberties groups — stayed when they left (see, for example, Age 21 November, 1981; Sun 6 August, 1981). Equipped with powerful zoom lenses and able to produce high-resolution digital images, the contemporary versions of these cameras can read the wording on a cigarette packet at 100 metres (Nixon 1996:32). Digital imaging can now be combined with software that can match faces or identify people through other biometric characteristics (Fox 2001:5). Face recognition software, widely used in the United States and the United Kingdom, is now being used in Melbourne to match faces in a crowd to a data base (Sunday Age 11 February 2001:4). The relevant database is said to include offenders and suspects but could also potentially include political activists. Police now always videotape political protests, and police helicopters are equipped with Forward-Looking Infra-Red that enables police in a helicopter and at a command post on the ground to ‘see’ people, vehicles, and buildings in the landscape on a television monitor. There are also similar ground-based video systems that can be mounted in modified four-wheel drives and linked to command centres and the Victorian Police Centre (Police Life April 1997:15). Police helmets, equipped with miniature mounted video camera systems, are also now on the market (see <http://www.helmets.co.uk/police­rego2.shtml>).

It is not only the quantity of surveillance that has changed but also its quality. Deleuze argues that we have moved from the type of disciplinary societies described by Foucault towards control societies. Disciplinary societies are made of enclosures (prison, factory, school) whereas control societies are made up of self-deforming casts which continuously change from moment to moment (computer, image, corporation). The surveillance of old tended to be confined to specific geographical locations and specific points in time whereas the surveillance of today tends towards the ubiquitous—a more flexible, intensive use of disciplinary power (Deleuze 1992; see also Hardt & Negri 2000: 195-98).
Changes in the relationship between the police and the army

While technology has increased the intensity of surveillance, current political trends have increased what is at stake. The separation between the police and military is in the process of breaking down, with police and military activity increasingly converging (Smith 1998). In Australia—unlike countries such as Indonesia where the military is regularly used as a repressive force against citizens—in the past the military has largely been confined to dealing with external enemies in times of war (Andrews 1988). The military’s restricted role in internal security or law enforcement is part of Australia’s social and constitutional traditions. As one commentator put it ‘In terms of our popular social traditions, the idea is very firmly entrenched that the use of armed forces within the realm in peacetime is ‘not cricket’ (Blackshield 1978). Until the mid 1970s it was broadly accepted in that the military were used primarily to kill enemies in times war whereas the police were primarily peacekeepers engaged in protecting citizens. Philosophically police are duty bound to protect life and operate using only ‘minimum force’. The military, on the other hand, are trained to kill and may use ‘maximum force’ to overcome an enemy’ (see, for example, McCulloch 2001). However since the mid-1970s counter-terrorism has provided the justification for the military’s increased involvement in internal security (Hocking 1993).

Apart from conducting its own counter-terrorist training and exercises the army’s commando unit, the Special Air Services, frequently conducts counter-terrorist exercises with state police forces, and provides training to police paramilitary units (McCulloch 2001). Consistent with the greater contact between the police and military there has also been an increased emphasis on exchange of information between police and military intelligence agencies (see, for example, Hourn 1988).

Recent controversial amendments to the Defence Act—drafted on the pretext of security at the 2000 Sydney Olympics—further the trend towards greater military involvement in internal security. The Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000 permits the Commonwealth Government to call out the troops, without consulting the states, in a wide range of circumstances, including environmental, industrial or transport disputes. Victoria Police opposed the legislation arguing it did not make Defence Force personnel adequately accountable to the criminal justice system and that it represents an unreasonable intrusion into state rights (Age 21 August, 2001:1). Although the primary official justification given for the legislation was fear of terrorism during the Olympics, commentators have suggested that the real impetus for the legislation was concern about demonstrations that might have arisen in the context of the Olympics (Head 2000; Brown 2000). The new provisions do not allow the Chief of the Defence Force to use troops to stop or restrict any protest, dissent, assembly or industrial action except where there is a reasonable likelihood of the death of, or serious injury to, person or serious damage to property. However as the possibility of damage to property or injury to people is likely to be present in many protests or industrial disputes, the restriction is substantially meaningless. According to Michael Head the legislation and Olympic security operation sets ‘an expanded legal precedent and provide extensive practice for the future of use of “military aid to the civil power” in the event of rising social tensions of the type revealed by the planned Olympic protests’ (Head 2000:194).

While the military are becoming increasingly involved in areas traditionally considered to be the responsibility of police, police are simultaneously becoming more militaristic. Over the past twenty-five years in Australia, the police paramilitary units originally set up to counter terrorism have been used for an increasing range of policing duties, and weapons formerly available exclusively to paramilitary police, like chemical weapons and semi-automatic firearms, are now being made available to police outside the specialists units. In
addition, paramilitary tactics are being passed onto other police through training programs designed and delivered by former members of the police paramilitary units (McCulloch 2001). Commentators in the United Kingdom and United States have noted a similar trend in those countries. Kraska and Kappeler commenting on the situation in the United States document a precipitous rise in the number of paramilitary units, and escalation in their level of activity, a normalisation of these units into mainstream policing, and a direct link between the units and the military (1997; see Jefferson 1992 and Waddington 1993 for discussion of militarisation of the police in the United Kingdom).

An Australian Army manual, written in 1983 to cover the contingency of the army being called out to be used against citizens—a contingency made more likely by the recent Defence Act amendments (see above)—provides for ongoing liaison between the police and the military on intelligence matters. Information provided by police or government agencies to the army in the event that the army is called out is to include ‘personality profiles on dissidents or terrorists’. Tasks considered to be important during protracted operations include intelligence records on ‘dissident personalities’, ‘dissident organizations’, and incidents including ‘murder, robbery, sabotage, arson, propaganda, riots and demonstrations’. The manual states that ‘intelligence requirements’ would include amongst other things, ascertaining the ‘aims of dissidents’, ‘internal organisation of dissident groups’, ‘identities of dissident organizations, groups and individuals’, ‘location of dissident leaders’, ‘description of dissidents’, and ‘identities of dissident sympathizers’ (Australian Army 1983: 17; 320-21). The manual makes it clear that it is assumed that state police forces are amassing a vast array of information on ‘dissidents’ for use in case of military call-out.

Sections of the army manual refer to establishing detention centres. There is no discussion as to why detention centres might be required; however, that they are contemplated, provides further reason to fear police intelligence gathering and surveillance at demonstrations and the like. The manual explains the screening process of persons held at the detention centre. Two types of screening are to take place:

a. Low Level . . which is done at the temporary detention centre, aims to identify and clear persons of good character and should be done by police.

b. High Level . . is done by police at the main detention centre. The task of police is to interview all detained persons picked out during the search and decide who should be arrested . . During this period, the detained persons should be prevented from communicating with other persons or disposing of incriminating papers . . (Australian Army 1983: 636).

The whole tone of the manual indicates that to be considered of ‘good character’ and thus avoid detention and ‘interview’ one would need to avoid showing any signs of being a dissident, that is, thinking differently.

Globalisation and shifts in the State’s coercive capacities

These contemporary shifts in the configuration of the state’s coercive capacities manifest in the blurring of the line between the police and military, have coincided with a shift in the national economy towards globalisation. According to Hardt & Negri:

the era of major conflicts has come to an end: sovereign power will no longer confront its Other and no longer face its outside, but rather will progressively expand its boundaries to envelop the entire globe as its proper domain. The history of imperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over. Or really we have entered the era of minor and internal conflicts. Every imperial war is a civil war, a police action—from Los Angeles and Granada to
Mogadishu and Sarajevo. In fact, the separation of tasks between the external and the internal arms of power (between the army and the police, the CIA and the FBI) is increasingly vague and indeterminate (2000:189).

On a basic level globalisation has provided a context for increased international exchanges between police forces and the military: as a result police forces around the world are becoming more similar (Kotharie cited in Kraska & Kappeler 1997). Units trained and equipped to use the highest levels of force internationally are looked to as providing models of ‘best practice’ in the global context. The increased international exchanges and similarities between police forces has fuelled a move away from minimum force by police forces and a trend towards militarisation of policing. This is particularly true in countries like Australia with lower levels of internal conflict and violence than the countries like the United States and Britain, which are providing ‘best practice’ models of policing.

Globalisation involves the waning of the nationally defined capitalist class and the ascendancy of a new international class with global interests. With the end of the Cold War and the replacement of national capitalists with international capitalists the nation-state is losing some of its power and importance. While it is argued by some that the extent of the decline of the nation-state has been exaggerated and that multinational companies have existed for centuries it is generally agreed that there has been a fundamental shift in the past twenty years (Gray 1999; Keohane & Nye 2000). Capitalists now generally have international rather than national interests to protect. In this context there has been a decline in wars between nation-states but an increase in internal conflict and ‘wars’ on crime involving the military or paramilitary police (Martin & Schumann 1997:25; Christie 1994:13–14; Kraska & Kappeler 1997). Hugh Smith, writing in the Australia context, maintains that one of the pressures for greater military involvement in law enforcement over the past twenty-five years has been the lack of ‘actual wars’, resulting in a search for ways to keep the armed forces ‘gainfully employed’ (Smith 1998). The involvement of the military in law enforcement has partly come about as governments and defence forces seek ways to keep the armed forces relevant. While globalisation has been associated with a decline in ‘actual wars’ it has also coincided with increasing internal conflict as nation-states abandon social justice in the pursuit of mobile international capital. Dissenting citizens—those participating in organised resistance against the decline in living standards, degradation of the environment and increasing inequality within and between nations—are, consistent with the counter terrorist’s worldview, increasingly becoming the enemy within.

Watching the watchers

While police surveillance of protesters is routine, police at the World Economic Forum were at pains to avoid scrutiny and exposure of their own behaviour. Prior to the World Economic Forum in Melbourne, the last time Victoria Police used batons against demonstrators was at a protest over a closure of a secondary school in Richmond (an inner suburb of Melbourne). The baton charge on 13 December, 1993 was filmed and photographed by members of the media. The police action was the subject of public disquiet and ultimately strong criticism by the Ombudsman (Perry 1994). At a police debriefing that took place the day after the baton charge senior police expressed concern over the media coverage of the events. The debriefing notes record that:

the community perceive what the media do. The 13/12/93 morning events portrayed by the media were 'anti-police', indicating an over-reaction by police. A media conference with the A/C (O) [Assistant Commissioner Operations] regarding justification of the forced used was positive, with the P.M. reporting showing police in a better light . . . Following discussion regarding the best way to keep media out of the way . . . suggested that he
[Deputy Media Director] send a release to all media advised [sic] to keep clear. A/C (O) suggested that that could be open to some misinterpretation. Media Liaison should be used to keep media out of the way. They could shepherd them out of the way—that is their role (Victoria Police 1993).

Visual images of police actions can create credibility problems for police. Images of police clashes with protesters can depict events out of sync with police statements. So, for example, while much of the commentary on the protests at Richmond Secondary College and the World Economic Forum focused on police allegations of violence by protesters, the video footage and photographs of the baton charges show police assaulting passive protesters. Police sought to justify the use of batons at Richmond Secondary College by creating the false impression that the picketers were violent and that the police action was taken in response to that violence. Media releases put out by police referred to injuries sustained by police and senior police claimed that ‘they [the police] came off second best’ (see, for example, Channel 10 News 13 December 1993). However, after viewing extensive video coverage the Ombudsman, who investigated complaints by protesters, was unable to find any evidence to support police claims that they were punched, kicked or spat at by the picketers. Photographs and video footage provide a record and some objective evidence about disputed events. This may be problematic for police facing official investigation or being sued by injured protesters. Even police surveillance tapes can sometimes undermine the police version of events. Several months after the protests in Melbourne outside the World Economic Forum, police said that they were still examining video tapes ‘with a view to processing more offenders’. Responding, an S11 spokesperson said ‘they have absolutely state of the art technology—and a few arrests, which would be a quiet day at the Grand Final’ (Age 7 March, 2001:2).

There were numerous complaints made by members of the media about police assaults on camera operators and photographers at the World Economic Forum. SBS television on the evening of the 12 September baton charge reported that: ‘Police attacked indiscriminately. TV crews appear to have been targeted. SBS cameraman Luke Roache was attacked [by police] from behind’. Roche’s footage showed the police advancing on him, then threatening him, before assaulting him, as his camera fell to the ground. Channel Seven News reported ‘Several officers turned on a Seven News camera crew’. The Age reported that one of its photographers was hit with a police baton and another was picked up by an officer and thrown to the ground, damaging his equipment. Additionally the Age reported that a Herald-Sun photographer said that he had his camera smashed by a police officer when he tried to take a photo of plain clothes men dragging a young woman by the hair inside police barricades, where, he said, she and others were roughed up (14 September, 2000:7).

Media depictions of police violence can be detrimental to the image police work to maintain through public relations. Hatty maintains that police media management is aimed at:

exploiting the opportunities for publicity in order to minimise knowledge about certain police behaviours, particularly if those behaviours are problematic. According to the logic of this approach, the public would be presented with a reconstructed version of events in which the activities of police would be cleansed of their negative connotations (Hatty 1991:176).
It may be that in the wake of the public outcry over the baton charge at Richmond, successful civil actions by injured protesters, and a critical Ombudsman’s report that police are attempting to keep the media ‘out of the way’ in order to avoid public exposure of their tactics. The absence of a visual record outside police control clearly reduces accountability. Additionally, the failure of police at the World Economic Forum to wear nametags, as required by regulation and the wearing of riot helmets with visors further decreases accountability by making identification of individual members difficult or impossible. Questioned by the media about the failure of police to wear nametags at the World Economic Forum, Assistant Commissioner Neil O’Loughlin referred to ‘concerns of the members in relation to being unnecessarily identified [by protesters] as persons who may or may not have assaulted them.’ (7.30 Report 13 September 2000).

Conclusion
The struggle over defining terrorism and labeling terrorists is not an equal one: ‘Governments [and their agents] have huge resources and connections that give them great defamation edge. They are therefore usually able to name their enemies and targets of attack as terrorists without much trouble, no matter how absurd the designation’ (Herman 1993:48). Commentators, scholars and the media tend to adopt the categories of terrorism and counter-terrorism promoted by government with the result that state terrorism — murder, police violence, sexual assault, torture, illegal arrests and detention, and legal arrest and detention based on political activity, ethnicity, race or class background (in other words kidnapping or hostage-taking) — are ignored altogether or at least permitted to masquerade as ‘counter-terrorism’. In other words, violence committed in the name of protecting the state or powerful interests is generally held up to a different measure. ‘The term counterterrorism may be used to legitimate extraordinary sanctions directed toward offending parties; sanctions that might otherwise be rejected by many’ (Perude 1989:ix).

The ideology of terrorism provides a means for states to commit violence and call it something, which sounds reasonable, such as ‘counter-terrorism’. ‘Counter-terrorist’ police in Turkey, for example, murder and torture people whose ‘crimes’ consist only of opposing the existing social order, or being related to or associated with such people (Amnesty International 1996:59-9). According to Anthony Wilden, ‘Wherever violence exists an ideology exists to justify it. In oppressive societies ideologies make physical and other forms of violence seem ordinary and inevitable, a part of the “natural” order of things. Violence is blamed on its victims’ (Wilden 1987:91).

Complacency over state violence is not justified by the history of ‘counter-terrorism’. States, through the military and police, have enormous capacity to coerce citizens and inflict violence on individuals. It is not surprising then that state-sponsored terrorism, looked at in terms of numbers killed, is far more prevalent and significant than the terrorism of dissidents and rebels (Herman 1993:54-5). Writing in the mid 1990s Watts pointed out that: ‘Our century has been one of unmitigated, ceaseless and unprecedented state-sponsored violence and terrorism’ (1995: 154). State violence is likely to intensify in the new millennium as the forces of globalisation are the harbinger of a ‘race to the bottom’, not only in terms of wages and environmental standards, but also civil liberties and the value states place on the lives and security of their citizens.
The recording of 'dissident' identities at protests and the sinister potential of this information together with police violence inflicted on protesters and the recent apparent attempt by police to hide their actions and identities raises questions about the real face of terror in the new millennium. Perhaps it is not that of the balaclava-clad protester. Citizens are right to fear disclosing their identity to a state that views them as the enemy. Terrorism—domination of the population through fear—is better captured in the image of state agents, armed and dangerous, faces hidden behind riot visors, name tags removed, engaged in the systematic recording of 'dissident' identities, while simultaneously assaulting media camera people to avoid public exposure of their own violence.

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