Reindl, Andreas P. --- "How Strong is the Case for Criminal Sanctions in Cartel Cases?" [2006] ELECD 451; in Cseres, J. Katalin; Schinkel, Pieter Maarten; Vogelaar, O.W. Floris (eds), "Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006)

Book Title: Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement

Editor(s): Cseres, J. Katalin; Schinkel, Pieter Maarten; Vogelaar, O.W. Floris

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781845426088

Section: Chapter 5

Section Title: How Strong is the Case for Criminal Sanctions in Cartel Cases?

Author(s): Reindl, Andreas P.

Number of pages: 23

Extract:

5. How strong is the case for criminal
sanctions in cartel cases?
Andreas P. Reindl1

1 INTRODUCTION

This contribution provides comments on Bill Kovacic's and Wouter Wils'
chapters. The comments will build primarily on the work of the OECD in
relation to the role of sanctions in effective cartel enforcement, which in
turn reflects the experiences of OECD member countries and observers to
the OECD Competition Committee.
The OECD's work on cartels and effective anti-cartel enforcement
provides support for criminal anti-cartel enforcement, including criminal
sanctions against individuals. OECD publications such as the Second Cartel
Report,2 have documented that financial fines imposed on corporate cartel
participants are virtually always too low to effectively deter cartels. These
findings have led to the conclusion that criminal sanctions for individuals,
including jail time, can be a useful complement to corporate sanctions.
The Second Cartel Report therefore recommended that member countries
consider introducing criminal sanctions against individuals to more
effectively deter cartel activity.3
A careful study of the OECD's work reminds us, however, that the case
for a wider use of criminal sanctions4 is less straightforward than some,
including Wouter Wils in his chapter, have suggested. A criminal sanctions
regime not only has potential benefits, but also comes with certain costs.
A range of country-specific circumstances would determine what the net
effective of a criminal sanctions regime would be, and we might overestimate
the potential benefits and/or underestimate the potential costs associated
with wider use of ...