Fox, Eleanor M. --- "Cartels: A United States Story, and a Research Program for the World" [2006] ELECD 458; in Cseres, J. Katalin; Schinkel, Pieter Maarten; Vogelaar, O.W. Floris (eds), "Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006)

Book Title: Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement

Editor(s): Cseres, J. Katalin; Schinkel, Pieter Maarten; Vogelaar, O.W. Floris

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781845426088

Section: Chapter 12

Section Title: Cartels: A United States Story, and a Research Program for the World

Author(s): Fox, Eleanor M.

Number of pages: 9

Extract:

12. Cartels: a United States story, and
a research program for the world
Eleanor M. Fox

1 INTRODUCTION

The United States was the first jurisdiction to have systematically enforced
antitrust laws. Violation of the US Sherman Antitrust Act is a crime.
Criminal enforcement is, however, essentially limited to cases against hard
core cartels. The US story is a success story. Criminal enforcement is robust.
Virtually every US antitrust chief through time has focused on cartels as a
priority. The arsenal of tools against cartels is impressive: strong detection
and enforcement techniques including wire taps, high fines and jail terms,
a strong and clear leniency program to help identify cartels and destabilize
them, and a system of private enforcement with treble damages. Each
year, scores of grand juries are convened to investigate cartels; most of the
ensuing cases are settled for large fines and sometimes prison terms. The
notorious vitamins case was settled by the US government and the ring
leader for $500 million, and vitamin company officials went to jail.
Cartels are indeed harmful to consumers and the economy in general,1
and the US record against them would seem to reflect great success. There
is one hitch: how many cartels go undeterred and undetected we will never
know. We do know, however, that there is an observed increase in global
or cross-border cartels, and we can deduce that either antitrust enforcers
are simply detecting more cartels, or that, despite agencies' increased
vigilance, cartel activity is increasing.2 Thus, ...