Ezrachi, Ariel --- "Merger Control and Cross-Border Transactions: A Pragmatic View on Cooperation, Convergence and What is in Between" [2006] ELECD 541; in Marsden, Philip (ed), "Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006)

Book Title: Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust

Editor(s): Marsden, Philip

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781845421816

Section: Chapter 24

Section Title: Merger Control and Cross-Border Transactions: A Pragmatic View on Cooperation, Convergence and What is in Between

Author(s): Ezrachi, Ariel

Number of pages: 19

Extract:

24 Merger control and cross-border
transactions: a pragmatic view on
cooperation, convergence and what
is in between
Ariel Ezrachi1


Introduction
Cross-border merger control has traditionally been a difficult subject for
multilateral cooperation, let alone harmonization. The multitude of inter-
ests at stake and the heterogeneous multilateral environment mean that
attempts to reduce inefficiencies stemming from multijurisdictional merger
review face resistance at various levels. This chapter examines the domestic
nature of merger control and how it affects the feasibility and effectiveness
of cooperation and convergence in merger regulation. It explores the role
of bilateral and multilateral initiatives in merger control and identifies their
limits. In doing so, the discussion echoes the challenges for undertakings
and agencies operating in the current suboptimal environment of multiple
enforcers and the difficulty of resolving present inefficiencies.

When national (merger control) meets international (business)
The friction generated by the misfit between national merger control and
cross-border economic activity has long been recognized. Although globa-
lization processes have strongly influenced national economies and brought
them closer to interdependence, the impact of globalization did not lead to
similar results in merger review.
This tension is mostly felt at two levels. At the agencies' level it may result
in `system friction'.2 As each competition agency conducts its independent
analysis the simultaneous application of numerous domestic merger regimes
to a single transaction may lead to conflicting decisions and remedies. This
is even more pronounced when competition agencies apply different laws,
different economic models or involve domestic ` ...