Eilmansberger, Thomas --- "Restrictive Agreements and Unilateral Restraints: Merging Regimes on Market Power and Exclusion" [2009] ELECD 199; in Drexl, Josef; Idot, Laurence; Monéger, Joël (eds), "Economic Theory and Competition Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009)

Book Title: Economic Theory and Competition Law

Editor(s): Drexl, Josef; Idot, Laurence; Monéger, Joël

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781847206312

Section: Chapter 10

Section Title: Restrictive Agreements and Unilateral Restraints: Merging Regimes on Market Power and Exclusion

Author(s): Eilmansberger, Thomas

Number of pages: 23

Extract:

10. Restrictive agreements and
unilateral restraints: merging
regimes on market power and
exclusion
Thomas Eilmansberger*

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Scope of this Presentation

The title of this session is a bit ambiguous, for it can mean two things,
namely (i) merging regimes regarding the assessment of market power on
the one hand and exclusion on the other, or (ii) merging regimes on market-
power-related exclusion. I took the liberty to choose the second variant, and
I furthermore inferred from the first part of the title that the regimes men-
tioned in its second part are those in Article 81 and Article 82 EC. Also
taking into account the overall theme of this conference, I reformulated the
basic question of my presentation as follows: Does an increased role for eco-
nomic analysis bring about a convergence of EC competition rules on
cartels and dominant firms with regard to exclusionary practices? In ad-
dition, I will briefly examine whether a more prominent use of economic
analysis has brought about, or might bring about, a merging of regimes with
regard to the different exclusionary practices caught only by Article 82 EC.

1.2 What does an Increased Use of Economic Analysis Mean?

A discussion of the actual and potential effect of an increased use of eco-
nomic analysis in competition law should first clarify the meaning and
import of economic analysis in antitrust law. It is assumed here that eco-
nomic analysis can influence the antitrust analysis of agreements and
unilateral conduct ...