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McAdams, Richard H.; Ulen, Thomas S. --- "Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics" [2009] ELECD 469; in Garoupa, Nuno (ed), "Criminal Law and Economics" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009)

Book Title: Criminal Law and Economics

Editor(s): Garoupa, Nuno

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781847202758

Section: Chapter 16

Section Title: Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics

Author(s): McAdams, Richard H.; Ulen, Thomas S.

Number of pages: 34

Extract:

16 Behavioral criminal law and economics
Richard H. McAdams* and Thomas S. Ulen**


Introduction
The standard theoretical law-and-economics account of criminal behavior
begins from the observation that potential criminals are rational deci-
sionmakers (Becker, 1969). The theory assumes that potential criminals
compare the expected costs and benefits of criminal activity, where the
expected benefits include the anticipated monetary and nonmonetary
returns to the crime, discounted by their probabilities of realization, and
the expected costs of the crime, which include formal and informal sanc-
tions (the latter including loss of lawful employment opportunities, social
stigma, and guilt), discounted by the probabilities of detection. If the
expected benefits exceed the expected costs, then the rational potential
criminal commits the crime; otherwise, he or she does not. Moreover, the
rational potential criminal compares the expected costs and benefits of
criminal activity with those of legitimate activity and rationally allocates
her time and other resources between those alternatives so that the mar-
ginal net benefit is equated.1
Similarly, the standard law-and-economics account of other partici-
pants in the criminal justice system ­ police, judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, juries, and legislators ­ also presumes rational decisionmaking.
So, the police ­ both individually and collectively ­ may choose to allocate
their limited resources according to rational calculations about costs and
benefits, choosing, for example, between the investigation of detected


* Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School,
1111 E. 60th Street, Chicago, IL, 60637; USA, tel. (773) 834­2520; rmcadams@
uchicago.edu.
** ...


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