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Moir, Hazel V.J. --- "Who Benefits? An Empirical Analysis of Australian and US Patent Ownership" [2009] ELECD 535; in Haunss, Sebastian; Shadlen, C. Kenneth (eds), "Politics of Intellectual Property" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009)

Book Title: Politics of Intellectual Property

Editor(s): Haunss, Sebastian; Shadlen, C. Kenneth

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848443037

Section: Chapter 9

Section Title: Who Benefits? An Empirical Analysis of Australian and US Patent Ownership

Author(s): Moir, Hazel V.J.

Number of pages: 29

Extract:

9. Who benefits? An empirical analysis
of Australian and US patent
ownership
Hazel V.J. Moir

1. INTRODUCTION

The story of the role a small handful of major companies played in the
inclusion of regulatory patent laws into free trade negotiations is well
told elsewhere (Drahos 1995, 2002; Ryan 1998; Sell 2003). During the
Uruguay Round negotiations there was little public discussion of the
proposed agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS), and there was little organised opposition until towards the end
of the process, when the implications for public health budgets became
more apparent. Commenting on why lower-income countries agreed to a
measure which was clearly welfare-reducing,1 Scherer notes:

Third-world nations . . . accepted the bargain in the hope of better export pros-
pects in agriculture and textiles and to ward off punitive measures under U.S.
Trade Act Section 301. Because the textile and especially agricultural changes
have at best been slow in coming, it would not be improper to suggest that the
third-world nations were led into a Faustian bargain. (Scherer 2006: 42)

The story of the TRIPS negotiations is a prime example of Olsen's expli-
cation of the impact of interest groups on public policy ­ a small well-
organised group which will gain significant benefits from an initiative may
well prevail in obtaining artificial rents where those who lose are dispersed
and individually suffer small losses (Olson 1971).
Shadlen shows in Chapter 2 of this book how in Argentina, Brazil ...


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