Karpova, Kateryna --- "Comparative Aspects of Fundamental Rights in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe: The Example of Ukraine" [2010] ELECD 121; in Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Antonina; Nergelius, Joakim (eds), "New Directions in Comparative Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

Book Title: New Directions in Comparative Law

Editor(s): Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Antonina; Nergelius, Joakim

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848443181

Section: Chapter 10

Section Title: Comparative Aspects of Fundamental Rights in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe: The Example of Ukraine

Author(s): Karpova, Kateryna

Number of pages: 12

Extract:

10. Comparative aspects of fundamental
rights in Germany and Central and
Eastern Europe: the example of
Ukraine
Kateryna Karpova

I. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN GERMANY: GENERAL
CHARACTERISTICS
The German Constitution of 1949, the Basic Law, as one of the first post-war
Constitutions, has realised a new orientation which has contributed to the
further development of constitutionalism in Europe: it has placed the individ-
ual at the centre of constitutional law by recognising that the dignity and
liberty of man are the highest values.1 Therefore, the Basic Law has adopted
a charter of fundamental rights as the first part of the Constitution which
constitutes a comprehensive value order with impact on each branch of inter-
nal law, on public as well as on private law.
Fundamental rights in Germany are conceived as subjective rights,2 which
means that the individual as such is the holder of these rights and entitled to
invoke them directly before the courts. Thus, the fundamental rights are not
only objective principles which must be implemented by the legislator to be
effective. The German Basic Law has the intention of giving directly applica-
ble rights to the individual and of avoiding programmatic norms which outline
a constitutional programme but do not give direct rights under the
Constitution.3 For historical reasons constitutional programmes as foreseen by
the Weimar Constitution (see Anschütz, 1933: 507­510, 511, 513­514) were
considered inefficient and intentionally not introduced into the 1949
Constitution.
The subjective character of the Fundamental Rights ...