Zimmer, Daniel --- "Consumer Welfare, Economic Freedom and the Moral Quality of Competition Law – Comments on Gregory Werden and Victor Vanberg" [2011] ELECD 340; in Drexl, Josef; Kerber, Wolfgang; Podszun, Rupprecht (eds), "Competition Policy and the Economic Approach" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)

Book Title: Competition Policy and the Economic Approach

Editor(s): Drexl, Josef; Kerber, Wolfgang; Podszun, Rupprecht

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781848448841

Section: Chapter 3

Section Title: Consumer Welfare, Economic Freedom and the Moral Quality of Competition Law – Comments on Gregory Werden and Victor Vanberg

Author(s): Zimmer, Daniel

Number of pages: 7

Extract:

3. Consumer welfare, economic
freedom and the moral quality
of competition law ­ comments
on Gregory Werden and Victor
Vanberg
Daniel Zimmer

1. WHICH CONSUMER'S WELFARE?

Gregory Werden presents a broad analysis of the use of the notion `con-
sumer welfare' in economics as well as in legal practice. There is no point
in restating it here, but I would like to underline the author's conclusion
that there is no international consensus about the meaning of the term
`welfare'. Professor Werden points out that in US competition policy
consumer welfare is practically the same as total welfare, whereas the
competition policy in the EU is more oriented to benefit consumers at the
end of the distribution chain. He also makes clear that `consumer welfare'
can come into play at different levels of competition policy: as an ultimate
goal, but also as a mere test or guidance when applying competition law.
He then gives some indications about the use of a `consumer welfare'
concept in the different areas of competition policy.
According to the author, the goal of merger control laws should be
understood to be promotion of social welfare generally. With respect to the
implementation of this goal, Werden states: `Whatever test for legality is
applied, it must be applied using the available analytic tools, and economics
provides tools best suited to predicting likely short-term price effects from
mergers'. If this is meant to say that merger control should mainly focus
on short-term price effects, this raises ...