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Sadurski, Wojciech --- "Commutative, Distributive and Procedural Justice: A Response to Professor Christine Chwaszcza" [2011] ELECD 669; in Micklitz, Hans-W. (ed), "The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)

Book Title: The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law

Editor(s): Micklitz, Hans-W.

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781849802604

Section: Chapter 4

Section Title: Commutative, Distributive and Procedural Justice: A Response to Professor Christine Chwaszcza

Author(s): Sadurski, Wojciech

Number of pages: 15

Extract:

4. Commutative, distributive and
procedural justice: a response to
Professor Christine Chwaszcza
Wojciech Sadurski

1 INTRODUCTION
Anyone writing about justice must not only grapple with the complexities and
difficulties raised by different conceptions of justice, and weigh arguments for
and against competing conceptions, but also assert and uphold a stance as to
the very concept of justice ­ that is, as to the demarcation of the sphere of
consideration where the words `just' or `unjust' are relevant.1 Undoubtedly, the
first type of argument is more exciting and has more practical relevance, but
without some plausible position as to the latter type of considerations ­ which
are meant to respond to the question `What is justice about?' rather than `What
is required by justice?' ­ not only are debates on the conceptions of justice
carried out in a conceptual vacuum, but discussants engaged in such debates
risk furthermore to be simply talking at cross-purposes. This is because much
­ perhaps all ­ of their disagreement may stem from the fact that they have
drawn different demarcation lines between `justice' and other social ideals and
virtues, rather than from the fact that they have different substantive views
about what is required by justice.
It is a commonplace in a theory of justice that we need to distinguish
between a very broad ­ and therefore rather unhelpful ­ notion of `justice'
which encompasses the totality of good social arrangements, norms or virtues
(depending on the object to which the property of `justice' can be attributed)
and a narrower ...


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