Ackermann, Thomas --- "Excessive Pricing and the Goals of Competition Law" [2012] ELECD 418; in Zimmer, Daniel (ed), "The Goals of Competition Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012)

Book Title: The Goals of Competition Law

Editor(s): Zimmer, Daniel

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9780857936608

Section: Chapter 18

Section Title: Excessive Pricing and the Goals of Competition Law

Author(s): Ackermann, Thomas

Number of pages: 22

Extract:

18. Excessive pricing and the goals of
competition law
Thomas Ackermann* 37




1 INTRODUCTION

Competition law and the regulation of excessive prices have a notori-
ously uneasy relationship. If competition authorities directly intervene
in markets in order to secure lower prices they pursue a popular aim:
fighting against monopoly profits is apparently a just and noble cause.
However, there is a distinct feeling among many observers that by
taking from the rich and giving to the poor, competition law enforcers
gain popularity for all the wrong reasons: price interventions are based
on the premise that authorities or courts are better than markets at
detecting and bringing down monopoly rents. These interventions do
not support the competitive process but change its outcome, and by
doing so, they appear to threaten rather than to enhance the welfare-
generating potential of competition. Against this background, the
abstention of US antitrust law with regard to the charging of monopoly
prices seems to be self-evident, while the European approach of pro-
hibiting the imposition of unfair prices by dominant undertakings, as
most prominently featured in Article 102(2)(a) TFEU, but also in the
competition laws of EU Member States such as Germany, begs for
explanation.
This chapter starts from the assumption that a deeper understanding
of this peculiar divergence between US and European competition laws
can only be found if a broad perspective is taken that includes the inter-
play between competition law and economic regulation. First, on a level
of a positive ...