Davies, Bleddyn --- "Delegation and Accountability of Criminal Agencies after Lisbon: An Examination of Europol" [2012] ELECD 527; in Trybus, Martin; Rubini, Luca (eds), "The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012)

Book Title: The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy

Editor(s): Trybus, Martin; Rubini, Luca

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9780857932556

Section: Chapter 17

Section Title: Delegation and Accountability of Criminal Agencies after Lisbon: An Examination of Europol

Author(s): Davies, Bleddyn

Number of pages: 16

Extract:

17. Delegation and accountability of
criminal agencies after Lisbon:
an examination of Europol
Bleddyn Davies*

1. INTRODUCTION
As the scope of European Union (EU) law has increased, so has the
number of independent or quasi-independent agencies necessary to allow it
to carry out its work. This is true in every field of Union law including
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) where both
Europol and Eurojust provide centres for European criminal cooperation.
The creation of the European Police Office, Europol, under the pre-Lisbon
Third Pillar was designed to encourage closer engagement and provide a
conduit for operations between police authorities in the Member States.
This type of cooperation, outside the core of internal market activities, has
been historically more politically controversial and the Third Pillar
retained oversight from the Member States which was not present in the
first. However, weaknesses in the Third Pillar mechanisms for judicial
oversight and accountability structures meant that the analysis of the old
Third Pillar was based on a tacit belief that communitarisation would be
the solution to these wider problems and that the Third Pillar structures
were outdated for the role they had to perform.1 This chapter will, however,
seek to demonstrate that in some respects the Lisbon reforms in relation to
criminal law, while bringing the competence within the Treaty on the


* I am extremely grateful to Michael Dougan, Ruth Lamont and Martin
Trybus for their comments and advice on earlier versions of this chapter. Any errors
or ...