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Kovacic, William E. --- "HSR at 35: The Early US Premerger Notification Experience and its Meaning for New Systems of Competition Law" [2012] ELECD 825; in Whish, Richard; Townley, Christopher (eds), "New Competition Jurisdictions" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012)

Book Title: New Competition Jurisdictions

Editor(s): Whish, Richard; Townley, Christopher

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9780857939517

Section: Chapter 1

Section Title: HSR at 35: The Early US Premerger Notification Experience and its Meaning for New Systems of Competition Law

Author(s): Kovacic, William E.

Number of pages: 20

Extract:

1. HSR at 35: the early US premerger
notification experience and its
meaning for new systems of
competition law
William E. Kovacic1

1. INTRODUCTION

No development in recent years in competition law has caused more
anxiety among mergers and acquisitions (M&A) specialists than the adop-
tion of new merger control regimes in China and India. Implementation of
China's antimonopoly law, effective since August 2008, has raised recur-
ring questions about the predictability, purpose and speed of enforce-
ment by the country's merger review unit in the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM).2 The run-up to the adoption of India's merger regulation
aroused acute concerns about the scope of reporting requirements and
the likely duration of examinations undertaken by the Competition
Commission of India (CCI) during the mandatory waiting period.3
Companies and their advisors are right to see the new merger regimes in
China and India as significant additions to a global merger control frame-
work that already includes over 80 jurisdictions with notification obliga-
tions. Until recently, the power of a single jurisdiction to determine whether
mergers with substantial cross-border effects live or die resided mainly in a
duopoly of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). This


1 The views expressed here are the author's alone.
2 On the implementation of China's antimonopoly system, see W. Zheng,
`Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and
State Control' (2010) 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law
643.
3 ...


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