Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew --- "Active courts and menu contracts" [2013] ELECD 1332; in Miceli, J. Thomas; Baker, J. Matthew (eds), "Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 281

Book Title: Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law

Editor(s): Miceli, J. Thomas; Baker, J. Matthew

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781781000144

Section: Chapter 13

Section Title: Active courts and menu contracts

Author(s): Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew

Number of pages: 27

Abstract/Description:

In a recent paper (Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite 2011) we showed, by means of a simple example, that Courts that actively intervene in partiesí contracts may improve on the outcome these parties could achieve without intervention. In particular if the role of the Court is to maximize the partiesí welfare under the veil of ignorance, Court intervention can induce parties to reveal their private information and enhance their ex-ante welfare. The example in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2011) is one in which parties are asymmetrically informed when they write their ex-ante contract. The seller knows the value and cost associated with the widget she provides while the buyer is uninformed. If the seller is restricted to offering a simple trading contract (a price at which to trade the widget in question) without the Courtís intervention she will offer the same price whatever the value and the cost of the widget. In other words, different types of seller offer the same trading contract and in equilibrium inefficient pooling arises. Court intervention that takes the form of a restriction on the price at which the parties can trade, induces the different types of seller to separate and reveal their private information. In so doing the inefficiency associated with the sellersí pooling is eliminated and ex-ante welfare increases. In this chapter we consider a different example from the one in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2011).