Ginsborg, Lisa --- "The United Nations Security Council’s counter-terrorism Al-Qaida sanctions regime: Resolution 1267 and the 1267 Committee" [2014] ELECD 435; in Saul, Ben (ed), "Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 608

Book Title: Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism

Editor(s): Saul, Ben

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9780857938800

Section: Chapter 35

Section Title: The United Nations Security Council’s counter-terrorism Al-Qaida sanctions regime: Resolution 1267 and the 1267 Committee

Author(s): Ginsborg, Lisa

Number of pages: 18

Abstract/Description:

What started as just one of many sanctions regimes in the history of the United Nations Security Council rapidly became, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011 (9/11), one of the most controversial and widely criticized. Since its creation in 1999, the Resolution 1267 sanctions regime, known today as the ‘Al-Qaida sanctions regime’, has been subject to numerous and radical transformations in response both to wider historical and political events and growing criticism of the regime itself, in particular its human rights implications. This chapter gives an overview of the evolution of the 1267 sanctions regime and the controversies surrounding the practice of ‘blacklisting’ individuals and entities suspected of association with Al-Qaida. The chapter concludes that despite the significant improvements brought about by the establishment of Office of the Ombudsperson in 2009 to review delisting requests, the 1267 regime still presents a number of problems for the rights of individuals targeted by the sanctions. In particular, while in practice the Ombudsperson delisting system has been providing an effective remedy to listed individuals and entities to date, on paper it still lacks procedural fairness in a number of areas. Finally, the lack of an effective periodic review of listings by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (also known as the 1267 Committee) itself may call for still stronger procedural guarantees.