Boon, Kristen E. --- "Timing matters: termination policies for UN sanctions" [2017] ELECD 1003; in van den Herik, Larissa (ed), "Research Handbook on UN Sanctions and International Law" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 236

Book Title: Research Handbook on UN Sanctions and International Law

Editor(s): van den Herik, Larissa

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781784713027

Section: Chapter 11

Section Title: Timing matters: termination policies for UN sanctions

Author(s): Boon, Kristen E.

Number of pages: 27

Abstract/Description:

In recent decades, the UN Security Council has increased its use of sanctions, particularly in cases of intrastate (non international) conflict. However once in place, UN sanctions tend to stick. The decision to lift sanctions – just like the decision to impose them – is political, and there is an instinct not to revisit ‘already decided’ matters. While it is often assumed that it is preferable to have high barriers to the termination of sanctions in order to extract credible commitments from entities subject to sanctions, how and when sanctions end is related not only to their efficiency but also to legal principles related to public authority. In this chapter, I examine the Security Council’s current termination practices for multilateral sanctions. I then explore the relationship between termination procedures and voting rules, and other mechanisms such as delisting. I argue that in most cases, short sanctions with defined termination procedures in the form of sunset clauses, combined with a global delisting review process, are the most desirable model. Keywords termination, delisting, sunset clauses, snap-back, commitment to review