Levmore, Saul --- "Interest groups and the durability of law" [2017] ELECD 556; in Fagan, Frank; Levmore, Saul (eds), "The Timing of Lawmaking" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 171

Book Title: The Timing of Lawmaking

Editor(s): Fagan, Frank; Levmore, Saul

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781785364327

Section: Chapter 8

Section Title: Interest groups and the durability of law

Author(s): Levmore, Saul

Number of pages: 24

Abstract/Description:

At any given point, lawmakers and interest groups benefit if the laws they pass are long-lived, or durable. The quest for durability explains some kinds of licensing, but a more important conclusion is that it explains a preference for spending programs, rather than mere regulation. Expenditures create endowment effects, to be sure, but spending programs are especially appealing to their beneficiaries when they bring about physical assets that future lawmakers will have no reason to dismantle. In an earlier era, the quest for durability might have generated overinvestments, as monumentalist rulers sought to leave their marks. In modern times, durability can be obtained through social programs as well as construction projects. In some settings durable projects can be reversed with targeted taxes, but recapturing previously awarded benefits is more difficult. Keywords: durability, interest groups, retroactivity, public goods, clawbacks