Fagotto, Elena --- "Resolving gaps in third-party certification for food safety hybridization" [2017] ELECD 632; in Verbruggen, Paul; Havinga, Tetty (eds), "Hybridization of Food Governance" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 54

Book Title: Hybridization of Food Governance

Editor(s): Verbruggen, Paul; Havinga, Tetty

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781785361692

Section: Chapter 3

Section Title: Resolving gaps in third-party certification for food safety hybridization

Author(s): Fagotto, Elena

Number of pages: 24

Abstract/Description:

Delivering safe foods to consumers is a shared responsibility of the public and private sectors. Governments and food safety authorities design and implement safety regulations applying to the foods produced and commercialized in each country. But in recent decades, the private sector has expanded its regulatory function by introducing a variety of food safety standards imposing hygiene and management requirements on the industry. These private standards apply to supply chains that transcend national boundaries and are a quasi-mandatory requirement that buyers impose on their suppliers, constituting an example of transnational private regulation. Buyers’ demand has been the most significant driver for the adoption of private standards. As a matter of fact, proof of certification is a strict contractual requirement for most large retailers and manufacturers who strive to control product safety and quality across complex and global supply chains. Private food safety schemes are monitored and enforced by third-party certification bodies that conduct periodic audits on facilities and issue certificates signaling compliance with private regulation. Public regulators are looking with interest at private regulation to avoid is still lagging behind. Indeed, multiple hybrid forms of governance are emerging where public functions are carried out by private actors or where governments validate private initiatives. In some countries, including Canada and the United States, regulators have delegated some enforcement functions to third-party certifiers and more regulators are exploring ways to incorporate third-party certification into their toolkit. Whereas private schemes may fill the gaps left by government, especially in the sphere of international food safety regulation, they also raise concerns when it comes to their monitoring and enforcement. In light of this, can we really trust third-party certification to deliver a public good such as safe foods? The answer to this question is complex and critical given a growing trend of hybridization in food safety. This chapter builds on the analytic framework elaborated by Verbruggen and Havinga in the introduction to this edited volume and focuses on the actors (third-party certification bodies) that carry out the monitoring and enforcement of private standards. In doing so it delves on several dimensions of hybridization to understand how they may impact the ultimate objective of delivering safe foods to consumers. This chapter examines the motivations and drivers (also referred to as incentives) of third-party certification bodies and advances several theoretical hypotheses on how these motivations may result in reduced food safety. The chapter also examines whether the metarules that the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), the meta-regulator of private food safety schemes, imposes on its recognized schemes can rectify incentives and ensure reliable certification. This chapter identifies shortcomings and suggests ways to change the motivations and drivers of third-party certifiers to better align them with the goal of increased food safety. Its findings should interest not only the industry, who pays for and implements such sophisticated safety and quality controls, but also the public sector, who is increasingly looking at ways to leverage private food safety controls to target resources and avoid duplication. The chapter will unfold as follows. Section 2 will describe briefly private food safety standards and the role of third-party certification bodies. Section 3 will propose a theoretical framework to examine whether the motivations and drivers provided by the present institutional design of third-party certification result in adequate monitoring and enforcement, and ultimately food safety. Section 4 discusses the rules introduced by the GFSI to regulate the behavior of certification bodies and whether these rules correct some of the shortcomings identified in the theoretical framework. Section 5 will reflect on whether the GFSI framework addresses gaps in third-party enforcement. Section 6 will offer conclusive remarks.