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Boyle, Kate --- "An Introduction to Gatekeeper: The Government's Public Key Infrastructure" [2000] JlLawInfoSci 3; (2000-2001) 11(1) Journal of Law, Information and Science 38

An Introduction to Gatekeeper: the Government’s Public Key Infrastructure

KATE BOYLE[*]

Abstract

Gatekeeper is a world leading project that deals with security issues related to electronic transactions. This Gatekeeper strategy could eventually be a national scheme. The following is a sketch of the Gatekeeper project. It includes a basic overview of the PKI and some legal issues arising from the use of Gatekeeper for online transactions.

1. Introduction

Increasingly the Internet is becoming a part of our daily lives. The potential benefits that e-transactions have for all of us, as individuals as well as businesses, is no longer a theory, but is a very real part of our reality.

‘E-commerce’ or ‘e-transactions’ are terms in common usage that are generally understood.[1] Both these terms have become familiar to many Australians because of their use of the Internet: In May 1998 17.9 per cent of households had Internet access. This percentage had increased to 25.1 per cent in November 1999. In the 12 months to November 1998, 286,000 Australian adults purchased or ordered goods over the Internet. In the 12 months to November 1999, this number increased to 802,000.[2]

However, there are several perceived impediment to reliable e-transactions. These include user concerns regarding security, privacy and the legal rights and obligations surrounding e-transactions.

The Gatekeeper strategy, released in May 1998, is the government’s response to many security issues, and also contributes to privacy protection and to legal assurance of electronic transactions such as the evidentiary value of electronic transactions.

The major aims of the Gatekeeper Strategy are to encourage confidence in the online economy, and to ensure trust between all users at each level of transactions with government.[3]

The principles of Gatekeeper are laid out in the document Gatekeeper, A Strategy for Public Key Technology use in the Government henceforth referred to as the Gatekeeper Report. Gatekeeper is sometimes referred to as the Government Public Key Infrastructure (GPKI). The report outlines the broad GPKI, including privacy and security principles, the entities that will make up the GPKI and issues such a risk management and industry development. The Gatekeeper Report contains a number of recommendations, which includes the establishment of the Gatekeeper Public Key Authority (GPKA) as an advisory body to the National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE) (formerly the Office for Government Online (OGO)).

Gatekeeper will be used to support the Government Online strategy which aims to have all appropriate government services online by 2001.[4] Gatekeeper is one of many enablers that will allow this goal to be met; another enabler is the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth).

Since May 1998, Gatekeeper has evolved and the Gatekeeper Report is in the process of being updated. The development of Gatekeeper 2 has involved wide consultation of the public sector across Australia.

The States and Territories have expressed an interest in using Gatekeeper. If this occurs, it will mean that Gatekeeper will become a national framework for Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used throughout all levels of government. Thus, an individual or business could completely streamline their interaction with government by making safe electronic transactions using as little as one digital certificate (DC) (see below).

One aspect of the consultation around Gatekeeper 2 is to allow the needs of the States and Territories to be incorporated in order for them to adopt Gatekeeper for their PKI needs.

Gatekeeper has formal links with Singapore and Hong Kong, and informal links with Canada and the USA. There has been interest from New Zealand in using Gatekeeper.

Why Gatekeeper is important:

• Australia is a world leader in this area. No other country has to date adopted a Government Public Key Infrastructure

• Gatekeeper could become a national framework

• Gatekeeper certificates could potentially be used in business-to-business transactions not involving the government

Public key technology is a set of procedures and technology that assures authentication, integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality when undertaking electronic transactions. The combination of these features allows users to conduct transactions with confidence in the online world. PKI is capable of providing greater benefits and surety than conventional processes for completing offline transactions.

Below are some of the major benefits that a PKI can provide:

Authentication: allows the identity of the sender of the message to be authenticated so that the receiver is sure that the sender is who they claim to be.

Message Integrity: allows the receiver of a message to be sure that the message has not been altered between its being sent and received.

Non-repudiation: ensures that it is difficult for the sender to later deny having sent the message.

Confidentiality: ensures that only the intended recipient is able to open the message.

PKI is built on the basis of ‘keys’. A user will have two ‘keys’- a public key and a private key. The public key may be distributed freely. The sender of a message will use the recipient’s public key to encrypt the message. The message can then only be decrypted by the holder of the corresponding private key. PKI uses an asymmetric key generation process which allows two completely different keys to be used in this manner.

Public keys are held in ‘digital certificates’. A digital certificate is simply a file on a computer system.[5]

Private keys may be held as a file on a computer or on a wider variety of tokens such as on smart cards or CD-ROMS.

When a certificate is used a digital signature is attached to that message.[6] Digital signatures may be used to ‘sign’ a document in a process equivalent to signing a document with a handwritten signature in the offline world. Digital signatures can be used to sign many types of documents including email, Internet transactions and World Wide Web pages.[7]

When a message is signed, the signature is only able to be verified with the corresponding key. Detailed PKI processes are invisible to the user.

2. Components in the Gatekeeper framework

Within GPKI there are a number of entities that perform certain functions. These various entities and their functional relationships are shown in Figure 1 below.

2.1 National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE)

The NOIE is the standard setter and manager of Gatekeeper and the GPKI. NOIE’s chief role is to accredit and oversee Gatekeeper service providers, on the advice of the GPKA. NOIE also has a role in developing certificate profiles for use by Commonwealth agencies, assisting agencies and other parties with an interest in using Gatekeeper, and assisting potential Gatekeeper service providers to become accredited.

2000_300.jpg

Figure 1: Entities in the GPKI and their functional relationships

2.2 Government Public Key Authority

The GPKA is an advisory body to NOIE consisting of representatives from various Commonwealth government agencies, the Australian Capital Territory government, the Australian Information Industry Association, the Australian Electrical Electronic Manufacturers Association and a privacy member to address community concerns. The GPKA plays a policy advisory role in relation to Gatekeeper, including standard setting and accreditation.

2.3 Certification Authorities

Certification Authorities (CAs) are generally the bodies that issue and sign certificates. A CA will often be the point of contact when an individual or business wishes to be issued with a certificate.

Some CAs will generate a user’s (or subscriber’s) key pairs. This does not necessarily involve key generation (which depends upon a CA’s business model). Under Gatekeeper, Extended Service Registration Authorities may perform some of these functions.

CAs are responsible for maintaining certificate directories containing information relating to certificates that is necessary for subscribers to know (such as Certificate Policies (CPs) or Certification Practice Statements (CPSs), key repositories (where subscribers public keys may be stored) and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) (CAs must maintain up-to-date CRLs. The revocation lists include details of certificates that have been revoked (due to the private key being compromised for example) or have expired and are essential for allowing Relying Parties to be able to rely on certificates they may receive.

2.4 Registration Authorities

Before a CA can issue a certificate, a Registration Authority (RA) must perform an evidence of identity check on the person.[8] RAs are responsible for the identification and authentication of potential subscribers by linking the potential subscriber’s evidence of identity uniquely to the digital certificate that they receive.

RAs do not generally sign or issue certificates, however, Gatekeeper will allow extended service RAs which may perform some typical CA functions (such as key generation). An RA wishing to perform any CA function must obtain Gatekeeper Accreditation (following the same process as a CA to the extent of those CA functions).

2.4.1 Evidence of Identity

‘Evidence of identity’ (EOI) is the more up-to-date and accurate way of describing the link between an individual and that individual’s ‘identity.’ There has been a move away from the commonly used term ‘proof of identity” (POI) as it is arguably, from a legal perspective, an anomaly. If a baby is born, and someone watches over that baby for every second of its life, that individual will be able to prove that they have watched over that same individual, as opposed to being able to prove that the baby is a particular individual from, say, a particular family.

EOI checks under Gatekeeper are based around the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth), which is the same process used to open a bank account. Some Gatekeeper certificate types may require up to 150 point checks (rather than the standard 100 point checks).

For organisations, mainly businesses, it is likely that a number of certificates will be needed for use be the organisation. The way around this is for an authorised officer to undergo an EOI check to link them with their identity and with the organisation they purport to represent. Once this is proven this officer will be able to be issued with various certificates for use within the organisation. Where this occurs, the organisation must be responsible for use of those certificates - an online application of the off-line concept of apparent authority.

2.5 Subscriber

A subscriber is the term generally used to describe an individual or organisation who has been issued with a digital certificate from a CA. In the Gatekeeper framework a subscriber will be contractually bound in its relationship with the CA through a ‘subscriber agreement.’ Subscriber agreements will incorporate CPs and CPSs.[9]

Subscribers are also known as ‘end entities’ or ‘users’ because different service providers may use different terms.

2.6 Relying party

When a subscriber receives a transaction, it becomes a ‘relying party’, simply a party who relies upon the validity of a PKI communication. In an open PKI, as there will be a number of CAs issuing digital certificates, not every subscriber will have a certificate issued by the same CA in which case each subscriber may have slightly different legal rights and obligations. These may have implications in cases where loss or liability arise.[10]

CRLs provide certainty in transactions that a relying party would not otherwise have. CRLs allow the relying party to determine whether a certificate they have received as part of an online transaction may be relied upon. A relying party’s computer will usually look up the CA’s CRL automatically and provide a warning where a certificate should not be relied upon.

3. Gatekeeper in Action

The largest impediments to legally and commercially reliable electronic transactions are the lack of a means of determining the identity of the sender of a message, preventing the unauthorised reading of an electronic message, a means to ensure that the sender of a message cannot easily deny that they sent the message and that the message has not been changed. These requirements correspond to the assurances that may be provided by PKI, namely, integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation.

Gatekeeper will allow individuals and businesses to do safe and secure online transactions with government.

A number of Commonwealth government agencies will soon implement frameworks that take advantage of Gatekeeper. These include the Health Insurance Commission issuing certificates to medical practitioners (to manage Medicare payments and to facilitate better management of medical records) and Customs implementing Gatekeeper to provide online import/export clearance online over the Internet (rather that the current dedicated electronic network). While these are examples of Gatekeeper applications that will soon be available, the Australian Tax Office has been using Gatekeeper for its online GST returns since July 2000.

The Australian Taxation Office: Gatekeeper in Practice

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is the first fully accredited Gatekeeper CA in Australia. Although it is slightly atypical as most Gatekeeper accredited entities will be private sector entities, it provides an excellent illustration of one type of application of Gatekeeper.

The ATO has implemented Gatekeeper to issue unique ATO digital certificates. These will be used for business entities with turnovers of $20 million or more per annum to place their returns and are also available to an ABN holder which has nominated to lodge its GST returns electronically. (ATO certificates should not be confused with the proposed ABN-Digital Signature Certificate. See discussion below).

The ATO is in a unique position also because it has been legislatively mandated to accept certain GST returns electronically in the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).

This is a closed PKI in which the digital certificates are only for use with the ATO, and the ATO will almost exclusively be the relying party (as subscribers will be sending their GST returns to the ATO which will rely on them).

ATO certificates were generated by the ATO CA and sent out to subscribers on CD-ROMs.

4. Gatekeeper Accreditation

Before an entity can operate as a CA or an RA under the Gatekeeper framework, it must undergo a rigorous accreditation process to ensure that there is a high level of trust in the framework, especially on the part of Commonwealth agencies and their clients. Gatekeeper service providers will generally be third party private sector entities.[11]

Potential CAs or RAs are required to meet a number of accreditation criteria to ensure that appropriate policies and practices are upheld, including privacy and security, and to ensure the interpretability of certificates issues by accredited organisations. These criteria include the following:

• Security Policy

• Physical Security

• Personnel Vetting

• CA Policy

• Technology

• Evaluation

• CA Administration

• Procurement Policy

• Privacy

• Considerations

• Contracts

NOIE, the Australian Government Solicitor, the Australian Security and Intelligence Office and the Defence Signals Directorate evaluate whether these criteria have been met by an applicant. Meeting the criteria is a comprehensive process that usually takes several months to complete.

A CA’s methods of operation must be documented in a CPS which is a statement of the practices which a certification authority employs in issuing certificates and a CP which relates to a type of certificate issued by the CA. These documents are ‘accredited’ by NOIE to ensure that they meet the standards required to issue certificates to the Commonwealth government.

Gatekeeper accreditation will not affect the entity’s ability to perform non-Gatekeeper accredited functions, including the issue of non-Gatekeeper accredited digital certificates. There are two level of Gatekeeper CA accreditation, entry level and full. Entry level allows a CA to perform limited Gatekeeper functions (essentially to issue Gatekeeper compliant server certificates). Full accreditation allows a CA to perform full Gatekeeper services. RAs may be either Core RAs or Extended Services RAs (which may perform certain CA functions).

The relationship between NOIE and accredited entities is contractual when a Head Agreement is signed following all the accreditation criteria being met. A Head Agreement governs all the terms and conditions upon which Gatekeeper Accreditation is granted.[12]

So far, the ATO has been granted full Gatekeeper accreditation; eSign and Certificates Australia Pty Ltd have been granted entry level accreditation. Sixteen other entities have registered to gain Gatekeeper accreditation (both CA and RA accreditation has been applied for) and are in various stages of reaching this. By early 2001, there should be around seven fully accredited Gatekeeper service providers in operation.

5. The Management of the Legal Relationships between Gatekeeper components

A major issue for all parties involved in the Gatekeeper framework will be the management of liability.[13] For the most part liability will be managed contractually; including NOIE imposing risk management techniques to minimise risks falling unfairly or unduly on subscribers and to have liability flow more directly from breaches of core responsibilities by CAs and subscribers.[14]

5.1 The Commonwealth

Gatekeeper will meet the needs of the Commonwealth’s, however, for the framework to be viable it must meet the needs of all the players, CAs, RAs, Subscribers and Relying Parties.

It is unlikely that losses will occur or that liability will be an issue. This is so long as the implementation of the infrastructure and accreditation of the entities are maintained at stringent best practice levels that are up-to-date with current technology. Losses are more likely to be associated with human error.

The Commonwealth will often be a subscriber or a relying party; for example, when procuring or when relying on electronic contracts. The ATO is the relying party in every case in the current GST returns system. Potential losses and liability risks are the same for the Commonwealth as for any other subscriber or relying party in the Gatekeeper framework. The creation of a level playing field is seen as important for increasing confidence in the framework.

As the Commonwealth has no control over B2B transactions, users must accept their own risk in undertaking such a transactions.

5.2 Certification Authorities and Registration Authorities

Each Head Agreement between NOIE and Gatekeeper accredited entities contractually governs liability including warranties and indemnities, and details obligations on both parties. Head Agreement also contains provisions relating to ongoing accreditation, including compliance audits, privacy audits and procedures for when Gatekeeper standards need to be updated.

5.3 For Subscribers

The relationship between the subscriber and the CA can be dealt with by contract. The binding document is usually called a ‘subscriber agreement’ and the terms and conditions of this agreement must be accepted prior to a digital certificate being accepted. Each CA will have their own terms and conditions contained in these agreements regarding the extent to which they may be held liable by subscribers as well as obligations and responsibilities for both parties.

Subscriber agreements within Gatekeeper will generally incorporate the CP and the CPS. These follow RFC 2527 which is the generally internationally accepted format for CPs or CPSs.[15]

Subscriber agreements summarize major issues from the CP and CPS. These are then placed in a short, easy to read document to ensure that subscribers are aware of all their rights and obligations.

Although subscriber agreements will generally contain provisions stating that subscribers may only use their Gatekeeper digital certificates for the purpose for which they are designed, the Commonwealth cannot be responsible for use over which it has not control. Where these certificates are used for transactions not with the government, the subscriber bears all the legal risk of such a transaction. An exception to this may be where the subscriber takes out insurance for the use of the certificate for use in transactions other than with the government. Such insurance could be taken privately or through a CA.

5.4 Relying Parties

In Australian law, the status of relying parties’ relationships with a CA is currently unclear. One solution to this problem would be to form a contract, most likely of the click-wrap variety, when the relying party checks the subscriber’s CA’s CRL.[16] This would form a legal relationship between the RP and the subscriber’s CA.

This may be a solution to the problem. However, most Internet browsers are configured in a way that the computer will automatically look up the CRL. This will avoid presenting the opportunity for a contract to be formed. Whether a click-wrap contract can be formed will depend upon the application of the user, not the certificate or how the CRL is implemented.

When a computer automatically looks up a certificate on a CRL, the process is invisible to the user except that a message should appear stating that the certificate is valid even though the certificate and its fields may be viewed. Even to configure an application to maximise certificate information shown requires a certain level of computer literacy that many users may not have.[17]

RPs may have to rely upon common law actions such as negligence, negligent misstatement or contract law where appropriate. A paper written by Mark Sneddon for the National Electronic Authentication Council (available at www.noie.gov.au) Legal Liability and e-transactions, provides further information about general PKI legal relationships, particularly the legal position of Relying Parties.

In many scenarios in the GPKI, the Commonwealth will actually be the relying party. Note however that the ATO for example, will always be the relying party in the closed PKI system that is currently in place.

6. A Certificate for Business Use

Most Australians will by now be familiar with the Australian Business Number (ABN), the number issued by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) to be used primarily as a unique identifier for businesses. The provision of ABNs is covered by the A New Tax System (Australian Business Number) Act 1999 (Cth).

NOIE is currently developing a Gatekeeper digital certificate based around the ABN. The proposed ABN-Digital Signature Certificates (ABN-DSC) will be certificates designed for business to use in its transactions with government.[18]

The ABN-DSC is a set of standard specifications for a broad use digital certificate. These certificates, although designed for business-to-government (B2G) transactions may be used for business-to-business (B2B) transactions (although the Commonwealth will not have any control over such use, and is therefore unable to accept liability).

The ABN-DSC:

• will be a digital certificate used by Commonwealth agencies to identify "client" businesses when conducting online transactions;

• will be a digital certificate that a business can use (as far as possible) to undertake all online dealings with the Commonwealth;

• will be based on the X509 standard, the internationally recognised standard for digital certificates;

• will be able to be issued by any fully accredited Gatekeeper CA;

• will be recognised by all Commonwealth government agencies regardless of which CA issued them (one certificate alone may suffice);

• may be called whatever a CA chooses to name their particular issue of the "ABN-DSC" eg XYZ Business Certificate; and,

• will be designed to operate in an open rather than a closed PKI.[19]

A draft Concept of Operations for the ABN-DSC is available at www.govonline.gov.au.

7. Individual Certificates

Although no individual certificates have been issued, it is envisaged that they will begin to be issued from 2001. Individual certificates require increased privacy protection as they may be used when doing personal transactions with government (for example; personal tax returns or the provision of government benefits). One of the largest hurdles for implementing Gatekeeper is ensuring user confidence. Privacy is a public confidence issue as stringent protections have already been built into the framework and others are in development.

8. Australia’s Legal Framework and Gatekeeper

A number of areas of the law currently impact on the use and status of digital signatures. As there are no laws relating specifically to Gatekeeper digital certificates, the below points relate to digital certificates generally.

8.1 Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) (ETA)

The ETA provides that an electronic transaction will not be invalid merely because it took place wholly or partly as a result of one or more electronic communications. This provides surety that electronic transactions are legally recognised.

The ETA does not add to existing law. It is likely that electronic transactions would be upheld by courts even without legislation, however, legislation was seen as an important step towards providing confidence in the online world.

The States and Territories have all committed to passing equivalent legislation by 2001. Victoria and New South Wales have already passed corresponding ETAs. Once this legislation is in place across all jurisdictions, a national framework will be in place - such a framework will reflect the cross-jurisdictional nature of electronic transactions, and is essential for the surety of e-transactions.

The ETA is an enabler for electronic transactions, including for the use of digital certificates.

8.2 Evidence Acts

The necessary flip-side to having legally recognised electronic transactions is a need to allow electronic evidence to be admissible. There is little point passing a law to allow electronic contracting if, in case of dispute, the relevant Evidence Act does not allow electronic evidence to be admissible in court.

The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (so far applicable in the Commonwealth, Victoria and New South Wales) clearly allows electronic evidence. Where transaction are with the Commonwealth, this will not be an issue. However, where wider transactions are envisaged, the status of electronic evidence may become an issue that will need to be dealt with.

8.3 Privacy

Privacy is a particular issue in the online world: consumers are increasingly concerned about the unauthorised collection and use of personal information. These concerns are legitimate. Cookies and web bugs, and a whole range of other tools can be used by third parties to gather information about users and their online habits.

So far, Gatekeeper digital certificates have been used only for businesses, however, it is likely that they will be used for individuals in the future. Increased privacy protection is necessary for individuals. Individuals must be given choice and information about their options, rights and protections regarding privacy in a PKI environment.

Gatekeeper incorporates a number of stringent built-in privacy protections. The most important of these is that RAs and CAs wishing to be accredited must meet twelve accreditation criteria that relate directly to privacy. These are:

1. The manner and extent of collection of personal information must comply with IPP 1, 2 and 3 and requirements in the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual.

2. Security safeguards in relation to personal information must meet IPP 4 and requirements in the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual.

3. Openness about the types of personal information held and information handling policies must meet IPP 5 and requirements in the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual.

4. The availability of procedures to allow subjects of personal information to access and correct the information must meet IPPs 6 and 7 and requirements in Commonwealth Protective Security Manual

5. The accuracy of personal information must meet IPP 8 and requirements in the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual.

6. Personal information is only to be used for relevant purposes to meet IPP 9 and requirements in the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual.

7. Limits are placed on the use of personal information to meet IPP 10 and requirements in Commonwealth Protective Security Manual.

8. Limits are placed on disclosure of personal information to meet IPP 11 and requirements in Commonwealth Protective Security Manual.

9. Ensure that privacy protection is provided for personal information published in publicly accessible lists / registers (controls over how personal information is accessed, searched and used).

• No personal information shall be made publicly available in CRLs and other directory services.

• CAs shall collect and hold minimal personal information when logging accesses to CRLs or other directory services.

• CAs should not disclose personal information collected by logging access to CRLs or other directory services, except in circumstances where, if that information were protected telecommunications information, they would be authorised or required to disclose the information under Part 13, Division 3, Subdivision A of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth).

10. Multiple certificates: Persons to whom certificates are issued (Users) will be allowed to have more than one certificate from the same CA, wherever the use of multiple certificates is not inconsistent with the purpose of those certificates; ie users should not be limited to one certificate when dealing with more than one agency.

11. Notification procedures: CAs will establish and follow procedures to notify users whether the IPPs or National Privacy Principles (NPPs) apply to protect personal information collected and held by the CA for the purpose of issuing and managing certificates, and the applicable mechanism for making and investigating privacy complaints.

12. Support of anonymous or pseudonymous certificates: The CA should have the ability to provide anonymous or pseudonymous certificates where appropriate.

All Gatekeeper accredited entities are bound in their Head Agreement with NOIE to the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) as contained in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). Subcontractors must also be bound by the IPPs. This ensures that the IPPs must be met on an ongoing basis even after the initial Gatekeeper accreditation process has been successfully completed.

All Head Agreements also have provisions for NOIE to order a privacy audit to be conducted on CAs or RAs. These audits will be carried out by approved third party auditors, the aim being to ensure that privacy practices are maintained at an appropriately rigorous level.

All CA staff that will have access to either encryption software or personal information must be vetted by Australian Security Vetting Services (part of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department) to Highly Protected level, which only has one level of higher vetting available. RA staff must be cleared to the In-Confidence level.[20]

NOIE is working towards ensuring that a Defence Signals Directorate accredited key generation product is available to users.

NOIE has established an inter-agency privacy group to deal with privacy issues for agencies to use when using individual Gatekeeper digital certificates to deal with clients. The Privacy Commissioner is intending to develop a set of privacy guidelines for individual certificates.

9. Conclusion

Gatekeeper is the government’s answer to online security issues. It is a rigorous accreditation framework that service providers must pass through prior to them being given permission to issue Gatekeeper digital certificates. It involves the development of the ABN-DSC, a Gatekeeper compliant certificate based around the ABN for businesses to use in transactions with the government.

Ensuring that the legal framework will support the implementation of Gatekeeper, and related e-commerce and government online developments, is a chief concern of NOIE in advancing the Government’s commitment to have all appropriate government services online by 2001.


[*] Kate Boyle works in the Government Public Key Infrastructure Branch of the National Office for the Information Economy in Canberra. The GPKI Branch is responsible for the implementation of the Gatekeeper Strategy. Kate's responsibilities involves considering legal issues surrounding Gatekeeper including the contractual process surrounding Gatekeeper Accreditation and wider legal issues arising from electronic transactions and PKI.

[1] An ‘e-transaction’ is an online transaction that may not have any direct financial implications. E-commerce is usually used to describe transactions involving a financial transfer.

[2] Source: ABS Use of Internet by Householders (Cat. No. 8147.0) November 1998, November 1999.

[3] Gatekeeper incorporates a large number of Australian and international standards, including Australian Standard 4539 which deals with the Public Key Authentication Framework (PKAF), AS/NZS 4444.1:1999 IS Security and AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management, AS/NZS 4019.8:1996, Information technology, Open Systems Interconnection, The Directory, Authentication framework and ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (03/00) - Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks.

[4] Details of the Government Online Strategy are available at www.govonline.gov.au.

[5] Refer to PKIX Working Group Internet Draft Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile (Housley, Ford, Polk, Solo) July 14 2000 (http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-02.txt)

[6] A digital signature should not be confused with a digitised signature. The latter is a scanned image of a handwritten signature.

[7] More information on the technical aspects of PKI can be found at www.govonline.gov.au.

[8] At present Gatekeeper does not use anonymous certificates. Given appropriate demand, such certificates may be issued in the future. Truly anonymous certificates do not require any form of EOI check.

[9] See ‘Gatekeeper Accreditation.’ below.

[10] A closed PKI is where only one CA issues the certificates and there is no cross-recognition or cross-certification of certificates. An open PKI is where several CAs are issuing certificates and the relying party may not have any relationship with the CA who issued the certificate being relied upon (there will also be cross-recognition and cross-certification of certificates).

[11] The Australian Tax Office is one exception where a Commonwealth agency has been granted Gatekeeper accreditation.

[12] A model Head Agreement is available at www.govonline.gov.au. This model is used as a starting point for negotiation with potential Gatekeeper service providers.

[13] See Figure 1 above.

[14] Gatekeeper will use Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures (which imposes certain professional standards on CAs).

[15] Refer to Network Working Group Request for Comments 2527, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework (S. Chokhani) March 1999 (http://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-02.txt).

[16] Although the validity of click-wrap contracts have not been tested in Australia, it is likely that they will be upheld. See the US case of Caspi v The Microsoft Network (MSN) 323 NJ Super 118, 732 A.2d 528 in which a click-wrap contract was upheld.

[17] While CRLs could potentially be looked up manually, they will generally be lists containing mainly numbers (as opposed to user friendly lists such as the online white pages).

[18] The ABN-DSC should not be confused with the ATO certificates which have a separate set of specifications. ABN-DSCs are not used by the ATO at present.

[19] Taken from The ABN-DSC Broad Specifications available at www.govonline.gov.au.

[20] Australian Security Vetting Services perform security clearances for the Commonwealth government.


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