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ACADEMIC LAWYERS AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN ENGLAND:
TOWARDS A NEW RELATIONSHIP?
MARTIN PARTINGTON*
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this conference — legal academia
— raises for discussion and analysis basic questions about the current
state
and status of the legal academy. It implies historical questions: how have
we arrived at the position we are in today? It implies
predictive questions: how
are we likely to develop in the years ahead? How should we be developing? It
also implies comparative questions:
is what we do here similar/dissimilar to
what goes on in other common law countries? In the civil war jurisdictions? In
the (former?)
Eastern Bloc countries? A complete and comprehensive analysis of
all these issues would require a substantial research agenda.
Despite the
potentially vast scope of the enterprise sketched out above, this paper
addresses a narrower set of issues that revolve
around the questions: what
should the status of the legal academic be? What should the relationship be
between the legal academic
and the legal practitioner?l
In what follows there will inevitably be a rather narrow focus on the position
in England.2 Nevertheless, the conference agenda does
suggest that some consideration of the matters discussed here form at least part
of the
agenda in Australia and New Zealand as well. It must also be acknowledged
that much of the inspiration for developments occurring
in England derive from
experience and expertise developed in Australia and New Zealand. The Paper falls
into two main parts: Part
One looks at developments at Higher Education policy
in Britain and the responses of law schools to them; Part Two explores the
changing
relationship between legal academics and legal practitioners in
England. Finally some conclusions are drawn.
PART ONE — POLICY ON HIGHER EDUCATION IN BRITAIN
Before proceeding further, however, it is important to
be reminded of the broader public policy context within which Higher Education
is currently placed. In Britain, the basic structure of higher education as it
now exists was effectively prescribed in 1963 by the
publication of the Robbins
Report.3 This led to a substantial expansion of the
university sector of higher education in the late 1960s and also to the
emergence of the
polytechnic sector, from former Colleges of Advanced
Technology, who were given the ability to offer degree level courses, accredited
by a central body, the Council for National Academic Awards. The “binary
line”, with the universities on the one side
and the polytechnics on the
other, was widely regarded as creating a two-tier system of higher education:
the Universities still
attracted the resources to fund research as well as
teaching; the Polytechnics were funded less generously, with the emphasis there
being more on teaching and less on research.
In the late 1960s and early
1970s resources were available from the public purse to allow both sectors to
develop. However from the
mid-1970s onwards, the fiscal implications of the
policy of expansion became increasingly clear, and financial matters became
increasingly
sharply drawn. No longer was expansion effectively driven by the
institutions asking for more resources; the Treasury became more
and more
reluctant to part with money.4
When the
Conservative Government came to power in 1981, the attack on the financial
position of the Universities, in particular, became
more overt. Initially,
reductions in student numbers going to university were officially forecast,
which were used to justify sharp
cuts in actual levels of
expenditure.5 Naturally the Universities sought to
challenge the basis for these policies. Alternative predictive models for
student numbers were
advanced which showed an increase in demand for places,
rather than a decline. Eventually this led to the Government amending its
policy. It accepted the universities’ case for increased student numbers.
Indeed it became committed to increasing the “participation
rate”
— the numbers of school-leavers able to enter the higher education system
in general.6
The Government did not, however,
fundamentally change its approach to funding. Indeed it became ever more
determined to drive down,
so far as it could, the “unit of
resource”. This was done by both allowing unrealistically low levels of
inflation when
increasing the level of government funding plus the imposition of
what were (and are) euphemistically described as “efficiency
gains”.
In this, the Universities — perceived as expensive — were
successfully played off against the Polytechnics
— perceived as cheaper.
In addition to policies relating to resources, at least five further policies
were being developed
by Government:
First, was that
“industry” — broadly defined — should pay more for the
work done in the Universities and Polytechnics,
from which it derived benefits.
Most of this discussion focused on the financial support for applied research;
but the argument also
applied to advanced educational and training programmes as
well. Universities and Polytechnics, used to charging rather
“notional”
levels of fees, were encouraged to become much more
commercial and recover the full costs of providing
services.7
Secondly, Universities should
become more “enterprising”, not just in the sense that they should
be more commercial in their marketing,
but also in terms of preparing their
students for work in the “enterprise” culture. A consistent theme
has been the encouragement
of Universities to at least be aware of and respond
to vocational needs.8
A third, was that
University management structures should be overhauled.9
There was to be greater devolution of financial management into departments to
encourage both greater freedom in decision-taking
and greater accountability for
decisions taken. In this way it was intended that there would be better use of
the resources that
were provided for the Universities. At the same time,
Universities were asked to establish planning committees that comprised at
least
an element of “lay” (external) membership. This move was designed to
encourage the university sector to be more
responsive to outside (market)
pressures.
A fourth, more recent policy has been that Universities
and Polytechnics should become much more flexible in their pay structure.
Traditionally
accepted mechanisms, whereby salaries were negotiated nationally
and staff were paid (broadly) the same in each institution, were
to become less
rigid to enable staff, in subjects where teachers were scarce, to be recruited
or retained by higher rewards than
in others where mobility was low and
availability high.
Fifth, in the university sector, resources for
research were to be redirected on the basis of evaluations of the quality of
research, with
increasingly large sums going to those universities achieving the
highest research “ratings”. In short, there was a considerable
and
consistent pressure on the universities, in particular, and to a lesser extent
in the Polytechnics, to change and to respond
more to the
“marketplace”.
The effect of these policy initiatives has been
mixed. Much change has occurred — more than is normally seen discussed in
the
public media. Universities are probably more “efficient”; if
there was any waste of resources a decade ago, there is
certainly none now.
“Productivity” is higher: across higher education as a whole, more
students are taught by fewer staff.
Research output has increased. New modes of
teaching have been introduced. There is more choice of courses. At the same
time, there
has been a price to pay. In particular, the time needed to enable
the scholar to think and to write has been reduced. A1 though very
difficult to
measure empirically, .it is likely that — at least in this respect —
quality has suffered.
The Response of the Law Schools
The response of the Law Schools10 to these pressures might have been very negative. In fact it has been extremely positive. Well before the financial crisis of the 1980s began to bite, Law Schools had begun to change in a whole variety of ways. For example:
In the 1980s these trends continued. As the Law Schools were in the fortunate position of being able to attract overseas students, this provided some financial cushion which to a degree protected Law Schools from the worst effects of the cuts. In the 1980s, therefore, further developments occurred:
Two
specific — and related — developments did, however, begin to cause
unease within Law Schools. First, the fact —
already noted — that
the 1980s was a time of enormous expansion, not only in the provision of legal
services but also the levels
of reward that those who provided them were able to
command, was having an impact on recruitment into the academic branch. While
it
is hard to demonstrate that the quality of young person becoming law teachers
has fallen, the numbers interested in a life of
teaching and scholarship do seem
to have dropped. There are now rather less applicants for posts than was the
case a decade ago.
Secondly, as the larger legal practices become ever more
committed to the professional development and continuing legal education
of
their staff, increasing numbers of offers (that it was hard, if not impossible,
to refuse) were being made to legal academics
to tempt them to move into firms,
to organise training programmes and other “knowhow”
services.19
Thus, experienced academics were being
lured away from the academy; and their replacements were, perhaps, not quite so
well qualified.
The Challenge of the 1990s
The current position is then, that while much energy
and innovation has resulted in the legal academy in England becoming
increasingly
productive, there are problems ahead which those who now have the
responsibility for offering leadership to the academic branch of
the legal
profession must come to terms with and seek to resolve. The challenges which we
face are, in my view, as follows:
Expansion. Law Schools,
particularly the larger better funded ones, do have an academic need to expand,
not without limit, but in a measured
way.20 The reason
for this is that the legal context within which we live becomes seemingly ever
more complex. It must be the claim of the
leaders of the academic community that
they are at the “cutting edge” of their discipline. (This
“cutting edge”
can of course exist either in the teaching or the
research functions of the legal scholar. Academics do, however, need to be
conscious
of this objective lest, under the pressures which are now imposed upon
them, they stop thinking about this. If this happens, they
will fail to have the
forward looking approach that should characterise the lively scholarly
community. They will fail to be taking
the risks to develop new areas of
research, or new modes of teaching that they ought to be looking at.) The
“core curriculum”
does not change, but new areas of law constantly
open up which should be the focus of scholarly attention. For these reasons,
inter
alia, we do need to find more scholars able to move into new areas
of teaching and research.
Resources. The policies of the major
political parties give no suggestion that there will be any significant increase
in resources, at least,
not for the Universities. While overseas students
obviously have a valuable role to play in law departments — and more
generally
can provide a means for helping to sustain the vitality of the common
law — too great a financial dependence on them is perhaps
unwise. The home
countries of such students are — quite rightly — constantly seeking
ways to reduce the outflow of resource
that studying abroad represents. Thus the
Law Schools do need to explore alternative sources of additional income.
Teaching Quality. Complementing the surveys and assessments of
research quality, it is inevitable and proper that arrangements for assessing
the quality
of teaching must be put in place. The first steps towards the
Universities’ Academic Audit have now been taken. The Law Schools
need
urgently to think about how to respond to this, in order to develop the audit
process in such a way as will demonstrate the
good quality of the teaching that
is offered.21
The Collapse of the Binary
Line. It is equally inevitable that the sharp distinction between
Universities and Polytechnics, that has existed for the last twenty
years or so,
will disappear. Polytechnics will shortly be able to retitle themselves as
Universities. In principle, this is strongly
to be welcomed. This very fact
does, however, create its own challenges. Amplifying a point already mentioned,
it is unlikely that
the Government will provide additional levels of funding to
allow all institutions of higher education to undertake research in the
way
universities have until now. Thus it is likely that rather sharp distinctions
will have to be drawn between “research”
universities and
“teaching” universities, or perhaps some status in between. If so,
how are decisions to be reached?
Once decided, will decisions be changeable? The
implications of such changes are likely to be difficult and painful.
The
Status of the Academic Lawyer. But perhaps the greatest challenge facing the
legal academy — which in effect brings together the more specific matters
set
out in the preceding paragraphs — is to define and develop a
recognition of the appropriate status of the academic lawyer in
English legal
culture. It is in this context that the academic must look beyond the narrow
world of the academy and instead seek
both to understand and to influence the
wider legal world beyond. This will involve the development of an increasingly
constructive
relationship — partnership, even — between the worlds
of the scholar and the practitioner. It is to this specific theme
that I now
turn.
PART TWO — ACADEMIC LAWYERS AND PRIVATE PRACTICE
Academic lawyers in England have, for a long time, had frankly rather an awkward even limited relationship with legal practitioners. As long ago as 1846, a Parliamentary Select Committee on Legal Education observed that in England there were:
... few examples of that important class of thinkers who, in other countries, standing on the summit of the profession and disengaged from the turmoil and labour of its daily technical duties, have to keep the [legal] profession up to the intellectual height to which it should be its proudest boast to aspire ...22
One hundred and
twenty years later, Professors Abel-Smith and Stevens concluded in Lawyers and
the Courts, that: University Law Faculties
... lacked prestige ... with the
[legal] profession.23
Twenty years on, and similar
claims were still being made: for example, Atiyah:
In the English legal system the scholar as teacher is a person with a decidedly inferior status...24
And Wilson:
... this sense of difference of status has been reinforced in the past by the difficulty in identifying any obvious role for the legal scholar other than teaching future practitioners ... [There] is only a limited informal network of contacts between legal scholars in general and those who bear the main responsibility for administering the law.25
Such statements, if justified, demonstrate the
extent of the challenge that faces the academic legal community.
The
impression I have — and it is only an impression — is that while
twenty-five years ago (when coincidentally I was
first offered an academic
appointment) the conclusion at which Abel-Smith and Stevens arrived was probably
more or less justified,
the more recent statements are less descriptive of a
reality that I know. Below, I set out ways in which I suggest that both the
influence of the legal academic — in both teaching and research — is
stronger than suggested by Atiyah, and the networks
are more formal and stronger
than suggested by Wilson.
The Definition of “Legal Practice”
First though, we must be clear about what is meant by the world of legal practice. For the purpose of this argument, ‘legal practice” comprises what I have described elsewhere26 as two conceptually distinct components: a “private practice” component, which involves the day-to-day operation and administration of the law and the legal system; and a “public policy” component, which focuses on the development, through public policy initiatives, of the law. Thus while the former will also include those creative but rather unpredictable developments in our jurisprudence that arise — intermittently — from litigation in the courts, the latter embraces all those developments in the law which derive from legislation enacted by Parliament, together with policy initiatives started within Government. A definition of “legal practice” which includes the whole range of activities which lead towards the development of a legal culture is of considerable significance when trying to understand and develop the relationship between the academic lawyer and “legal practice”.
Teaching
The “Academic” Stage
Twenty-five years ago, it was
very common for lawyers to qualify — either as barristers or solicitors
— without obtaining
a law degree, or indeed, any degree at all. This
situation began to change rapidly after 1971. In that year the Report of the
Ormrod
Committee27 concluded that all lawyers should
start the process of obtaining professional qualifications by first completing
an “academic”
stage of education. In order that students, by
completing a law degree, were able to obtain exemption from the first part of
the
subsequent professional examinations it was necessary that students should
study six “core” subjects.28 The syllabuses
for these subjects were, initially, prescribed in some detail. In practice,
however, the teaching institutions found
that they had considerable flexibility
in the way they taught and assessed these courses and in the content. In the
last twelve months,
this more relaxed approach was formally recognised. A joint
working party — representing the teaching institutions, the Bar
and the
Law Society — replaced the old syllabi with much briefer
“outlines” of topics that should be covered (and
which in reality
are covered). In short, the practising branch of the profession had accepted
that the teaching institutions could
be relied on to put suitable courses
together, so that any attempt by them to intervene was unnecessary. Furthermore,
under the Courts
and Legal Services Act 1990 — which, infer alia
establishes a new Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct —
the so-called “academic” stage has, in fact,
received statutory
recognition.29
The fact that, effectively, all new
recruits to legal practice now have degrees, a majority of them law degrees, is
important in the
context of this discussion. For whereas twenty-five years ago
many leaders of the profession knew next to nothing of the universities
(and,
doubtless, cared less), the present generation is aware of what the legal
academy has to offer. This is a trend that will continue.
Continuing Legal Education
A second development, already noted, which brings
legal academics and legal practitioners into closer contact results from a new
commitment
to continuing legal education. The Law Society has embarked on a
policy which, by 1995 will require all solicitors who entered the
profession
after 1965 to undergo continuing legal education each year. Within the last
twelve months, the Bar has also taken steps
to introduce compulsory continuing
legal education.
Although much of this is done “in-house” by
larger firms, and much is also done by commercial training companies, the
universities and polytechnics have played a very substantial part in this
development. This has the particular value of bringing
academics and
practitioners together to discuss developments in specific areas of law. In
addition to short “updating”
programmes, continuing legal education
is also becoming linked with two further developments: specialisation and
retraining.
Related to this, important initiatives have also occurred in the area of judicial training. Ten years ago this would have been limited, almost exclusively, to instruction on sentencing for magistrates. The former assumption that judges knew everything has been replaced by a rather more open-minded approach. Now increasingly sophisticated programmes are being organised for the judiciary — at all levels — in which there is a not inconsiderable input from academic 1awyers.30
The Vocational Stage of Legal Education
A third development relates to the vocational stage
of legal education, which follows from the completion of the academic stage.
Here,
the two branches of the practising profession have retained much greater
control. The Bar runs courses at the Inns of Court School
of Law. The Law
Society runs its vocational stage through the College of Law, in association
with a number of polytechnics. Within
the last twelve months, however,
significant changes have been introduced.
The Bar’s final course was
substantially revised, in 1990, to include a much larger element of instruction
on the skills needed
to become an advocate. (The content and structure was
heavily influenced by courses offered in other parts of the common law world.)
The current view at the Bar is that the course has to be run in a single
location in London, since a key component of the course
is instruction and
assessment by practitioners in the arts of advocacy and court procedure.
This is causing two problems:
It is very likely that the syllabus for the
latter category will shortly be brought into line with the new ICSL course. But
it will have to be taught elsewhere. I predict that at least one of the law
teaching institutions will become authorised to offer
this new programme. The
Law Society have been bolder. The Law Society Final course was last reformed in
1979. It then had as its
objective, the aim of introducing students to practical
skills as well as areas of substantive law. However, the course was taught
in a
number of different locations. A particular feature of the way the course was
organised was that there was a single, centrally-set
examination, which all
students had to take. This had the effect of making both the teaching
institutions and their students concentrate
almost entirely on learning the
rules essential to pass the written examination. Little more than lip service
was given to the skills
element.
To overcome this, the Law Society has in
July 1991, passed proposals for a new course to be introduced in 1993 which will
address
the problems associated with the existing course. In particular, while
each authorised teaching institution will be required to provide
a course that
meets objectives set out in a detailed set of written standards, the modes of
teaching and assessment will be for each
teaching institution to determine.
Common standards will be achieved by detailed monitoring of the institutions
through a new Legal
Practice Course Board.
The significance of these moves
can hardly be overstated. Since the Law Society has come to accept that in
general terms, the teaching
institutions can be relied upon to offer appropriate
vocational courses as well as the academic stage and the continuing
stage,)32 the teaching institutions now have the
opportunity to develop and experiment with their modes of vocational instruction
in a way
that has not hitherto been possible.
In my view it is essential
that at least some university law departments play a part in this development,
as well as the College of
Law and the polytechnics. Many law teachers are likely
to resist this argument, claiming that the primary justification for the
teaching
of law — particularly in the universities — is the
intellectual discipline that is associated with the study of law.
A broader
vision, however, would embrace both the liberal educational values associated
with this point of view and a wider concern
that education — in its
broadest sense — should be associated with the formation of individual
professional identities.
If this wider view becomes accepted, this would do much
to widen the influence of legal academics in the English legal system and
legal
profession.
Research and Scholarship
In addition to teaching, legal academics also have a commitment to research and scholarship. It seems clear on the basis of my 1982 survey that the product of this research and scholarship is, in fact, applied in the world of legal practice (as defined above) to a very substantial degree.33 Although a follow-up study has not yet proved possible, it is reasonable to assume that the involvement of legal academics in legal practice is now even greater than it was then. The survey showed that legal academics were engaged in a wide variety of activities in a wide range of contexts:
And it should not be forgotten,
of course, that very many practitioners use the product of the legal
academics’ research and
scholarship, which is published in texts, books
and articles, and other legal commentaries.
No “audit” of the
extent and nature of any influence from the work of legal academics has been
undertaken. But it is not
hard to think of issues which have been taken up and
debated in the academic literature which have influenced thinking both in
practice
(eg judicial review) or in policy making (eg models of legal service
delivery). Furthermore, the academic community is now more involved
in research
projects which are likely to result in changes to the law, legal process or the
legal profession than was the case 10–15
years ago.
Undoubtedly there
are dangers involved in the academic community becoming too closely locked into
policy-driven research programmes,
particularly if that is the only kind of
research for which resources are available. At the same time, however, these
developments
would not have occurred if those outside the legal academy had not
found the work of legal academics to be of value.
Investment in the Academy
The value of a strong academic base for legal practice is also acknowledged by the increasing investment or sponsorship of academic activity by private practice. This can take a variety of forms:
Where
individual firms engage in such sponsorship, strings usually come attached. The
department/faculty concerned may have to provide
teaching to the firm, or other
contributions to “know-how”. The firm may seek to acquire access to
students, eg by the
delivery of lectures.
Another recent initiative has been
the creation of the City Solicitors’ Educational Trust, funded by the
large firms in the
City of London, who have made a number of grants to law
departments to assist with “core” undergraduate teaching. These
resources are freer, in that they do not impose any direct reciprocal obligation
on the academic departments to provide services
to specific firms. In addition,
the sponsorship of students by firms is now very common — particularly at
the vocational stage
of training.
In all these respects, Government policy
noted above — to get “industry” investing more in higher
education —
is proving increasingly successful, and as a trend is likely
to continue.
CONCLUSIONS
The thesis of this paper is that academic lawyers in
England are moving closer towards having the kind of influence in the
development
of law in England that the Select Committee of 1846 argued was
desirable. The downbeat conclusions expressed by Abel-Smith and Stevens
are no
longer valid. The view of Atiyah and Wilson seem based on too limited an
analysis of what the academic legal community is
actually doing.
In making
this argument it is important not to overstate the case. First, the day-today
administration of the law is clearly in the
hands of the practitioner. Legal
academics have some role to play through advisory work or consultancy or
part-time judicial work,
but it is a limited involvement. Indeed in some areas
of practice, especially rapidly developing parts of commercial law or tax law,
academics appear to play almost no part at all. Secondly, many areas of the law
are developed through the creativity and imagination
of solicitors and
barristers in practice. The judiciary, too, are able to make significant
developments.35 Nonetheless, given the changing nature
of the law — much greater emphasis on statute, less on the role of the
common law —
means that more often than not developments occur in
Parliament and Government, rather than the courts, where legal academics can
have a more significant voice. Thirdly, the work of many legal academics is, in
any event, not directed towards the concerns of legal
practice, however broadly
defined. Indeed, the academic freedom of scholars to undertake work which they
have defined for themselves
rather than have had defined for them is a precious
one that must be strongly defended. It is they who will help to remind us that
our law and legal system is not simply about the operation of markets, but does
embody fundamental societal values. While the case
for the academics must not be
overstated, equally it must not be understated. Historically the relationship
between the legal academic
and the legal practitioner in England has been too
unequal. The evidence presented here indicates that the current position is that
legal academics have a more important role to play in the development of law in
England than is often appreciated. The legal academic
community as a whole,
should recognise this and in an appropriate manner, should assert that it has a
contribution to make to the
development of law in England that while different
from that of the practitioner, is nonetheless of significance.
It must also
be recognised that the interests of the practising branches and the academic
branch will by no means always coincide.
For example, while institutions of
higher education are being encouraged to give access to ever more students, the
professions may
not be able to absorb all those graduates who might wish to
practise law. Law schools may need to think very carefully about possible
alternative careers for their students outside of the legal profession.
There will be some academics who will argue that the scholar should have no
involvement with the world of practice. I think there
are at least two strong
reasons for rejecting this view. First, there is no contradiction between the
highest standards of legal
scholarship and practical utility. Being interested
in practical issues does not compromise academic integrity. To the contrary:
in
many areas of law — especially those dominated by statute and regulation
— an adequate understanding of the law can
only be achieved by an
understanding of how the law operates in practice. Secondly, other disciplines
in the academic community have
benefitted from developing links between scholars
and practitioners: the medical disciplines, the engineering disciplines,
education
are all examples of disciplines enhanced by a strong relationship
between the world of the academy and the world of practice.
It is the
responsibility of academic communities, in general, to give leadership to the
development of their discipline. In England,
the legal academy for too long
— and with notable and honourable exceptions — failed to demonstrate
to the full its ability
to give leadership to the development of the discipline
of the law. The position has changed and is changing rapidly. We need to
acknowledge this and indeed, refine our theories of legal education and
scholarship to take account of this.
The main challenge now facing legal
academics in England in the 1990s is to encourage them to consolidate the
changes of attitude
and practice that have occurred in the last 10–20
years, and in partnership with the practising branches of the legal profession,
to explore ways of enhancing the contribution they make to the development of
the law, legal services and the legal system. Such
a partnership, in which the
legal academic retains a clear identity but on a basis of equality, is necessary
to encourage bright
young scholars to come into the academic branch. We need to
think of the nature of the career we can offer, as much as the practising
branch. Indeed both branches of the legal profession should think more seriously
about devising mechanisms to enable much easier
transfers from the academic to
the practical world, and vice versa, than has been the case so far. By
combining our strengths, it may be possible to exercise the kind of influence
necessary to secure an adequate funding base,
and thereby begin to resolve some
of the very real difficulties sketched out in the earlier parts of this paper.
* Faculty of Law, University of Bristol. This paper is the revised text of a
Paper presented to the Australasian Law Teachers Association
46th Annual
Meeting, Perth, Western Australia on 12 July 1991. I am grateful to participants
at the Conference for their comments;
also to Professor Avrom Sherr, Liverpool
University, and to Phi1 Jones, Polytechnic of, Central London for helpful
suggestions and
the correction of a number of errors.
© 1992. [1992] LegEdRev 4; (1992) 3
Legal Educ Rev 75.
1 I am aware that it is perfectly plausible to argue that law teaching is but one aspect of the practice of the law; for the purpose of the argument in this paper, however, I think it helpful to retain the distinction.
2 Scotland and Northern Ireland are quite different.
3 Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education, (Cmnd 2154, 1963).
4 See for example M Kogan, The Attack on Higher Education (London: Kogan Page, 1983).
5 There was a considerable programme of “voluntary” redundancies and early retirements which were, in fad, quite generously funded by the Government.
6 See Higher Education: A New Framework (Cm 1541, London, 1991) esp Annex 2.
7 Right from 1981 the Universities and Polytechnics became effectively obliged to do this in the context of the fees charged to students from overseas.
8 The Polytechnic sector was always more willing to respond to these pressures; indeed, in order to be attractive to potential students, it often took the lead in developing courses to enable vocational goals to be achieved.
9 Report on the Standing Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities (Chair: Sir Alex Jarratt) (London: Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, 1985).
10 In this section, I shall focus primarily on the University Law Schools.
11 Most law schools now offer subjects (eg Intellectual Property Law, Banking Law, Environmental Law, Consumer Protection Law, Women and the Law) that were not available 10–15 years ago.
12 These developments were encouraged by the foundation of new Law Schools in the 1960s such as those at Warwick and Kent Universities.
13 For example, the programmes offered by Brunel University or Nottingham Polytechnic.
14 The best review is in the (unpublished) Ph.D thesis by Julie MacFarlane, currently working at the City Polytechnic of Hong Kong.
15 See W Twining, “Goodbye to Lewis Eliot. The Academic Lawyer as Scholar” (1980) 15 J Soc Public Teachers of Law pp 2–19.
16 These developments have been encouraged by BILETA — the British and Irish Legal Education Technology Association — based at Warwick University.
17 See RL Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
18 See M Partington, Academic Lawyers and ‘Legal Practice’ in Britain (1988) 15 J of Law & Soc 374.
19 The Legal Education and Training Group now has over 100 members, a significant number of whom have been appointed from University or Polytechnic Law Schools.
20 Changes in the way in which Universities are funded will also lead to financial pressures to expand that are not necessarily desirable on academic grounds. There has been a marked shift in funding from the Funding Councils to the fees brought to the University (and Polytechic) by students: see Cm 1541 supra note 6 Annex 1.
21 See Cm 1541 supra note 6 at Ch 5.
22 Quoted by B Abel-Smith & R Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts (London: Heineman 1967) at 68–69.
23 Id.
24 PS Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (London: Stevens, 1987) at 35.
25 GP Wilson, “English Legal Scholarship” (1987) 50 Mod L Rev 818 at 842.
26 Partington supra note 18.
27 Report of the Committee on Legal Education Cmnd 4594, (London: HMSO, 1971).
28 Land Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Trusts, Criminal Law, Contract Law and Tort Law.
29 See for example Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, Sched 2 paras 2 & 3.
30 See Judicial Studies Board, Report for 1983–7 (London: HMSO, 1988).
31 It is arguable that a consequence of this practice is that present rules relating to entrance to the Bar are anti-competitive, contrary to the philosophy enshrined in the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990.
32 The new Legal Practice Course will be supplemented by a Professional Skills Course — taken by trainee solicitors during the period of their traineeship — which will remain under the control of the Law Society.
33 See Partington, supra note 18.
34 Particularly the Law Commission, where those “learned in the lay” receive statutory recognition: Law Commission Act 1965.
35 There has been no attempt to assess the extent to which practitioners and the judiciary have, in fact, been influenced by their academic mentors, though see R Goff, The Search for Principle (1983) 69 Proceedings of the British Academy 169.
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