

A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE: THE BUDAPEST CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME AND THE CHALLENGES OF HARMONISATION

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Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) are now central to the way we interact, both socially and commercially. Inevitably, some people will use ICTs in the commission or facilitation of crime; so-called 'cybercrimes'. The interconnected nature of modern technology makes this a global problem, and for decades there has been international awareness of the need for coordinated action. The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime ('Convention') was the first multilateral binding instrument to regulate cybercrime. Having recently passed the 10th anniversary of its coming into force, it is timely to reflect on the Convention's role in the harmonisation of cybercrime laws and its place amongst other international efforts to combat cybercrime. This article begins with a discussion of the importance of harmonisation in combatting cybercrime. There is then a general overview of the Convention, followed by an analysis of three key aspects of harmonisation — the extent to which it is: (1) comprehensive; (2) protective of rights; and (3) representative. Consideration is then given to the desirability and likelihood of an international convention on cybercrime. Although the Convention remains the most significant instrument in this area, it is now accompanied by a range of international, regional and national initiatives. In an environment where an international agreement may be some way off, the Convention provides an important touchstone against which national efforts may be measured. More broadly, the international focus is appropriately moving toward the more pressing issue of capacity building.

I CYBERCRIME: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE

Although by now a familiar story, the pace of technological change continues to amaze. Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) are now central to the way we interact, both socially and commercially, with in excess of one trillion web sites¹ providing ready access to an incredibly diverse range of information and services. The social networking site Facebook alone has over 1.3 billion monthly active users,² and over 100 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube every minute.³ The estimated value of United States retail e-commerce

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1 Australian Law Reform Commission, *Classification — Content Regulation and Convergent Media*, Report No 118 (2012) 25.

2 Facebook, 'Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2014 Results' (Financial Press Release, 23 July 2014) 1.

3 YouTube, *Statistics* <<http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html>>.

sales for the second quarter of 2014 was US\$75 billion.⁴ Increasingly, we see the so-called ‘internet of things’,⁵ with the number of networked devices already exceeding the global population.⁶

Approximately 2.9 billion people, almost 40 per cent of the world’s population,⁷ are connected to the Internet.⁸ While access is highest in developed countries (78 per cent of the population compared to 32 per cent in the developing world),⁹ the actual number of Internet users in developing countries far outnumbers that in developed countries.¹⁰ The convergence of computing and communication technologies has further accelerated this process, with mobile telephony now accessible to 96 per cent of the world’s population.¹¹

Inevitably, some will use ICTs in the commission or facilitation of crime; so-called ‘cybercrimes’.¹² These include crimes in which ICTs are the target of the criminal activity, existing offences where ICTs are a tool used to commit the crime, and crimes in which the use of ICTs is incidental but may afford evidence of the crime.¹³ The interconnected nature of the technology makes this a global problem, and for decades there has been international awareness of the need for coordinated action.¹⁴

The product of over 16 years of preparatory work,¹⁵ the Council of Europe’s *Convention on Cybercrime*¹⁶ was the first multilateral binding instrument to

4 Ian Thomas, William Davie and Deanna Weidenhamer, United States Department of Commerce, *Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 2nd Quarter 2014* (15 August 2014) United States Census Bureau <<http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecom/14q2.pdf>>.

5 See International Telecommunication Union, ‘ITU Internet Reports 2005: The Internet of Things’ (Report, International Telecommunication Union, November 2005).

6 Broadband Commission for Digital Development, ‘The State of Broadband 2012: Achieving Digital Inclusion For All’ (Report, International Telecommunication Union, September 2012) 6.

7 United States Census Bureau, *US and World Population Clock* (19 April 2015) <<http://www.census.gov/popclock/>>.

8 International Telecommunication Union, *Statistics* <<http://www.itu.int/en/itu-d/statistics/pages/stat/default.aspx>>.

9 International Telecommunication Union, ‘ICT Facts and Figures: The World in 2014’ (2014) 5.

10 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime’ (Report, February 2013) 1 (‘*Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*’).

11 International Telecommunication Union, ‘ICT Facts and Figures’, above n 9, 3.

12 A number of terms are used synonymously and often interchangeably including ‘computer crime’, ‘high-tech crime’, ‘digital crime’, ‘electronic crime’ and ‘technology-enabled’ crime.

13 Gregor Urbas and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, ‘Resource Materials on Technology-Enabled Crime’ (Technical and Background Paper No 28, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2008) 5.

14 Stein Schjolberg, ‘The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime Legislation — The Road to Geneva’ (Cybercrime Law, December 2008). See also Miriam F Miquelon-Weismann, ‘The *Convention on Cybercrime*: A Harmonized Implementation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process?’ (2005) 23 *John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law* 329, 332–4.

15 Transborder Group, ‘Transborder Access and Jurisdiction: What Are the Options?’ (Discussion Paper No T-CY (2012)3, Cybercrime Convention Committee, Council of Europe, 6 December 2012) 7 (‘*Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*’). This followed Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, *Recommendation No R (89) 9 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Computer-Related Crime* (adopted 13 September 1989); Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, *Recommendation No R (95) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedural Law Connected with Information Technology* (adopted 11 September 1995). The Council’s initiatives in the area of computer crime go back even further to 1976: Schjolberg, above n 14, 2.

16 *Convention on Cybercrime*, opened for signature 23 November 2001, ETS No 185 (entered into force 1 July 2004) (‘*Convention*’).

regulate cybercrime. The *Convention* opened for signature on 23 November 2001 and entered into force on 1 July 2004. Having recently passed the 10th anniversary of its coming into force, it is timely to reflect on the *Convention*'s role in the harmonisation of cybercrime laws and its place amongst other international efforts to combat cybercrime.

This article begins with a discussion of the importance of harmonisation in combatting cybercrime. There is then a general overview of the *Convention*, followed by an analysis of three key aspects of harmonisation — the extent to which it is: (1) comprehensive; (2) protective of rights; and (3) representative. Consideration is then given to the desirability and likelihood of an international convention on cybercrime. Although the *Convention* remains the most significant instrument in this area, it is now accompanied by a range of international, regional and national initiatives. While these initiatives provide an important diversity of views — allowing the tailoring of responses according to national perspectives — the greatest danger is fragmentation of effort. In an environment where an international agreement may be some way off, the *Convention* provides an important touchstone against which national efforts may be measured. More broadly, the international focus is appropriately moving toward the more pressing issue of capacity building.¹⁷

II THE IMPORTANCE AND CHALLENGES OF HARMONISATION

It is generally accepted that some degree of harmonisation between countries is vital if effective regulation of cybercrimes is to be achieved.¹⁸ Although many offences are transnational in nature — for instance trafficking in humans, weapons and drugs, money laundering and terrorism¹⁹ — cybercrime presents unique challenges due to the inherently transnational nature of the underlying technology. No other type of crime can become transnational so effortlessly. The Bredolab botnet, for example, was estimated to have infected 30 million computers at its peak, generating 3 billion infected emails per day.²⁰ At a more fundamental level, the nature of modern communications is such that even where offender and victim are in the same jurisdiction, evidence of the offending is almost certain to have passed through, or to be stored in, other jurisdictions. In a recent United Nations study, over half of responding countries reported that ‘between 50 and 100 per cent of cybercrime acts encountered by police involved a “transnational element”’.²¹

17 See Part V below.

18 *Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information Technologies*, GA Res 55/63, UN GAOR, 55th sess, 81st plen mtg, Agenda Item 105, UN Doc A/RES/55/63 (22 January 2001, adopted 4 December 2000) (*‘Combating Criminal Misuse No 1’*); *Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information Technologies*, GA Res 56/121, UN GAOR, 56th sess 88th, plen mtg, Agenda Item 110, UN Doc A/RES/56/121 (23 January 2002, adopted 19 December 2001) (*‘Combating Criminal Misuse No 2’*).

19 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above 10, 56.

20 Sophos, ‘Security Threat Report 2013’ (Report, 2013) 27.

21 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 55.

In broad terms, harmonisation is essential for two reasons. The first is to eliminate or at least reduce the incidence of ‘safe havens’. If conduct is not criminalised in a specific country, persons in that country may act with impunity in committing offences that may affect other jurisdictions. Not only is there no ability to prosecute in the home jurisdiction, efforts at evidence gathering and extradition are likely to be thwarted in the absence of dual criminality. This raises the second and more far-reaching rationale; that harmonisation is crucial for effective cooperation between law enforcement agencies.

Although desirable, harmonisation presents considerable challenges when seeking to address issues as complex and diverse as substantive and procedural law, mutual assistance and extradition. Each country brings its particular perspective, influenced by its legal tradition(s) as well as cultural and historical factors.²² Even at the national level, there can be issues of harmonisation between state or provincial and federal governments. In the international sphere, harmonisation may be with other countries, regionally or internationally.²³ Although any international response to cybercrime must therefore seek to accommodate and reconcile these differences, it must be emphasised that ‘harmonised’ does not mean ‘identical’. What is required is complementarity — enabling enforcement mechanisms to work effectively while respecting national and regional differences.

As the most ambitious attempt to achieve harmonisation in the field of cybercrime, the *Convention* provides the ideal vehicle for analysis of some of the specific challenges of achieving harmonisation in this area. These challenges will be analysed under three criteria. First, the extent to which it comprehensively addresses the challenges of cybercrime. Second, the extent to which it protects fundamental rights. Third, the extent to which it is representative of different legal systems. While the focus of this article is on the *Convention*, these issues are equally applicable to any attempt to achieve international agreement in relation to cybercrime.

A Comprehensive

To date, the focus of cybercrime laws around the world has largely been on criminalisation — creating new offences or adapting existing offences to address the challenges of cybercrime.²⁴ However, this is merely one aspect and from its inception the *Convention* sought to provide a comprehensive response, addressing issues of substantive offences, procedural laws and international cooperation.²⁵

22 The three major legal traditions are civil law, common law and Islamic law: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition’ (United Nations, September 2012) 9 (*Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*). Some jurisdictions may be described as ‘mixed law’, for example, Chinese law which draws upon a range of legal systems: *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 57 n 21.

23 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 59–60.

24 *Ibid* 53.

25 For a more detailed discussion of the provisions of the *Convention* see Explanatory Report, *Convention on Cybercrime*, opened for signature 23 November 2001, ETS No 185 (entered into force 1 June 2004) (*Convention Explanatory Report*).

Aside from provisions concerned with ancillary and corporate liability and sanctions,²⁶ the *Convention* provides for four broad categories of substantive offence: (1) offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems;²⁷ (2) computer-related offences (computer-related fraud and forgery);²⁸ (3) content-related offences (child pornography);²⁹ and (4) criminal copyright infringement.³⁰ While in some respects the *Convention* has proved to be remarkably resilient — capable of adapting to new forms of technology such as botnets³¹ — clearly these offences do not encompass the full spectrum of cybercrimes.³² Notable omissions include identity theft,³³ sexual ‘grooming’ of children,³⁴ unsolicited emails or ‘spam’³⁵ and so-called ‘cyberterrorism’.³⁶

Although there is certainly room for improvement,³⁷ it must be remembered that differences relating to the content of the criminal law often depend on socio-

26 *Convention* ch II s 1 title 5.

27 *Ibid* ch II s 1 title 1.

28 *Ibid* ch II s 1 title 2.

29 *Ibid* ch II s 1 title 3.

30 *Ibid* ch II s 1 title 4.

31 Cybercrime Convention Committee, ‘T-CY Guidance Note 2: Provisions of the *Budapest Convention* Covering Botnets’ (Guidance Note No T-CY (2013) 6E Rev, Council of Europe, 5 June 2013).

32 See Susan W Brenner, ‘The Council of Europe’s *Convention on Cybercrime*’ in Jack M Balkin et al (eds), *Cybercrime: Digital Cops in a Networked Environment* (New York University Press, 2007) 207, 210–12. See also Stein Schjolberg and Solange Ghernaoui-Helie, *A Global Treaty on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime* (2nd ed, 2011) <http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/A_Global_Treaty_on_Cybersecurity_and_Cybercrime_Second_edition_2011.pdf>.

33 See, eg, Brigitte Acoca, ‘Scoping Paper on Online Identity Theft’ (Ministerial Background Report No DSTI/CP(2007)3/FINAL, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008) 16–24; Model Criminal Law Officers’ Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorney’s-General, ‘Identity Crime’ (Final Report, March 2008); Marco Gercke, ‘Internet-Related Identity Theft’ (Discussion Paper, Project on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, 22 November 2007) 31.

34 Alisdair A Gillespie, ‘Child Protection on the Internet — Challenges for Criminal Law’ (2002) 14 *Child and Family Law Quarterly* 411, 411–12. See also *Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*, opened for signature 25 October 2007, CETS No 201 (entered into force 1 July 2010) art 23 (‘*Convention on the Protection of Children*’); European Commission, *Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating the Sexual Abuse, Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography, Repealing Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA*, Doc No COM(2010)94 final (29 March 2010).

35 Task Force on Spam, ‘Stopping Spam: Creating a Stronger, Safer Internet’ (Report, Industry Canada, May 2005); Task Force on Spam, ‘Report of the OECD Task Force on Spam: Anti-Spam Toolkit of Recommended Policies and Measures’ (Report No DSTI/CP/ICCP/SPAM(2005)3/FINAL, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 19 April 2006); Federal Trade Commission, ‘Spam Summit: The Next Generation of Threats and Solutions’ (Staff Report, Division of Marketing Practices, November 2007).

36 Clive Walker, ‘Cyber-Terrorism: Legal Principle and Law in the United Kingdom’ (2006) 110 *Penn State Law Review* 625, 635–42; Gabriel Weimann, ‘Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?’ (2005) 28 *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 129, 130–1. See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes’ (Report, September 2012).

37 Richard W Downing, ‘Shoring Up the Weakest Link: What Lawmakers Around the World Need to Consider in Developing Comprehensive Laws to Combat Cybercrime’ (2005) 43 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 705; Alana Maurushat, ‘Australia’s Accession to the *Cybercrime Convention*: Is the *Convention* Still Relevant in Combating Cybercrime in the Era of Botnets and Obfuscation Crime Tools?’ (2010) 33 *University of New South Wales Law Journal* 431, 432; Marco Gercke, ‘10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*’ [2011] *Computer Law Review International* 142, 147–9; Jonathan Clough, ‘The Council of Europe *Convention on Cybercrime*: Defining “Crime” in a Digital World’ (2012) 23 *Criminal Law Forum* 363.

cultural factors; for example, differing attitudes to freedom of expression.³⁸ Differences may also arise due to varying levels of technical capacity. Spam, for example, is an issue that many developing countries would like to see criminalised, but is addressed by most developed countries as a civil or administrative matter.³⁹ There is therefore a distinction between offences that were not anticipated, and those on which international agreement could not be reached. While it is possible to incorporate the former within an amended or new convention, the latter will necessarily limit the scope of any convention.⁴⁰

The *Convention* itself makes provision for the parties to consult periodically to facilitate its 'effective use and implementation', the exchange of information and 'consideration of possible supplementation or amendment of the *Convention*'.⁴¹ Any party may propose an amendment to the *Convention*, although whether it is adopted is ultimately a decision of the Committee of Ministers, taking into account the opinion of the European Committee on Crime Problems and consultation with non-member state parties.⁴² This mechanism has already been utilised in relation to the *Additional Protocol on Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature*,⁴³ and is currently being used as the basis for discussion of an additional protocol in relation to transborder access to data.⁴⁴

Further, the *Convention* does not preclude other national, regional or international bodies addressing these substantive offences to the extent they are not inconsistent with the *Convention*.⁴⁵ For example, the European Parliament and Council are given power to set minimum rules in relation to definitions and sanctions with respect to 'computer crime'.⁴⁶ It is therefore one mechanism whereby member states may update their cybercrime legislation, even if the *Convention* remains static.⁴⁷

While globally some attention has been given to substantive offences, less focus has been given to the equally, if not more important areas of investigation, criminal

38 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 58.

39 ICB4PAC, 'Electronic Crimes: Knowledge-Based Report' (Report, International Telecommunication Union, 2013) 6.

40 Clough, above n 37, 379.

41 *Convention* art 46(1).

42 *Ibid* art 44(3).

43 *Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems*, opened for signature 28 January 2003, ETS No 189 (entered into force 1 March 2006).

44 Transborder Group, '(Draft) Elements of an Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime Regarding Transborder Access to Data' (Draft Proposal, Cybercrime Convention Committee, Council of Europe, 9 April 2013). This issue is discussed in more detail below in Part II(B)(4).

45 See, eg, *Convention on the Protection of Children* art 23; European Commission, *Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Attacks against Information Systems and Repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA*, Doc No COM(2010) 517 final (30 September 2010) ('*Proposal on Attacks against Information Systems*').

46 *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [2009] OJ C 115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993) art 83(1) ('*FEU*').

47 Gercke, '10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*', above n 37, 144.

procedure, evidence and international cooperation.⁴⁸ One of the most striking and challenging features of the *Convention* is the comprehensive approach it adopts in relation to these broader issues.

1 Investigation

The challenges of digital investigations are addressed in the *Convention* ch II s 2. Because of the inherent volatility of digital evidence, this includes powers for the expedited preservation of stored computer data,⁴⁹ and the expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data.⁵⁰ These powers allow for relevant data to be preserved, allowing authorities time to seek its disclosure. Partial disclosure of traffic data is also allowed in order to identify the path through which the communication was transmitted. Provision is also made for production,⁵¹ or search and seizure of data,⁵² as well as real time collection of traffic data and/or interception of content data.⁵³

These procedures must be applied to those offences provided for under arts 2–11. Further, to help ensure equivalence between the collection of non-digital and digital evidence,⁵⁴ and subject to limited exceptions, they must also be applied to other offences committed by means of a computer system, or where evidence is collected in electronic form.⁵⁵ This reflects the fact that the importance of electronic evidence extends beyond ‘cybercrimes’ to potentially any form of offending to which electronic evidence may be relevant.

2 International Cooperation

At the domestic level, both substantive offences and investigative powers may be enacted without recourse to international agreement. It is when those offences and procedures are to be applied outside of the jurisdiction that international agreement becomes of crucial significance. The ability to carry out investigations affecting the territory of other states, so-called ‘investigative jurisdiction’,⁵⁶ is addressed in ch III of the *Convention*. The *Convention* does not expressly provide

48 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 53.

49 *Convention* art 16.

50 Ibid art 17. ‘Traffic data’ is defined in art 1 as ‘any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service’.

51 Ibid art 18.

52 Ibid art 19.

53 Ibid ch 2 s 2 title 5.

54 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [141].

55 *Convention* art 14(2).

56 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 55.

for the principle of reciprocity,⁵⁷ but does state that parties are to cooperate with each other ‘to the widest extent possible’ in the investigation of cybercrimes and the collection of electronic evidence.⁵⁸ This includes the sharing of information without request where it would assist another party in its investigation or which it believes might assist the receiving party in the investigation of any offence that could lead to a mutual assistance request under the *Convention*.⁵⁹

Of course, not all investigations can be conducted on an informal or voluntary basis, and so provision is made in the *Convention* for mutual assistance. These provisions mirror the procedural powers discussed above, including expedited preservation of stored computer data and expedited disclosure of traffic data.⁶⁰ In the case of real time collection of traffic data and interception of content data, parties shall give such assistance as permitted under their domestic laws and applicable treaties (subject to reservations to the *Convention*’s provisions).⁶¹

Consistently with the general principle in art 23, parties are also to afford mutual assistance ‘to the widest extent possible’ in respect of ‘offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence’.⁶² As with voluntary cooperation, this latter point recognises that effective international cooperation is important not just for ‘cybercrimes’ in the narrow sense, but for all offences involving digital evidence.⁶³

Parties may, however, restrict their level of cooperation more narrowly in cases of extradition, mutual assistance regarding the real time collection of traffic data and mutual assistance regarding the interception of content data.⁶⁴ More broadly, this general principle of cooperation is to be carried out ‘through the application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws’.⁶⁵ This reinforces the general principle that cooperation under ch III does not supersede these other instruments and arrangements.⁶⁶

In order to facilitate cooperation, both formal and informal, the *Convention* also provides for a 24/7 network to be created, whereby each party designates a contact point, to be available at all times, to provide immediate assistance for the purpose of cybercrime investigations or proceedings or the collection of

57 In contrast, the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, opened for signature 12 December 2000, 2225 UNTS 209 (entered into force 29 September 2003) art 18(1) (‘*UNTOC*’) states that parties ‘shall reciprocally extend to one another similar assistance’ where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the offence is transnational in nature.

58 *Convention* art 23.

59 *Ibid* art 26.

60 *Ibid* arts 29–30.

61 *Ibid* arts 33–4.

62 *Ibid* art 25(1).

63 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [243], [253].

64 See Part II(B) below.

65 *Convention* art 23.

66 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [244].

electronic evidence.⁶⁷ This provision is based on the experience of the G8 network of contact points, which currently consists of 50 members.⁶⁸

If implemented, one of the most significant changes to result from the *Convention* would be the expedited processing of urgent mutual assistance requests. Current mutual assistance mechanisms are notoriously slow, and may take months as they pass through bureaucratic channels using traditional means.⁶⁹ The *Convention* makes provision for parties, in ‘urgent circumstances’, to make mutual assistance requests and communications using ‘expedited means of communication, including fax or e-mail’.⁷⁰ Such means need only be utilised to the extent that they provide appropriate levels of security and authentication.⁷¹ The requested party must accept and respond to the request using expedited means of communication, with formal confirmation only necessary if at the request of the requested party.⁷²

3 Jurisdiction

In terms of substantive jurisdiction, that is, the ability of states to assert jurisdiction over criminal offences,⁷³ the *Convention* requires parties to establish jurisdiction over the offences established under arts 2–11 when they are committed within its territory, on board a ship or aircraft flagged or registered under the laws of that party, or by one of its nationals if the offence is punishable under the criminal law where it was committed, or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state.⁷⁴

While the goal is to provide as expansive an application as possible, parties may reserve the right not to apply, or to limit the application of, any of the jurisdictional bases other than territoriality.⁷⁵ The *Convention* does not, however, exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a country under its domestic law.⁷⁶ Where more than one party claims jurisdiction, they are to ‘consult with a view to determining

67 *Convention* art 35.

68 Council of Europe, *Action against Economic Crime: About 24/7 Points of Contact* <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/points%20of%20contact/aboutpoc_EN.asp>. See also the Interpol I-24/7 Secure Global Police Network: Interpol, *Data Exchange* <<http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Data-exchange/I-24-7>>.

69 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [256].

70 *Convention* art 25(3). These are of course illustrative examples, which will develop as technology develops: *ibid* [256]. For example, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) could be used as a form of communication for these purposes.

71 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [256].

72 *Ibid*.

73 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 55.

74 *Convention* art 22(1).

75 *Ibid* art 22(2). In total, six countries have exercised this right, albeit to varying degrees — Australia, Belgium, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States: see Council of Europe, *List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No 185* <<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1>>.

76 *Convention* art 22(4).

the most appropriate jurisdiction'.⁷⁷ The *Convention* may, however, be criticised for not providing any criteria for the settlement of such disputes.⁷⁸

4 Extradition

The fact that a country asserts jurisdiction over an offence does not automatically translate into the ability to enforce that jurisdiction. As a general principle, at least in common law countries, serious criminal offences will not be tried in absentia.⁷⁹ Nor will countries enforce the public law judgments of another state.⁸⁰ Therefore the practical ability to prosecute falls to the country that has the defendant in custody. Yet that country may have no interest in prosecuting, or may have one of a number of competing claims to prosecution.

Extradition involves the formal surrender of a person by one state for the purposes of prosecution or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in another,⁸¹ and is commonly supported by bilateral treaties.⁸² A common requirement of extradition is 'dual criminality'; that is, in order to be extraditable the offence must be an offence under the laws of both jurisdictions, usually subject to a minimum level of penalty.⁸³ This causes particular challenges in the context of cybercrime where one jurisdiction may not recognise the relevant conduct as an offence at all.⁸⁴ Difficulties may also arise where the relevant extradition treaty adopts an enumerative rather than a prescriptive formulation.⁸⁵ The listed offences might not incorporate newer forms of offence, and it is now more common for extradition treaties to define extraditable offences by reference to minimum penalty level, regardless of whether they are classified in the same way.⁸⁶

The *Convention* may play an important role in addressing these issues without the need for renegotiation of individual treaties. Under art 24 each of the offences established under arts 2–11 are deemed to be extraditable offences in any extradition treaty between or among the parties. Parties also 'undertake to

77 Ibid art 22(5).

78 Henrik W K Kaspersen, 'Cybercrime and Internet Jurisdiction' (Discussion Paper (draft), Council of Europe, Project on Cybercrime, 5 March 2009) 20–2 [59]–[67].

79 See generally *R v Jones* [2003] 1 AC 1. The fact that a person has been convicted in absentia is a ground for refusal of extradition under the United Nations' *Model Treaty on Extradition*, GA Res 45/116, UN GAOR, 45th sess, 68th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/45/116 (14 December 1990) art 3(g); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 'Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters' (December 2002) 14 ('*UNODC Revised Manuals*').

80 Uta Kohl, *Jurisdiction and the Internet: Regulatory Competence Over Online Activity* (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 104–6.

81 *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 19.

82 See generally Alun Jones and Anand Doobay, *Jones on Extradition and Mutual Assistance* (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 2014).

83 See, eg, *European Convention on Extradition*, opened for signature 13 December 1957, ETS No 24 (entered into force 18 April 1960) art 2(1) ('*European Convention on Extradition*').

84 Marc D Goodman and Susan W Brenner, 'The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace' (2002) 6 *UCLA Journal of Law and Technology*, 5–7.

85 John T Soma, Thomas F Muther, Jr and Heidi M L Brissette, 'Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are New Treaties and Laws Needed?' (1997) 34 *Harvard Journal on Legislation* 317, 324–6.

86 *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 46.

include such offences ... [under] any extradition treaty ... concluded between or among them'.⁸⁷ Where parties require a treaty as a precondition of extradition but none is in existence, the *Convention* may provide the necessary legal basis for extradition.⁸⁸ Those parties which do not require a treaty for the purposes of extradition are to recognise these offences as extraditable offences.⁸⁹

The purpose of this summary has been to illustrate the potentially broad range of powers and obligations under the *Convention*. Although undoubtedly making it the most comprehensive instrument in this area,⁹⁰ they also give rise to some of the most strident criticisms of the *Convention* and impediments to its wider adoption. This article will now turn to consider some of the most significant objections to the *Convention*, particularly regarding its approach to protection of individual and state rights.

B Protective

The goal of harmonisation, particularly across such a broad spectrum of laws, will inevitably come into conflict with differences in national principles, whether legal or cultural.⁹¹ This is most apparent in the protection of individual rights, where the tension between the need to improve law enforcement capabilities whilst protecting individual freedoms and privacy has been recognised for some time.⁹² Recent revelations concerning 'almost-Orwellian' government programs for the bulk collection of metadata have dramatically underscored the need to ensure due process and effective rights protection in the digital environment.⁹³ This has recently prompted the United Nations to state that it is '[d]eeply concerned at the negative impact that surveillance and/or interception of communications ... as well as the collection of personal data, in particular when carried out on a mass scale, may have on the exercise and enjoyment of human rights'.⁹⁴

Given that it applies to many different legal systems and cultures, the approach adopted by the *Convention* is the pragmatic one of requiring parties to draw upon their own standards under international and domestic law in enacting the necessary protections and safeguards.⁹⁵ First, each party is to 'ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the powers and procedures provided for in this Section are subject to conditions and safeguards provided for

87 *Convention* art 24(2).

88 *Ibid* art 24(3).

89 *Ibid* art 24(4).

90 *Proposal on Attacks against Information Systems*, above n 45, 3.

91 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 58.

92 *Combating Criminal Misuse No 1*, UN Doc A/RES/55/63; *Combating Criminal Misuse No 2*, UN Doc A/RES/56/121.

93 *Klayman v Obama*, 957 F Supp 2d 1, 33 (D DC, 2013).

94 *The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age*, GA Res 68/167, UN GAOR, 68th sess, Agenda Item 69(b), UN Doc A/RES/68/167 (21 January 2014, adopted 18 December 2013). See also *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression*, Frank La Rue, UN HRC, 23rd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/23/40 (17 April 2013).

95 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [145].

under its domestic law, which shall provide for the adequate protection of human rights and liberties'.⁹⁶ These include rights arising under the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*⁹⁷ and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*,⁹⁸ as well as 'other applicable international human rights instruments'.⁹⁹ The *ICCPR* for example, states that '[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation' and that '[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks'.¹⁰⁰ Parties must also incorporate the principle of proportionality.¹⁰¹

Second, those conditions and safeguards shall include, 'as appropriate in view of the nature of the procedure or power concerned ... judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure'.¹⁰² Finally, '[t]o the extent that it is consistent with the public interest, in particular the sound administration of justice, each Party shall consider the impact of the powers and procedures in this section upon the rights, responsibilities and legitimate interests of third parties'.¹⁰³

Such an approach has been described as 'flexible harmonization';¹⁰⁴ that is, 'a model of uniform rule making confined to establishing parameters for acceptable substantive rules, leaving the formulation of procedural due process rules to the cultural peculiarities of each nation'.¹⁰⁵ It is presumed that parties to the *Convention* 'form a community of trust and that certain rule of law and human rights principles are respected'.¹⁰⁶ While this may facilitate achieving law enforcement goals, it is arguably at the expense of due process and the protection of individual rights,¹⁰⁷ with drafting of these provisions dominated by law enforcement.¹⁰⁸ Beyond aspirational statements it provides for no specific minimum standards of due process,¹⁰⁹ arguably placing too much responsibility on domestic law to provide appropriate protection.¹¹⁰ In the United States, for example, Fourth

96 *Convention* art 15(1).

97 *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) ('*ECHR*').

98 *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) ('*ICCPR*').

99 *Convention* art 15(1).

100 *ICCPR* art 17.

101 *Convention* art 15(1).

102 *Ibid* art 15(2).

103 *Ibid* art 15(3).

104 Miquelon-Weismann, above n 14, 354 quoting Ulrich Sieber, 'Memorandum für ein Europäisches Modellstrafgesetzbuch' [Memorandum on a European Penal Code], (1997) 52 *JuristenZeitung* 369, 379.

105 Miquelon-Weismann, above n 14, 354.

106 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 21.

107 Miquelon-Weismann, above n 14, 354.

108 Brenner, above n 32, 216.

109 Miquelon-Weismann, above n 14, 341.

110 Laura Huey and Richard S Rosenberg, 'Watching the Web: Thoughts on Expanding Police Surveillance Opportunities under the *Cyber-Crime Convention*' (2004) 46 *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice* 597, 599.

Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure may not apply to extraterritorial investigations, nor to the investigation of cybercrimes committed by aliens.¹¹¹

However, such an approach is not unique to the *Convention*. The ‘decentralized nature of international law, relegating enforcement to domestic legislation, results from the decentralized structure of international society and the inability to enforce violations of binding legal rules’.¹¹² Article 58 of the *Geneva Declaration of Principles*, for example, provides that the ‘use of ICTs and content creation should respect human rights and fundamental freedoms of others, including personal privacy, and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion in conformity with relevant international instruments’.¹¹³ This approach allows countries to pursue common goals while respecting legitimate national differences, using international human rights law as an ‘important external reference point’.¹¹⁴ It is for ‘[n]ational legislatures ... to determine, in applying binding international obligations and established domestic principles, which of the powers and procedures are sufficiently intrusive in nature to require implementation of particular conditions and safeguards’.¹¹⁵

For example, art 19(4) of the *Convention* requires each party ‘to empower its competent authorities to order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of a computer system or measure applied to protect the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking’ of the search and seizure under art 19. Such provisions may require a person to disclose passwords and may contravene the privilege against self-incrimination.¹¹⁶ However, this provision is subject to art 15 and so the United States, for example, would be entitled to limit the provision so as not to offend the Fifth Amendment¹¹⁷ as this is a condition and safeguard provided for under its domestic law.¹¹⁸ In contrast, Australia — which has no constitutional protection of the right against self-incrimination — has provisions to compel password disclosure that apply beyond persons who might incriminate themselves to include suspects.¹¹⁹

111 Miquelon-Weismann, above n 14, 358.

112 Ibid 359.

113 World Summit on the Information Society, ‘Declaration of Principles: Building the Information Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium’ (Document No WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E, International Telecommunication Union, 12 December 2003) [58] (*‘Geneva Declaration of Principles’*). See also World Summit on the Information Society, ‘Tunis Agenda for the Information Society’ (Document No WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E, International Telecommunication Union, 18 November 2005) [42] (*‘Tunis Agenda for the Information Society’*).

114 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, xii.

115 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [147].

116 Brenner, above n 32, 216.

117 *United States Constitution* amend V.

118 *Convention* art 15(1). As to the compelled production of passwords and the Fifth Amendment, see *United States v Fricosu* 841 F Supp 2d 1232 (D Colo, 2012).

119 *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) s 3LA. For a comparison of art 15 as applied in the Netherlands and the United States, see Henrik Kaspersen, Joseph Schwerha and Drazen Dragicevic, ‘Article 15: Conditions and Safeguards under the Budapest *Convention on Cybercrime*’ (Discussion Paper, European Union and Council of Europe, 29 March 2012).

Although it may be argued that ‘the need to eradicate cybercrime cannot outweigh the equally important need to achieve a consensus on minimal standards for securing fundamental procedural due process guarantees’,¹²⁰ it is unrealistic to expect the *Convention* to achieve what has not been achieved elsewhere. For example, some have advocated that the *Convention* should incorporate the highest standards of data protection such as those found in Europe, as opposed to the lower standards applied in countries such as the United States.¹²¹ However, it is highly unlikely that international agreement on the nature and scope of those protections could be achieved, with the two main participants in the drafting of the *Convention* — Europe and the United States — taking widely divergent views on the issue of privacy protection.¹²² The *Convention* does not, however, prevent parties from accepting other international standards that are not inconsistent. For example, the Council of Europe’s *Data Protection Convention* is open to non-member states.¹²³

The alternative of an additional Protocol to the *Convention*, specifying minimal procedural protections, does not address the underlying problem if it applies only to a limited number of countries and/or is subject to reservations by countries. The *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*,¹²⁴ which might provide a suitable model,¹²⁵ is a salient example. The *Charter* enshrines a number of civil and political rights including the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence, principles of legality and proportionality and protections against double punishment. Although incorporated in the *Treaty of Lisbon*,¹²⁶ it affects only the application of European law.¹²⁷ Further, both the United Kingdom and Poland secured Protocols to the *Charter* limiting its application in domestic courts.¹²⁸ The limited and still controversial application of rights, within the relatively homogenous European Union, is an indication of the formidable obstacles that would be faced in trying to achieve consensus on issues as divisive as privacy and due process. This would likely doom any international agreement and would leave international cooperation to be negotiated at the national level.

120 Miquelon-Weismann, above n 14, 360.

121 Brenner, above n 32, 215.

122 See generally James Q Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 *Yale Law Journal* 1151.

123 *Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data*, opened for signature 28 January 1981, ETS No 108 (entered into force 1 October 1985) art 23 (‘*Data Protection Convention*’).

124 *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* [2010] OJ C 83/389 (entered into force 1 December 2009) (‘*Charter*’).

125 Miquelon-Weismann, above n 14, 360.

126 *Treaty on European Union*, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [1992] OJ C 191/1 (entered into force 1 November 1993) art 6(1), as amended by *Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community*, signed 13 December 2007, [2007] OJ C 306/01 (entered into force 1 December 2009) (‘*Treaty of Lisbon*’).

127 *Charter* art 51.

128 *Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom*, signed 13 December 2007, [2007] OJ C 306/156 (entered into force 1 December 2009).

Against this background, it is useful briefly to review some of the specific protective mechanisms that the *Convention* puts in place in order to balance these competing concerns.

1 *Investigative Powers*

The ‘traditional veil of privacy’¹²⁹ surrounding personal communications has long been subject to exceptions whereby law enforcement may intercept mail, telecommunications, phone records or employ other forms of surveillance. However, the sheer scale of communications data now being generated has the potential to give law enforcement agencies unprecedented access to personal information unless privacy protections are adapted to the modern communications environment. While it may be argued that such access should be granted ‘only in the rarest and most serious of circumstances, subject always to judicial review’,¹³⁰ if digital information is to be subject to greater protection than existing communications, it should be through a considered application of privacy laws. Digital communications should not be granted de facto protection simply because the law has failed to keep pace with technology. What the *Convention* seeks to achieve is an equivalence of laws applying to the digital environment, allowing law enforcement to employ similar techniques to those already employed in relation to other forms of communication.

A possible concern is that the *Convention* does not express any limitation on the seriousness of those offences that are subject to these investigative powers. Theoretically, they may apply equally to serious or relatively minor offences. Such concerns must, in general, be addressed by the principle of proportionality.¹³¹ That is, it is for individual parties to determine whether particular conduct is sufficiently serious to warrant the application of certain investigative powers, and the circumstances in which those powers may be exercised. However, a specific limitation applies in relation to the interception of content data in recognition of the high level of privacy protection that many states afford to the contents of communications.¹³² Accordingly, the power to intercept content data is to be applied to ‘a range of *serious* offences to be determined by domestic law’.¹³³

A related but optional limitation is provided for in relation to the real-time interception of traffic data¹³⁴ whereby a party may reserve the right to apply this provision only to certain offences or categories of offence.¹³⁵ This recognises that some parties may regard interception of traffic data to be as intrusive as the

129 Huey and Rosenberg, above n 110, 599.

130 Ibid 603.

131 *Convention* art 15(1). Each power is specified to be subject to arts 14 and 15: at arts 16(4), 17(2), 18(2), 19(5), 20(4), 21(4).

132 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [142].

133 *Convention* art 21(1) (emphasis added). Under art 21, what is a ‘serious offence’ is to be determined according to domestic law.

134 Ibid art 20.

135 Ibid 14(3)(a).

interception of content data.¹³⁶ This is particularly significant as the distinction between content and traffic data becomes blurred.¹³⁷

However, the restriction must not be greater than the range of offences to which the party applies the power to intercept content data under art 21. That is, the reservation under art 20 must be as or less restrictive than the range of serious offences to which art 20 applies. Given the potential importance of real-time interception of traffic data in tracing the path of communications, parties that exercise this reservation are invited to do so in a way that allows for the broadest exercise of this power.¹³⁸

Considerable concern has been raised in relation to the implementation of broad based data retention schemes in order to facilitate access by law enforcement to telecommunications data.¹³⁹ However, while the preservation of data is provided for under art 16, this requires parties to ensure that their competent authorities can order or similarly obtain ‘the expeditious preservation of specified computer data’.¹⁴⁰ If this obligation is given effect to by means of a preservation order, the party must adopt the necessary measures to require a specified person to preserve and maintain the integrity of the data for up to 90 days. During this time the relevant authorities may seek its disclosure, subject to the possibility of renewal.¹⁴¹ It is left to individual countries to specify the precise computer data to be preserved, although it must include ‘traffic data’.¹⁴²

Importantly, the ‘specified computer data’ that must be preserved is data that has already been stored. That is, the *Convention* requires mechanisms for data preservation, not data retention,¹⁴³ with the obligations applying only to data that is already in existence.¹⁴⁴ These obligations are therefore dependent upon what ISPs and other service providers decide or are otherwise required to store. While a broad-based data retention regime would make compliance with such orders much easier, it is not required by the *Convention*.

136 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [143].

137 Orin S Kerr, ‘Internet Surveillance Law after the USA *Patriot Act*: The Big Brother That Isn’t’ (2003) 97 *Northwestern University Law Review* 607, 645–6; Australian Law Reform Commission, *For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice*, Report No 108 (2008) vol 1, 394 [9.23].

138 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [143].

139 See generally Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, *Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation* (2013) ch 5; Nigel Brew, ‘Telecommunications Data Retention — An Overview’ (Background Note, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 24 October 2012); Ian Brown, ‘Communications Data Retention in an Evolving Internet’ (2011) 19 *International Journal of Law and Information Technology* 95.

140 *Convention* art 16(1).

141 *Ibid* art 16(2). Such orders may also be subject to a confidentiality undertaking: at art 16(3).

142 *Ibid* art 16(1). ‘Traffic data’ is defined in art 1(d): see above n 50.

143 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [152].

144 *Ibid* [150].

2 Mutual Assistance

Although parties are to cooperate ‘to the widest extent possible’,¹⁴⁵ there is no obligation to provide information spontaneously, and any provision of information is subject to the domestic law of the providing party. Further, such information may be provided subject to binding conditions, for example, confidentiality.¹⁴⁶ This is particularly important where the provision of information may disclose operational information such as technical capability or techniques, or the subject of ongoing investigations.¹⁴⁷ However, it is the incorporation of both mutual assistance and extradition provisions that may raise concerns as to the extent to which local law enforcement will be required to act at the behest of foreign law enforcement agencies.

The *Convention* does not, in general, impose mutual assistance obligations on parties. Unless specifically stated to the contrary, mutual assistance is subject to the domestic laws of the requested party or applicable mutual assistance treaties, including the grounds on which the requested party may refuse cooperation.¹⁴⁸ This allows parties to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of people located within their jurisdiction.¹⁴⁹ This is, however, subject to the qualification ‘[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided’.¹⁵⁰ For example, in relation to offences under arts 2–11 of the *Convention*, mutual assistance is not to be refused solely on the ground that the request concerns an offence that the requested party considers to be a ‘fiscal offence’.¹⁵¹ This ‘reflects the growing concern that offences with fiscal overtones, such as money-laundering, are major components of transnational organized crime and should therefore not be immune to investigation, extradition and prosecution’.¹⁵²

Applying the principle of subsidiarity, the *Convention* may also supplement other multilateral or bilateral agreements between states, or may be utilised where no such agreements are in place.¹⁵³ For example, it has been used in tandem with the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime* (‘*UNTOC*’), as well as bilateral extradition treaties.¹⁵⁴ These agreements must not, however,

145 *Convention* arts 23, 25.

146 *Ibid* art 26(2).

147 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [261].

148 *Convention* art 25(4); *ibid* [254]. A similar approach is adopted in the *UNTOC*: see *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 22.

149 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [257]. In some jurisdictions, mutual assistance and extradition may be granted under domestic law without reliance on a treaty: see *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 22 [53].

150 *Convention* art 25(4).

151 *Ibid*. Although not defined in the *Convention*, these have been defined in other instruments as ‘offences in connection with taxes, duties, customs and exchange’: *European Convention on Extradition* art 5.

152 *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 53.

153 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 18 [84].

154 Conference of the Parties to the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Catalogue of Cases Involving Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and Other Forms of International Legal Cooperation Requested on the Basis of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime*, 5th sess, Agenda Item 6, UN Doc CTOC/COP/2010/CRP.5 (22 September 2010) 5 [20], 8 [37] (‘*Catalogue of Cases*’).

conflict with the principles of the *Convention*.¹⁵⁵ If such measures are not in place, or existing measures do not contain appropriate provisions, parties are required to adopt such legislative measures as necessary to carry out their obligations.¹⁵⁶

Where dual criminality is a condition of mutual assistance under the law or obligations of the requested party, and this is permitted under the *Convention*, this condition is taken to be fulfilled 'irrespective of whether its laws place the offence within the same category of offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting Party'.¹⁵⁷ This does not impose dual criminality in cases where the conduct is not an offence in both countries. Rather, as with extradition,¹⁵⁸ it ensures that mutual assistance requests are not defeated due to differences in classification rather than substantive objections.¹⁵⁹ For example, while some jurisdictions address the misuse of identity information by specific 'identity theft' provisions, the majority continue to rely on a combination of existing fraud and related offences.¹⁶⁰ So long as the conduct is criminalised in both countries, then dual criminality will be taken to be fulfilled regardless of how it is classified.

In the event that there is no mutual assistance treaty or arrangement between the parties, art 27 of the *Convention* sets out the basis on which mutual assistance requests will be dealt with.¹⁶¹ Significantly, parties may refuse assistance if the request concerns an offence that the requested party considers to be a political offence,¹⁶² or it considers the request 'is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, *ordre public* or other essential interests'.¹⁶³ It may also postpone action on a request if such action would prejudice criminal investigations or proceedings conducted by its authorities.¹⁶⁴

Specific provision is made in relation to certain forms of mutual assistance request.¹⁶⁵ A party may submit a request for the expeditious preservation of stored data where the requesting party intends to submit a request for mutual assistance for access to that data.¹⁶⁶ Preservation must be for at least 60 days in order to allow the requesting party time to submit a request for access to the

155 *Convention* arts 23, 39.

156 *Ibid* art 25(2). In some cases, it may be sufficient for a party to treat the provisions of the *Convention* as self-executing, or existing mutual assistance arrangements may be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the provisions of the *Convention*. See *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [255].

157 *Convention* art 25(5).

158 See Part II(B)(3) below.

159 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [259].

160 Neil Robinson et al, 'Comparative Study on Legislative and Non Legislative Measures to Combat Identity Theft and Identity Related Crime: Final Report' (Report No TR-982-EC, RAND Europe, June 2011) 80.

161 These provisions may also apply in whole or in part where such agreements or arrangements are in existence, but only by agreement of the parties concerned. See *Convention* art 27(1). See also *Convention* art 28, which makes provisions for confidentiality and limitation on use in such circumstances.

162 *Ibid* art 27(4)(a).

163 *Ibid* art 27(4)(b).

164 *Ibid* art 27(5).

165 *Ibid* ch III s 2 title 1.

166 *Ibid* art 29(1).

data.¹⁶⁷ Once such a request is received, the data must continue to be preserved pending a decision on that request.¹⁶⁸ Where the preservation request relates to traffic data and ‘the requested Party discovers that a service provider in another State was involved in the transmission of the communication, the requested Party shall expeditiously disclose to the requesting Party a sufficient amount of traffic data to identify that service provider and the path through which the communication was transmitted’.¹⁶⁹ Such a request may only be refused on the basis that the request relates to a political offence, or would otherwise ‘prejudice its sovereignty, security, *ordre public* or other essential interests’.¹⁷⁰

Although dual criminality is not a condition of providing such preservation,¹⁷¹ a party that requires dual criminality as a condition for responding to mutual assistance requests may reserve the right to refuse on that basis if it has reason to believe that the condition of dual criminality will not be satisfied at the time of disclosure.¹⁷² This limitation does not apply to offences established under arts 2–11, as parties must have created such offences under their domestic laws. In all cases, a preservation request may be refused on the basis that the request concerns a political offence, or would otherwise ‘prejudice its sovereignty, security, *ordre public* or other essential interests’.¹⁷³

As these articles expressly state the *only* grounds on which requests are to be refused, they operate to the exclusion of any existing mutual assistance treaties or arrangements.¹⁷⁴ However, as the nature of the requests becomes more intrusive, greater deference is given to existing arrangements and/or domestic laws. For example, art 30, which relates to mutual assistance regarding the accessing of stored computer data, makes no provision in respect of grounds of refusal. Such grounds would therefore be found in existing treaties or under art 27. Article 33, which relates to mutual assistance in the real-time collection of traffic data, is specifically stated to be governed by the conditions and procedures provided for under domestic laws. The most intrusive form of request, the interception of content data, is completely governed by ‘applicable treaties and domestic laws’.¹⁷⁵

3 Extradition

Concern may be expressed that the *Convention* will expand the extradition obligation of parties to countries with which they would not otherwise enter into extradition arrangements. However, the requirements under the *Convention* are associated with existing or proposed extradition arrangements. All that is required is that the offences created under the *Convention* are designated as extraditable

167 Ibid art 29(7).

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid art 30(1).

170 Ibid art 30(2).

171 Ibid art 29(3).

172 Ibid art 29(4).

173 Ibid art 29(5).

174 Ibid art 25(4).

175 Ibid art 34.

offences; it does not guarantee that extradition will occur. When the *Convention* itself may be used by a party to support extradition, it is not obligated to do so.¹⁷⁶ In addition, a number of requirements are imposed.

First, these offences will only be extraditable if punishable under the laws of both parties by a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment or more.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, even where an offence would ordinarily be extraditable under the *Convention*, if it is subject to less than the minimum penalty it is no longer so. For example, a party may impose less than 12 months maximum on the offence of unauthorised access with no aggravating factors. Such an offence would therefore not be extraditable under the *Convention*.¹⁷⁸ In addition, where the parties have agreed a different (higher or lower) minimum level of penalty for these purposes, then that minimum will apply.¹⁷⁹ For example, in some countries the penalties attached to illegal access offences can range from as low as a fine only or less than six months imprisonment, up to in excess of three years.¹⁸⁰

Second, extradition is subject to the laws of the requested party and/or applicable extradition treaties.¹⁸¹ Therefore the ultimate decision to extradite resides in these arrangements, not the *Convention*. It is commonly the case that extradition will be refused, for example, where the prosecution is seen to be for a political offence,¹⁸² or where the defendant may be subject to torture.¹⁸³ Such restrictions continue to apply. In general, there is also a practical impediment — the complexity and cost of the extradition process ensures that it is typically reserved for serious offences.¹⁸⁴

The application of existing extradition arrangements may nonetheless result in controversial decisions to extradite. For example, Englishman Gary McKinnon fought his extradition to the United States in respect of his alleged unauthorised access to United States federal computers.¹⁸⁵ However, any controversy lies with the extradition arrangements between those countries, not the *Convention* itself. The *Convention* merely ensures the possibility of extradition for these offences; it is up to individual parties to determine whether extradition will be granted.

176 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [248].

177 *Convention* art 24(1)(a). Internationally, the penalty level attached to international cooperation may vary from as low as six months to up to four years under the *UNTOC*. The more typical figure is 12 months: see *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 62.

178 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [245].

179 *Convention* art 24(1)(b).

180 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 62.

181 *Convention* art 24(5).

182 *European Convention on Extradition* art 3.

183 *Extradition Act 1988* (Cth) s 22(3)(b).

184 Jordan Paust, 'Panel: Cybercrimes and the Domestication of International Criminal Law' (2007) 5 *Santa Clara Journal of International Law* 432, 442.

185 *McKinnon v United States of America* [2008] 4 All ER 1012; *R (McKinnon) v Secretary of State for Home Affairs* [2009] EWHC 2449 (Admin). His extradition was eventually blocked by the Home Secretary: 'Gary McKinnon Extradition to US Blocked by Theresa May', *BBC News UK* (online), 16 October 2012 <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19957138>>. See also *Griffiths v United States of America* (2005) 143 FCR 182.

Many states, particularly from the civil law tradition, do not extradite their own nationals,¹⁸⁶ and in such cases the *Convention* recognises the principle of ‘*aut dedere aut judicare*’ — the obligation to extradite or prosecute.¹⁸⁷ Where extradition is refused solely on the basis of nationality, or because the requested party claims jurisdiction over the case, then on request, the requested party must prosecute the matter under its domestic laws and report the outcome to the requesting party.¹⁸⁸ If no request is made then there is no obligation on the party to undertake a domestic prosecution.

4 Territorial Sovereignty

While much of the criticism of the *Convention* has concerned the protection (or lack thereof) of individual rights, it has also been criticised for its lack of protection in relation to the rights of states. The nature of modern communications is such that data is increasingly ‘volatile, unstable and scattered over multiple jurisdictions’.¹⁸⁹ The ability to access data in other jurisdictions expeditiously is therefore an important aspect of modern criminal investigations. While data in another jurisdiction may be accessed via more traditional means, including mutual assistance, the technology itself provides law enforcement agencies with the ability to conduct transborder searches; that is, ‘to unilaterally access computer data stored in another Party without seeking mutual assistance’.¹⁹⁰ While such searches can be carried out covertly and deliberately, they may also be inadvertent or reckless; an inevitable consequence of networked computing. Because computer data may be stored anywhere in the world, simply accessing a webpage or an email account may involve the accessing of data stored in another country.

However the fact that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have the capacity to conduct such searches does not make it lawful. It would ordinarily be regarded as a breach of territorial sovereignty for LEAs from one country to conduct investigations within a foreign country without the permission of that country. This principle of international law posits that no state may enforce its jurisdiction within the territory of another sovereign state.¹⁹¹ Accordingly, a state cannot enforce its laws, conduct investigations or arrest a person in the territory of another state, without clear legal authority to do so.¹⁹² Such conduct also threatens to undermine the protections accorded to the citizens of the target country. The

186 *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 49 [108]. See also *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [251].

187 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [251].

188 *Convention* art 24(6).

189 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 9 [32].

190 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [293].

191 *SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment)* [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10, 18–19. See, eg, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Protocol on Foreign Criminal Investigators in Canada* (15 February 2007) <<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/interpol/fcjp-pcece-eng.htm>>.

192 Teresa Scassa and Robert J Currie, ‘New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to Jurisdiction’ (2011) 42 *Georgetown Journal of International Law* 1017, 1029.

legitimacy or otherwise of such conduct is therefore an issue of considerable importance.

The issue of transborder access to electronic evidence has been recognised since the 1980s, though at the time the issue did not seem ‘too pressing’.¹⁹³ However, changes in technology meant that the issue rapidly became more urgent and was debated, inter alia, by the European Committee on Crime Problems, the G8 and the Council of Europe.¹⁹⁴ Although the drafters of the *Convention* discussed the issue ‘at length’, agreement could not be reached other than in respect of two specific instances discussed below.¹⁹⁵ This was apparently due to a lack of actual experience of such searches at the time, and the difficulty in formulating general principles when so much turns on the individual circumstances of the case.¹⁹⁶

The two instances of transborder search addressed by the *Convention* are found in art 32. The first states that a party may, without the authorisation of another party, ‘access publicly available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located geographically’.¹⁹⁷ This simply recognises that LEAs may access data in the same way as any member of the public, regardless of where that evidence is located.

The second and more controversial aspect is contained in art 32(b). It allows a party to ‘access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system’. Some countries, most notably Russia, have objected to this provision on the basis that it ‘might damage the sovereignty and security of member countries and their citizens’ rights’.¹⁹⁸

The Russian attitude to this provision was undoubtedly not helped by the fact that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were known to have conducted a covert transborder search of Russian computers in the course of their investigation against two Russian nationals — Alexey Ivanov and Vasily Gorshkov.¹⁹⁹ Though often referred to in the context of the *Convention*, it is important to emphasise that art 32 says nothing of the situation that arose in that case, nor any covert transborder search. Accordingly, transborder searches not covered by the *Convention* are ‘neither authorised, nor precluded’²⁰⁰ and the specific issue raised

193 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 6 [14].

194 *Ibid* 6–7 [15]–[17].

195 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [293].

196 *Ibid*.

197 *Convention* art 32(a).

198 ‘Putin Defies *Convention on Cybercrime*’, *CNews* (online), 27 March 2008 <<http://eng.cnews.ru/news/top/index.En.shtml?2008/03/27/293913>>. See also Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), ‘Report on the 2nd Multilateral Consultation of the Parties Strasbourg, 13 and 14 June 2007’ (Information Document No CM/Inf(2007)38, Council of Europe, 20 July 2007) [6] <<https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1167033&Site=COE>>.

199 See generally *United States v Gorshkov* (WD Wash, No CR00-550C, 23 May 2001); *United States v Ivanov*, 175 F Supp 2d 367 (D Conn, 2001).

200 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [293]. *Convention* art 39(3) provides that ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall affect other rights, restrictions, obligations and responsibilities of a Party’.

by the Ivanov/Gorshkov case remains unresolved and controversial.²⁰¹ Therefore, objections to art 32(b) on the basis that it authorises such covert searches are misplaced.

This is not to say that art 32(b) is uncontroversial. By applying to both the accessing and receiving of data through a computer system with consent, it allows law enforcement in one country to conduct an extraterritorial investigation in another country without notifying authorities in that country. For example, the owner of an email account whose data is stored in another country may voluntarily disclose or allow access to that data to local law enforcement.²⁰² The potential breadth of this provision becomes apparent when one considers that much of our modern communications networks and associated data storage is privately owned. ISPs and content providers such as Google and Facebook are repositories of enormous amounts of data, which may be of interest to LEAs. As long as the consent of the 'owners' of this data is obtained, it may lawfully be accessed by, or disclosed to, foreign LEAs.

The first limitation on the breadth of this provision is that consent must be voluntarily given. Clearly consent given as a result of duress, coercion or deception is not voluntary. Similarly, consent given by minors or persons with a cognitive impairment may also not be sufficient, subject to domestic law.²⁰³ A plain reading of the *Convention* would suggest that it authorises communications between LEAs in one country and individuals in another in order to obtain the necessary permission. However, for LEAs in one country to encourage a citizen of another country to assist with their investigations may itself be a breach of sovereignty and in some jurisdictions is a criminal offence.²⁰⁴ It has therefore been argued that art 32(b) can only be used to obtain the consent of a person who is under the jurisdiction of the investigating state.²⁰⁵ This accords with the Explanatory Report to the *Convention* ('*Convention Explanatory Report*'), which gives the example of data stored outside the jurisdiction, where a person within the jurisdiction has lawful authority to retrieve that data.²⁰⁶ Where the person is present in the territory of another state, 'mutual assistance procedures should be applied'.²⁰⁷

The second limitation is that the person must have 'lawful authority' to consent to that data being accessed or received. As to the question of who has the 'lawful authority' to disclose, the *Convention Explanatory Report* rather obviously and unhelpfully states that this will depend on 'the circumstances, the nature of the person and the applicable law concerned'.²⁰⁸ For example, lawful authority to

201 For a more detailed discussion see Susan W Brenner and Joseph J Schwerha IV, 'Transnational Evidence Gathering and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime' (2002) 20 *John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law* 347.

202 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [294].

203 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 21 [104]–[105].

204 See, eg, *Strafgesetzbuch* [Swiss Criminal Code] (Switzerland) 21 December 1937, SR 311.0, art 271(1).

205 Kaspersen, above n 78, 28 [81].

206 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [294].

207 Kaspersen, above n 78, 28 [81].

208 *Convention Explanatory Report*, above n 25, [294].

consent may reside in both the email user and the email provider, though different considerations will apply. To what extent does the service provider have authority to disclose that data? It has been suggested that in most parties, cooperation in a criminal investigation would require explicit consent and therefore 'general agreement by a person to terms and conditions of an online service used would not constitute explicit consent even if these terms and conditions indicate that data may be shared with criminal justice authorities in cases of abuse'.²⁰⁹ However, the terms of art 32 are not so limited.

Not only must the person have the lawful authority to disclose, that disclosure must itself be lawful. This serves to emphasise that it is for individual parties to determine the extent to which their citizens may lawfully disclose data. Concerns as to the potential broad sweep of this provision could be addressed, for example, by strict data protection laws. Note that the authority in art 32(b) is not simply to disclose the data, but to disclose to *the party through* a computer system. Therefore, restrictions on disclosure could be targeted to prohibit disclosure to foreign agencies.

While art 32 has the advantage of freeing up a large amount of data collection, and avoids the use of mutual legal assistance treaties, it is understandably a controversial provision. Given that it may be cited as a reason for not ratifying the *Convention*,²¹⁰ it is imperative that it be addressed as was envisaged at the time of its drafting.²¹¹

One option would be to remove art 32 from the *Convention*. Less drastic would be to allow parties to make a reservation to that provision. Yet another alternative would be to provide for a notification requirement. That is, where a country seeks to access or receive data under art 32(b), they must notify the party in which the person or organisation is resident. Although a limited notification requirement was proposed by the G8, it was not adopted in the *Convention*.²¹²

Such notifications should not slow down the process unless the requested party has an objection, in which case that objection should be resolved. Such requests are not covert, the requested person being under no obligation to keep the request confidential. Notification would also provide a level of supervision, which would help to address concerns as to voluntariness. It may be that such an approach addresses the concerns of countries otherwise reluctant to ratify on the basis of this provision.

209 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 21–2 [106].

210 See, eg, above n 198.

211 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 19 [90].

212 Ministerial Conference of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transnational Organized Crime (Communiqué, Moscow, 19–20 October 1999) annex 1 cl 6 <<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/adhoc/crime99.htm>> ('*Communiqué*'). Of course, the *Convention* does not preclude parties providing notification if it is considered appropriate. See *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 21 [103].

It could also be argued that this is an area where it may be appropriate to insert a protection of sovereignty clause as is found in some international agreements.²¹³ For example, the *UNTOC* requires parties to carry out their obligations under that Convention ‘in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States’.²¹⁴ Further, parties are not entitled to undertake in another state ‘the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law’.²¹⁵ A similar principle was in fact agreed upon by the G8 Justice and Interior Ministers meeting in Moscow in 1999,²¹⁶ but was ultimately not included in the *Convention*.

A further issue is that art 32(b) refers to ‘stored computer data located in another Party’. It is therefore presumed that the location of the data is known.²¹⁷ However, modern developments mean that this may no longer be the case, with data dynamically shifted — potentially between jurisdictions — such that it is impossible with certainty to state where particular data is at any one time.²¹⁸ As it may be impossible for law enforcement agencies to determine whether data being accessed is stored locally or outside the jurisdiction,²¹⁹ it may be necessary to develop mechanisms to address these new challenges.²²⁰

More broadly, there is an ongoing need to address those transborder searches that fall outside the scope of art 32. A recent Council of Europe survey of member states indicates that transborder searches are occurring, though practices vary considerably.²²¹ According to the United States Department of Justice, obtaining data from computers located overseas must ‘usually’ be in compliance with international treaties and mutual assistance requests.²²² However, in some circumstances, investigators may argue that the search of data was justified by ‘exigent circumstances’, in particular the danger that evidence might be lost or destroyed.²²³ The extent to which such rationales can be used to justify access to data held in another jurisdiction is unclear.²²⁴

213 Chernukhin Ernest, ‘Cybercrime: New Threat and Global Response’ (Presentation to Expert Group on Cybercrime, Vienna, 17–21 January 2011) slides 21, 26.

214 *UNTOC* art 4(1). See also *United Nations Convention against Corruption*, opened for signature 9 December 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (entered into force 14 December 2005) art 4(1) (‘*UNCAC*’).

215 *UNTOC* art 4(2). See also *UNCAC* art 4(2).

216 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 6–7 [17]; *Communiqué*, above n 212, annex 1 cl 6.

217 Such a limitation does not apply to publicly accessible data, the location being irrelevant.

218 Joseph J Schwerha IV, ‘Law Enforcement Challenges in Transborder Acquisition of Electronic Evidence from “Cloud Computing Providers”’ (Discussion Paper (draft), Council of Europe, 15 January 2010) 9–11.

219 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 18 [86].

220 Council of Europe, ‘Cloud Computing and Cybercrime Investigations: Territoriality vs the Power of Disposal’ (Discussion Paper, 31 August 2010) 5–6.

221 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 29 [137].

222 H Marshall Jarrett et al, *Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations* (Office of Legal Education, Executive Officer for United States Attorneys, Department of Justice, 2009) 57.

223 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 9 [33]. See also *ibid* 27–31.

224 *Transborder Access and Jurisdiction Discussion Paper*, above n 15, 10 [34].

Apparent authority for such searches may come about due to broadly drafted search powers. For example, under *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) s 3L, the executing officer of the warrant ‘may operate electronic equipment at the warrant premises to access data (*including data not held at the premises*)’.²²⁵ Although it may therefore be argued that the warrant authorises the officer to access data outside the jurisdiction, this provision is consistent with art 19(2) of the *Convention*, which applies where authorities search or access a specific computer system and believe on reasonable grounds that relevant data is stored in another system. In those circumstances, parties are required to empower authorities to extend the search to the other system. However, this only applies where the data is lawfully accessible from the initial system, and the other system is ‘in its territory’.²²⁶ It does not authorise an extraterritorial search. In any event, even if rendering the conduct lawful in Australia, it has no bearing on the legality of the conduct outside the jurisdiction.

C (Un)representative

The Council of Europe consists of 47 member states including all 27 members of the European Union.²²⁷ In addition, five countries have observer status: Canada, the Holy See,²²⁸ Japan, Mexico and the United States of America.²²⁹ Although representing a quarter of the world’s countries,²³⁰ they overwhelmingly represent the developed world, largely excluding the G24²³¹ and G77²³² groups of developing countries.²³³

The *Convention* was always intended to apply globally,²³⁴ and in addition to member states and those who ‘participated in its elaboration’,²³⁵ it is open to non-member states invited by a unanimous decision of the parties.²³⁶ At the time of writing, only two member states had not signed — Russia and San Marino.²³⁷

225 *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) s 3L(1) (emphasis added).

226 This was also the position stated in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Cybercrime Bill 2001 (Cth) 15–16.

227 Although all 27 members of the European Union are members, the Council of Europe should not be confused with the European Council which is an institution of the European Union: see *Treaty of Lisbon*.

228 The Holy See is not a member state of the United Nations but has permanent observer status: United Nations, *Permanent Observers* <<http://www.un.org/en/members/nonmembers.shtml>>.

229 Council of Europe, *The Council Of Europe’s Relations with Non-Member States* <http://www.coe.int/t/der/NonMemberStates_en.asp>.

230 There are 193 member states of the United Nations: United Nations, *Member States* <<http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml>>.

231 Intergovernmental Group of Twenty Four, *G-24 Home* <<http://www.g24.org/>>.

232 The Group of 77 at the United Nations, *G-77 Home* <<http://www.g77.org/>>.

233 Clough, above n 37, 387.

234 Council of Europe, ‘Project on Cybercrime: Final Report’ (Report No ECD/567(2009)1, 15 June 2009) 5.

235 *Convention* art 36(1).

236 *Ibid* art 37(1).

237 Council of Europe, *Convention on Cybercrime CETS No: 185* (18 April 2015) <<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG>>.

Two non-member countries — Canada and South Africa²³⁸ — have signed but not ratified, while thirteen others — Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Tonga — have been invited to sign.²³⁹

More significant than the number of signatories is the number of ratifications. While international obligations do not have the force of law in those countries adopting a dualist system until they are incorporated within domestic legislation, in monist systems, a treaty, once ratified, has the same authority as domestic law.²⁴⁰ In any event, once a treaty has been ratified, a party is bound by it notwithstanding that it is not incorporated into its domestic law.²⁴¹ There are now only six member states which have signed but not ratified,²⁴² and a number of non-member states have now ratified: the United States (2006), Australia and Japan (2012), Dominican Republic and Mauritius (2013) and Panama (2014).²⁴³

This brings to 45 the number of parties to the *Convention* who have ratified. While obviously falling short of truly international agreement, no equivalent initiative exists, let alone comes close to this level of international acceptance.²⁴⁴ Rather than looking at overall numbers of ratifications, it is important to consider why particular countries may not have ratified.

An obvious impediment is that, in contrast to United Nations conventions,²⁴⁵ accession for non-member states is by invitation and requires a majority decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, albeit with the unanimous consent of all parties.²⁴⁶ Although it may be difficult for some countries to ratify a convention that they did not participate in drafting, such mechanisms are not unique.²⁴⁷ Further, the process of invitation does at least help to ensure genuine implementation,²⁴⁸ and those who become parties become members of the Cybercrime Convention Committee and are involved in its future development.²⁴⁹

238 For a discussion of cybercrime in South Africa, see Sizwe Snail, 'Cyber Crime in South Africa — Hacking, Cracking and Other Unlawful Online Activities' [2009] (1) *Journal of Information, Law & Technology* <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2009_1/snail/snail.pdf>.

239 Council of Europe, *Convention on Cybercrime CETS No: 185*, above n 237.

240 *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 10 [23]–[24].

241 *Ibid* 25 [57]. Under the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 27 '[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty'.

242 Andorra, Greece, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Monaco and Sweden: Council of Europe, *Convention on Cybercrime CETS No: 185*, above n 237.

243 *Ibid*.

244 See Part V below.

245 Gercke, '10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*', above n 37, 145.

246 *Convention* art 37.

247 See, eg, *Agreement on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Offences Relating to Computer Information*, opened for signature 1 June 2001 (entered into force 14 March 2002) art 17.

248 Although the *Convention* provides no mechanism for ensuring compliance with its terms, and some have not been fully implemented even by those who have ratified: Gercke, '10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*', above n 37, 145.

249 *Convention*, art 46; Council of Europe, *Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY)* <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/T-CY/Default_TCY_en.asp>.

Further, many parties have exercised their right under the *Convention* to declare reservations, thereby allowing its implementation to be adapted to local conditions.²⁵⁰ While this may dilute uniformity, reservations allow for differences to be accommodated in a transparent and coherent fashion, and are an accepted way of addressing the difficulties in achieving international consensus.²⁵¹

More broadly, for many countries non-ratification is a capacity issue. The *Convention* requires countries to have in place domestic legislation across the spectrum of substantive and procedural laws and to put in place mechanisms for international cooperation. These measures can present significant capacity challenges for developed countries.²⁵² For developing countries, those challenges may be insurmountable without assistance.

Even for countries that have the capacity to ratify, there may be serious political objections which are seen to outweigh the benefits of the *Convention*.²⁵³ For example, Russia's non-acceptance is based in part on objection to a particular provision rather than a wholesale rejection.²⁵⁴ In Canada, the process has been hampered by an inability to pass domestic legislation.²⁵⁵ For some countries the level of human rights protection may be too low, for others too high. None of these necessarily represent a failure of the *Convention*, but rather illustrate the challenges of implementing such a comprehensive international instrument. These same challenges would be faced in implementing any international convention.

III A UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME?

A 'The Perfect is the Enemy of the Good'²⁵⁶

Despite near universal support for international action against cybercrime, there is currently no binding international cybercrime agreement.²⁵⁷ If the *Convention* is not to fulfil this role, the question arises as to how such international consensus

250 See Council of Europe, *List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No 185* <<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=09/06/2011&CL=ENG&VL=1>>, cited in Clough, above n 37, 391.

251 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 67. Reservations mechanisms, of varying degrees, are found, for example, in the League of Arab States, *Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences* (2010); African Union, *Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework Conducive to Cyber Security in African* (1 September 2012) art IV-3.

252 As to some of the legislative challenges even within Europe, see Anne Flanagan, 'The Law and Computer Crime: Reading the Script of Reform' (2005) 13 *International Journal of Law and Information Technology* 98.

253 Alexander Seger, 'The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 10 Years on: Lessons Learnt or the Web is a Web' (Council of Europe, 16 February 2012) 5.

254 'Putin Defies Convention on Cybercrime', above n 198.

255 See Dominique Valiquet and Katherine Simonds, 'Bill C-51: Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act' (Legislative Summary, Publication No 40-3-C51-E, Library of Parliament, 3 February 2011) 2 [1.3]; Rob Currie, *Canada Doesn't Ratify the European Cybercrime Convention ... Again* (25 March 2011) International & Transnational Criminal Law <<http://rjcurrie.typepad.com/international-and-transna/2011/03/canada-doesnt-ratify-the-european-cybercrime-convention-again.html>>.

256 The original quote in French is 'Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien', from Voltaire, *Dictionnaire Philosophique, Portatif* (Cramer, 1764).

257 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 64.

is to be achieved. The United Nations is the obvious choice, with its resolutions on *Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information Technologies*²⁵⁸ raising many of the issues addressed by the *Convention*.²⁵⁹ However, none of these measures were binding, with member states invited to take them into account in developing their own efforts to combat the criminal misuse of information technologies.²⁶⁰

Out of the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, held in Geneva in 2003,²⁶¹ came the *Geneva Declaration of Principles*²⁶² and the *Geneva Plan of Action*.²⁶³ The latter included action line C5, 'Building Confidence and Security in the use of ICTs', art 12(b) of which contained a number of measures that government should take, in cooperation with the private sector, to 'prevent, detect and respond to cyber-crime and misuse of ICTs'.²⁶⁴ The second phase held in 2005 produced the *Tunis Agenda for the Information Society*. In the context of legislative reform, this called upon governments 'to develop necessary legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime' taking into account existing frameworks and regional initiatives 'including, but not limited to, the Council of Europe's *Convention on Cybercrime*'.²⁶⁵

In 2007 the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is responsible for facilitating action line C5, launched its Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA).²⁶⁶ The GCA is divided into five pillars/work areas: Legal Measures, Technical and Procedural Measures, Organizational Structures, Capacity Building and International Cooperation.²⁶⁷ In respect of legal measures it highlights the importance of international harmonisation and, in what would seem a thinly veiled reference to the *Convention*, notes that '[s]ome efforts to address this challenge have been undertaken, and although very valuable, they are still insufficient. The Internet is an international communication tool and, consequently, any solution to secure it must be sought at the global level'.²⁶⁸

Yet the GCA does not pursue a binding global initiative. The first of the seven strategic goals 'calls for the elaboration of strategies for the development of cybercrime legislation that is globally applicable and interoperable with existing national and regional legislative measures'.²⁶⁹ Harmonisation of laws and facilitation of international cooperation is seen as essential to achieving global

258 *Combating Criminal Misuse No 1*, UN Doc A/RES/55/63; *Combating Criminal Misuse No 2*, UN Doc A/RES/56/121.

259 *Combating Criminal Misuse No 1*, UN Doc A/RES/55/63, para 1.

260 *Ibid* para 2; *Combating Criminal Misuse No 2*, UN Doc A/RES/56/121, para 2.

261 *World Summit on the Information Society*, GA Res 56/183, UN GAOR, 56th sess, 90th plen mtg, Agenda Item 95(c), UN Doc A/RES/56/183 (31 January 2002, adopted 21 December 2001).

262 *Geneva Declaration of Principles*, above n 113.

263 World Summit on the Information Society, 'Plan of Action' (Document No WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E, International Telecommunication Union, 12 December 2003) ('*Geneva Plan of Action*').

264 *Ibid* 6.

265 *Tunis Agenda for the Information Society*, above n 113, [40].

266 International Telecommunication Union, *Global Cybersecurity Agenda* <<http://www.cybersecurity-gateway.org/pdf/new-gca-brochure.pdf>>.

267 *Ibid* 12.

268 *Ibid* 14.

269 *Ibid*.

cybersecurity.²⁷⁰ However, the mechanism whereby such harmonisation can be achieved remains contested. The *Convention* is the only non-United Nations initiative referred to by the General Assembly as a regional initiative to which countries should have regard in ascertaining whether they have developed the necessary legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime.²⁷¹

The Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice produced a clear division of opinion as to whether to proceed with negotiation of a global convention on cybercrime.²⁷² On the one hand, countries such as the Russian Federation²⁷³ and China supported the negotiation of a global convention.²⁷⁴ The broader notion of an international agreement also finds support in African,²⁷⁵ Asian and Pacific,²⁷⁶ Latin American and Caribbean²⁷⁷ nations. On the other hand, the United States, United Kingdom²⁷⁸ and European Union²⁷⁹ argued that the *Convention* is sufficient and that the focus should be on capacity building.

The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice was then invited to convene ‘an open-ended intergovernmental expert group to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime’.²⁸⁰ In addition, it was recommended ‘that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, upon request,

270 Ibid.

271 *Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and Taking Stock of National Efforts to Protect Critical Information Infrastructures*, GA Res 64/211, UN GAOR, 64th sess, 66th plen mtg, Agenda Item 55(c), UN Doc A/RES/64/211 (17 March 2010, adopted 21 December 2009).

272 *Report of the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, UN Doc A/CONF.213/18 (18 May 2010) 56–7 [202]–[204].

273 See generally Ernest, above n 213.

274 Greg Masters, ‘Global Cybercrime Treaty Rejected at UN’, *SC Magazine* (online), 23 April 2010 <<http://www.scmagazineus.com/global-cybercrime-treaty-rejected-at-un/article/168630/>>.

275 *Report of the African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in Nairobi from 8 to 10 September 2009*, UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.4/1 (24 February 2010) 8–9 [40].

276 *Report of the Asian and Pacific Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in Bangkok from 1 to 3 July 2009*, UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.3/1 (8 September 2009) 7–8 [298]; *Report of the Western Asian Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in Doha from 1 to 3 June 2009*, UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.2/1 (12 June 2009) 10 [47].

277 *Report of the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Held in San Jose, from 25 to 27 May 2009*, UN Doc A/CONF.213/RPM.1/1 (26 May 2009) 10 [41].

278 Masters, above n 274. The Quintet of Attorneys-General from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States have resolved to ‘promote the *Convention* as the key international instrument for dealing with cyber crime and use the *Convention* as a basis for delivering capacity building and awareness raising activities’: US Reference Service, *Communiqué — Quintet of Attorneys General: Action Plan to Fight Cyber Crime* (18 August 2011) <<http://usraustralia.state.gov/us-oz/2011/07/15/aag2.html>>.

279 *Proposal on Attacks against Information Systems*, above n 45, 6–7.

280 *Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive Strategies for Global Challenges: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Systems and Their Development in a Changing World*, para 42 <http://www.unodc.org/documents/crime-congress/12th-Crime-Congress/Documents/Salvador_Declaration/Salvador_Declaration_E.pdf> (‘*Salvador Declaration*’). Paragraph 42 of the *Salvador Declaration* was adopted by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and then by the Economic and Social Council: *Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, ESC Res 2010/18, UN ESCOR, 45th plen mtg (22 July 2010). It was also adopted by the General Assembly: *Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, GA Res 65/230, UN GAOR, 65th sess, Agenda Item 105, UN Doc A/RES/65/230 (1 April 2011, adopted 21 December 2010).

provide, in cooperation with Member States, relevant international organizations and the private sector, technical assistance and training’ in order to deal with cybercrime.²⁸¹

Most recently, the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of the Problem of Cybercrime (‘Expert Group’) met in January 2011,²⁸² and again in February 2013, at which time it considered the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*.²⁸³ In December 2012, the United Nations General Assembly noted with appreciation the work of the Expert Group, and encouraged it ‘to enhance its efforts to complete its work and to present the outcome of the study to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in due course’.²⁸⁴ At the subsequent meeting of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in April 2013, the issue of international agreement was once again deferred, with a draft resolution inviting member states ‘to continue to consider ... ways and means to strengthen international cooperation in combating cybercrime’, and requesting an open-ended intergovernmental working group to be convened to further examine the problem of cybercrime and responses to it by member states.²⁸⁵ A further draft resolution requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) ‘to strengthen partnerships for technical assistance and capacity-building with Member States, relevant organizations, the private sector and civil society’, and ‘to serve as a central repository of cybercrime laws and good practices’.²⁸⁶ Although over 10 years has passed since the idea was seriously mooted,²⁸⁷ we are no closer to a United Nations convention nor to international acceptance of the *Convention*.

There are a number of advantages to pursuing a convention through the United Nations. The first and most significant is that it would have the broadest geographic scope, being open to all member states.²⁸⁸ Second, it would provide an opportunity to address issues not included in the *Convention*, or to improve on provisions requiring amendment.²⁸⁹ Third, it would potentially allow amendment

281 *Salvador Declaration* para 41.

282 *Report on the Meeting of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of the Problem of Cybercrime, Held in Vienna from 17 to 21 January 2011*, Doc No UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.4/2011/3 (31 March 2011).

283 See *Report on the Meeting of the Expert Group to Conduct a Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, Doc No UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.4/2013/3 (1 March 2013). See also *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10.

284 *Strengthening the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in Particular Its Technical Cooperation Capacity*, GA Res 67/189, UN GAOR, 67th sess, 60th plen mtg, Agenda Item 103, UN Doc A/RES/67/189* (27 March 2013, adopted 20 December 2012) para 6.

285 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, *Strengthening International Cooperation to Combat Cybercrime*, UN ESCOR, 22nd sess, Agenda Item 7, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/L.14 (2 April 2013) para 3.

286 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, *Enabling International Cooperation against Cybercrime through Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building*, UN ESCOR, 22nd sess, Agenda Item 7, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/L.16 (2 April 2013) paras 3–4.

287 Downing, above n 37, 761.

288 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 66–7.

289 Clough, above n 37, 389.

or removal of the provisions that have provided an obstacle to wider acceptance of the *Convention*.

There are, however, a number of significant disadvantages. Principal among them is the time taken to reach international agreement, if agreement can in fact be reached. It has been estimated that having signed the *Convention* it takes a country, on average, more than five years to ratify.²⁹⁰ Should a comprehensive binding international cybercrime agreement be implemented, there is no reason to believe that ratification would occur more quickly. In an area where we are constantly told of how rapidly technology outpaces attempts at regulation, there seems to be a blithe acceptance that we can wait a few more years before international agreement is reached.

Even assuming international agreement can be reached, it is not clear that it would add a great deal to the *Convention*. In fact, in order to ensure international agreement it is likely to provide less. The influence of the *Convention* 'has now been so pervasive on cybercrime laws throughout the world that any international agreement would largely have to mirror its terms'.²⁹¹ Were it to depart significantly, it would be unlikely to achieve agreement from those countries that have implemented legislation based on the *Convention*. Equally, to ensure agreement from those countries that have objected to terms of the *Convention*, it would need to provide less. Human rights and privacy protections, for example, may have to be diluted or removed, while certain substantive offences may not be included.²⁹²

As an illustration of the difficulties of achieving international agreement in this area, as recently as 2012 agreement could not be reached on the International Telecommunication Regulations.²⁹³ Although signed by 89 member states, a number of countries including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States refused to sign,²⁹⁴ in part due to an addition to the preamble proposed by African countries which states that '[t]hese regulations recognise the right of access of member states to international telecommunication services'.²⁹⁵ This was seen by some countries as expanding the regulations beyond their current remit to cover Internet governance and content.²⁹⁶

290 Gercke, '10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*', above n 37, 144.

291 Clough, above n 37, 389.

292 The ITU Cybercrime Toolkit, for example, does not contain provisions related to child pornography: International Telecommunication Union, 'ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation' (Draft Rev February 2010) 32–3 ('*ITU Toolkit*').

293 See generally International Telecommunication Union, 'Final Acts of the World Conference on International Telecommunications (Dubai 2012)' (December 2012).

294 International Telecommunication Union, *Signatories of the Final Acts: 89* <<http://www.itu.int/osg/wcit12/highlights/signatories.html>>. See also 'US and UK Refuse to Sign UN's Communications Treaty' *BBC News* (online), 14 December 2012 <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20717774>>.

295 'US and UK Refuse to Sign UN's Communications Treaty', above n 294.

296 *Ibid.*

IV (DIS)HARMONY

Overall, the global picture is one of a certain degree of fragmentation in membership of international and regional instruments related to cybercrime. Regional patterns are particularly clear. Countries in some parts of the world benefit from membership of binding cybercrime instruments — including more than one instrument for some countries — while other regions do not participate in any binding framework.²⁹⁷

An international convention is, of course, only one approach to harmonisation, and recent years have seen a flurry of activity in relation to cybercrime at the international, regional and national level. The UNODC has identified five ‘clusters’ of international and regional instruments addressing the challenges of cybercrime.²⁹⁸

The first are those which have been developed in the context of the *Convention*, the most significant being the *Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime*.²⁹⁹ Second, those developed by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)³⁰⁰ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).³⁰¹ The third is the League of Arab States’ *Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences*³⁰² and associated Model Law. Fourth is the *Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework Conducive to Cyber Security in Africa*.³⁰³ If ratified, this last instrument will make a particularly significant contribution to the development of cybercrime

297 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 68.

298 *Ibid* 64.

299 The Commonwealth, *Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime* (LMM(02)17, October 2002) (‘*Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime*’). See also Council of Europe, ‘The Cybercrime Legislation of Commonwealth States: Use of the *Budapest Convention* and the *Commonwealth Model Law*’ (27 February 2013). The *Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime* was recommended for the endorsement of Law Ministers in 2002.

300 Commonwealth of Independent States, *Agreement on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Offences Relating to Computer Information* (2001) (‘*CIS Agreement*’). The CIS consists of former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine: Commonwealth of Independent States, *About Commonwealth of Independent States* <<http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm>>.

301 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, *Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Information Security* (2010). The SCO consists of member states of Kazakhstan, China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as observer states of Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan, and dialogue partners of Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka: Official Website of Russia’s Presidency in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2014–2015, *Brief Introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization* <http://en.sco-russia.ru/about_sco/20140905/1013180761.html>.

302 League of Arab States, *Arab Convention on Combatting Information Technology Offences*, opened for signature 21 December 2012 <<https://cms.unov.org/DocumentRepository/Indexer/GetDocInOriginalFormat.drsx?DocID=3dbe778b-7b3a-4af0-95ce-a8bbd1ecd6dd>> (‘*Arab Convention*’).

303 African Union, *Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework Conducive to Cyber Security in Africa* (1 September 2012) (‘*Draft African Union Convention*’).

laws globally, being a binding instrument which encompasses the 54 member states of the African Union.³⁰⁴

The fifth category is United Nations instruments. Although there is no United Nations convention on cybercrime, the *UNTOC* can and has been utilised in the context of cybercrime.³⁰⁵ The *UNTOC* applies to the ‘prevention, investigation and prosecution’ of a number of specific offences required to be criminalised under arts 5, 6, 8 and 23,³⁰⁶ as well as ‘[s]erious crime’³⁰⁷ where the offence is ‘transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group’.³⁰⁸ The *UNTOC* has been ratified by 181 countries³⁰⁹ and requires parties to ‘afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings’.³¹⁰ It may also be used as the basis for extradition in those cases to which it applies.³¹¹

Although the United Nations’ *Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters*³¹² and *Model Treaty on Extradition*³¹³ do not deal specifically with cybercrime investigations or prosecutions, they can be applied or adapted to computer searches.³¹⁴ For example, the revised *Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters*³¹⁵ contains model provisions for expedited preservation and disclosure of stored computer data, production of stored computer data and search and seizure of computer data.³¹⁶ They do not, however, contain provisions relating

304 African Union, *Member States* <http://www.au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles>. The convention is only open to members of the African Union: *ibid* art IV-2(1). For a discussion of responses to cybercrime in Africa, see Uchenna Jerome Orji, *Cybersecurity Law and Regulation* (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012) chs 4–6.

305 See *Catalogue of Cases*, UN Doc CTOC/COP/2010/CRP.5, 6 [27].

306 *UNTOC* art 3(1). These are offences relating to participation in an organised criminal group, laundering of proceeds of crime, corruption and the obstruction of justice.

307 Defined as ‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty’: *ibid* art 2(b).

308 *Ibid* art 3(1)(b).

309 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Signatories to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime and its Protocols* <<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html>>.

310 *UNTOC* art 18(1).

311 *Ibid* arts 16 (extradition), 18 (mutual legal assistance). See also *Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition*, above n 22, 2 [3].

312 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters* <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_mutual_assistance_criminal_matters.pdf>. This model treaty was subsequently adopted in *Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters*, GA Res 45/117, UN GAOR, 45th sess, 68th plen mtg, Agenda Item 100, UN Doc A/RES/45/117 (14 December 1990) and amended in *Mutual Assistance and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters*, GA Res, 53/112, UN GAOR, 53rd sess, Agenda Item 101, UN Doc A/RES/53/112 (20 January 1999).

313 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Model Treaty on Extradition* <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition.pdf>. This model treaty was subsequently adopted in *Model Treaty on Extradition*, GA Res 45/116, UN GAOR, 45th sess, 68th plen mtg, Agenda Item 100, UN Doc A/RES/45/116 (14 December 1990) and amended in *International Cooperation in Criminal Matters*, GA Res 52/88, UN GAOR, 45th sess, 70th plen mtg, Agenda Item 103, UN Doc A/RES/52/88 (4 February 1998).

314 *UNODC Revised Manuals*, above n 79, 70 [12(d)], 77–8 [42], 111–12 [169].

315 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2007)* <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/model_law_on_mutual_assistance.pdf>.

316 *Ibid* ch 2 pt 4.

to electronic surveillance and interception, these being matters which parties may consider including in any treaty between them.³¹⁷

These are, of course, not discrete clusters, and there is considerable overlap. The *Convention*, in particular, has played a significant role in influencing the drafting of other instruments. In the Commonwealth, for example, beyond those countries which are parties, the *Convention* and the *Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime* have influenced the cybercrime legislation of a significant number of countries.³¹⁸ For example, although Australia is now a party, its cybercrime laws had already been influenced by the terms of the *Convention*.³¹⁹ Its influence further extends to countries such as Argentina, Pakistan, the Philippines, Egypt, New Zealand³²⁰ and Nigeria.³²¹ Adoption of the *Convention* has been recommended by the Organization of American States³²² and the Financial Action Task Force,³²³ and its influence on the United Nations' *ITU Toolkit*³²⁴ further expands its reach. Even within Russia it is acknowledged as the 'most important international legal instrument aimed at combating crime against computer security'.³²⁵ Overall it is claimed to have influenced approximately 100 countries in the drafting of their cybercrime laws,³²⁶ though such claims are very difficult to verify, and may conceal considerable divergence in levels of implementation.³²⁷

317 *UNODC Revised Manuals*, above n 79, 79 [47].

318 See discussion on Commonwealth States' use of the *Convention*: Council of Europe, 'Cybercrime Legislation of Commonwealth States', above n 299. At the meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers in Sydney in 2011, ministers

mandated the Commonwealth Secretariat to form a multidisciplinary working group of experts to review the practical implications of cybercrime in the Commonwealth [and] identify the most effective means of international co-operation and enforcement, taking into account, amongst others, the Council of Europe *Convention on Cybercrime*, without duplicating the work of other international bodies ...

Commonwealth Working Group of Experts on Cybercrime, 'Report to Commonwealth Law Ministers 2014 (Report, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014).

319 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 'Model Criminal Code — Chapter 4: Damage and Computer Offences' (Report, January 2001) 89.

320 See generally Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 'New Zealand's Cyber Security Strategy' (Report, 7 June 2011) <http://www.dPMC.govt.nz/sites/all/files/publications/nz-cyber-security-strategy-june-2011_0.pdf>.

321 Gercke, '10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*', above n 37, 143.

322 Organization of American States, *Conclusions and Recommendations of Remja-VII* <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cybVII_CR.pdf>.

323 Financial Action Task Force, 'International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations' (Report, February 2012) 27.

324 *ITU Toolkit*, above n 292.

325 Ernest, above n 213, slide 18.

326 Council of Europe, 'Project on Cybercrime: Final Report', above n 234, 42. See also Seger, above n 253, 3.

327 Gercke, '10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*', above n 37, 143. The cybercrime profile of a number of countries can be found at: Council of Europe, *Cybercrime Legislation — Country Profiles* <http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/CountryProfiles/default_en.asp>.

Beyond the *Convention*, the ITU has been active in promoting model legislation in a number of areas including Africa, the Caribbean³²⁸ and the Pacific.³²⁹ Africa, in particular, has seen a raft of initiatives, including the East African Community's *Draft EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws*,³³⁰ the Economic Community of West African States' *Directive on Fighting Cyber Crime Within ECOWAS*,³³¹ the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa's (COMESA) *Cybersecurity Draft Model Bill (2011)*³³² and the South African Development Community's *Computer Crime and Cybercrime Model Law*.³³³

Although it is positive to see so many global initiatives addressing the challenges of cybercrime, there is the very real danger of fragmentation. While a comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this article,³³⁴ it is sufficient to note that there are significant differences. For example, while the *Convention*, the *Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime*, the *CIS Agreement* and the *Arab Convention* all focus on a criminal justice response to cybercrime,³³⁵ others address cybercrime as part of a broader attempt to deal with international information security.³³⁶ The *Draft African Union Convention* for example, includes provisions relating to electronic transactions, cybersecurity and e-governance as well as cybercrime.³³⁷ Similarly, the SCO's *Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Information Security* provides for international cooperation in relation to information warfare, terrorism and other threats to international information infrastructure.³³⁸ Even within a criminal justice response, only the *Convention* and the *Arab Convention* cover substantive law, procedural law, jurisdiction and mutual assistance.³³⁹ Some provide for substantive offences on which it would be difficult to obtain broad international agreement, such as pornography and public order offences.³⁴⁰ Electronic evidence, which is vital to successful cybercrime prosecutions, is covered by relatively few instruments.³⁴¹

328 International Telecommunication Union, 'Cybercrime/e-Crimes: Model Policy Guidelines & Legislative Texts' (2012).

329 See generally International Telecommunication Union, *Support for the Establishment of Harmonized Policies for the ICT Market in the ACP States* <<http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-EC-ACP/Pages/default.aspx>>.

330 East African Community, *Draft EAC Legal Framework For Cyberlaws* (November 2008) <http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=632&Itemid=148>.

331 Economic Community of West African States, *Sixty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers: Directive C/DIR. 1/08/11 on Fighting Cyber Crime Within ECOWAS* (August 2011) ('*Directive on Fighting Cyber Crime Within ECOWAS*').

332 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 64.

333 International Telecommunication Union, 'Computer Crime and Cybercrime: Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law' (2013) <<http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/SADC%20Model%20Law%20Cybercrime.pdf>> ('*Computer Crime and Cybercrime Model Law*').

334 For a comparative analysis see *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, annex 3 267–75.

335 *Ibid* 68.

336 *Ibid*.

337 *Ibid* 69.

338 *Ibid* 68–9.

339 *Ibid* 70.

340 *Ibid*.

341 See *ibid* 69.

V WHERE TO FROM HERE?

Ultimately, however, the use of both binding and non-binding international and regional instruments has significant potential for positive progress towards greater sufficiency and harmonization of national laws — and, in the long run, enhanced international cooperation against a global challenge.³⁴²

On the one hand, the current global situation is one in which cybercrime is clearly on the international agenda, with a broad range of international, regional and national models for countries to draw upon. On the other hand, there is the danger that divergence ‘may lead to the emergence of country cooperation “clusters” that are not always well suited to the global nature of cybercrime’.³⁴³ While the United Nations process continues, it is conceivable that no international agreement will be reached on this issue in the near future. An international agreement will face the same challenges as the *Convention* — plus the additional issues that it does not address — all to be agreed between the member states of the United Nations. The ‘window of opportunity’ during which such an agreement could be reached may have passed,³⁴⁴ and it would now be ‘very difficult to bring all interests under an international agreement of the scope and depth of the *Budapest Convention*’.³⁴⁵

In the absence of international agreement, the *Convention* remains ‘the most complete international standard to date’.³⁴⁶ As of 2013, 82 countries had signed and/or ratified a binding cybercrime instrument.³⁴⁷ While no one instrument could be said to have global reach, the *Convention* has by far the largest influence,³⁴⁸ with 53 signatures/ratifications.³⁴⁹ Although falling short of a ‘global standard’,³⁵⁰ amongst countries responding to the UNODC’s *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime* it has by far the greatest influence on existing or planned cybercrime legislation.³⁵¹

This is not to suggest that all countries should accede to the *Convention*. The reality is that many will not or cannot. The *Convention* does, however, provide an important touchstone against which a country’s response to cybercrime may be measured, providing a ‘guideline or reference’ even for those countries which do not want to become parties.³⁵²

342 Ibid 76.

343 Ibid xi.

344 Seger, above n 253, 3.

345 Ibid.

346 *Proposal on Attacks against Information Systems*, above n 45, 3.

347 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 67.

348 Ibid.

349 Council of Europe, *Convention on Cybercrime CETS No: 185*, above n 237. Compare with the *Arab Convention* (18 countries/territories), *CIS* (10 countries/territories) and *SCO* (six countries/territories).

350 Gercke, ‘10 Years *Convention on Cybercrime*’, above n 37, 144.

351 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 75.

352 Seger, above n 253, 5.

Perhaps the most promising development over recent years has been the increased emphasis on capacity building, and the willingness of international, regional and national agencies to assist countries in developing an appropriate response to cybercrime. At the international level, there is increased cooperation between the UNODC and other relevant organisations including INTERPOL, the ITU, the European Commission and the Council of Europe, as well as the private sector.³⁵³

In 2012, the UNODC finalised its ‘Global Programme on Cybercrime’ which is intended to take an ‘holistic approach’ including ‘enhanced national, regional and international cooperation in addressing cybercrime’.³⁵⁴ In this it is supported by the ITU³⁵⁵ whose *Cybersecurity Gateway* lists a range of initiatives drawing upon the expertise of national, regional and international agencies and bodies.³⁵⁶ In addition, the ITU has produced two resources, the *ITU Toolkit*³⁵⁷ and *Understanding Cybercrime: Phenomena, Challenges and Legal Response*.³⁵⁸ The UNODC also participates as an observer with the Council of Europe Convention Committee, the Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative and others.³⁵⁹

The ‘Octopus’ programme is part of the Council of Europe’s ‘Global Project on Cybercrime’.³⁶⁰ The ‘Octopus Conference’ on cybercrime was first run in 2007 to encourage ratification and accession to the *Convention* and aimed to promote the use of the *Convention* as a guide in developing national legislation.³⁶¹ Today the conference still addresses the implementation of the *Convention* and ‘threats and trends’ in cybercrime, but also takes a unique focus each year.³⁶² For instance, in 2012 the key focuses of the conference were jurisdiction and cloud computing and information sharing.³⁶³ The Council of Europe also facilitates the ‘Octopus

353 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, *Promotion of Activities Relating to Combating Cybercrime, Including Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building: Report of the Secretary General*, UN ESCOR, 22nd sess, Agenda Item 7, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/24 (5 March 2013) 2 [3] (‘*Promotion of Activities Relating to Combating Cybercrime*’).

354 *Ibid* 2 [4].

355 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC and ITU Join Forces to Make Internet Safer* (19 May 2011) <<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/May/unodc-and-itu-to-cooperate-more-closely-to-make-the-internet-safer.html>>.

356 See generally International Telecommunication Union, *Cybersecurity Gateway: Home* <<http://groups.itu.int/cybersecurity-gateway/HOME.aspx>>.

357 See generally *ITU Toolkit*, above n 292.

358 See generally Marco Gercke, ‘Understanding Cybercrime: Phenomena, Challenges and Legal Response’ (Report, International Telecommunication Union, September 2012).

359 *Promotion of Activities Relating to Combating Cybercrime*, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/24, [13]–[14].

360 Council of Europe, *Octopus 2013* <http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy_octopus2013/Octopus2013_en.asp>. For a summary of the development of the Octopus Program, see Council of Europe, *Roots: The History of Octopus* <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy_octopus2012/presentations/Conclusions_octopus12.pdf>.

361 Council of Europe, *Octopus Interface 2007* <http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy%20activity%20Interface2007/Interface2007_en.asp>.

362 Council of Europe, *Octopus 2012* <http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy_Octopus2012/Interface2012_en.asp>; Council of Europe, *Octopus 2013* <http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy_octopus2013/Octopus2013_en.asp>.

363 Council of Europe, *Octopus 2012*, above n 362.

Cybercrime Community', which links cybercrime experts from around the globe with an aim of strengthening cooperation against cybercrime.³⁶⁴

To see harmonisation as a destination is unrealistic; it is a process. As the technology evolves and changes so too our responses will need to evolve and change. The ideal that all member states will have comprehensive cybercrime laws is a noble goal, but one that is many years off. With almost 60 per cent of reporting countries in the UNODC's *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime* indicating new or planned cybercrime legislation,³⁶⁵ it is vital that support be provided. Rather than focusing on differences as an impediment to harmonisation, the focus should be on how those differences may be resolved in working towards the common goal of effective international cooperation against a global challenge.

The binary debate about the *Convention* versus a United Nations Convention in some way presents a false dichotomy. Each country will determine what it considers necessary to effectively combat cybercrime, looking to national, regional and international standards in enacting laws that best suit its national circumstances. Nonetheless, the *Convention* provides a crucial benchmark against which such efforts can be measured, providing an internationally recognised framework for the harmonisation of cybercrime laws. For those countries that are unable to, or choose not to ratify, it provides an important model against which their own laws can be compared. Discussions about what the *Convention* does not cover are equally important for parties and non-parties alike. The UNODC and Council of Europe, as well as other regional and national initiatives, play an extremely valuable role in information sharing and capacity building. In this way, difference and diversity becomes a driver of change; the focus on what needs to be achieved rather than how difficult it will be. In a world now connected by technology, we may find that '[w]hat unites us is far greater than what divides us'.³⁶⁶

364 Council of Europe, *Welcome to the Octopus Cybercrime Community: About the Octopus Cybercrime Community* <<http://octopus-web.ext.coe.int>>.

365 *Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime*, above n 10, 63.

366 John F Kennedy, 'Address before the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa' (Speech delivered at the Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, 17 May 1961).