

School not liable for exclusion of student with a disability

Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education & Training)
[2003] HCA 62

THE FACTS

In 1998, Mr Purvis complained to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission that the New South Wales Department of Education and Training had contravened the *Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)* by suspending and then expelling his foster son, Daniel.

Daniel was born in 1984 and suffered a severe encephalopathic illness at six or seven months of age. The illness damaged his brain and caused him to act violently and abusively at times.

In 1997, Daniel was expelled from a New South Wales state high school after numerous suspensions for kicking, punching and swearing at teaching staff and other students.

The commission found the Department of Education and Training had discriminated against Daniel because of his disability and ordered the sum of \$49,000 be paid as compensation.

The State of New South Wales sought an order of review of the decision by the Federal Court and the decision was set aside. Mr Purvis appealed

to the Full Federal Court which dismissed the appeal. In 2002, Mr Purvis was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia.

FINDINGS

The respondent argued successfully before the Full Federal Court that the disturbed behaviour caused by a disability should be distinguished from the physical manifestation of the disability.

Before the full bench of the High Court, the appellant argued that the definition of 'disability' includes both the disorder and the behaviour that results from or is caused by the disorder. The High Court agreed with this contention and concluded that Daniel's violent and abusive behaviour was covered by the Act.

The High Court then considered whether Daniel was treated less favourably than a person without his disability would have been treated in circumstances that were the same or not materially different.

To make this comparison, the appellant argued that the treatment Daniel received should be compared to the treatment that would have been received by a student without the disability who did not exhibit disturbed behaviour. The majority of the High Court disagreed and found the violent

actions towards teachers and other students formed part of the circumstances in which it was said that Daniel was treated less favourably.

In coming to this conclusion, the court considered the harsh position that would arise if an employer or education authority, confronted with violent behaviour resulting from a disability, breached discrimination legislation by complying with the criminal law or with their legal obligations to maintain the safety of staff and students.

The majority, comprising Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ, then determined that Daniel had not been discriminated against as the education authority would have suspended and eventually expelled a student who did not have Daniel's disability, but exhibited the same abusive and violent behaviour.

McHugh and Kirby JJ provided a dissenting judgment. Their Honours highlighted the beneficial nature of the legislation and stated that courts should avoid construing ameliorating provisions narrowly for fear of imposing 'draconian consequences' on respondents. It is a matter for parliament to correct the legislation if harsh consequences result from an interpretation that gives full effect to the language of the Act.

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Their Honours considered the purpose of the Act would be defeated if the characteristics of the disabled person, such as violent behaviour, were attributed to the person with whom the com-

parison was being made and found Daniel had been discriminated against by the education authority.

Throughout the proceedings a case was made out for direct discrimination

only, as the model for indirect discrimination was not applicable in the circumstances. ■

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Don't be added to the bottom of the waiting list

Aviles v Allianz - Unreported, Brisbane District Court, Boulton DCJ, 27 August 2003

A request by a defendant for a medico-legal examination can sometimes cause a plaintiff frustrating delays. Defendants most often make these requests after the plaintiff has obtained their medical evidence, and it is not uncommon for the next available medical appointment to be up to six months away.

In *Aviles v Allianz*, the insurer requested that the plaintiff undergo examination by a psychiatrist and forwarded the requisite panel of three practitioners. The plaintiff rejected the panel on the grounds of unnecessary delay. Allianz submitted a further panel of practitioners which was again rejected on the same grounds.

Allianz then provided a third panel. An appointment with Dr Lawrence on this panel would have caused a delay of six months or more, while appoint-

ments with doctors on the previous panels would have caused delays of approximately seven to ten months.

Allianz argued that the practitioners on its panel were ones in whom it had confidence. Boulton DCJ noted that it was not good enough for Allianz to adopt a stance that there are only seven psychiatrists in Brisbane in whom it has confidence and if that means delay to the plaintiff then it is up to the plaintiff to concede the point.

Boulton DCJ ordered that Allianz provide the plaintiff with a panel of three psychiatrists available within three months to assess the plaintiff. Further, if Allianz failed to do so, it would forgo the right to have the plaintiff assessed.

The irony is that had the plaintiff's solicitors agreed to the first panel of experts, the examination would have long since been completed by the time the application was heard.

The *Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002* (Qld) and *WorkCover Queensland Act 1996* (Qld) have similar provisions allowing defendants the opportunity to have plaintiffs independently examined and require a similar panel of three

practitioners to be submitted for the plaintiff's consideration. *Aviles* could be applied in these situations to avoid unnecessary delay for plaintiffs.

In the past, plaintiff lawyers have generally accepted the delay caused by the defendant exercising their right to have the plaintiff examined. In light of the decision in *Aviles*, plaintiff lawyers are less likely to tolerate long waiting lists for medical examinations. It is most likely that defendants will have to either widen the pool of specialists they brief or make bulk future appointments which they can then allocate to specific plaintiffs as the need for review arises.

As reports from new specialists become available, the APLA special interest group forum will be a great tool for practitioners to discuss these reports and to assist in making a choice of expert from a defendant panel. It may well be the case that solicitors prefer to endure some delay, rather than select a practitioner who will undoubtedly write an unfavourable report. However, as a result of *Aviles*, that delay should be no more than three months. ■

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