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Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal |
HOW TO BE SELFISH AND POLITICAL WITHOUT REALLY TRYING – TIME FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT IN THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES WITHIN QUEENSLAND’S NOT-FOR-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONS
NIGEL
STOBBS [*]
Disputes
within incorporated associations in Queensland currently come within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Queensland.
There is no statutory
requirement for internal dispute resolution procedures and no statutory
mediation requirement. Both are features
of similar legislation in some other
Australian jurisdictions. In an environment of significantly increased
membership of not-for-profit
associations, a more accessible and less formal
dispute resolution regime is called for. The author argues that a therapeutic
approach
to internal disputes would be preferable to the current adversarial
approach.
I THE ADVERSARIAL STATUS QUO
According to the Office of Fair Trading there are approximately 20,000
incorporated associations in
Queensland.[1] Although some of these
associations no doubt boast few more than the statutory requirement of seven
members,[2] it would be fair to
suggest that virtually all Queenslanders are involved in, or are members of, an
incorporated association at some
time in their life. Associations which cater
for the sporting, cultural, political and professional activities of citizens
are probably
destined to play an even more prominent role in the lives of
ordinary Queenslanders given the needs of an aging population, many
of whom
still desire to maintain an active social, sporting and cultural life after
retirement.[3]
Given the
diverse and extensive membership base of these associations it is not surprising
that disputes between members and the two
organs of management of an association
– the management committee and the members in general meeting – are
very common.
Some disputes can be resolved internally, but an increasing number
cannot. Despite the existence of mechanisms within the legislation
for an
external review of some disputes,[4]
and the availability of various mediation forums, these avenues are rarely
pursued by most community groups.
The Associations Incorporation Act
1981 (Qld) (the Act) provides for a judicial review of the validity of a
decision of an association which deprives a member of a right
conferred on that
member by the association’s
rules.[5] But what constitutes such a
right is usually limited to the very basic matters of admission to, and
expulsion from, membership,
acting in accordance with the association’s
rules and procedural matters.[6]
Although some expulsion cases are dealt with judicially, it is rare for
other sources of dispute – such as contrary interpretations
of club rules
– to reach the litigation stage. Furthermore, discretion to refuse an
application for review exists where a
matter is considered to be
trivial.[7] Neglecting to hold
committee meetings or to ignore applications for membership have been held to be
reviewable matters,[8] but often the
issues giving rise to disputes, while vitally important to the disputants, lack
sufficient statutory impetus to attract
jurisdiction. In the case of Re
Maggacis[9] Thomas J dismissed
an application for the review of a procedure for the election of a sporting
coach, where the successful candidate
was himself a voting member of the
appointing committee, saying that: ‘It was one of the many exercises in
life where people
are entitled to act, if they so choose, selfishly or
politically’. Selfish or political behaviour is clearly at the heart
of
many disputes within clubs and community organisations. The Office of Fair
Trading, which has responsibility for administering
the Act, makes this
observation in a more diplomatic way:
The membership of an incorporated
association can be made up of a number of individuals with different
personalities, values and beliefs
and this may lead to disputes arising within
that membership, particularly about the interpretation of an association’s
rules.[10]
Such behaviour on the part of members of public statutory tribunals
would be almost certain to attract jurisdiction for review, since
in those
tribunals high levels of objectivity and impartiality are required, and where in
the words of one judicial authority: ‘the
administration of justice by
courts proper, and those acting in a similar capacity, public policy requires
that there should be no
doubt about the purity of the
administration’.[11]
But in the private association, neither the perception nor the reality of
selfish and political behaviour and motivation can really
be
avoided:[12]
Domestic
tribunals are usually established in circumstances which are radically
different. The members, generally speaking, have agreed
to abide by a set of
rules and the authority of a committee to enforce them, if necessary by
expulsion. The committee members cannot,
in the nature of things, divest
themselves of the manifold predilections and prejudice resulting from past
associations with members.
Apprehension of bias could be generated in all kinds
of ways. If it was a disqualifying consideration, the enforcement of the
consensual
rules would be largely unworkable.
If there are justiciable
issues at the heart of a dispute (which relate to the rights of a member
conferred by the association’s
rules), jurisdiction for a review is vested
in the Supreme Court.[13]
It is hardly surprising that few disputes reach this forum considering the
expense involved and the complexity of rules of evidence
and procedure which
really demand professional legal representation. Most matters which do reach
the court are grounded in allegations
that the applicant has been denied natural
justice by the respondent
association.[14]
The Act
requires an incorporated association to observe the rules of natural justice in
adjudicating upon the rights of its members
conferred by the association’s
rules. But the benefit to the corporate health of an association, where
external adjudication
of disputes concerning an alleged denial of natural
justice occurs is, in practice, quite limited given that any overturned decision
will frequently be reconsidered by the association’s management committee
or by the members in general meeting. This may do
nothing to address the
underlying causes of any dispute.
There is no definition of natural
justice in the Act, and the common law authorities tell us that the content of
natural justice will
depend on the circumstances of each case – how the
impugned decision was made, what the consequences were for the applicant
and
what rights are available under the association’s
rules.[15] Nevertheless, an
applicant who establishes that they have been denied natural justice as required
by the Act, establishes that there
has been an error in law and is entitled to
have the decision set aside as
void.[16]
The court does have
a discretion to require an applicant to exhaust any possible remedies or
adjudicatory processes available within
the
association[17] before filing an
application for review, but the Act itself mandates neither the exhaustion of
internal remedies nor even the existence
of internal remedies to begin with.
The Act contains no prescription for dispute resolution mechanisms beyond the
recognition of
the authority of a general meeting to overturn decisions of the
management committee in some circumstances – a few of those
circumstances
being dealt with in the statutory Model
Rules.[18] Under the rules of most
associations, the right to be heard by a general meeting in relation to other
sorts of disputes is usually
subject to the ability of the member concerned to
requisition a meeting by petitioning the management committee or by lobbying for
the support of a significant number of other
members.[19] So in effect the
ultimate internal authority to adjudicate on a dispute is a simple majority of
the members in general meeting.
If a member asserts that this simple majority
has, in reaching a decision, breached the vague and uncertain content of the
principles
of natural justice, or denied a right which the member ought to
possess under the association’s rules, then the next step pursuant
to the
Act is an originating application in the Supreme Court of
Queensland.[20]
Although
the nature of dispute resolution processes within Queensland associations is
frequently adversarial in nature, there is no
statutory or common law
requirement that a domestic tribunal must conduct itself according to an
adversarial model.[21] Most of the
litigation in the area of associations’ law involves claims by members of
associations that they have been unfairly
excluded from an organisation or that
the process used to expel them has been contrary to the association’s
rules. The process
used to expel a member, however, is necessarily adversarial
in that it invariably involves a contest between firstly the individual
member
and the management committee, and then the individual member and a general
meeting of members. A survey of the few matters
which make it to a Supreme
Court review are illustrative of this.
In the matter of Green
v Nanango Bowls Club Inc.[22]
the applicant sought orders overturning his expulsion from the bowls club, a
constitutional objective of the club being to: ‘develop
and promote
activities to advance good fellowship between club members.’ The source
of the dispute was a number of letters
received by the club’s management
committee, from (among others) the applicant’s sister and her husband,
complaining
of the language the applicant had used to describe her after
‘an incident’ one afternoon at the club premises. The management
committee voted to expel Mr Green on the grounds that his impugned conduct
breached a clause of the club rules which proscribed various
forms of
unacceptable behaviour.[23]
Although the applicant had been provided with copies of the letters of
complaint, the club secretary, in the notice of the expulsion
hearing, did not
specify exactly which form of conduct in the rules was alleged to have been
exhibited by exactly which actions or
words of the applicant. According to
White J, this failure to adequately particularise the impugned conduct, with
reference to the
club rules, amounted to a breach of natural justice and the
applicant was successful. The order was therefore a declaration that
the
decisions of both the management committee and the general meeting to expel Mr
Green were void. Both the applicant and the volunteer
members of the
association’s management committee would therefore have endured at least
three adversarial processes, culminating
in a Supreme Court hearing where both
parties were represented by solicitors and counsel. The ultimate result would
almost certainly
have been the convening of another general meeting, this time
with written notice which complied with the court’s understanding
of
procedural fairness. The benefit to all parties from this process would have
been negligible.
Therefore in these circumstances, the adoption of
adversarial processes may lead to a party being declared ‘the
winner’,
but that is not really a ‘resolution’ in the sense
that the internal dissension leading to the adversarial process had
not been
resolved. These sorts of adversarial processes consequently do not resolve
disputes at all – and in Green’s Case I would suggest that
the statutory review process simply prolonged the dispute at considerable
expense to the parties – exactly
the same outcome is likely to have
occurred and the applicant would, almost certainly, have still been expelled
from the club. In
Re Maggacis, commenting on the evolution of civil
rights and liberties, Thomas J advises that: ‘In guiding this evolution,
the idealism
of judges should be tempered with the knowledge that intrusion of
lawyers into every aspect of human life and the cultivation of
a litigious
society may not be in the public
interest’.[24]
Given
the fractious, political and dare I say it, selfish nature of community
organisations we ought not to assume, however, that
the dearth of associations
matters heard by Queensland courts is any reflection of a lack of disputation
within these organisations.
If we do accept the view of Thomas J that
association members are entitled to act selfishly and politically, we should not
conflate
that with a fatalistic acceptance that the law, and law makers, can do
nothing but sit by while community organisations wallow in
dysfunction and pick
up the pieces when the dust of litigation settles. It is inadequate legislative
policy to simply ask associations
to settle their disputes internally (where the
association’s rules provide for this), and that if this internal process
fails,
to seek adjudication in the Supreme Court. What is needed is some
prescriptive general process for the hearing of grievances within
these
community organisations and an ultimate review forum which is both more
accessible and more therapeutic in operation than the
Supreme Court.
In
the next section I suggest that a dispute resolution scheme within an amended
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ought to be based on a
therapeutic, rather than an adversarial model.
II A NEW PARADIGM - THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
A dispute within an association is fundamentally dissimilar to a dispute
within a company or a dispute involving a public authority.
An incorporated
association is a corporate expression of shared interests, objectives and
values, and that shared experience is
shaped and regulated by a set of rules to
which the members voluntarily submit. The authority to interpret and apply
those rules
is granted to the management committee which has an authority
defined by the consent of members. A dispute in this context, therefore,
is a
disagreement of an insular and private nature. Nevertheless, the paradigm for
the legal resolution of associations’ disputes
is a blend of approaches
from administrative law and company law. Being a hybrid and somewhat ad
hoc approach, there is a consequent lack of a credible underlying
jurisprudence on which to ground a system of dispute resolution. Inevitably
therefore, the jurisprudence which informs the approach of the legislature and
court towards dispute resolution in private associations
is adversarial in
nature – and it is that adversarial jurisprudential paradigm which I say
is counterintuitive. The legislative
reforms suggested later in this paper are
based on the premise that the law ought not to act exclusively as a forum for
adversarial
arbitration of associations’ disputes but as a therapeutic
agent. The contention is that in these sorts of disputes, ‘the
law itself
can function as a kind of
therapist’.[25]
As in
company law,[26] the constitution of
an incorporated association forms the terms of a contract between the members
and the association.[27] Resolution
of commercial contractual disputes, although sometimes able to be achieved
through mediation or arbitration, is ultimately
a matter for an impartial and
external, statutory tribunal. Authority to adjudicate disputes concerning the
terms of a commercial
contract lies with the court. The role of the law in a
commercial contractual dispute is to decide which party to the dispute shall
prevail – the health, well-being or continued ability of the parties to
contract not only falls outside the court’s jurisdiction,
but ought to be
excluded from judicial reasoning as matters outside the terms of the contract.
Perhaps axiomatically, the dysfunction
which lies at the heart of many
commercial disputes is neither addressed nor resolved by adversarial litigation
and the disintegration
of business relationships is often accelerated by
litigation.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is informed by beliefs that
adversarial legal processes can have a wide range of deleterious effects on
the
physical, mental and emotional wellbeing of the parties to a dispute – in
addition to the deleterious effects of the dispute
itself. Although
traditionally associated with the so-called problem solving
courts[28] there is a growing trend
to incorporate this approach into other areas of legal focus. Therapeutic
jurisprudence takes the view
that the legal content of a dispute is not the only
factor (or even the major factor) which impacts on the health or wellbeing of
the parties to the dispute. The manner in which the dispute is addressed and
resolved is also critical.
The coercive nature of a judicial decree or
order, as the result of an adversarial attempt to sway judicial opinion, often
does nothing
to address the underlying tensions and political differences which
give rise to the dispute. More importantly, an adversarial approach
to dispute
resolution within associations does nothing to promote and encourage the
resolution of disputes internally. Simply asserting
that it is judicial and
legislative policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of private
associations,[29] and vesting
jurisdiction to hear those disputes which are nevertheless eligible for review
in a superior court, may reduce the incidence
of associations litigation, but
surely does nothing to reduce the incidence of internal disputes. Research
shows that 86 per cent
of associations in Queensland have an income of less than
A$50,000 per annum, and 78 per cent have a membership of less than
100.[30] Organisations of this size
simply do not have the resources to access the Supreme Court in order to resolve
a dispute.
The reluctance to prescribe internal procedures of any sort
gains some credence from the liberal right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and
association. Article 22(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,[31] to which
Australia is a signatory, provides that: ‘[e]veryone shall have the right
to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and join
trade unions for the protection of his interests’. Even this fundamental
source, however, recognises
that the freedom to associate is not unlimited and
ought to be coupled with some responsibilities by those who choose to associate
in a formal way.[32] A right to
associate and to incorporate may be a licence to act selfishly and politically,
but if such behaviour threatens to undermine
an association (if not addressed)
to the extent that the association’s continued existence is at risk, then
some legislative
prescription of dispute resolution procedures may in fact be
seen as a protection of the right to associate.
What then would
constitute a therapeutic approach to the resolution of associations’
disputes? A coherent dispute resolution
regime would not involve the imposition
of a particular mediator or domestic tribunal format, but would recognise that
those disputes
which just cannot be resolved internally would be dealt with in a
forum which suits the nature and needs of this type of organisation.
As one
commentator has suggested: ‘researchers have renounced the paternalistic
notion of the therapeutic State’ –
the agenda is not about imposing
some publicly determined conception of normative wellbeing, but in this context
would involve elucidating,
to some extent, the association’s own views
about what constitutes its wellbeing and how that can be best
achieved.[33]
In
Green’s Case discussed
above,[34] neither the process nor
the outcomes of the dispute resolution procedure were therapeutic. There was no
attempt to mediate the dispute
between members of the club and this rapidly
escalated into a dispute between an individual member and the association
itself. This
escalation process and the tendency of an association’s
management to ‘take sides’ in disputes between members
is a direct,
and perhaps inevitable, result of the adversarial paradigm. The process of
convening a hearing for the termination
of membership and then enduring a
hearing in the Supreme Court would naturally involve some degree of stress and
trauma for the parties
– and the point I am examining here is that this
stress and trauma is in addition to that created by the subject matter of
the
dispute itself (the allegedly abusive behaviour of the applicant).
A
therapeutic alternative to the adversarial paradigm would have some genesis in
the restorative justice approach. Rather than simply
processing the litigating
parties according to the usual legislative rules, any external forum for review
would have as its goal
the restoring of the balance between the parties which
allows a harmonious free association to continue (where possible). To some
extent this approach is adopted by the Small Claims Tribunal in Queensland,
which is convened by a referee (usually a specially trained
magistrate) in an
informal environment and in which lawyer advocates are excluded unless all
parties agree and the Tribunal is satisfied
that no party would be at a
disadvantage.[35]
In many
associations the only formal dispute resolution procedure within their
constitution is probably the right of a member to appeal
to a general meeting
following a decision to expel the member. If we were to adopt a legislative
policy which required associations
to adopt some procedure for initially dealing
with grievances in a less adversarial manner, this would not be an infringement
of
the right to associate. It would bolster that right. In the following
section I discuss statutory requirements for internal dispute
resolution and
mediation mechanisms adopted in other jurisdictions which do not always
prescribe the method of mediation to be adopted,
but specify how mediation and
the hearing of grievances is to be carried out if an association has not turned
its attention to this
matter within its own rules.
III REFORM IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A United
Kingdom
Australian jurisdictions are relatively progressive in comparison to the rest
of the common law world when it comes to the choice
of corporate personalities
open to community organisations – and the legal structure of an
organisation will, to some extent,
impact on the availability and
appropriateness of dispute resolution procedures. In the United Kingdom, for
example, most sporting,
cultural and community organisations are either
incorporated as companies limited by guarantee or as registered
charities.[36] Until quite
recently, not-for-profit organisations in England needed to adopt both these
structures and comply with both company
law and charities law if the
organisation wanted to benefit from limited liability, legal personality and the
ability to access even
modest amounts of public
funding.[37] Remedies open to a
disgruntled member of a company limited by guarantee are, of course, those
provided for by corporations legislation
and since a company is fundamentally a
commercial entity we would not expect these remedies to be as appropriate for a
private community
organisation as those provided for in dedicated
associations’ laws.
Charities in the United Kingdom, which are
somewhat more broadly defined than in Australia, will soon be able to
incorporate as a
body akin to incorporated associations in
Australia.[38] Disputes between
members of these organisations, or between members and the organisation itself
are often referred to mediation,
but no statutory provisions for internal
dispute resolution exist and a common law civil action may be the only other
avenue open
to a
member.[39]
Clause 32 and sch
6 of the Charities Bill 2005 (UK) creates a new legal entity, the Charitable
Incorporated Organisation, which has
been created specifically for charities.
Virtually all incorporated charities are currently companies limited by
guarantee and there
are dual reporting requirements for both the Companies House
and the Charity Commission. Although this proposed legislation has
some
resemblance in terms of its substantive provisions to Australian incorporated
associations’ legislation, it contains no
provisions for the resolution of
internal disputes. No such incorporation process, however, is available for
non-charitable associations,
and internal disputes would therefore be resolved
pursuant to the limited company’s own memorandum and articles of
association.
All Australian jurisdictions, in providing for the creation
of a dedicated legal structure for associations, separate to that available
under company law, are therefore well placed to provide some statutory guidance
to internal dispute resolution for these entities.
The extent to which this
opportunity is taken, however, varies between jurisdictions. Some Australian
jurisdictions already take
a more therapeutic approach to associations’
disputes, although others are even less progressive than Queensland.
B New South Wales
The Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) provides that the rules
of an association must provide for the mechanism for the resolution of disputes
between members (in
their capacity as members) and between members and the
incorporated association.[40] This
then would be the minimal therapeutic requirement we could expect. It
represents some requirement that an association attempt
to address internal
disputes other than simply referring them to the finality of a general meeting.
The Model Rules, set out in sch 1 of the Associations Incorporation
Regulation 1999 (NSW), provide that all disputes are to be referred to a
community justice centre for mediation in accordance with the Community
Justice Centres Act 1983 (NSW). This mechanism for the resolution of
disputes in the Model Rules would apply where an association’s rules do
not provide
for the matter. In this legislation there is no statutory power to
expressly exclude the Model Rules.
This differs significantly from the
Queensland legislation. Internal dispute resolution is not a matter which must
be provided for
within an association’s rules. Unsurprisingly therefore,
there is no equivalent model rule to that of the New South Wales
legislation
which prescribes a mediation process. Even if such a model rule existed in the
Queensland legislation, there is an express
statutory authority to exclude the
Model Rules.[41]
C Victoria
In most salient respects, the Associations Incorporation Act 1981
(Vic) operates in a similar way to the Associations Incorporation Act
1984 (NSW). The schedule to the Victorian Act in s 17 requires an
association to include a grievance procedure in its rules and there
is no
provision to exclude the Model
Rules.[42] Model Rule 8 in sch 5 of
the Associations Incorporation Regulation 1998 (Vic) suggests compulsory
mediation before progressing to a pursuit of a member’s rights according
to law.
Interestingly s 14B of the Associations Incorporation
Regulation 1998 (Vic) also prescribes that a member must be allowed to
appoint any person to act for them in a grievance procedure – and
that the rules of natural justice must apply. Although there may well be
situations
where a member is so traumatised by the content of a dispute, or has
some unavoidable disability preventing self-advocacy (such as
coming from a non
english speaking background), this provision ought to have been drafted more
rigidly to either preclude the appearance
of professional legal advocates or to
make their appearance subject to the agreement of all parties to the dispute.
The fact that
the early involvement of lawyers in associations’ disputes
is not often warranted, was the focus of some important obiter in
Green’s Case where White J stated
that:[43]
Mr Green contends
that he was entitled to be represented by his solicitor ... I am not persuaded
that the council failed to accord
Mr Green procedural fairness when it declined
to allow him legal representation. Even though there is no statutory prohibition
or
prohibition in the rules it is not inappropriate to keep such procedures
reasonably informal.
It could well be the case, given the nature of
community organisations, that a member is significantly disadvantaged in not
having
the necessary resources to engage counsel in such a dispute – and
the subsequent imbalance of power may itself infringe the
individual
member’s right to associate.
It is worth noting that the
Associations Incorporation Regulation 1998 (Vic) also gives jurisdiction
to the Magistrates Courts[44] to
declare and enforce the rights and obligations of members under the rules, and
these courts may refuse to give any orders sought
for reasons similar to those
set down in the current Queensland Act with respect to the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction.[45] The Victorian
Parliament recognised eight years ago that Supreme Court litigation would be
beyond the resources of the vast majority
of
associations.[46]
D South Australia
In South Australia no statutory model rules are available, and there is only
a very basic set of required constitutional content (which
does not include
provision for the resolution of internal
disputes).[47] The Supreme Court of
South Australia has a jurisdiction to amend an association’s rules on
application by the
members.[48]
E Western Australia
The Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) mandates that whilst some
matters must be dealt with in an association’s rules, internal dispute
resolution is not one
of these
matters.[49] Although the power to
wind up an association is given to the Supreme
Court,[50] there are no statutory
natural justice requirements applying to decisions of an association and hence
no provision for a court to
resolve any internal dispute between the association
and its members.[51]
F Tasmania
Incorporated associations in Tasmania are regulated by the Associations
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas). There is no express provision within this Act
for dispute resolution, but model rules are available and the legislation
provides
that where an association’s rules, submitted as part of its
application for incorporation, do not exclude or modify particular
provisions of
the Model Rules, then those particular Model Rules are deemed to form part of
the rules of the association.[52]
Model Rule 35 then provides that internal disputes, meaning disputes between a
member of the association and the association itself,
are to be determined by
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Arbitration
Act 1986 (Tas). This is an interesting compromise between the expense and
complexities of a higher court hearing and the informality of a
mediation.[53] The Model Rules do
provide, however, that disputes in relation to the termination of individual
membership are to be dealt with
by the association’s committee, at first
instance, and then by the members in general meeting. The arbitration provision
is
expressly excluded from applying to matters of
expulsion.[54]
G Northern Territory
The Northern Territory is one of the few jurisdictions to have enacted
mandatory natural justice requirements in relation to the resolution
of disputes
within incorporated associations (either between individual members or between
members and the association).[55]
The Associations Act 2003 (NT) also provides that a member of an
association may apply to a local court or to the Supreme Court for an order in
relation to
conduct (or proposed conduct) of the association which is
oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial or unfairly
discriminatory.[56] Both courts
have similar powers with respect to the orders that can be issued in response to
such an application[57], except that
the local court cannot give an order to wind up the association or to appoint a
receiver.[58] There is a requirement
that an association’s constitution contain a procedure for the settling of
disputes between a member
and the
association[59] and, interestingly,
an express provision for the incorporation of customs and traditions from the
ethnic community to which the association’s
members
belong.[60] Presumably then, it is
possible for associations with a predominantly aboriginal membership to take
advantage of Indigenous dispute
resolution mechanisms. Model rules are
available, as in some other jurisdictions, and these provide for grievance and
dispute resolution
procedures similar to those in the Victorian
legislation,[61] but there is no
statutory provision which would insert a model rule into an association’s
own rules if they were silent as
to a particular
matter.[62]
H Australian Capital Territory
The Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) provides that members of an association who are deprived, by a decision of the association’s management committee, of a right conferred by the association’s rules may make application to the Supreme Court or the Magistrates Court for a remedy.[63] As under the Queensland Act, the Model Rules are deemed to apply where the association’s own rules are silent as to a matter which is provided for in the Model Rules.[64] Although neither this Act nor its Regulations make any specific provision for internal dispute resolution, the Model Rules do mandate a process for dealing with the ‘disciplining of members’.[65] This procedure requires that a member who is to be suspended or expelled from the association has a right of appeal to the management committee in regard to this suspension or expulsion, which is to include a right to an oral hearing. This is of interest in that the common law does not recognise any general right to a hearing for members of an association in such disputes.[66]
Under the legislation of the Australian Capital Territory, an
association can, of course, avoid the imposition of the right to an
oral hearing
of a dispute by drafting its rules in that way. As in
Queensland,[67] the statutory
natural justice requirements cannot operate to exclude express provisions of an
association’s rules in relation
to dispute resolution – and the
rules of the association are deemed to be the terms of a contract between each
of the members
and between the members and the association
itself.[68]
IV RECOMMENDED REFORMS FOR QUEENSLAND
A therapeutic paradigm for the resolution of associations’ disputes in
Queensland would ideally involve each of the following
reforms:
A Removal of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear
disputes
As we have seen above, in Victoria the jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes
externally has been removed from the higher courts to the
Magistrates Court. A
similar reform here would have the advantage of decentralising the forums (there
are far more Magistrates Courts
than Supreme Courts in Queensland). It would
also involve far less expense for parties to the dispute. All stipendiary
magistrates
are deemed to be referees of the Small Claims
Tribunal[69] and therefore can be
expected to have at least some training and insights into the nature of disputes
within community organisations.[70]
However, I believe it would be counter-intuitive to both make the court
process more accessible and then to encourage more litigation
and less
self-reliance by creating a broader jurisdiction for review. If the
Magistrate’s Court was to be the choice of an
alternative forum I would
suggest keeping the grounds for a statutory external review reasonably narrow
– and to require some
form of internal grievance procedure and mediation
as a condition precedent to getting a court hearing.
If a Magistrates
Court is to gain jurisdiction there will also need to be some thought given as
to the rules of procedure and evidence
which will apply. If we adopt the
legislative position adopted by the Small Claims Tribunal discussed above, then
both procedure
and evidence would be a matter for negotiation between the
parties and the court.[71] This
surely has some therapeutic advantage as no party will have complex and
adversarial processes imposed upon them.
Another issue requiring
attention would be the appellate hierarchy to which any decision of a magistrate
sitting in an association’s
jurisdiction would be subjected. A right of
appeal to a higher court, against any review by a magistrate, could ultimately
nullify
the therapeutic advantage of a hearing in a less formal environment, but
to what extent would we need to reconcile this with a need
to allow the law of
private and domestic tribunals to continue to develop? My own submission would
be that in light of the relatively
few matters which are litigated in the
superior courts of Queensland (only two matters involving an internal dispute of
an incorporated
association were heard by the Supreme Court in the 2005 calendar
year – and none by the Court of
Appeal)[72], the lack of future
legal development would be a small price to pay for the overthrow of the
adversarial paradigm.
Another alternative forum for review could be the
Commercial and Consumer Tribunal
(CCT).[73]
This tribunal commenced operation in July 2003 to hear matters from various
‘empowering Acts’[74]
such as the Building Act 1975 (Qld), the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) and
the Retirement Villages Act 1999 (Qld). This is in many ways the ideal
forum for the resolution of associations’ disputes as it is already
equipped with the
sort of jurisdiction and powers which promote a therapeutic
hearing. The Tribunal has the power to permit or prohibit legal representation
at hearings and the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Act 2003 (Qld) is
based on the principle that parties should be self-represented whenever
possible.[75] Most matters will
involve an initial mandatory mediation, and legal representation, at this stage,
is also at the discretion of
the presiding Tribunal member and with the consent
of the other parties.[76] An
application to commence a hearing is currently
A$212[77] for matters commencing
pursuant to most of the empowering Acts and this puts the forum more
realistically within the range of community
organisations and their members.
The provision for mandatory mediation and case management would go some way
towards avoiding the
feared increase in litigation which may arise if the
jurisdiction was transferred to the Magistrates Court.
One weakness of
this forum could be the somewhat centralised location of the facilities.
Currently the Tribunal is only physically
located in Brisbane and although there
is some provision for teleconferencing, and the registry operates an online
service, the infrastructure
does not really exist for the CCT to convene in
anywhere near the number of centres as does the Magistrates Court. For this
reason,
it would seem to be clearly more equitable, in the interests of access
to justice, to vest jurisdiction in the Magistrates Court.
It should, however,
be noted that a lack of available statistical data kept by the relevant
jurisdictions makes it difficult to
quantify any increased benefits to
associations in those jurisdictions, such as Victoria (discussed
above),[78] where jurisdiction has
been transferred to a lower
court.[79]
B Statutory requirement for internal grievance
procedures
The second strategy we can adopt to assist associations manage disputes is to
create some statutory requirement for associations to
have meaningful internal
processes for resolving grievances. Often what starts as a minor personality
clash or a disagreement over
a relatively trivial matter can snowball into
genuine threats of legal action, defamation suits and attempts by members to
have each
other expelled from the association. In Green’s Case
discussed earlier,[80] a dispute
over harsh language in the car park of a bowls club rapidly escalated into a
Supreme Court hearing about the content of
natural justice. Some of these
disputes could surely be nipped in the bud if there were a process for
addressing grievances that
fell short of court action or convening general
meetings – but was perceived by the aggrieved party as more credible than
simply
an appeal hearing to the same committee that made the impugned decision
in the first place. In my view the Associations Incorporation Act 1981
(Qld) ought to require some internal dispute management procedures which must be
exhausted before an application could be made to
a court or tribunal for an
external review.[81] Even if there
was such a prescribed process within a Queensland association, there is no
statutory requirement for an applicant
to exhaust those remedies before they
apply to the Supreme Court for a review.
C Mediation
If internal procedures fail then the next port of call ought to be external
mediation. There is already a free mediation service
provided by the Department
of Justice and Attorney-General in Queensland, but that is rarely utilised.
This would almost certainly
change if we were to require mediation before a
tribunal or court review. A mediator does not rule for either party or decide
the
issue for them – but can assist the parties to come to a negotiated
settlement and if necessary to formalise the terms of their
agreement in a
legally binding way. Considering the fairly specialised nature of associations
disputes it may be desirable for the
Office of Fair Trading (as the body
administering the Associations Incorporations Act 1981 (Qld)) to train or
be involved in the provision of mediators – but regardless of who
coordinates them, mediators need to be
available in all areas of the State.
Obviously some disputes, once they leave the association are beyond mediation
– but an
internal dispute may seem insoluble simply because there has been
no independent viewpoint up until that
point.[82]
V CONCLUSION
We need a shift in focus from adversarial and external dispute resolution process to a model which positively encourages and empowers associations to resolve their disputes internally. Disputes within a voluntary organisation can be a healthy and therapeutic experience if properly managed, and my intention here has not been to suggest that we ought to try and prevent or suppress disputes via legislation or policy.[83] Proponents of both restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledge that the therapeutic agenda is not about control. However, if some disputes must be settled by a public tribunal, then that tribunal ought to be informed, as far as possible, by a therapeutic rather than adversarial ethos. This is not a time for incremental changes to associations’ law. Major legislative reforms do not happen often in this area. The leading High Court decision dates back more than sixty years.[84] Opportunities for reform are infrequent, and for that reason this shift in focus needs to be rapid and paradigmatic.
[*] BA,
MA(Phil) (UQ), PGrad Dip Ed (USQ), LLB (Hons) (QUT), PhD candidate (QUT),
Associate Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, Queensland
University of
Technology.
[1] Department of
Tourism, Fair Trading and Wine Industry Development, Review of the
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld), Consultation Paper
(2005).
[2] Associations
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 51(a).
[3] D Rowland, ‘An
Ageing Population: Emergence of a New Stage of Life?’ in S Khoo and P
McDonald (eds), The transformation of Australia’s Population:
1970-2030 (2003) 8, 8.
[4]
Section 119 allows for the appointment of a special investigator by the Chief
Executive, pursuant to saving provisions in the now repealed Financial
Institutions Code 1992. This avenue is really only available where
there is a purported issue of fraud or serious financial mismanagement which
amounts
to criminal behaviour on the part of the association’s management
committee.
[5] Associations
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s
71(2).
[6] See various clauses of
the Model Rules in the Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld)
– such as clauses 6, 8, 9 and
10.
[7] Associations
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s
73(2)(a).
[8] Della Bon v
Abednego [2000] QSC
275.
[9] [1994] 1 Qd R 59,
68.
[10] Department of Tourism,
Fair Trading and Wine Industry Development Queensland, Incorporated
Associations – Good Business Guide (2005) 49
<http://www.fairtrading.qld.gov.au/oft/oftweb. nsf/AllDocs/BF1D4613C153A04A4A256F6A001AA6FE/$File/IA%20Good%20Business%20Guide.pdf>
at 30 June 2006.
[11]
Mahoney v NSW National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR
161, 170 (Glass JA).
[12]
Ibid.
[13] At common law a
court will consider whether an association’s rules do in fact empower the
association to exercise the powers
which it purports to exercise (Lee v
Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329), but will generally
not supplant its own decision for that of the domestic tribunal where those
powers are in fact provided for in
the rules (Malone v Marr
[1981] 2 NSWLR 894).
[14] Associations
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s
71(3).
[15] According to one
commentator: ‘The courts emphasize that particular applications do not
create precedents, but as more and
more decisions are subject to judicial review
it is only natural that public and private tribunals, their advisers and lawyers
who
appear before them look for guidelines, if not firm rules’. J R S
Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (2002)
87.
[16] Escobar v
Spindaleri (1987) 7 NSWLR
51.
[17] R v Williams;
Ex parte Lewis [1992] 1 Qd R
643.
[18] The Act provides that
the management committee must be elected by the members in general meeting (s
62(1)) and that the management
committee must see that the association complies
with rules concerning the convening of general meetings (s 57(1)) – so
that,
in this sense, management committee decisions are ultimately reviewable by
the membership by way of a change in committee membership
(in addition to any
decisions expressly subject to a general meeting review under the
association’s rules). Clause 10 of the
Model Rules, for example,
(contained in sch 4 of the Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999
(Qld)) provides a process for a general meeting of members to adjudicate on an
appeal by a member over a decision of the association’s
management
committee to terminate that person’s membership. The Model Rules are a
set of basic provisions, drafted in plain
English, which an association is able
to adopt, either as written or in amended form, as its own rules. The
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 47 provides that where a
matter is included in a provision of the Model Rules but not in an
association’s own rules, then the
association’s own rules are taken
to include that other provision. Section 47(3) allows, however, an association
to expressly
exclude the operation of s 47. One suspects that many (and perhaps
most) associations may be unaware of the operation of s
47.
[19] Clause 26 of the Model
Rules would require that a general meeting can be requisitioned by 33 per cent
of the members of the management
committee or by ordinary members of the
association numbering double the number on the management committee plus
one.
[20] The Office of Fair
Trading reminds associations that: ‘If the situation cannot be resolved
within the association, you can
choose to seek mediation or legal advice. It
has no power to intervene in an association’s internal disputes. It
cannot provide
legal advice to you, nor can it assist in interpreting the rules.
Ultimately only the Supreme Court can make a ruling on internal
disputes’.
Department of Tourism, Fair Trading and Wine Industry Development Queensland,
above n 10, 50.
[21] Forbes
observes that: ‘A duty to act judicially does not mean that it (the
domestic tribunal) must act judicially’.
Forbes, above n 15,
163.
[22] [2002] QSC 201.
[23] Clause 12 of the
club’s constitution provided that a member: ‘shall not conduct
illegal gambling, betting on games,
speak obscene or abusive language or indulge
in unseemly conduct. Any alleged infringement of this clause, on report in
writing to
the Council, shall be investigated by the Council, which shall have
the power to demand and direct apologies and, if necessary, if
the offending
person be a member, to deal with that person under the provisions of Clause 13
[pertaining to expulsion]’.
[24] Re Maggacis [1994] 1
Qd R 59, 68.
[25] B J Winick,
‘The jurisprudence of therapeutic jurisprudence’ (1997) 3(1)
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 184,
185.
[26] Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) s 140(1): ‘A company’s constitution (if any) and any
replaceable rules that apply to the company have effect as a
contract.’
[27]
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 71(1): ‘Upon
incorporation the rules of the association shall constitute the terms of a
contract between the members from time to
time and the incorporated
association.’
[28] See,
eg, D Wexler, ‘Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence’ in D Wexler and B Winick (eds), Law in a Therapeutic
Key (1995) 811. Here a broader conceptualisation of therapeutic
jurisprudence is applied beyond the American drug courts which address
problems
of recidivism via a blend of case management and rehabilitation in
[29] There is judicial policy
of long pedigree to the effect that it is inappropriate for a public court to
intrude into the internal
affairs of a private association. See, for example,
the following House of Lords dicta: ‘Save for the due....administration
of
property, there is no authority... to take cognisance of the rules of a
voluntary society’ (Forbes v Eden (1867) LR 1 SC & DIV
568, 581). Since the seminal High Court decision of Cameron v
Hogan [1934] HCA 24; (1934) 51 CLR 358, 373, in which the court pronounced that:
‘agreements to associate for scientific or philanthropic, social or
religious purposes
are not agreements which courts of law can enforce’,
the policy has prevailed in Queensland. As stated in Re Maggacis [1994] 1
Qd R 59, 67: ‘it is not appropriate that the courts intrude unduly into
the management of private
associations’.
[30] F
Guthrie, Report on the Non-Profit Enterprises Business Improvement
Project (February 2002).
[31]
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 22(1) (entered into force 23 March
1976).
[32] International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December
1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 22(1) (entered into force 23 March 1976): ‘No
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
which
are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public),
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.’
[33]
B Arrigo, ‘The Ethics of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Critical and
Theoretical Enquiry of Law, Psychology and Crime’
(2004) 11(1)
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 23,
24.
[34]
[2002] QSC 201. See above n 22 and accompanying
text.
[35] Small Claims
Tribunal Act 1973 (Qld) s
32(3).
[36] As a company limited
by guarantee, these organisations would be regulated by the Companies Act
1985 and 1989 (UK) which contains no provision for the resolution of
internal disputes.
[37] In
Queensland, not-for-profit organisations which are incorporated associations but
which do not meet the stringent criteria for
registration as a charity can still
access significant funding sources via statutory schemes such as the Gambling
Community Benefit
Fund, established by the Gaming Machine Act 1991 (Qld)
s 315.
[38] The Charities Bill
2005 (UK) has passed through the House of Lords and is currently awaiting a
second reading in the House of Commons:
Public Bills Before Parliament
2005-06 (2006) The United Kingdom Parliament
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgibin/newhtml_hl?DB =semukparl & STEMMER=en & WORDS=chariti%20bill & ALL=charities%20bill
& ANY= & PHRASE= & CATEGORIES= & SIMPLE= & SPEAKER= & COLOUR=red & STYLE=s & ANCHOR=muscat_highlighter_first_match
& URL=/pa/pabills.htm#muscat_highlighter_first_match>
at 9 June 2006.
[39] Such as a
civil action for breach of trust, breach of contract or breach of
director’s duties.
[40]
Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) sch 1 cl 5A.
[41] Although s 47(1) of the
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) provides that: ‘if a
matter is not provided for under an incorporated association’s own rules
but the matter is
provided for under a provision of the Model Rules (the
“additional provision”), the association’s own rules are
taken
to include the additional provision’, the power to expressly exclude the
Model Rules appears in s 47(3) which states
that: ‘Subsection (1) does not
apply to an incorporated association as far as its own rules provide that the
subsection does
not apply to the association’.
[42] Associations
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 21(3).
[43] [2002] QSC 201, [28].
[44] Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s14A(2).
[45] The Court may
refuse to give an order on the grounds that the application is trivial, or
unreasonable, or where the conduct of the
appellant has contributed to the costs
of the proceedings: Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 14A(4).
See further above n 7 and accompanying text.
[46] The Minister in her Second
Reading Speech for the Associations Incorporation (Amendment) Bill 1997 (Vic)
declared: ‘In expressing support for the Bill I also point out that the
miscellaneous provisions now provide -- among
other things, but probably most
significantly -- for members of associations to have disputes heard in the
Magistrates Court rather
than in the Supreme Court, which is an expensive means
of enforcing one's rights.’ Victoria, Parliamentary Debates,
Legislative Council, 14 October 1997, 138 (Hon. D A Nardella).
[47] Associations
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s
23A.
[48] Associations
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s
24A.
[49] Associations
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) sch
1.
[50] Associations
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s
31.
[51] One would presume,
therefore, that a member who asserts that the association is bound by the rules
of natural justice when adjudicating
on the rights of members would need to
invoke common law authorities. There is some authority in Dickason v
Edwards [1910] HCA 7; (1910) 10 CLR 243, 255; [1910] VicLawRp 85; [1910] VLR 537 that (in the absence of
statutory standards) the rules of an association ought to be constructed in a
way which is consistent with
the rules of natural
justice.
[52] Associations
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 16. The Model Rules are contained in the
Associations Incorporation (Model Rules) Regulation 1997
(Tas).
[53] Arbitration
provides, for example, for the appearance of legal representatives by agreement
of all parties, or where the subject
matter of the dispute involves amounts
exceeding A$20,000, whereas legal representatives are unlikely to be involved in
mediations:
Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (Tas) s
20.
[54] Associations
Incorporation (Model Rules) Regulation 1997 (Tas) cl 35(1), (2).
[55] Associations Act
2003 (NT) s 39 provides that: ‘If the committee of an incorporated
association exercises a power of adjudication that it has in
relation to a
dispute between members of the association, or a dispute between itself and
members of the association, the rules of
natural justice must be
observed’.
[56] Associations Act
2003 (NT) s 109. Section 109(c) also allows a member to seek orders in
circumstances where they allege that the association’s rules
contain
provisions which are ‘unfair or unreasonable’.
[57] Associations Act
2003 (NT) s 109(f), for example, provides that the court may issue an order
requiring a person to do a specific act, while s 109(g) empowers
the court to
alter the constitution of an
association.
[58]
Associations Act 2003 (NT) s
109(5).
[59] Associations Act
2003 (NT) s 21(c).
[60]
Associations Act 2003 (NT) s
21(3).
[61]
Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations 2004 (NT) cl
56.
[62] Associations (Model
Constitution) Regulations (NT) cl
56.
[63] Associations
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 49,
50.
[64] Associations
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 37(1),
(2).
[65] Associations
Incorporation Regulation 1991 (ACT) sch 1, s
9.
[66] See, eg Croatia S
Sydney Soccer Football Club Ltd v Soccer Australia Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Einstein J, 23
September
1997).
[67]
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s
47(3).
[68] This is generally
the position at common law in Australia (Dickason v Edwards [1910] HCA 7; (1910) 10 CLR
243, 251-255) and by statute in the Australian Capital Territory
(Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s
58).
[69] Small Claims
Tribunal Act 1973 (Qld) s
5(1).
[70] Small Claims
Tribunal Act 1973 (Qld) s 5(1).
[71] The Small Claims
Tribunal Act 1973 (Qld) s 32(3) provides, for example, that no party may be
legally or professionally represented unless all other parties agree.
Section
33(3) displaces the standard rules of evidence and empowers the tribunal to
inform itself on any matter in such manner as
it thinks fit.
[72] According to the judgments
available on the court’s own website at: Queensland Courts
<http://www.courts.qld.gov.au>
at 31 August 2006.
[73] According to the Department
of Tourism, Fair Trading and Wine Industry Development, ‘[t]he Commercial
and Consumer Tribunal
is an independent decision-making body for resolving
consumer and industry related disputes and reviewing administrative decision
fairly, quickly, economically and informally’. Commercial and Consumer
Tribunal (2004) Department of Tourism, Fair Trading and Wine Industry
Development
<http://www.qbt.qld.gov.au>
at 16 June
2005.
[74] Commercial and Consumer
Tribunal Act 2003 (Qld) ss 4(1),
8.
[75] Commercial and
Consumer Tribunal Act 2003 (Qld) s 76(1) provides that a person representing
a party (other than an individual) cannot be a lawyer and that an individual
must represent himself
or herself. Section 76(2) sets out the conditions upon
which legal representation may be permitted, including at the direction of the
Tribunal itself (s
76(2)(e)).
[76] Commercial
and Consumer Tribunal Act 2003 (Qld) s
117.
[77] According to the
current scale published by the Tribunal Registry at Commercial and Consumer
Tribunal (2004) Department of Tourism, Fair Trading and Wine Industry
Development
<http://www.qbt.qld.gov.au/Registry/rFees.shtm>
at 16 June
2005.
[78] See above n 44, and
accompanying text.
[79] Consumer
Affairs Victoria, like its counterparts in other jurisdictions, has no statutory
responsibilities in relation to internal
disputes and so does not keep records
of litigated disputes or their outcomes. Similarly, matters dealt with by the
State’s
Magistrates Courts are not reported. There is anecdotal evidence
that some associations in Victoria do not believe that the Magistrates
Court is
the appropriate forum, and a recent review of that State’s legislation
recommends (in response) that magistrates be
given the option of referring such
disputes to mediation or arbitration: Review of the Associations
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) Interim Report (2005) Consumer Affairs
Victoria, 28
<http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/ CAV_Publications_Consultations_Reviews/$file/IAreviewreport.pdf#xml=http://search.justice.vic.gov.au/isysquery/irl4ba2/2/hilite>
at 30 June
2006.
[80]
[2002] QSC 201. See above n 22 and accompanying
text.
[81] Forbes considers
that the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene in the internal disputes
of clubs could well have extended
to some strict rule of internal exhaustion
– but legislatures and courts have declined to create such requirements
even where
the constitution of an association itself seeks to proscribe legal
action until internal remedies have been sought: Forbes, above
n 15,
268.
[82] And of course there
must always be some ultimate provision for external adjudication if a party
requires it, because as Forbes observes
‘in some quarters the belief
persists that a hearing is superfluous in “clear” cases...That is
the very idea that
natural justice seeks to dispel’: Forbes, above n 15,
90.
[83] See, eg, S Lukes, Power:
A Radical View (1974) 24, cited in D Carson, ‘Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Adversarial Injustice: Questioning Limits’ (2003) 4(2)
Western Criminology Review 124, 127. Here Lukes states: ‘is it not
the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever
degree,
from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the
existing order of
things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because
they see it as natural and unchangeable,
or because they value it as divinely
ordained and beneficial?
[84] Cameron v Hogan
[1934] HCA 24; (1934) 51 CLR 358.
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