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Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal |
TECHNOLOGICAL TYING OF THE APPLE IPHONE:
UNLAWFUL IN AUSTRALIA?
DALE
CLAPPERTON[*] AND STEPHEN
CORONES[†]
Technology
vendors are producing products and services which, by design, use technological
methods to restrict interoperability and
tie the use of their products and
services to the use of other products and services from the same vendor. Often
this type of technological
tying raises concerns that it is anti-competitive.
One such example is the technological tying of the Apple iPod to music purchased
from the Apple iTunes Music Store, and vice versa. The new Apple iPhone
contains technological locks which tie the iPhone to the
mobile telephony
services of a particular third-party mobile carrier, a new development in
technological tying, and much more likely
to be unlawful in Australia. The
purpose of this article is to examine whether the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth), in its current form is adequate to deal with this type of technological
tying.
I INTRODUCTION - DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL TYING
Increasingly, products and services are being bundled together in the
computer, media, entertainment, and telecommunications sectors.
Such bundling
may be economically efficient and pro-competitive if it is the result of
economies of scope which give rise to cost
savings. Consumers benefit if the
integrated product is supplied to them at lower prices. On the other hand, such
bundling may
be the result of a misuse of market power. A supplier with market
power in relation to one product or service may force consumers
to take a second
product or service which consumers do not want, or can obtain more cheaply, from
another supplier. If so, consumers
are harmed and more efficient suppliers are
foreclosed.[1]
In the past,
suppliers have given effect to such anti-competitive conduct by way of
conditions in contracts or licence agreements.
However, the need to impose such
a tie by way of contract has been obviated by the increasingly widespread use of
methods of technologically
tying products together, such as restrictive Digital
Rights Management (‘DRM’)
technology.[2]
DRM systems are
not perfect, and most DRM systems have been ‘cracked’ or
circumvented, often by groups of enterprising
amateurs, collaborating over the
Internet. Manufacturers use their ingenuity to devise better and stronger DRM
systems, and technology
enthusiasts use their ingenuity to devise ways around
the DRM, motivated by the intellectual challenge, a philosophical objection
to
DRM, quest for glory and bragging rights, or more practical considerations.
Thus far, the manufacturers have lost every major
battle.
A Apple Inc.’s DRM track record
Apple Inc.’s previous use of DRM in their entertainment-related
products and services has caused significant controversy. Apple
Inc.’s
proprietary DRM system, known as FairPlay, is the only DRM system supported by
the Apple iPod, and is used to encrypt
all content (including music, videos, and
movies) purchased from the Apple iTunes Music Store.
The effect of this
is that content which consumers purchase from the iTunes Music Store can only be
used on hardware and software
that support FairPlay DRM. Because Apple Inc.
refuses to license FairPlay to other manufacturers, the only devices which
support
FairPlay DRM are produced by Apple Inc.
FairPlay is the only DRM
technology that the iPod supports, and as a consequence, consumers with iPods
cannot purchase content from
suppliers other than Apple and use it on their
iPods. Those other suppliers of content use different, more openly-licensed DRM
technologies.
When a competitor of Apple Inc. devised a way to encrypt music in
a FairPlay-compatible format, and sold music through their own
website which
could be played on Apple Inc. iPods, Apple Inc. threatened to sue, and updated
the software in iPods to prevent that
music from being played on
iPods.[3]
Despite the
controversy caused by Apple Inc.’s use of FairPlay DRM, until recent times
their conduct was limited to technologically
tying Apple Inc. goods and services
to other Apple Inc. goods and services, and as we discuss
below,[4]
would only be unlawful in Australia if it had the purpose, effect or likely
effect of substantially lessened competition.
Apple Inc.’s marketing
strategy for the iPhone in some foreign countries steps over a significant line
– it is no longer
forcing the use of their own products and services, it
is forcing the acquisition of services from entirely unrelated companies.
This
conduct may be per se unlawful in Australia.
B Tying or locking of mobile phones to specific carriers
The sale of mobile phones which are tied to a particular carrier is
long-established in Australia. The justification for this behaviour
is that the
mobile phones are sold – or often supplied ‘free’ – to
consumers at less than their actual cost
ie the mobile carrier subsidises the
cost of the phone. The carrier then recoups this loss over the term of the
contract with the
consumer.
Typically, the mobile phones will be unlocked
by the carrier upon request, once the initial contract term has expired, or an
early
termination fee of some description is paid, so that the carrier may
recoup the subsidy.[5]
Where
the carrier has not subsidised the cost of the phone, there seems to be no
legitimate pro-competitive justification for locking
the phone to the services
of that carrier, especially where that locking is permanent and not just for the
duration of the initial
contract.
Apple Inc. co-founder and CEO Steve Jobs announced the Apple iPhone at
the Macworld convention in January
2007,[6] describing the iPhone as
‘a revolutionary and magical product that is literally five years ahead of
any other mobile
phone.’[7]
The iPhone was said to combine:
three products – a revolutionary
mobile phone, a widescreen iPod with touch controls, and a breakthrough Internet
communications
device with desktop-class email, web browsing, searching and maps
– into one small and lightweight handheld
device.[8]
The iPhone
functions as a quad-band[9] GSM
mobile phone with EDGE support,[10]
a 2.0 mega pixel digital camera, a portable media player with iPod-type
functionality, which allows the playing of music and video
(including purchased
television content and motion pictures), an organiser with PDA-like
functionality, and an Internet browser and
email client with internet
connectivity via WiFi (allowing the iPhone to be used on residential or
corporate wireless networks) or
EDGE (via the mobile telephony
network).
Apple Inc. announced on the same day that Cingular (a
then-subsidiary of AT&T, currently branded as AT&T Mobility) had been
chosen as ‘Apple’s exclusive US carrier partner’ for the
iPhone.[11]
Other exclusive distribution agreements have been announced for Germany,
France and the United
Kingdom.[12]
However, it appears that Apple will not itself sell iPhones to the public in
Germany and France, making their carrier partners the
sole
suppliers.[13]
The
precise terms of the agreement between Apple and AT&T are not known, but
some details have been leaked by the press, and the
terms of the agreement are
alleged to include that:
• AT&T would be the exclusive provider
for iPhone mobile telephony services in the US;
• the duration of the
exclusive agreement was five years;
• Apple Inc. would receive a
proportion of revenues generated by AT&T iPhone
users;[14]
• iPhone users
were to be prohibited from using a mobile provider other than AT&T by way of
technological locks on the iPhone;
and
• Apple Inc. would be restrained
for a period of time from developing a version of the iPhone which would be
compatible with
CDMA wireless networks – the network technology used by
many of AT&T’s largest
competitors.[15]
The back of
the retail packaging of the iPhone states: 'Requirements: Minimum new two-year
wireless service plan with AT&T required
to activate all iPhone features,
including iPod
features.'[16]
In smaller
print, further down the back of the packaging, it states in part: 'Credit check
required; must be 18 years or older. Service
plan with AT&T required for
cellular network capabilities on expiration of initial two-year
agreement.'[17]
Despite the
technological tie to AT&T, the iPhone has been phenomenally successful.
Launched on 29 June 2007, Apple Inc. reported
selling 270 000 iPhones in the
first two days of its release,[18]
and sold 1 000 000 iPhones within 74
days.[19]
US financial
disclosure rules require Apple to separately account for ‘deferred
revenue’ to be received from Apple Inc.’s
carrier
partners.[20] This has allowed
financial analysts to calculate that AT&T pays Apple Inc., on average, US$18
per month per iPhone activated
on the AT&T network. Over the two-year
contract term, an iPhone user will pay more to Apple Inc. in these indirect fees
than
the purchase price of the
phone.[21] Media reports claim that
European mobile operators have offered Apple Inc. as much as 40% of revenues
from iPhone users to secure
exclusivity.[22]
The cost of
these secret commissions to Apple Inc. is, of course, ultimately born by the
consumer, in the form of more expensive mobile
services.
A Technological enforcement of the iPhone-AT&T tie
Although there is no express contractual requirement to enter into a
mobile contract with AT&T to purchase the iPhone, a newly
purchased iPhone
is in a disabled or ‘locked’ state and cannot be used until it is
‘activated’. All functionality
of the iPhone is disabled until the
phone is activated[23] – the
iPhone cannot even be used for iPod-type functions, such as playing audio files,
until activation takes place.
Activation is a technical process, during
which the user electronically provides their personal details, contact
information, credit
card details, etc to AT&T and contracts with AT&T
for a two-year mobile telephone
plan.[24] Once the new contract
with AT&T is complete, an electronic signal is sent to the iPhone which
‘activates’ or unlocks
it, and all functions of the phone are
available from that point onwards.
However, even post-activation, the
iPhone cannot be used with mobile telephony services provided by any carrier
other than AT&T.
Inserting a SIM card of another mobile carrier will not
work, and will display an error message on the iPhone. This means that
US-based
iPhone users can not use their iPhones with any carrier other than AT&T,
even after the expiration of their initial
two-year
contract.
B Circumventing the iPhone-AT&T technological tie
The US launch of the iPhone started another round of the DRM v The
People arms race. In less than two months, George Hotz, a 17-year old
American student publicly announced a method of unlocking the
iPhone.[25] Hotz’s original
method involved disassembling the iPhone and soldering its components, and as
such required specialised skills,
making this method unsuitable for most
consumers.[26]
Software-only
unlocking methods were developed thereafter, and iPhone unlocking software tools
have evolved to the point where they
can be used by ordinary
consumers.[27] Many observers would
have expected Apple Inc. to sue under anti-circumvention laws to suppress the
development and distribution
of these tools, yet this has not yet happened.
There appears to have been only one reported case in which Apple or AT&T has
even threatened legal
proceedings.[28]
Yet if Apple
Inc. is showing restraint in dealing with iPhone unlocking via the legal system,
it seems to be striking back at a technological
and customer support level.
Apple announced that the unlocking of an iPhone, by software or otherwise, would
void the warranty on
the iPhone, a claim which is supported by the warranty
documentation.[29] Some
commentators have argued that this action violates the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act[30] and is
unlawful.[31] Apple Inc. has also
announced that unlocking the iPhone is a violation of the user’s licence
to use the iPhone
software.[32]
Apple Inc. has
also signalled an intention to continue working against unlocking tools and
unlocked iPhones at a technological level.
Apple CEO Steve Jobs described the
problem of unlocking as ‘a constant cat and mouse game ... we have to stay
one step ahead
of them. It’s our job to keep them from breaking
in.’[33]
Apple Inc. has
also released updated software for the iPhone which, if installed on an unlocked
iPhone, will permanently disable the
device.[34] While Apple Inc.
attribute this result to ‘irreparable damage’ said to be caused to
the iPhone’s software by ‘unauthorized
iPhone unlocking
programs’, and deny that it is intentionally disabling unlocked iPhones,
consumer reaction has been considerably
more sceptical.
At least two
class action lawsuits have been filed against Apple Inc. in the US in relation
to the iPhone, alleging contraventions
of federal and state antitrust and
consumer protection laws, as well as other causes of
action.[35]
III TRADE PRACTICES ACT ANALYSIS OF IPHONE TYING
The iPhone is expected to be launched in Australia some time in early
2008.[36] Given that Apple Inc. has
an exclusive agreement with AT&T in the
US,[37] and has announced exclusive
agreements in Germany, France and the
UK,[38] Apple may well pursue a
similar marketing strategy in Australia.
It is not clear whether Apple
inc will itself sell the iPhone in Australia. Apple Inc. sells the iPhone to
the public in the US,
and has announced its intention to do so in the UK, but in
Germany and France, Apple’s chosen mobile carrier is the sole
authorised[39] source of the
iPhone.[40]
Of the mobile
networks in Australia, only Telstra’s network supports the EDGE technology
which the iPhone uses for high-speed
data
transfer.[41] This might make
Telstra appear the logical partner for Apple, but senior Telstra executives have
publicly criticised the iPhone
as ‘old hat’ and suggested that Apple
should stay out of the mobile phone
market.[42]
In the course of
writing this article, we requested comment from Apple Inc. on how the iPhone
would be distributed in Australia.
Apple Inc. declined to comment on what it
described as ‘rumour and speculation’ concerning the launch of the
iPhone in
Australia.[43]
For
the purposes of our analysis we will assume the following
facts:
• Apple will enter into an exclusive distribution contract
with a single Australian mobile carrier (‘Carrier’);
• the
Carrier will sell the iPhone to the public, but Apple Inc. may or may not do
so;[44]
• where the
identity of the Carrier is relevant, the Carrier will be
Telstra;[45]
• as in the
US, the iPhone will be sold in a disabled state and will not be able to be
‘activated’ without entering
into a new mobile phone contract with
the Carrier;
• as in the US, the iPhone, even after
‘activation’, will not be able to be used with the mobile services
of any
company other than the Carrier; and
• as in the US, the iPhone
retail packaging will contain a statement that entering into a new mobile phone
contract with the
Carrier is necessary to activate the iPhone.
In this section, we discuss third-line forcing in the context of Apple Inc. selling the iPhone, as well as the Carrier. This may constitute third-line forcing by Apple Inc.. Where the iPhone is sold by the carrier only, this may constitute exclusive dealing (tying) by the carrier and is discussed below in section III
C 2.
Exclusive dealing is prohibited by s 47(1) of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Most types of exclusive dealing are unlawful only
if they have the purpose, or are likely to have the effect of substantially
lessening competition.[46]
Third-line forcing, however, is a form of exclusive dealing that is unlawful
per se. The nature of third-line forcing is such that it is reasonable
to presume that it harms competition, and so actual harm need not
be
shown.[47] Once it is found that a
company has engaged in third-line forcing, arguments that it did not
substantially lessen competition are
irrelevant.[48]
In
this respect, the competition laws of Australia are somewhat unique – in
the US, EU, and most other countries, third-line
forcing is treated no
differently from any other kind of exclusionary conduct.
Third-line
forcing involves at least two separate
suppliers.[49] Company A sells
product A on the condition that the purchaser also acquires product B from
company B, or Company A refuses to sell
product A because the prospective
purchaser would not agree to acquire product B from company
B.[50]
Third-line forcing is
defined in ss 47(6) and 47(7) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
Section 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) provides
that:
(1) Subject to this section, a corporation shall not, in trade or
commerce, engage in the practice of exclusive dealing.
...
(6) A
corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the
corporation:
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services;
(b)
supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services at a particular price;
or
(c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount, allowance,
rebate or credit in relation to the supply or proposed supply
of goods or
services by the corporation;
on the condition that the person to whom the
corporation supplies or offers or proposes to supply the goods or services or,
if that
person is a body corporate, a body corporate related to that body
corporate will acquire goods or services of a particular kind or
description
directly or indirectly from another person not being a body corporate related to
the corporation.
Section 47(7) is in similar terms to s 47(6), but
defines third line forcing by reference to a refusal to supply for the
reason that the person supplied has not acquired goods or services from a third
party, or agreed to do so.
Thus, in order to satisfy the definition of
third line forcing in s 47(6) it is necessary to satisfy the following
elements:
• two separate products, Product A and Product
B;
• three parties, Supplier A, Supplier B and the
Customer;
• Supplier A will supply Product A to the Customer only on
the condition that the Customer acquires Product B from Supplier
B.
The
basis upon which Apple Inc. will conduct sales of iPhones in Australia has not
yet been announced. In this section we consider
the implications of a number of
possibilities.
1 First Characterisation
If Apple Inc. supplies or offers to supply goods (the iPhone) on the
condition that the purchaser will acquire mobile phone services
from the
Carrier, the conduct will clearly fall within s 47(6).
There would be two
contracts: one between Apple and the purchaser for purchase of the iPhone
itself, and a separate contract between
the Carrier and the purchaser for the
supply of mobile telephony services. This would negate any ‘package
deal’ defences.[51]
The
next question to be addressed is whether the iPhone would be supplied on the
condition that the purchaser acquired mobile telephony services from the
Carrier. Apart from the notice on the back of the retail iPhone packaging
to
the effect that entering into a new contract with the Carrier is required to
activate the iPhone, there seems to be no express
statement from Apple Inc. that
the purchaser is in fact under an obligation to contract with the
Carrier.
However, ‘condition’ within the meaning of s 47
encompasses more than just express contractual conditions, and has a meaning
‘uncircumscribed by contract law
notions.’[52] Section 47(13)
provides that:
(13) In this section:
(a) a reference to a condition
shall be read as a reference to any condition, whether direct or indirect and
whether having legal
or equitable force or not, and includes a reference to a
condition the existence or nature of which is ascertainable only by inference
from the conduct of persons or from other relevant circumstances;
The
‘condition’ however must involve more than a mere hope or
expectation,[53] and must involve
some element of compulsion to acquire the second
product.[54] In SWB Family
Credit Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd, Northrop J
said:
It does not matter whether the condition is legally binding or not,
see s 47(13)(a) ... but in my opinion the condition must have some attributes of
compulsion and futurity. This can be expressed in the form ‘If
we do
this, you will (must) do that.’ A condition in the nature of an
obligation must be imposed upon the person dealing with
the corporation. The
condition to be complied with must result from something done or to be done by
the corporation imposing the
condition.[55]
The iPhone is
sold in a disabled state, and cannot be used until it is
‘activated’, which can only be performed once the
purchaser has
entered into a contract with the Carrier. Although entering into a contract
with the Carrier is not, strictly speaking,
a condition of purchasing an iPhone,
the iPhone is all but useless unless and until the purchaser contracts with the
Carrier. There
is a very real practical compulsion on the consumer to acquire
mobile telephony services from the Carrier.
The availability of methods
to circumvent the DRM which locks the customer into a particular carrier would
be unlikely to affect this
conclusion, especially given that those methods may
be unlawful, would void the warranty of the phone, contravene the software
licence
agreement, and Apple Inc. is taking technological steps to prevent their
use.
A court would be likely to infer the existence of a
‘condition’ in the terms suggested, based on the conduct of Apple
Inc. and the technological locking of the iPhone.
If the Carrier or Apple
were also to sell an ‘unlocked’ version of the iPhone at a higher
price,[56] this would not affect the
conclusion that this behaviour would constitute third-line forcing. Section
47(6) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) encompasses not only supply
of goods or services upon a relevant condition, but supply of goods or services
at a particular price, or giving or allowing a discount or rebate, upon a
relevant condition.
2 Second
characterisation
Apple Inc. could argue that it is not
supplying the iPhone on the condition that the customer acquires the
Carrier’s services. Rather, any condition which exists relates
only to
the use of the software on the iPhone, which is a different issue to the
chattel ownership of the iPhone itself. For the reasons given above,
a court
would be likely to reject this argument.
If this characterisation of
Apple’s conduct is accepted, it would satisfy the definition of third-line
forcing in ss 47(6) or 47(7). A licence to use the iPhone software, or actually
permitting use of the software (by the ‘activation’ process) would
arguably fall within the statutory definition of ‘services’ in s 4
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Similarly, Apple Inc.’s
licensing of the software, or permitting its use, would arguably fall within the
statutory
definition of ‘supply’, which includes ‘provide,
grant or
confer.’[57]
Apple
Inc.’s conduct could then be characterised as either supply of
services (software service) on the condition that the consumer acquire
mobile telephony services from the Carrier, or a refusal to supply
services
because the Carrier’s services had not been acquired.
On either of
the first or second characterisations of Apple Inc.’s conduct, to the
extent that it sells or offers to sell the
iPhone in these circumstances, Apple
will engage in unlawful third-line forcing.
Where the iPhones are sold by
the Carrier, because they are forcing the acquisition of their own services, and
not the services of
a third party, their conduct would constitute second line
forcing or tying rather than third-line forcing.
Where the iPhones are
sold by retailers other than Apple Inc. or the Carrier, the situation is less
clear. Are the retailers engaging
in third-line forcing, given that they merely
resell the iPhones and have no role in the imposition of the technological
requirement
to acquire services from the Carrier? Or is Apple Inc. engaging in
third-line forcing, notwithstanding the fact that it is not itself
contracting
with the
purchaser?
3 Third
Characterisation
Apple Inc. has announced that in Germany and France,
it will not itself sell iPhones. Instead they will be available exclusively
from their nominated carrier. Whether this is due to a smaller presence of
Apple Inc. retail stores in those countries is unclear.
If Apple Inc.
were to adopt this approach in Australia it may nevertheless engage in
third-line forcing. The language of s 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth) is not concerned with sale, but with supply of goods or
services.[58] The fact that title
to the iPhone (ie the physical device) is acquired from the Carrier does not
exclude the possibility that Apple
Inc. is providing some other goods or
services to the consumer.
If, notwithstanding that title to the iPhone is
acquired from the Carrier, Apple Inc. is supplying goods or
services of some kind to the consumer, on the condition that mobile
telephony services are acquired from the Carrier, then Apple Inc.’s
conduct may still fall within s 47(6) and constitute third-line
forcing.[59]
The iPhone is
essentially a very small computer, in the shape of a mobile phone and having the
functionality of a mobile phone and
a computer combined. Like all computers, it
requires software to
operate.[60]
Supply, in
relation to services, includes to ‘provide, grant or
confer.’[61] Section 4 of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) contains a broad and inclusive definition
of ‘services’, which includes ‘rights, benefits, privileges or
facilities that are ... provided, granted or conferred in trade or
commerce’. Whether or not computer software, or a licence
to use such
software, constitutes ‘goods’ or ‘services’ within the
meaning of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has not been finally
determined in Australia.[62] We
think the better view is that a licence to use computer software falls within
the definition of ‘services’, although
the distinction is of no
relevance for present purposes so long as it is one or the
other.[63]
Is Apple Inc.
supplying services – ie a licence to use the iPhone software – to
the consumer? The answer lies within
Apple Inc.’s own legal documents.
Like most computer software, the use of the iPhone software is subject to an End
User Licence
Agreement or
'EULA'.[64] The EULA must be agreed
to by the user before the iPhone can be
activated.[65]
The EULA
states in relevant part:
PLEASE READ THIS SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT
("LICENSE") CAREFULLY BEFORE USING YOUR iPHONE. BY USING YOUR iPHONE, YOU ARE
AGREEING
TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS LICENSE. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE
TERMS OF THIS LICENSE, DO NOT USE THE iPHONE. IF YOU DO NOT
AGREE TO THE TERMS
OF THE LICENSE, YOU MAY RETURN THE iPHONE TO THE PLACE WHERE YOU OBTAINED IT FOR
A REFUND. [emphasis in original]
The software (including Boot ROM
code and other embedded software), documentation and any fonts that came with
your iPhone, whether
in read only memory, on any other media or in any other
form (collectively the "iPhone Software") are licensed, not sold, to
you by Apple Inc.. ("Apple") for use only under the terms of this License,
and Apple reserves all rights not expressly granted to
you.[66] [emphasis
added]
Although there is no express provision of the EULA which compels
the consumer to acquire services from the Carrier, as discussed above,
a court
would likely infer the existence of such a condition because of the
technological locking and activation process. Further,
the EULA specifically
prohibits modification of the iPhone software, which would be necessary to
circumvent the activation and technological
locking.
We concede that this
characterisation is somewhat contrived. Nonetheless, it is clear that Apple
Inc. is licensing the use of the
iPhone software under a contract between Apple
Inc. and the consumer (the EULA) which is separate and independent of any
contracts
between the consumer and the Carrier. If this is a supply of goods or
services, upon a relevant condition, it is arguably third-line
forcing.
B Exclusionary Provisions – s 45(2)(a)(i)
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) prohibits certain
‘horizontal’ contracts, arrangements or understandings between
companies who are competitors,
or are likely to be competitors, or who would (or
would likely) be competitors but for the agreement.
Such agreements are
prohibited per se if they contain an exclusionary
provision,[67] and are otherwise
prohibited if a provision of the agreement has the purpose, effect, or would
likely have the effect, of substantially
lessening
competition.[68] Giving effect to
such a provision is subject to a separate
prohibition.[69]
As with
exclusive dealing, being able to establish a per se contravention is
beneficial to a potential applicant, because it avoids the problematic
evidentiary issues inherent in establishing
that the purpose, effect, or likely
effect of the impugned provision was to substantially lessen competition.
Sections 45(2) and (3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
provide:
(2) A corporation shall not:
(a) make a contract or
arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, if:
(i) the proposed contract,
arrangement or understanding contains an exclusionary provision;
or
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding
has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect,
of substantially
lessening competition; or
(b) give effect to a provision of a contract,
arrangement or understanding, whether the contract or arrangement was made, or
the understanding
was arrived at, before or after the commencement of this
section, if that provision:
(i) is an exclusionary provision; or
(ii) has
the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening
competition.
(3) For the purposes of this section ..., competition, in
relation to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding or of
a
proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, means competition in any
market in which a corporation that is a party to the contract, arrangement
or understanding or would be a party to the proposed contract,
arrangement or
understanding, or any body corporate related to such a corporation, supplies
or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, goods or services or
would, but for the provision, supply or acquire, or be likely to
supply or acquire, goods or services. [emphasis
added]
‘Exclusionary provision’ is defined by s 4D of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth):
(1) A provision of a contract,
arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed contract, arrangement or
understanding, shall be taken
to be an exclusionary provision for the purposes
of this Act if:
(a) the contract or arrangement was made, or the
understanding was arrived at, or the proposed contract or arrangement is to be
made,
or the proposed understanding is to be arrived at, between persons any 2
or more of whom are competitive with each other; and
(b) the provision has
the purpose of preventing, restricting or limiting:
(i) the supply of goods
or services to, or the acquisition of goods or services from, particular persons
or classes of persons; or
(ii) the supply of goods or services to, or the
acquisition of goods or services from, particular persons or classes of persons
in
particular circumstances or on particular conditions;
by all or any of the
parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding or of the proposed parties
to the proposed contract, arrangement
or understanding or, if a party or
proposed party is a body corporate, by a body corporate that is related to the
body corporate.
(2) A person shall be deemed to be competitive with another
person for the purposes of subsection (1) if, and only if, the first-mentioned
person or a body corporate that is related to that person is, or is
likely to be, or, but for the provision of any contract, arrangement
or understanding or of any proposed contract, arrangement or understanding,
would be, or would be likely to be, in competition with the other
person, or with a body corporate that is related to the other person, in
relation to the supply or
acquisition of all or any of the goods or services to
which the relevant provision of the contract, arrangement or understanding
or of
the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding relates.
As is
apparent from ss 45(3) and 4D(2), a threshold issue for the application of these
sections to the hypothetical Apple-Carrier agreement is that Apple Inc.
and the
Carrier must be competitors in the relevant sense. That is, that Apple Inc. and
the Carrier:
• are in fact competitors in any
market;
• are likely to be competitors in any market;
or
• except for the impugned term(s) of the agreement, would be
competitors or would be likely to be competitors in any market.
The
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) defines markets in economic terms.
Section 4E of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) provides:
For the
purposes of this Act, unless the contrary intention appears, market means
a market in Australia and, when used in relation to any goods or services,
includes a market for those goods or services and
other goods or services that
are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with, the first-mentioned goods
or services.
A number of possible markets suggest
themselves:
• a market for mobile phone handsets;
• a
market for mobile telephony services; and
• a ‘cluster
market’ for mobile phone handsets together with mobile telephony services
as a package.
It could be argued that the iPhone constitutes a separate
market; this is discussed
below.[70]
The Carrier would compete in each of the possible markets identified above,
but would Apple Inc.?
1 Market for
handsets
If Apple Inc. sells the iPhone in Australia, it would
compete in this market, although it could be argued that since the iPhones it
sells are locked to the Carrier’s network, Apple Inc. is not, strictly
speaking, competing with the Carrier. If Apple does not sell the iPhone
in Australia, the question then is whether it would, or would be likely to sell
the iPhone in Australia, but for a term of the agreement with the
Carrier.
Whether Apple would be likely to do so is a question of
fact. It does not require that it be more likely than not, only that there is a
‘real chance or
possibility’ it would
occur.[71] Establishing this point
would depend on the available evidence at trial, but the fact that Apple Inc.
itself sells the iPhone in
the US and has announced its intention to do so in
the UK would support such a finding. If there is a ‘real chance or
possibility’
that Apple would sell the iPhone in Australia if not for a
term of the agreement with the Carrier, Apple and the Carrier will be
deemed to
be competitors within the meaning of ss 45 and
4D.
2 Market for mobile telephony
services
Considering mobile telephony services in isolation from
handsets, Apple Inc. does not compete in this market and is not likely to
do so.
The extent of Apple Inc.’s interest in the mobile telephony services
market appears to be artificially restricting the
choice of carrier of iPhone
users.
3 Cluster market for handsets and
services
A ‘cluster market’ refers to a market for a
bundle of products that are technical or commercial complements and are
purchased
as a bundle by
consumers.[72]
Stated more formally, it is a market in which the transaction costs
involved in providing specific goods and services separately would be so
great as to necessitate their provision
together.[73]
Ergas
writes that to say that a cluster market for products A and B exists is to imply
that a firm selling only A or only B would
not be able to compete with one
selling both A and B; either because the supply cost of producing A and B
jointly is substantially
below that of producing them separately, and/or because
consumers incur additional costs when they purchase A and B separately as
against purchasing them
jointly.[74]
In the case of a
potential cluster market for mobile phone handsets and mobile telephony
services, there are no supply-side economies
of joint
production,[75] but there would be
economies which result from offering a single source of supply for both handsets
and telephony services. Consumers
acquiring handsets and services separately
would also incur higher transactional costs than if they acquired them from a
single supplier,[76] and there is a
substantial consumer and supplier demand for telecommunications services to be
supplied as a
‘bundle’.[77] Goss
suggests that:
the nature of bundled services is such that a bundle of
services is more likely to be treated as forming a cluster market than a series
of unbundled telecommunications services supplied to a consumer. This is the
case because the transactional costs for both suppliers
and consumers of,
respectively, supplying and receiving the services indicate that they are more
efficiently supplied as a bundle.
Accordingly, a firm selling those services
separately could not compete with one selling them together. The prevalence of
bundled
telecommunications services suggests that there will be a high incidence
of situations in which cluster market analysis of competitive
effects will be
appropriate.[78]
In the
context of ‘land-line’ telephone services, the ACCC considers that
fixed line rental and local call services are
part of a cluster
market,[79] although Ergas believes
that local, STD, and IDD services each form separate
markets.[80]
If the existence of a cluster market comprising mobile phone handsets
and mobile telephony services is accepted, the next question
is whether Apple
Inc. could be properly viewed as a competitor of the Carrier in the relevant
sense, given that Apple Inc. would
(or arguably, would be likely to, but for a
provision of the Apple-Carrier agreement) only supply
handsets?
Statements in the literature that, in economic terms, a company
supplying only one element of a cluster market ‘could not compete’
with a company supplying all elements, mean in lay terms that they could not
compete profitably, all other things being equal. The wording of ss
45(3) and 4D(2) do not preclude a finding that a corporation which supplies only
one element of a cluster market is nonetheless a competitor
of a corporation
supplying all elements.
If Apple Inc. sells the iPhone in Australia, it
would arguably compete in this cluster market. If Apple Inc. does not sell the
iPhone
in Australia, it could be argued that, but for a term of the
Apple-Carrier agreement, it would be likely to do
so.
4 Exclusionary provision
If
we assume that Apple Inc. and the Carrier are competitors in the relevant sense
in at least one of the above markets, the next
question is whether a term of the
Apple-Carrier contract, arrangement or understanding is an exclusionary
provision within the meaning
of s 4D. The primary purpose of the Apple-Carrier
agreement would be to prevent, restrict, or limit the supply of iPhones to
particular
persons on particular conditions – that is, that Apple Inc.
would not supply iPhones to any of the Carrier’s competitors
in Australia;
or would not supply iPhones to the public unless they acquired the
Carrier’s services; or would not supply iPhones
to the public at
all.[81]
Provided that Apple
Inc. and the Carrier are competitors within the meaning of ss 45 and 4D, the
Apple-Carrier agreement will probably contain one or more exclusionary terms,
with the consequence that the making of
that agreement would be a per se
contravention of s 45(2), as would giving effect to such a provision.
C Other potential Part IV actions
Apple’s conduct may contravene other provisions of Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
1 Misuse of market power – s 46(1)
Section 46(1) of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) deals with misuse of market power, and is
historically one of the most difficult contraventions of Part IV to establish.
A threshold issue is whether Apple Inc. has a substantial degree of market
power. In any possible market we discuss
above, Apple would not have market
power. But if there is a separate market for iPhones, Apple Inc. as the
manufacturer and sole
source of supply would have substantial market
power.
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) defines markets in
economic terms, and a market for goods or services includes any other goods or
services that are substitutable for or otherwise competitive with the
first goods or services.[82] If the
iPhone is sufficiently unique in terms of its
features,[83]
desirability, and brand
loyalty,[84] that consumers would
not regard an ordinary mobile phone as a substitute for an iPhone, this would
weigh strongly in favour of the
existence of a separate market for the
iPhone.
A starting point for determining the issue of substitutability is
the SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in
Price).[85] Here, the SSNIP test
asks whether Apple Inc. would find it profitable to increase the price of the
iPhone by 5-10% for a non-transitory
period of time, say 12 months. If the
price increase causes consumers who would have bought iPhones to instead by a
different phone,
and the reduction in sales makes the price increase
unprofitable for Apple, this is a strong indicator that other phones are
substitutable
for the iPhone, and the iPhone does not comprise a separate
market.
If, on the other hand, consumers continue to buy the iPhone at
the higher price, making the price increase profitable for Apple, this
is a
strong indicator that other phones are not substitutable for the iPhone, and
that the iPhone may constitute a separate market.
Australian courts have
rejected several previous attempts to define a market in terms of a single trade
marked product,[86] brand of
vehicle,[87] or copyright
work.[88] However, the courts have
not rejected the possibility that a single brand product may constitute a
separate economic
market.[89]
Even
if the iPhone does not constitute a separate market, it may be part of a broader
market for next generation mobile phones, or
‘smartphones.’ At the
present time, Apple may have substantial market power within such a market, but
as competitors
enter that market with competing devices, that position might
erode to the point where they lack substantial market power and a contravention
of s 46(1) would no longer be possible.
The existence of Apple
Inc.’s substantial market power would need to be assessed over a period of
years rather than months and
would depend, in particular, on the existence of
barriers to entry.[90] Apple
Inc.’s intellectual property in the iPhone, such as the copyright in the
computer software may not confer a substantial
degree of market power. There is
growing recognition that traditional market definition procedure is flawed in
innovative industries
because it fails to take account of technological change
and its effects on future competition and market
power.[91]
Assuming that a
separate market for iPhones can be established, it would also need to be
established that Apple Inc. had taken advantage
of its substantial market power,
and did so for a purpose proscribed by s
46(1).[92]
2 Exclusive
dealing other than third-line forcing – s 47(2)
Regardless of
whether Apple Inc. sells the iPhone in Australia or not, the Carrier may engage
in exclusive dealing (other than third-line
forcing) under s 47(2) of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which provides in part:
(2) A
corporation engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the
corporation:
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or
services;
...
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation
supplies, or offers or proposes to supply, the goods or services or, if that
person is a body corporate, a body corporate related to that body
corporate:
(d) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, acquire
goods or services, or goods or services of a particular kind or description,
directly or indirectly from a competitor of the corporation or from a competitor
of a body corporate related to the corporation;
Here, the Carrier would
supply the iPhone on a condition that the purchaser would not, or would not
except to a limited extent, acquire
mobile phone services from a competitor of
the Carrier.
However, this section is subject to a further requirement
that the Carrier’s actions must have the purpose, effect or likely
effect
of substantially lessening
competition.[93] Whether it is
likely to have that effect or not would be a question of fact and dependant on
the size of the market, the number
of iPhones sold, and other
factors.
But the purpose of the Carrier in distributing the locked
iPhones would arguably be to substantially lessen competition, by ensuring that
any consumers
using those iPhones could not use them with the Carrier’s
competitors. A court can infer purpose from the nature of the arrangement
the
circumstances in which it was made, and its likely
effect.[94] The purpose of
substantially lessening competition need not be the sole purpose of the
Carrier, so long as it was one of their purposes, and was a substantial or
operative purpose.[95]
If it
can be established that a substantial or operative purpose of the Carrier was to
lessen competition in the cluster market for
mobile phones and services, or the
market for mobile telephony services, by preventing iPhone purchasers from using
the services
of the Carrier’s competitors, the Carrier will have engaged
in exclusive dealing within the meaning of s 47(2), which is prohibited by s
47(1).
D Exception for the licensing of intellectual property – s 51(3)
Intellectual property laws are pro-competitive because they provide
protection for and certainty of investment, and avoid problems
associated with
free-riding on intellectual property developed by others. Accordingly, s 51(3)
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)provides a statutory exemption from
most provisions of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth),[96] for certain conditions in
licences or assignments of certain IP rights, including copyright. Section
51(3) provides in relevant part:
(3) A contravention of a provision of
this Part other than section 46, 46A or 48 shall not be taken to have been
committed by reason of:
(a) the imposing of, or giving effect to, a condition
of:
(i) a licence granted by the proprietor, licensee or owner of ... a
copyright ...;
...
to the extent that the condition relates to:
[emphasis added]
...
(v) the work or other subject matter in which the
copyright subsists;
The scope of s 51(3) is uncertain because of
ambiguity surrounding the ‘relates to’
requirement.[97]
Section 51(3) has been judicially considered in only one case, which involved a
‘best endeavours’ clause in a licence to use a patented
process to
construct electricity poles.[98]
In that case, while a majority of the High Court did not find it necessary to
consider s 51(3), Mason and Wilson JJ held that the best endeavours clause did
‘relate to’ articles made by use of the patented
invention,[99] and fell within the
s 51(3) exemption.
In his judgment, Mason J stated:
In
bridging the different policies of the Patents Act and the Trade Practices Act,
s 51(3) recognizes that a patentee is justly entitled to impose conditions on
the granting of a licence or assignment of a patent in order
to protect the
patentee’s legal monopoly. ... Section 51(3) determines the scope of
restrictions the patentee may properly impose on the use of the patent.
Conditions which seek to gain advantages
collateral to the patent are not
covered by s
51(3).[100]
The proper
scope of ‘relates to’ within s 51(3) is still a matter of some
controversy. Section 51(3) was reviewed by the National Competition Council
(‘NCC’) in 1999,[101]
and the review identified a range of alternative views on the meaning of the
term.[102]
If we accept the
statement of Mason J that s 51(3) permits an intellectual property owner to
impose licensing conditions to protect the intellectual property owner’s
legal monopoly,
do the conditions imposed by Apple Inc. meet that test? The
‘legal monopoly’ of a copyright holder is the exclusive
rights
created by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). In the case of computer
software,[103] those rights are
set out in s 31(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and include the
exclusive right to reproduce the software in material
form.
Significantly, the right to control the use of computer
software is not an exclusive right of the copyright owner, nor is the right to
control the use of a device in which the
software is embodied.
It seems
likely in those circumstances that an attempt by Apple Inc. to control which
mobile carrier the iPhones can be used with
would be an attempt to seek a
collateral advantage to their copyright, and would not be protected by s 51(3).
The Carrier could not rely on s 51(3), as they are not the licensee of any
relevant intellectual
property.
1 Commentary on s
51(3)
Section 51(3) has never been judicially considered as it
applies to copyright. Professor Ricketson has argued that flaws in the drafting
of s 51(3) render it ‘virtually meaningless’ as it applies to
copyright.[104] Such a literal
construction of s 51(3) has been
criticised,[105] but the vagueness
of the ‘relates to’ requirement has left the scope of s 51(3)
uncertain.
In 2000, the Intellectual Property and Competition Review
Committee (‘IPCRC’) considered the recommendations of the NCC
review, and stated that:
there are flaws in the drafting of s 51(3) that
under any scenario would require amendment. Leaving aside drafting
considerations, the Committee believes that the uncertainty
surrounding the
scope of the section, and the possibility that it may exempt virtually all
agreements which touch on IP from relevant
sections of the Trade Practices Act,
make the current section inappropriate.
In 2001, the Government accepted
the recommendations of the IPCRC in part, and announced that it intended to
overhaul s 51(3), with the effect that intellectual property licensing would be
subject to more provisions of Part IV than is currently the
case.[106] Yet, more than six
years later, the legislation to give effect to this announcement has not been
introduced into Parliament, and
s 51(3) remains unchanged, in generally the same
terms as it stood in
1977.[107]
Times,
technology, and markets have changed greatly since the 1970s, as has
intellectual property. Computers as we know them today
did not exist when the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was introduced. The computer software
that existed in the 1970s was not protected by copyright; copyright has only
subsisted
in computer software since 1984 amendments to the Copyright Act
1968 (Cth).[108]
The
licensing and assignment of intellectual property in the 1970s was, generally,
an exercise between businesses. In modern times,
computers of some description
have found their way into many consumer goods and every-day items of commerce,
including things such
as mobile phones, electronic fuel injection systems in
motor vehicles, and even garage door openers. All of these computers run
software which is protected by copyright.
This means that the actual
licensing of intellectual property now reaches down the supply chain as far as
the consumer. Sophisticated
modern technology also allows the technological
imposition of prima facie anti-competitive restraints on consumers.
In
much the same way as Apple Inc. can design an iPhone which will only work with
AT&T, it could be possible for General Motors
Holden to produce a car whose
software-driven fuel injection system would only allow the car to run on Shell
petrol. It would be
absurd to allow third-line forcing of petrol in a modern
car, because the third-line forcing was enforced by copyright software,
but
disallow third-line forcing of petrol in an older car, without fuel injection.
Third-line forcing in relation to consumer goods
should not get a ‘free
pass’ from Australia’s competition laws simply because the supplier
imposes its anti-competitive
restraint by means of copyright software, rather
than a condition of a
contract.[109]
In a time
where the anti-competitive use of computer software and other modern technology
seems to be on the rise, s 51(3) is in need of a major overhaul to ensure it
does not give an undeserved shield to anti-competitive and anti-consumer
behaviour.
The Federal Court can grant an injunction in such terms as the Court
determines to be appropriate, where a person is engaging or proposing
to engage
in conduct that constitutes or would constitute a contravention or attempted
contravention of any of the provisions of
Part IV described
above.[110] Such an injunction
may be sought by any person,[111]
but as a practical matter is only likely to be sought by the ACCC or by a
competitor of the Carrier. The ACCC may also seek the
imposition of a pecuniary
penalty on Apple Inc. and/or the
Carrier.[112]
The ACCC has
additional powers to deal with allegedly anti-competitive conduct engaged in by
the Carrier, under Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth).[113] The markets we
discuss above would all be telecommunications markets within the meaning of s
151AF of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), because they involve the
supply or acquisition of carriage
services,[114] or goods for use in
connection with a carriage service. Our analysis above suggests that the
Carrier may contravene ss 45(2) and 47(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth), which, because the contravening conduct relates to a telecommunications
market, would constitute ‘anti-competitive conduct’
within the
meaning of s 151AJ(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
If
the ACCC has reason to believe that the Carrier is engaging in such
anti-competitive conduct, the ACCC may issue the Carrier with
a ‘Part A
competition notice’,[115]
which has the effect of exposing the Carrier to significant pecuniary penalties
if they continue such conduct while the notice is
in force. The ACCC may also
issue the carrier with a ‘Part B competition
notice’,[116] which would
provide considerable assistance to any competitor of the Carrier wishing to
litigate the contravention, as the Part B
competition notice is prima-facie
evidence of the matters set out in the
notice.[117]
While DRM and other forms of technological ‘locks’ may have
substantial pro-competitive benefits, where they are used
to prevent the
infringement of copyright, such technology can be used to achieve
anti-competitive ends. Thus far, the anti-competitive
abuses of DRM have mainly
involved locking in consumers, and locking out competitors. It is probably too
soon to conclude whether
Australia’s competition laws are adequate to deal
with anti-competitive abuses of
DRM.[118]
The Apple Inc.
iPhone represents a significant change in this type behaviour – for the
first time, a manufacturer is using DRM
and technological ‘locks’ to
force the use of goods or services other than their own.
On the available
evidence, Apple Inc.’s behaviour has no pro-competitive justification, and
serves merely to extract monopoly
rents from customers who are compelled to use
AT&T’s services. The pending antitrust actions against Apple Inc. in
the
US will test the legality of its conduct in that country, with the battle
likely to be framed in terms of Apple Inc.’s freedom
to innovate and
market its products as it sees fit, versus the rights of the consumer to choose
their own service provider at a cheaper
price.
Our analysis of Apple
Inc.’s potential future conduct under Australia’s competition laws
demonstrates that it may be unlawful.
Australia’s competition laws may be
uniquely suited to preventing this type of anti-competitive technological tying
–
because they prohibit third-line forcing per se, they greatly
simplify the task of seeking redress for this behaviour through the courts. In
addition, the Notice Procedure under
Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act
1974 (Cth) may facilitate enforcement by the ACCC.
Time will tell
whether we have entered a new age of anti-competitive use of technology, and
whether current competition laws in Australia
and elsewhere are up to the task
of preventing it.
[*] Student of Law, Queensland
University of Technology; Senior Research Assistant, Faculty of Law, Queensland
University of Technology.
[†]
BCom LLB (Qld) LLM (Lond) PhD (Qld); Professor of Law, Faculty of Law,
Queensland University of Technology. The authors would like
to thank Nic Suzor,
Jessica Coates, Kim Weatherall and Shane Dallas for their comments on an early
draft of this article. This research
was supported by a grant from the
Australian Research Council.
[1]
See S Corones, ‘Technological Tying in the Computer Industry: When Does
it Contravene s 46 of the Trade Practices Act’ (2003) 3 Queensland
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal
47.
[2] See generally, D
Clapperton and S Corones, ‘Locking in Customers, Locking out Competitors:
Anti-Circumvention Laws in Australia
and Their Potential Effect on Competition
in High Technology Markets’ [2006] MelbULawRw 22; (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law
Review 657.
[3] See generally
Wikipedia, FairPlay (2007)
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FairPlay#Harmony:_RealPlayer_Music_on_the_iPod>
at 17 October 2007. For a case study of Apple’s iTunes Music Store of how
the doctrines and principles of copyright and
contract law, DRM systems
(including anti-circumvention laws), and online media distribution models
interact with each other see:
iTunes How Copyright, Contract, and Technology
Shape the Business of Digital Media – A Case Study (The Berkman Centre
for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School, 15 June
2004).
[4] This conduct would
constitute exclusive dealing within the meaning of s 47(2) of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) only if it had the purpose, effect, or likely
effect of substantially lessening competition. See below part
IIIC2.
[5]
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some carriers, such as Hutchison 3G Australia
Pty Ltd (3), will refuse to unlock some phones under
any
conditions.
[6] Macworld,
Macworld Expo Keynote Live Update (2007)
<http://www.macworld.com/news/2007/01/09/liveupdate/index.php>
at 15
October 2007.
[7] Apple, Apple
Reinvents the Phone with iPhone (2007)
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09iphone.html>
at 15 October
2007.
[8]
Ibid.
[9] ‘Quad
band’ means a GSM mobile phone which can operate in the 850, 900, 1800,
and 1900 MHz bands, allowing it to be
used in almost any country in the world
with a GSM mobile phone
network.
[10] ‘EDGE’
is an acronym for ‘Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution’, an
enhancement to 2G GSM networks which
allows for higher-speed data transfers for
Internet access and other purposes. Presently, only the Telstra mobile phone
network
supports EDGE in
Australia.
[11] Apple, above n
7.
[12]
Apple, Apple Chooses O2 as Exclusive Carrier for iPhone in UK (2007)
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/18iphone.html>
at 15 October
2007; Apple, Apple Chooses Orange as Exclusive Carrier for iPhone in
France (2007)
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/10/16orange.html>
at 17 October 2007; Apple, Apple and T-Mobile Announce Exclusive Partnership
for iPhone in Germany (2007)
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/19iphone.html>
at 15 October
2007.
[13] Apple, Apple
Chooses Orange as Exclusive Carrier for iPhone in France, above n 12; Apple,
Apple and T-Mobile Announce Exclusive Partnership for iPhone in Germany,
above n 12; Email from Natalie Kerris (Apple press contact) to Dale Clapperton,
17 October 2007.
[14] Richard
Wray, Vodafone put off by Apple’s demand for big iPhone slice
(2007) The Guardian
<http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,2119921,00.html>
at 15 October
2007.
[15] Hohlman v Apple
Inc., No 5:07-cv-05152-RS (ND Cal, filed 5 October 2007) ‘Class action
complaint for damages, injunctive relief and restitution’
[38]-[44];
Smith v Apple Inc., No 1-07-CV-095781 (Sup Court of Cal, filed 5 October
2007) ‘Class action complaint for treble damages and permanent injunctive
relief’ [44].
[16] Anand
Lal Shimpi, Apple iPhone: Unboxed (2007) AnandTech
<http://www.anandtech.com/gadgets/showdoc.aspx?i=3025>
at 15 October
2007.
[17]
Ibid.
[18] Apple, Apple Inc.
Q3 2007 Unaudited Summary Data (2007)
<http://images.apple.com/pr/pdf/q307data_sum.pdf>
at 15 October
2007.
[19] Apple, Apple Sells
One Millionth iPhone (2007)
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/10iphone.html>
at 15 October
2007.
[20] Saul Hansell, The
$831 iPhone (2007) New York Times
<http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/the-831-iphone/>
at 7 January
2008.
[21]
Ibid.
[22] Richard Wray, O2
wins Apple iPhone deal – at a hefty price (2007) The Guardian
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/sep/17/mobilephones.apple>
at 7
January 2007.
[23] With the
exception of using the iPhone to call an emergency services number, such as 112
or 911.
[24] AT&T appears to
make an exception for users with poor credit ratings, who are permitted to use a
month-to-month plan at a higher
fee.
[25] George Hotz, Full
Hardware Unlock of iPhone Done (2007) Finding JTAG on the iPhone
<http://iphonejtag.blogspot.com/2007/08/full-hardware-unlock-of-iphone-done.html>
at 16 October 2007; Brad Stone, With Software and Soldering, AT&T’s
Lock on iPhone is Undone (2007) The New York Times Online
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0DE6DC113CF936A1575BC0A9619C8B63>
at 16 October 2007.
[26] Hotz
later traded the first unlocked iPhone for a Nissan 350Z sports car: Chris
Shunk, Teen Trades First Unlocked iPhone for Nissan 350Z (2007)
<http://www.autoblog.com/2007/08/28/teen-trades-first-unlocked-iphone-for-nissan-350z/>
at 16 October 2007.
[27] See, eg
kGizmodo, How the First iPhone Unlock Went Down [UPDATED] (2007)
<http://gizmodo.com/gadgets/exclusive/first-iphone-unlock-license-sold-works-but-shows-problems-298300.php>
at 16 October 2007.
[28] BBC
News, Legal Threats Halt iPhone Crack (2007)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6966600.stm>
at 16 October
2007.
[29] Apple, Apple One
(1) Year Limited Warranty (2007)
<http://images.apple.com/legal/warranty/iphone.pdf>
at 18 October
2007.
[30] 15 USC §§
2301-2312. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a US federal statute which
governs warranties on consumer
products.
[31] Christopher
Price, Did Apple Violate Magnuson-Moss over iPhone Unlocks? (2007) Phone
News
<http://www.phonenews.com/content/view/2386/9/>
at 16 October
2007.
[32] iPhone News Blog,
Unlocking iPhone Can Cause Permanent Damage! (2007)
<http://www.iphonenewsblog.com/2007/09/unlocking-iphone-can-cause-per.html>
at 16 October 2007.
[33] Thomas
Ricker, Live from Apple’s “Mum is No Longer the Word” event
in London (2007) Engadget
<http://www.engadget.com/2007/09/18/live-from-apples-mum-is-no-longer-the-word-event-in-london/>
at 16 October 2007.
[34] Jacqui
Cheng, Apple: Firmware Update Likely to Make Unlocked iPhones
“Permanently Inoperable” (2007) Ars Technica
<http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070924-apple-firmware-update-likely-to-make-unlocked-iphones-permanently-inoperable.html>
at 16 October 2007.
[35]
Hohlman v Apple Inc., No 5:07-cv-05152-RS (ND Cal, filed 5 October
2007); Smith v Apple Inc., No 1-07-CV-095781 (Sup Court of Cal, filed 5
October 2007).
[36] APC
Magazine, Australia Won’t See iPhone ‘till 2008 (2007)
<http://apcmag.com/4959/australia_wont_see_iphone_til_2008>
at 16 October
2007.
[37] Apple, Apple
Chooses Cingular as Exclusive US Carrier for Its Revolutionary iPhone (2007)
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09cingular.html>
at 14 January
2008.
[38] Apple, above n
12.
[39] We say the sole
authorised source because parallel-imported iPhones with the
technological ties to AT&T circumvented are currently available in Australia
via eBay and other methods.
[40]
Above n 13.
[41] The Sydney
Morning Herald, Telstra to Apple: ‘Stick to your Knitting’
(2007)
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/biztech/telstra-to-apple-stick-to-your-knitting/2007/02/15/1171405363291.html>
at 16 October 2007.
[42]
Ibid.
[43] Email from John Marx
(Apple PR executive) to Dale Clapperton, 18 October
2007.
[44] As we discuss below,
if Apple Inc. were to sell the iPhone to the public in Australia, its conduct
would likely constitute per-se
unlawful third line forcing. This may be a
factor which weighs against Apple Inc. doing
so.
[45] Much of our evaluation
involves per-se contraventions of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth), where the identity of the Carrier is not relevant because an actual or
likely lessening of competition need not be
shown.
[46] Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) s 47(10).
[47]
‘The rationale behind a per se prohibition is that the conduct prohibited
is so likely to be detrimental to economic welfare,
and so unlikely to be
beneficial, that it should be proscribed without further inquiry about its
impact on competition.’: Commonwealth,
Review of the Competition
Provisions of the Trade Practices Act (2003)
123.
[48] S Corones,
Competition Law in Australia (Lawbook Co, 4th ed, 2007)
[9.125].
[49] Since the
commencement of amendments made by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment
Act (No 1) 2006 (Cth), companies which are related body corporates are
treated as a single entity for the purposes of third line forcing:
ibid.
[50] References to
‘goods’ in these examples should be treated as interchangeable with
‘services’.
[51]
See, eg ACCC v IMB Group Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] FCA
402.
[52] Visy Paper Pty Ltd
v ACCC [2003] HCA 59; (2003) 216 CLR 1, 6 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne
JJ).
[53] SWB Family Credit
Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 125; (1980) 32 ALR
365.
[54] Corones, above n 48,
508; cf TPC v Tepeda Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1125; (1994) ATPR
41-319.
[55] SWB Family
Credit Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 125; (1980) 32 ALR 365,
381.
[56] As is occurring in
France and Germany: Tony Smith, Orange to offer unlocked iPhones for
€749, (2007) Register Hardware
<http://www.reghardware.co.uk/2007/11/28/orange_prices_up_iphone/>
at 14
January 2008.
[57] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
4.
[58] See, eg Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 47(6): ‘A corporation also engages in the
practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation ... supplies, or offers to
supply, goods
or
services.’
[59] Similarly,
if Apple Inc. refuses to supply services because the consumer has not acquired,
or agreed to acquire, services from the
Carrier, s 47(7) would
apply.
[60] If the software
becomes irrecoverably corrupted, the iPhone becomes similarly useless. When
Apple Inc.’s recent software
update to the iPhones caused unlocked iPhones
to become inoperable in this way, the term ‘iBrick’ was coined to
describe
such phones.
[61]
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
4.
[62] ASX Operations Pty
Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460, 468. See also
Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd [1983]
2 NSWLR 48, in which it was held that the supply of a computer system comprising
hardware and software was a supply of
goods.
[63] The distinction
between a software licence as a supply of goods or services is of more
importance in the context of implied warranties
under Part V, Division 2 of the
Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth).
[64] For a discussion of
EULA's and consumer protection concerns in electronic contracts generally, see D
Clapperton and S Corones, ‘Unfair
Terms in “Clickwrap” and
Other Electronic Contracts’ (2007) 35 Australian Business Law Review
152.
[65] By way of a
‘clickwrap’ licence.
[66] Apple, iPHONE SOFTWARE
LICENSE AGREEMENT (2007)
<http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iphone.pdf>
at 17 October
2007.
[67] Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) s
45(2)(a)(i).
[68] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
45(2)(a)(ii).
[69] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45(2)(b)(i),
(ii).
[70] See part
IIIC1.
[71]
News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd [1996] FCA 870; (1996) 64 FCR
410.
[72] Corones, above n
48,
[2.40]; see also Henry Ergas, Cluster Markets: What They Are and How To Test
For Them (2002) The Wayback Machine
<http://web.archive.org/web/20050623113852/http://necg.com.au/pappub/papers-ergas-cluster.PDF>
at 25 October 2007.
[73] A Goss,
‘The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Treatment of Cluster
Markets in the Australian Telecommunications Industry’ [2001] MelbULawRw 16; (2001) 25
Melbourne University Law Review 481, 482; see also Ergas, above n 72,
3-4.
[74] Ergas, above n 72,
3.
[75] As might be the case in,
for example, the joint production of wool and
lamb.
[76] Corones, above n 48,
[2.40].
[77] Goss, above n 73,
492.
[78] Ibid,
493.
[79] ACCC, Declaration
of Local Telecommunications Services under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act
1974 (July 1999) 40.
[80]
Ergas, above n 72,
17-18.
[81] An exclusive
distribution agreement would not ordinarily contravene s 45(2) unless the
supplier was vertically integrated and sold at a ‘retail’ level, in
competition with the other
party.
[82] Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) s 4E.
[83]
Apple Inc.’s own statements about the revolutionary and ground-breaking
nature of the iPhone could lend support to the view
that the iPhone comprises a
separate market: Apple, above n 7.
[84] A single brand market may
exist where the evidence supports a finding that consumers purchase a product
solely in reliance upon
its brand name and not in reliance upon the physical
qualities of the product: CCH, Trade Practices Commentary [ 2-560].
Anecdotal market evidence suggests that Apple Inc. has cultivated substantial
brand loyalty.
[85] Corones,
above n 48, [2.25]
[86] Mark
Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR
581.
[87] J Ah Toy Pty Ltd v
Thiess Toyota Pty Ltd (1980) 3 ATPR
40-155.
[88] Broderbund
Software Inc. v Computermate Products (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 22 IPR
215.
[89] Melway Publishing
Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 34; see also Clapperton and
Corones, above n 2, 694-5; Corones, above n 1,
50-2.
[90] Corones, above n 48,
[2.190].
[91] See R Gilbert and
S Sunshine, ‘Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency concerns in Merger analysis
– The Use of Innovative
Markets’ (1995) 63 Antitrust Law Journal
569; and R Posner, ‘Antitrust in the New Economy’ (2001) 68
Antitrust Law Journal
925.
[92] The proscribed
purposes are eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the
corporation in that or any other market, preventing
the entry of a person into
that or any other market, and deterring or preventing a person from engaging in
competitive conduct in
that or any other market. See generally Corones, above n
1, 57-64.
[93] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
47(10).
[94] Dowling v
Dalgety Australia Ltd (1992) 34 FCR
109.
[95] Trade Practices Act
1974 (Cth) s 4F(1)(b).
[96]
Sections 46 and 46A (misuse of market power) and 48 (retail price maintenance)
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) are unaffected by s
51(3).
[97] NCC, Review of
Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Final
Report (1999) 15-23.
[98]
Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd [1980] HCA 15; (1980) 144 CLR
83.
[99] Where the subject of
the licence is a patent, the condition must ‘relate to ... the invention
to which the patent or application
for a patent relates or articles made by the
use of that invention’: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
51(3)(a)(iii).
[100]
Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd [1980] HCA 15; (1980) 144 CLR 83,
102-3.
[101] NCC, above n 97,
186.
[102] Ibid 184; see also
Clapperton and Corones, above n 2,
709.
[103] Computer software
is protected as a literary work: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s
10.
[104] Section 51(3)(a)(v)
requires that the conditions must ‘relate to ... the work or other subject
matter in which the copyright subsists.’
Copyright does not subsist in
reproductions or copies, but only in the works or other subject matter in their
first material form.
Ricketson suggests that s 51(3) would therefore be
inapplicable to conditions relating to subsequent copies of the work: S
Ricketson and C Creswell, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright,
Designs and Confidential Information (Lawbook Co, vol 2) 24,
[15.190].
[105] Trade
Practices Commission, Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual
Property (1991) 12.
[106]
Australian Government, Government Response to Intellectual Property and
Competition Review Recommendations (2001) 12
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/general/response1.PDF>
. For a
consideration of the current s 51(3) and the likely impact of the changes
proposed by the IPCRC see: I Eagles and L Longdin, ‘Competition in
Information and Computer
Technology Markets: Intellectual Property Licensing and
Section 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (2003) 3 Queensland
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal
28.
[107] Except for minor
changes, s 51(3) has not been amended since the Trade Practices Amendment Act
1977 (Cth).
[108]
Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth) s
3.
[109] See Eagles and
Longdin, above n 106,
43-4.
[110] Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) s
80(1)(a)(i).
[111] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
80(1).
[112] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 76,
77.
[113] See generally
Corones, above n 48, Ch
13
[114] Mobile telephony
services are a ‘carriage service’ within the meaning of the
Telecommunications Act 1997
(Cth).
[115] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
151AKA.
[116] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s
151AL.
[117] Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 151AN(1). We concede that the issuing of a Part
B competition notice for this type of behavior would be unprecedented, the
ACCC
having never issued a Part B competition notice, even in cases of much more
serious anti-competitive
behavior.
[118] Clapperton and
Corones, above n 2.
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