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Allars, Margaret --- "Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures by D J Galligan and Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials by J M Evans, H N Janisch, David J Mullan and R C B Risk" [1997] SydLawRw 23; (1997) 19(3) Sydney Law Review 411



Press, Oxford, 1996, 537pp, ISBN 0 19825 676 0


by J M Evans, H N Janisch, David J Mullan and R C B Risk, Fourth

Edition, Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, Toronto, 1995, 4th

ed, 1519pp, ISBN 0 92072 272 5


University of Sydney

Two recently published books on administrative law are worthy of comment and comparison. One presents as a book about administrative law theory, the other as a text on administrative law.

D J Galligans Due Process and Fair Procedures is a study of procedure in government decision-making and what makes it fair or unfair. Galligan claims to offer a theoretical framework in which to examine procedural issues, drawing upon empirical studies and legal principles. He recognises that this mixed approach may not please everyone but argues that all three levels of analysis theory, legal principles and empirical studies can and should be brought together.1 Whether this work should be described as a book about theory, or about legal doctrine or applied theory, is a difficult question. Probably more than half the book is occupied by a general overview of legal principles and institutions rather than theory. However, the legal principles are described at a level of generality where it sometimes becomes unclear whether the exposition is descriptive or prescriptive. The reader will ask two questions. To what extent is the theoretical framework dependent upon or derived from the exposition of legal principles? To what extent is the body of legal principle elucidated by the theoretical framework Galligan proposes?

The central theoretical issue in this book is whether certain procedures have an inherent value or are only instrumental to achieving other goods of inherent value. This question was debated vigorously in a series of articles published in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s concerning process values.2 According to the dignitarian theory expounded by United States constitutional theorists at this time, fair procedure stems from the core principle of respect for persons or their dignity. Affording people process rights which accord them respect is of value independently of the fairness of outcomes of decision-making. The debate received further attention with the publication in 1990 of Michael Bayles excellent study of the issue.[3] However, since then debate about procedure and outcomes has been dominated by responses to the impact of economic rationalism upon public administration. In Australia the focus is now concentrated upon issues of appropriate procedures for retaining accountability where government institutions are privatised or corporatised, or public services are contracted out.

Let us turn to the detail of Galligans argument. In this review the expression natural justice will be used to refer to the common law rules about fair hearing and absence of bias, although these rules are now normally referred to as procedural fairness in Australia.[4] This will avoid confusion with terms used and defined by Galligan to describe various aspects of procedure and the concept of fairness. In particular, Galligan uses the term procedural fairness in a generic way, and not to denote the common law rules.

In Part I of the book (Chapters 1-4), which sets out the theory, Galligan starts with the assumption that procedures are the means by which legal purposes are achieved. He then sets out to map procedures by which legal issues are settled. Seven families of procedures, or forms of legal process, are classified, with the acknowledgment that there is room for intersection and overlap between them. These are: (i) application of authoritative standards; (ii) discretion or deciding as the official thinks best; (iii) decision by agreement; (iv) decision by voting; (v) decision by fiat or decree; (vi) investigation and inquiry; and (vii) proceduralism and participation.[5]

Galligan argues that each family of forms of legal process has a normative foundation. That foundation is comprised of three tiers of normative values, standards and principles.[6] The first tier is outcome-based and consists in the basic legal objectives of civil, criminal law and regulatory schemes. A second tier of less central outcome-based values and standards qualify or augment the first tier. They include principles relating to non-discrimination, consistency and fair trial. A third tier of principles is directly related to processes but indirectly affects outcomes. Examples are principles about voluntary confessions, privacy and confidentiality. The first tier of outcome-oriented values lies at one end of the spectrum whilst the third tier of clearly procedurally oriented values lies at the other. In between the second tier has some features of outcome and some of procedure. Galligan hopes that this framework will assist in resolving the tension between justice to the individual and the collective interest in achieving the objects of law.

What are procedures? For Galligan, procedures provide the means for practical application of the values, standards and principles at each tier. Where do the rules of evidence and the rules of natural justice fit into all of this? These are intermediate procedural standards which are contingent and instrumental means for giving effect to the tiers of underlying values.[7]

With this map in place, Galligan sketches a theoretical approach to procedures.[8] In Chapter 2: Procedural Fairness, Galligan argues that procedures are fair to the extent that they lead to the proper application of the standards of fair treatment.[9] They are not fair or unfair in themselves, but are instrumental and contingent to serving some end, purpose, or value.[10] Galligan concedes that a procedure may express a value rather than be instrumental to it. However, he maintains that this does not undermine the argument that procedures are only instrumental either expressing, or causally promoting, a value. Only by reference to an independent value do we judge a procedure to be fair or unfair.[11]

Thus, the procedural rules of evidence in civil and criminal trials and those of natural justice are simply a contingent means for attaining compliance with authoritative standards of fair treatment.[12] These procedural rules are not good or fair or justifiable in themselves. What procedure is appropriate depends very much upon the practical context.

In support of his approach, Galligan mounts a challenge to the dignitarian theory. Dignitarian theory proposes that process is inherently valuable in terms of respect for persons, and that if adherence to process values assists in reaching correct outcomes and achieving social goals, then this is of secondary importance. Galligans challenge is directed at the link dignitarians claim exists between respect for persons and certain procedures which afford process values.[13] Galligan also challenges the results of sociological research which claims that when people make judgments about the fairness of decision-making, they concentrate their attention upon procedures as the important aspect, pushing outcomes into the background.[14] He claims that if these researchers had probed further into why people consider certain procedural rules valuable, they would have discovered that it is purely because the rules ensure outcomes are correct and standards of fairness are met.[15]

While rejecting the dignitarian theory, Galligan endorses a fair treatment or administrative justice model of administration. This involves rejecting the Weberian model of bureaucratic administration, which is committed to effectiveness and efficiency irrespective of respect for persons.[16] Galligan claims that procedures should be devised to ensure that the model of administrative justice is achieved.

How is this reconciled with his rejection of the dignitarian theory? The answer seems to be that Galligan treats as inherently valuable the standards of fair treatment against which procedures should be designed. Galligan appears to be drawing a distinction between process which is inherently valuable by reason of preserving respect for persons, and procedures which are only of instrumental value in promoting standards of fair treatment which preserve respect for persons.

The standards of fair treatment create first order rights in each area of process.[17] Procedural rights are the rights to the necessary procedures for realising first-order rights.[18] At this point a flow chart may have helped the casual reader. The weakness in the analysis is Galligans failure to explain what is a first order right. He says these are the product of laws and any other binding standards.[19]

On the basis of a general endorsement of theories about responsive law, Galligan proceeds to argue that there is a principle of consideration which constrains the pursuit by government of the public interest.[20] This principle of consideration generates moral rights of individuals to consideration in the affairs of government.[21]

Simple endorsement of the very theories of responsive government which increasingly are spurned in practical terms by modern Western governments provides a frail basis for derivation of the principles which will be central to Galligans theory. What if bureaucratic administration is a more efficient instrument to achieving social goals? Where does Galligan stand then? Surely his rejection of dignitarian theory hands to economic rationalists an easy excuse for restricting or removing consultation and other forms of participation in government decision-making in favour of efficient authoritarian management structures. Does the administrative justice model insist on procedures purely for their own value in affording respect to persons? That would be inconsistent with the more general statement of Galligans theory.

In Chapter 4: The Virtues of Participation, Galligan concludes the statement of the theoretical framework. The rejection of the dignitarian theory is continued in the form of a challenge to theories of strong democracy.[22] Strong democracy is described as making a claim that participatory procedures will in practice produce good outcomes and that they are essential rather than contingent means to good outcomes. Another version of strong democracy accepts that there are no objective standards as to just outcomes, but holds that fair procedure produces a process which is legitimate.

Curiously, Galligan remains silent in Part I with regard to major theories which have engaged contemporary political and administrative law theorists. These include the theory of interest group pluralism, the theory of civic republicanism, feminist accounts of participatory democracy and Habermas theory of communicative action. It is not until Chapter 15 that Galligan returns to theories associated with strong democracy. In the context of his account of policy-making he provides a general description of the role of interest groups, but opts to analyse the normative foundation of policy-making through the notion of the common good rather than through the notion of participation. He concludes that interest group pluralism is the least attractive theory because it offers no normative basis for choosing between the competing interests of groups.[23] Habermas theory of communicative action (and probably with it Sunsteins civic republicanism[24] although it is not expressly referred to) comes second, but is rejected. These theories cannot cope with our modern, complex society in which agreement upon the common good can rarely be achieved, and never for very long.[25] The preferred theory is the standard model associated with Rawls.[26] Here making policies for the common good is achieved through administrative judgments formed in a structured environment of settled public values and principles. Under this theory it is acknowledged that final agreement may be impossible and a decision has to be made by someone in authority.[27]

The adoption of the standard model in preference to the others is central to Galligans project of offering a theoretical framework for the study of procedural issues. Yet the argument for the standard model in preference to the other two models is achieved within the space of five pages towards the end of a book which is in excess of 500 pages. Galligan then argues that the standards of fair treatment in policy-making are the principles of consideration, participation and openness.[28]

At the end of the day Galligans easy rejection or neglect of theories of strong or participatory democracy leaves his theoretical framework lacking in persuasive force. Galligan criticises these theories on the ground of lack of empirical evidence of the link between participation and respect for persons. Yet in relation to his own theory he has to admit that the instrumental effect of procedures upon outcomes cannot be definitively assessed empirically.[29] We can only rely on intuition in claiming one procedure produces better or more accurate outcomes than does another.

Part II of the book (Chapters 5-7) contains a description of legal principles relating to natural justice in the United Kingdom, due process in the United States and due process under European human rights law. Whilst he does not attempt to describe the principles of natural justice in Australia in Part II, Galligan makes passing references to Australian cases, legislation and review processes to illustrate argument at various other points. I return to this aspect of the book later.[30]

Part III (Chapters 8 and 9) deals with forms of process, with a view to categorising various decision-making procedures, including adjudicative, policy- oriented, investigative, mediation, negotiation and agreement procedures. The discussion is readable and accessible, proceeding at a level of extreme generalisation, and making occasional brief references to particular types of administrative decision-makers. These chapters provide an overview of the caselaw on the content of natural justice in various circumstances.

However, the point of conducting this task of classification remains elusive. Galligan would say that the point is to work out what are the standards of fair treatment for each of the various forms of process, and what procedures are instrumental to achieving compliance with those standards. His core assumption is that where there are rules creating substantive entitlements, standards of fair treatment require that each case be properly judged according to the rules. Where the process is more discretionary and without substantive entitlements, the standard of fair treatment is that each case be considered reasonably and in good faith according to the relevant factors.[31] It is not clear where this gets us. The form of process, or type of decision-making body, and the standard of fairness, are in fact defined by the procedures themselves.

It is all the more surprising that in discussing mediation and negotiation[32] Galligan pays no regard to the literature on deliberative processes of civic republicanism or feminist accounts of imbalance in power in bargaining processes. Galligan suggests that negotiation could more closely meet standards of fairness if procedures such as the hearing rule of natural justice were introduced. Yet different procedure would transform negotiation into a different form of process, perhaps something like adjudication.

From an Australian perspective the references to the law leave much to be desired. Any academic or practitioner with a basic knowledge of the area will immediately spot errors in references to leading cases and legislation central to the system of administrative law in Australia. The errors include spelling mistakes,[33] an incorrectly named case,[35] failure to use the authorised citation,[37] a wrongly dated Act,[39] and an incorrect title of a leading extra-judicial commentary.[40]

There are also substantive errors. The basis for the jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) is misrepresented.[41] Galligan says that the principle behind the Australian system of merits review by tribunals is that any administrative decision or action should be open to review by a tribunal and implies that this is secured by a broad definition of decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).[42] While the AAT has an enormously varied and extensive jurisdiction, it does not have a general review jurisdiction. The Administrative Review Council has played a central role in making recommendations to the Federal Government for the conferral of new jurisdiction upon the AAT, and has developed guidelines as to what types of jurisdiction are inappropriate for merits review by the AAT. Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred upon the AAT, normally in the statute which confers the power whose exercise is to be subject to review, and the definition of decision plays a minor role in restricting the scope of jurisdiction.[43]

Chapter 16: Legal Approaches to the Policy Process contains an account of formal rule making procedures. Galligan says that statutory consultation requirements in the making and scrutiny of delegated legislation have been introduced in Victoria, New South Wales and the Commonwealth.[44] While this is true of Victoria and New South Wales, the Commonwealth has not yet enacted such requirements. The Legislative Instruments Bill 1994 (Cth) was not enacted. The similar Legislative Instruments Bill 1996 (Cth) has yet to be enacted, although there is every expectation that it will be in 1997. Galligan also omits reference to the fact that such consultation procedures were introduced in Tasmania in 1992[45] and in Queensland in 1994.[46]

These are petty points about the exposition of the legal principles. They would matter little if a compelling argument for the theoretical framework had been made and its usefulness in relation to legal doctrine clearly explained. But the interface between theory and law is generally disappointing. For example, the Australian cases Galligan cites are not used by him to explore the very issues arising from the case-law which are critical to his theoretical framework. Galligan needs to address the argument that the concept of legitimate expectation may now be affording some kind of substantive protection of individuals interests rather than a purely procedural protection (a proposition which Australian courts deny).[47] The cases provide fertile ground for such a discussion. If substantive protection is afforded then it may be argued that natural justice is of inherent value and Galligans theory is undermined. Yet Galligans treatment of the concept of legitimate expectation is brief and inconclusive.[48]

A body of case-law not touched upon by Galligan concerns the principle that a court may in its discretion decline a remedy where it would be futile to grant relief. If this principle were applied too readily in the area of natural justice the very ground of review would be utterly undermined. Many judges now say that there is no technical breach of natural justice. They dismiss arguments that it would be futile to grant relief on the basis that the same decision would be reached irrespective of anything the applicant had to say if a fair hearing had been afforded.[49] Galligan does not explore this case-law or suggest how his theory that procedure is only of instrumental value explains the position of the judges.

Another question of particular contemporary interest in Australia is how external merits review by tribunals fits into this theoretical framework. In Chapter 13 Galligan discusses in general terms the difference between internal and external review and recognises the diversity of forms of review.[50] He does not relate this practical detail to his exposition of the idea of a procedural right in the early chapters. He gives an example of a welfare tribunal. Its procedures need to be designed so as to reduce mistaken outcomes which cause moral harm, but not to the point where the increase in direct costs of meeting non-outcome values is disproportionate to the excusable margin of error.[51] This suggests that a merits review tribunal constitutes a separate decision-making context with its own outcomes and procedures instrumental to achieving them. The outcome values are the same as those of the primary decision-maker and internal reviewer: correct distribution of welfare benefits. External administrative review processes then involve outcome values as well as non-outcome values.

However, the application of the theory to systems of external merits review remains unclear. It is arguable that there is no separate outcome value involved in such review. Only one decision is to be made at the end of the day as to whether X gets the welfare benefit, and this is connected with the social goals of the welfare legislation. The external merits review provides a more elaborate mechanism for eliminating mistakes. These are procedural rights, but are they just procedural? Are rights flowing from the establishment of merits review tribunals, ombudsmen, and freedom of information legislation the process rights Galligan has rejected? If a merits review tribunal simply refused to hear an application for review which was clearly within its jurisdiction, what values would be damaged outcome values or non-outcome values? The decision challenged, say to cancel a welfare benefit, may have been correct. No moral harm would be done by violation of a right to a benefit. But the tribunals refusal to accord a right to review arguably causes moral harm because of the normative expectations generated by the system of review in operation and utilised by other applicants. Arguably the review system enshrines process values in a way which is inherently valuable as well as serving the purpose of securing correct outcomes.

In Chapter 16 the link between theory and legal principle again remains unclear. For example, Galligan does not indicate why the interest group pluralism model could not explain the Australian or United States rule making requirements equally as well as, or more convincingly than, the standard model he has adopted.

Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials is the fourth edition of a text by J M Evans, H N Janisch, David J Mullan and R C B Risk, which has become the leading teaching text in Canada.[52] It is distinctive in its combination of case extracts with an extensive explanatory text, almost removing the need for a separate text on the subject. The introduction in Chapter 1: The Administrative State and the Rule of Law eases the unfamiliar into the administrative law scene by commencing with a description of the variety of forms of regulation, legal institutions and, in particular, types of tribunals in Canada. The introduction then turns to alternative avenues of accountability such as the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, legislative scrutiny of the executive branch, ombudsmen, courts and the scope of their review. The theoretical dimension of the study of administrative law is suggested towards the end of this introduction, through an outline of Diceys version of the rule of law and responses to Dicey in later years. The functionalist critique of Dicey led by the Canadian theorist John Willis, continues to influence the evolution of Canadian legal doctrine, which concurrently recognises the critical importance of procedural openness and rationality in decision-making whilst insisting upon judicial deference to the expertise of specialist agencies.[53] To this there has been added the more recent impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

This text proceeds to examine the key areas of Canadian administrative law within a clear and cogent structure. Part II deals with administrative procedure, including natural justice, rulemaking, the duty to give reasons and delegation of power; Part III with statutory interpretation and the fact/law distinction; Part IV with jurisdictional error, narrow ultra vires and abuse of power; and Part V with remedies, standing and the discretion of the court. The emphasis differs a little from what might be found in an Australian study of administrative law. For example, the topic of jurisdictional error occupies 150 pages. This is understandable since jurisdictional error lies at the heart of Canadian administrative law. It is here that the Supreme Court of Canada has interrogated the issue of the proper role of the courts in making the executive branch accountable. The position differs somewhat in Australia, where the introduction of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) removed the jurisdictional/non-jurisdictional distinction in judicial review of decisions of federal tribunals whose decisions were justiciable under the Act. Henceforth the controversial cases raising the spectre of judicial activism, the legality/merits distinction and more deeply the relationship between the executive and the judiciary, arose increasingly in ADJR Act review where the ground was a type of abuse of power, such as failure to take into account relevant considerations or Wednesbury unreasonableness, not jurisdictional error.

In relation to any administrative decision or dispute studied, this book urges the reader to gain an appreciation of its functional context comprised of law, policy, politics, program delivery and individual and institutional features. The authors also urge the reader to develop a technical knowledge of applicable legal principles of administrative law, together with an appreciation of the theoretical dimensions of the problem, in terms of competing conceptions of law and government.[54] The book delivers the material needed to achieve these objectives. The doctrinal material is presented by carefully edited cases located within a text which makes sense of the extracts in their historical context and within the evolution of ideas in the law. There is a welcome infusion of well selected comparative material. For example, a leading Australian case on natural justice is utilised to raise a series of pertinent questions concerning the impact of natural justice upon ministerial policy-making.[55]

Apart from Chapter 14: Confining and Structuring Discretion, which is almost exclusively concerned with theory and its relationship to the law, the theoretical dimensions of administrative law are simply suggested in the course of explication of issues raised by legal principles. For example, the authors include in Chapter 2 Fairness: The Threshold an extract from Mashaw[56] to encourage the reader to consider the justification for hearings and what procedures are appropriate for particular sorts of decisions.

With regard to theory, the objectives of the Canadian authors are much more modest than those of Galligan, who sets himself the task of constructing a new theoretical framework for administrative procedures. The purpose of the Canadian authors is primarily to provide a full and coherent account of Canadian administrative law principles, but to do so in a contextual manner and with appropriately timed and formulated reminders to the reader of the need to develop a theoretical framework to resolve issues of the accountability of government emerging from the cases. In this endeavour they may achieve more than does Galligan in elucidating the relationship between administrative law and political theory.

[1] Galligan, D J, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (1996), Preface vii.
[2] These include Summers, R, Evaluating and Improving Legal Procedure: A Plea for Process Values (1974) 60 Cornell LR 1; Michelman, F, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process in Pennock, J, and Chapman, J, (eds), Human Nature in Politics 1977; Scanlon, T, Due Process in Pennock, J and Chapman, J id.
[3] Bayles, M, Procedural Justice: Allocating to Individuals (1990).
[4] Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550.
[5] Above n1 at 25.
[6] Id at 33-8.
[7] Id at 49.
[8] Id at 48-51.
[9] Id at 53.
[10] Id at 55.
[11] Id at 56.
[12] Id at 64-5.
[13] Id at 81.
[14] Id at 91. See Tyler, T R, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
[15] Above n1 at 94.
[16] Id at 237-40.
[17] Id at 96.
[18] Id at 100.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Id at 108-111.
[21] Id at 109.
[22] Id at 148-9.
[23] Id at 469. The critique of interest group pluralism arises briefly again at 479-81 and 496.
[24] Sunstein, C R, Beyond the Republican Revival (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1539.
[25] Above n1 at 469.
[26] Rawls, J, A Theory of Justice (1971).
[27] Above n1 at 469-70.
[28] Id at 476.
[29] Id at 159 and 361.
[30] See text accompanying nn33-49.
[31] Above n1 at 283.
[32] Id at 273-87.
[33] Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1990] HCA 22; (1990) 169 CLR 648 misspelt in Table of Cases and at 320 n9, Salemi v Mackellar (No 2) [1977] HCA 26; (1977) 137 CLR 396 misspelt in Table of Cases.
[34] Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1990] HCA 22; (1990) 169 CLR 648 in the Table of Cases and at 320 n9.
[35] Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic [1990] FCA 22; (1990) 92 ALR 93 (also, authorised citation now 21 FCR 193) in Table of Cases and at 321 n17.
[36] Salemi v Mackellar (No 2) [1977] HCA 26; (1977) 137 CLR 396 at 488 n21; FAI Insurances v Winneke [1982] HCA 26; (1982) 151 CLR 342 at 488 n21; Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 488
[37] R v Toohey (Aboriginal Land Commissioner); Ex parte Northern Land Council [1981] HCA 74; (1981) 151 CLR 170, in Table of Cases and at 487 n14; Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656, in Table of Cases and at 437 n44; South Australia v OShea (1987) 163 CLR 378, in Table of Cases and at 69 n23.
[38] Regulation Review Act 1987 (NSW) in Table of Legislation and at 502 n54.
[39] Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) in Table of Legislation and at 357 n16.
[40] Mason, A, Administrative Review: The Experience of the First Twelve Years (1989) 18 Fed LR 122, above n1 at 404 n24.
[41] Above n1 at 403 n23.
[42] Id at 403.
[43] Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s25.
[44] Above n1 at 501.
[45] Subordinate Legislation Act 1992 (Tas).
[46] Statutory Instruments and Legislative Standards Amendment Act 1994 (Qld).
[47] Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1990] HCA 22; (1990) 169 CLR 648; Attorney- General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273. In addition there is South Australia v OShea (1987) 163 CLR 378, of which Galligans account is at one point rather misleading: above n1 at 69.
[48] Above n1 at 320-2.
[49] See Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 633; Fares Rural Meat and Livestock Co Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Live-stock Corp [1990] FCA 139; (1990) 96 ALR 153 at 171-2; Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Taveli [1990] FCA 169; (1990) 23 FCR 162.
[50] Above n1 at 402-6.
[51] Id at 126.
[52] Evans, J M, Janisch, H N, Mullan, D J, and Risk, R C B Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials (4th edn, 1995).
[53] Id at 31.
[54] Id at 33.
[55] Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1990] HCA 22; (1990) 169 CLR 648. Cf the analysis of this case by Galligan, text accompanying notes 47-48 above.
[56] Mashaw, J, Due Process in the Administrative State 1985.

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