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University of New South Wales Law Journal Student Series |
A RACE WE CAN WIN: A REALISTIC, YET HOPEFUL DISPOSITION TOWARD ACHIEVING AGENDA 2030
NATALIE DIANE
Biermann et al[1] argue that the adoption of United Nations’ 2030 Agenda and their 17 Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’)[2] have provided little more than discursive changes in the international legal community, and state there is minimal evidence of substantial transformative impact.[3] This article will expand upon Biermann et al.’s conclusions by assessing the implementation barriers and limitations of sustainable development law and policy, and examining the impact that discursive change has on the progress toward achieving the SDGs and their targets by 2030.
Part I will provide an overview of the collective progress toward achieving the SDGs to date, before identifying and analysing two fundamental challenges underpinning the obstruction of effective SDG implementation - weak international coordination, and disputed political responsibilities[4] - and their subsequent barriers of insufficient funding and resource allocation, inconsistency in multilateral political will/agenda, and loose accountability and reporting measures.
Part II will consider the critical evaluation of implementation challenges identified in Part 1, and provide two policy recommendations that take the current legal and political climate into consideration, and have the potential to improve the progress of the SDGs and their targets within the next seven years. These recommendations are the ‘Health in All Policies’ (‘HiAP’) paradigm, and the conceptual framework that combines the Circular Economy (‘CE’) model with Human Development (‘HD’) (referred to as the Circular Humansphere, or CE/HD framework for the purpose of this article). I will use these policy lenses to explore how applying such frameworks to sustainable development law and policy decision making could contribute to the effective integration of inter- and cross-sectoral laws and policies to move the legal and political needle toward achieving the SDGs by 2030.
I propose there is not much debate to be had in regard to whether the effective implementation of law or policy for achieving the SDGs is currently limited, as it is quite evident that it is so.[5] However, my thesis argues that although such limitations are proven to exist, we should not discount the crucial role that discursive impact has in generating greater institutional, normative and transformative change. I argue that discursive change has substantive potential, and is a palpable precursor to the development of ‘tangible’ legal and political change. Throughout this article, I present a realistic, yet hopeful disposition, similar to that of United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, in that sustainable development and the climate emergency may be “a race we are losing, but it is a race we can win.”[6]
Since the creation of Agenda 2030 and the 17 SDGs in 2015, there have been numerous law and policy initiatives developed with the intent to embrace the agenda[7] and ‘transform our world’.[8] However, anthropogenic climate change remains at such an alarmingly high concentration that more than 70% of the Earth’s land has been transformed by human activity, resulting in unrivalled environmental degradation and rates of global warming,[9] marine life species are close to ‘dinosaur-like extinction’ rates,[10] and atmospheric carbon dioxide levels contributing to global warming are the highest they’ve been in over four million years.[11] The 2022 United Nations’ SDG Progress Chart, in fact, identified the deterioration of SDG progress, particularly in areas of poverty (SDG1), food security (related to SDG2), non-communicable diseases and immunisation coverage (related to SDG3), and employment (related to SDG8, Decent Work and Economic Growth).[12]
So why, or rather, how, is it that eight years on, we are still being faced with the greatest global environmental crisis of our lifetime[13] despite the adoption of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, and the innumerable laws and policies created toward achieving them?
A number of factors have been attributed to the obstruction of effective law and policy implementation toward progressing the SDGs, including the broad ambitions of the goals themselves,[14] the voluntary nature of the framework[15] (and states’ hesitance to concede sovereignty to international organisations),[16] lack of accountability and enforcement mechanisms,[17] conflicting economic imperatives and their resulting ‘trade-offs’ between the goals,[18] inconsistencies in political will,[19] and insufficient funding and resource allocation.[20] Each of these barriers can be considered corollaries of two fundamental underpinnings, weak international coordination and disputed political responsibilities, which I will focus on first, before further dissecting the aforementioned subsequent barriers,[21] in an attempt to understand what is obstructing our collective progress toward achieving the SDGs.
Although current sustainable law and policy may be somewhat limited to discursive impact,[22] if we can understand the barriers, we can begin to optimise policies, systems and frameworks to, if not negate, at least accommodate them in future law and policy reform and development. In this way, I argue in line with my thesis that the discursive impact can ultimately be transformed into institutional, normative and transformative change.
A International Coordination Challenges
As a broad assessment, the international coordination challenges faced by the SDGs stem from three interconnected pillars: the interdependencies of the SDGs themselves; the need to mobilise collective action across multiple governments and jurisdictions; and the incongruence between national and global policy-making.[23]
Firstly, the interdependencies of the SDGs mean that any development toward one SDG has a direct impact on all others; either in the form of a synergy, or a trade-off.[24] Whilst some interconnection mapping and analysis tools exist to conceptualise the relationships between each SDG and contribute to policy coherence,[25] such tools are not widely utilised by states for informed policy decision-making.[26] This results in the adoption of one dimensional ‘siloed’ policies that detrimentally overlook the complexities and interdependencies of the SDGs.[27]
It can then be understood how collective action problems arise; if each country is adopting arbitrary, one dimensional policies that do not consider the interdependent nature of the SDGs, the mobilisation of collective action stagnates.[28] Collective action requires cohesion across multiple areas of government, policy, development and jurisdictions,[29] and each of these areas have their own ecosystem of structure and priority.[30] As such, one country’s siloed policy approach is unable to be effectively translated across these multiple areas, as it overlooks the innate complexity of each ecosystem and the interrelationships between all SDGs.[31] As a result, collective action stagnates due to the conflicting nature of priorities (also related to disputed political responsibilities, explored in Part B) and the siloed actions of states, rarely acting collectively toward a common goal.[32]
This then culminates in incongruent and disconnected national and global policy-making.[33] The disconnect between national and global policy-making is also evident in the SDG targets themselves, as many are only measured by national progress markers, with transboundary effects measured in less than 30% of SDG indicators.[34] Thankfully, SDG3, Good Health and Well-Being has a number of global progress markers within its proposed targets,[35] and holds some of the highest synergistic relations with other SDGs.[36] These elements support the HiAP policy recommendation toward improving collective SDG progress, which will be further explored in Part II.
In summary, one dimensional national policy plans are being developed without considering the systemic analysis of SDG interdependencies.[37] This creates confusing directives for collective international action, resulting in disconnected national and global policy-making, and thus directly impedes progress toward the SDGs.[38] It can be understood from here, how international coordination challenges play a fundamental challenge in the effective implementation of law and policy toward achieving the SDGs.[39]
Part B will analyse disputed political responsibilities as the second underpinning challenge impacting SDG progress, before progressing to Part C which will examine the subsequent barriers that stem from both international coordination challenges and disputed political responsibilities.
B Disputed Political Responsibilities
Disputed and conflicting political responsibilities between countries, multilateral governments, and political actors is another one of the foundational challenges faced by law and policy toward SDG progress.[40] Disputes over political responsibilities inherently arise from the broad and voluntary nature of the SDG framework itself, in that although the SDGs are universal, the shared roles of actors are not explicitly articulated or specified.[41]
Each SDG requires multiple actors to act cohesively, but the lack of guiding principles of how to effectively develop and coordinate multilateral and cross-sectoral partnerships contributes to the confusion of who shares what responsibility.[42] This also relates to the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities' (‘CBDR’) and the somewhat obliged role of developed countries to take lead in providing financial, economic and technological support for developing countries,[43] and the need for better transnational coordination for policy cohesion and localised capacity building.[44]
In summary, the voluntary framework, combined with the weak normative commitments of the SDG’s broad and morally ambitious goals are two of the inherent building blocks that produce conflicts and confusion around the political responsibility of actors, which ultimately limit the effective progress toward achieving the SDGs.[45] The voluntary nature of the SDG framework is also a precursive factor behind the lack of accountability/enforcement measures,[46] which will be further explored in Part C.
C Subsequent Barriers as a Result of International Coordination Challenges and Disputed Political Responsibilities
In understanding international coordination challenges and disputed political responsibilities, we can begin to dissect the subsequent proliferation of barriers to effective law and policy implementation toward achieving the SDGs.
To quote Eric Usher, Head of UNEP Finance Initiative:
“At the heart of the climate challenge are two gaps we urgently need to bridge: the ambition and the investment gap.” [47]
Both of these gaps can be better understood when we assess the existing international coordination challenges and contested political responsibilities between multilateral governments and political frameworks. This section will evaluate the investment gap of the SDGs generally, with specific reference to SDG3, Good Health and Well-Being, SDG4, Quality Education and SDG7, Affordable and Clean Energy. The broad ambition of the SDG framework is also explored via challenges of inconsistent acts of multilateral political will, and lack of accountability and enforcement measures. The role that discursive change has had on accountability mechanisms for SDG13, Climate Action, SDG14, Life Below Water and SDG15, Life on Land will also be explored.
It makes sense then, with contested political responsibilities and the lack of international coordination, that financial resource collection and allocation is ineffective in the global sustainable development space.[48] An additional challenge placed upon SDG funding came as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent global economic crisis.[49] Further investor uncertainty has also come as a result of the war in Ukraine which began 24 February 2022 and is continuing to date.[50] The pandemic resulted in the reduction of financial and economic resources, which actually reversed SDG progress.[51] The global foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) recovery since the pandemic has been inconsistent, ‘brittle’ and uneven,[52] and despite 2021 showing 70% growth in FDI, investor uncertainty is predicted to show a downward trajectory due to the war in Ukraine.[53]
2014 World Investment Report estimated that up to USD$7 trillion per year would be required to achieve the SDGs by 2030,[54] and the investment gap as of 2018 per ECOSOC Chamber, was estimated to be USD$2.5 trillion per year.[55] Stenberg et al. in 2017, estimated that an additional USD$274 billion per year is needed to make timely and sufficient progress toward SDG3.[56] The estimated annual resource gap for SDG4 is a minimum of USD$39 billion,[57] and funding requirements for SDG7 are estimated at USD$300 billion,[58] with funding for developing countries having continued to decrease over the past couple of years.[59]
Additional to the fundamental investment gap is the inconsistency of funding allocation. This can also be attributed to the broad ambition of the goals, and the varying political priorities between states.[60] There was almost twice as much of the 70% FDI growth in 2021 allocated to developed countries than developing and vulnerable economies.[61] The UN 2021 Climate & SDG Synthesis Report[62] also identified that although global climate finance increased by approximately 25% since 2015,[63] 76% of these resources are reinvested into the same country from which it originated, thus providing a further disconnect into transnational coordination and support for developing nations.[64] As such, it could be argued that the broad ambition of the SDG framework lends itself to the vast investment gap; and thus the two key challenges identified by Usher are, themselves, interrelated by cause and effect.
From this evaluation, we can see that weak international coordination and contested political responsibilities play a key role in exacerbating the sustainable development investment gap. As such, law and policy reform recommendations must take these into consideration to streamline global public and private resources in financing,[65] and adequately distribute financial resources toward SDG development and localised capacity building[66] if we are to see an effective and expedited improvement toward achieving Agenda 2030.[67]
Barua[68] takes into consideration not just the financial gap that currently exists toward achieving the SDGs, but the additional intertemporal costs that accumulate as a result of inaction.[69] I feel this is a pertinent inclusion in understanding the additional social, environmental and economic costs that come as a result of uncoordinated actions toward law and policy making.
With all of this in mind, Part II provides recommendations for a targeted policy framework (HiAP) that could help to streamline funding efforts toward SDG3 (and I advocate for the synergistic improvement this would have on SDGs 4, 5, 8, and 10), and a holistic conceptual framework (CE/HD) to help bridge these human development funding concerns with technical and economic progress (such as SDG7, Affordable and Clean Energy, and SDG12, Responsible Consumption and Production, and their relationship with SDG3).
Inconsistencies in multilateral political will can be directly related to the broad ambition and vague goals of Agenda 2030, as well as the voluntary nature of the framework.[70] It is also a corollary issue that arises from the interdependent relationships of SDGs, which often result in conflicting economic imperatives and trade-offs.[71]
The voluntary nature of the framework itself poses inconsistencies in political will for a number of reasons. Firstly, states can be hesitant to concede sovereignty to international organisations.[72] Secondly, as a voluntary framework, there is an inherent lack of enforceability and accountability mechanisms, and more so, I posit there exists an innate lack of trust between signatories whereby one could vigorously enforce its provisions, but there is no guarantee of similar or unified effort from other parties.[73] This also ties into the funding gap, in that, with a lack of trust in signatories committing to enforcement of provisions with equal effort, governments may be hesitant to financially contribute when noncompliance would save them from substantial costs.[74] This is also particularly true for less developed or developing countries, who have pre-existing economic and development challenges to consider before being able to prioritise sustainable development.[75] Of course this hesitance, and again, siloed approach to policy implementation and governance, causes inconsistencies in multilateral political will.[76]
As such, inconsistencies of multilateral political will can clearly be seen as a subsequent challenge from both underpinning challenges of weak international coordination and disputed political responsibilities, and should also be considered when optimising for future sustainable development law and policy decision making. Hence, the policy recommendations of HiAP, focusing on integrating SDG3 throughout national and global policies, and the integrated coordination efforts of the CE/HD framework, both of which will be further explored in Part 2.
The lack of accountability and enforcement measures are not only barriers to achieving the SDGs, but are challenges faced by international law and international environmental law generally.[77] This hurdle becomes doubly potent when we consider it in conjunction with the pre-existing complexities of international coordination challenges and disputed political responsibilities. Without a guiding accountability framework, it is unrealistic to expect a clear, multilateral political direction.[78] By providing succinct accountability measures, we can hope to see improved transnational coordination and multilateral diplomacy, consistency in determining political responsibility and funding objectives toward a common goal.
Thankfully, civil society organisations have come to the forefront in holding governments to account on their sustainable development obligations, in lieu of formal and/or legally binding accountability and enforcement measures set forth by the SDG framework.[79] The advocacy and political movement of more than 1,700 civil society organisations across 130 countries contributed to the recent UN General Assembly resolution toward an accountability framework for countries and their obligations regarding climate change (directly related to SDG13, Climate Action)[80] in what has been regarded as a ‘powerful demonstration of effective multilateral diplomacy...’.[81]
This recent UN General Assembly consensus was announced on 29 March 2023,[82] with the resolution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) to set ‘concrete’ climate change obligations for all governments.[83] This is a significant achievement toward defining human rights and sustainable development obligations.[84] It is intended that such an outcome will provide clear and definitive responsibilities of states in upholding their obligations toward climate change action, thus mitigating some of the challenges to sustainable development progress explored throughout Part I.[85]
This substantially supports my thesis that even if sustainable development law and policy implications are primarily discursive in the legal and political environment as the Biermann et al. study states, I argue that discourse is a powerful tool in creating transformative change. Further support for this argument can be seen in that altering the phrasing of ‘climate action’ to ‘climate crisis’ in recent discourse (largely attributed to the recognition that the global collective movement toward effectively reducing anthropogenic climate change has grossly under-performed),[86] has created a sense of urgency for more stringent enforcement and coordination mechanisms to be developed in international environmental, and sustainable development law and policy.[87] What is even more encouraging, is that the international legal community has shown positive responses to this discursively-framed urgency, as evidenced in the recent outcomes of COP15 in December 2022.[88]
COP 15 2022 saw the development of the ‘30 by 30’ pledge to protect 30% of marine and terrestrial biodiversity by 2030 (related to SDG14, Life Below Water and SDG15, Life on Land) and directly contributed to the development and adoption of two landmark international environmental law and policy mechanisms - The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (‘GBF’) and the 2023 UN High Seas Treaty.[89] The GBF directly contributes to accountability and enforcement measures for corporations and financial institutions by mandating annual reports on all programs related to nature.[90] Although not legally binding, by increasing reporting, monitoring and accountability measures of all parties,[91] the GBF plays a significant role in supporting the global progress toward achieving the SDGs.[92] The 2023 UN High Seas Treaty[93] on the other hand, provides clarity for multilateral cooperation efforts with its legal framework for establishing marine protected areas (‘MPAs’) in international waters.[94] The treaty has been regarded as a ‘victory in multilateralism’[95] and a crucial enforcement mechanism that can be used to advance the global progress of the GBF, the 30 by 30 pledge, and Agenda 2030.[96]
This section has shown the potency of discursive advocacy in the development of new accountability, enforcement and coordination mechanisms, and the way these mechanisms can help to circumvent some of the implementation barriers that are faced by international environmental law, and sustainable development law and policy. The development and adoption of these mechanisms highlight how the international community has been able to respond to the discursively urgent need to actively reduce anthropogenic climate change. Hence, supporting my thesis that although the effective implementation of sustainable development law and policy may face limitations, its discursive impact can create significant momentum toward transformative change.
The two recommendations provided in Part II have taken the SDG law and policy challenges as identified throughout Part I into consideration, and aim to circumvent these barriers and provide a pathway toward substantive normative, institutional and transformative change toward collective SDG progress.
Throughout this article, I have outlined some of the key challenges facing the operationalisation and progress of the SDGs, as a means to understand the barriers and determine ways to optimise law and policy to circumvent them.
As such, the first policy recommendation to be explored is the HiAP framework, primarily because it is centred around the progress of SDG3, which holds synergistic properties with at least nine other SDGs.[97] Having identified the two primary underpinning challenges faced by law and policy implementation toward SDG progress (international coordination and disputed political responsibilities) this policy reform recommendation aims to reduce these barriers, and their subsequent challenges, by 1) providing a coordinated response framework toward an SDG with high synergistic relationships; 2) developing clarity and direction for multilateral government and political actors, toward a common funding goal and its distribution; 3) by employing a central focal point, even without a binding enforcement or accountability measure, the specifics of the policy paradigm will provide a pseudo-guiding framework by which to measure accountability and obligations of states. Thus, endeavouring to implement a policy paradigm that meets, greets and circumvents the fundamental implementation barriers faced by the SDG and international environmental law framework, generally.
The second policy recommendation is the conceptual framework of the Circular Humansphere (‘CE/HD’),[98] which endeavours to amalgamate two comprehensive sustainable development policy frameworks, so that they can be applied effectively, as one.[99] The CE/HD framework aligns the commonly accepted and proven Human Development approach toward human-focused sustainable development, with the up and coming environmental sustainability and innovative technology model of the Circular Economy[100] - providing a fusion of both policies to bridge the gaps and omissions of the other to stimulate greater policy cohesion.[101]
A Health in All Policies (HiAP)
‘Health creates wealth’.[102] Agenda 2030 positions global health as a political priority at the heart of the SDGs,[103] and health equity has been identified as a cross cutting issue throughout almost all goals and targets.[104] Healthy populations are key determinants in sustainable development, and are critical in the success of all other SDGs.[105]
Niessen et al identify five core SDGs which rely on the reduction of health inequalities: SDG1, No Poverty; SDG3, Good Health and Well-Being; SDG4, Quality Education; SDG5, Gender Equality; and SDG10, Reduced Inequalities.[106] Kroll et al[107] identified SDG1 as the SDG with the most synergistic relations with the other targets. Namely, the close and positive correlation to SDGs 3, 4, 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) and 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).[108] When Kroll et al.’s cross-sectional analysis was compared with Pradhan et al.’s longitudinal studies and analysis, both identified that progression toward SDG3, improving health and well-being, and SDG1, eliminating poverty, would have the largest synergies and impact on other goals.[109]
With this in mind, the first policy recommendation toward multilateral policy cohesion and SDG progress, is to implement the ‘Health in All Policies’ (HiAP) paradigm. HiAP is a systematic approach to public policies across sectors that considers the health implications of decision making in order to avoid harmful health impacts, and seeks synergies to improve overall population health and health equity.[110] Agenda 2030 and the SDGs challenge the global community toward a common future, leaving no one behind.[111] WHO is explicit in their reasoning that HiAP is pivotal to achieving this global, transformational agenda.[112] Adopting the HiAP framework within law and policy for sustainable development is primarily aimed toward the achievement of SDG3, but due to the interdependent nature of the SDGs, optimises for the synergistic relationship and subsequent resulting progress toward SDGs 1, 4, 5, 8 and 10, at minimum.[113]
Inadequate disease control and prevention disproportionately impacts lower income countries and communities i.e. those experiencing poor economic conditions and poverty (interrelation with SDG1) and lower education/access to education (interrelation with SDG4).[114] Furthermore, higher medical costs associated with poor health (and poor health access and education) are more likely to impact poorer populations (interrelation with SDGs 8 and 10), due to the higher prevalence of illness and health complications within the community.[115] As such, applying a HiAP policy framework can directly work toward improving SDG3[116] by improving health, which then acts as a catalyst for a cascading effect of significant positive trajectories toward the success of other closely aligned and synergistic goals,[117] such as decreasing poverty (SDG1), increasing access to education (SDG4) and gender equality, particularly related to sexual and reproductive health services (SDG5), providing increased employment opportunities and economic growth due to the improved health of the community (SDG8), and reducing socio-economic inequalities (SDG10).[118]
In addition to these highly synergistic properties, SDG3 is one of the SDGs with transboundary progress markers, which can be found in targets 3.2, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3 a, b, c and d.[119] As such, a further recommendation for HiAP implementation is to tailor the program toward these global progress markers such as 3.2, reducing neonatal mortality rate; 3.7, providing universal access to sexual and reproductive health care services and education; and/or 3.8, providing universal health coverage. Therefore, focusing on SDG3 and its universally applicable targets can create pivotal momentum for global sustainable development by not only enhancing national SDG progress, but allowing for transnational coordination efforts and compounding synergies. Thus, it has the potential to bridge the national and global policy making gap and optimises for effective sustainable development progress.
In their 2018 report, WHO and the Government of South Australia acknowledge the challenges that come with the development and implementation of systems with an integrative and sustainable approach, such as HiAP.[120] However, they also acknowledge the number of countries and regions who have successfully employed the HiAP framework (ranging from Africa, the United States, South-East Asia, Canada, Europe, Ecuador, Eastern Mediterranean, PRC and Australia[121]) and identify many more who are considering this policy framework as a means toward achieving Agenda 2030.[122]
South Australia’s HiAP implementation has proven to stand the test of time; it was one of the earliest adoptions of the HiAP paradigm (adopted in 2007)[123] and has remained in place and predominantly successful despite political transitions and government changes.[124] Thus, HiAP has the ability to withstand the instability/inconsistencies of political governance – an identified challenge that sustainable development law and policy needs to overcome in order to progress toward achieving the SDGs.[125]
Applying the HiAP paradigm against the backdrop of the SDG framework has also provided clear and dedicated direction toward improving intersectoral health targets in Sudan, Suriname, Namibia and Zambia.[126] Although it begins as a national policy development, it is able to be expanded transnationally, and thus, streamlines international coordination challenges and reduces the incongruencies between national and global policy making.[127]
Of course, introducing HiAP principles into domestic legislation would provide a stronger platform for its integration and in ensuring high-level political will and commitment.[128] Legislative backing for the program has proven to be highly effective in providing program continuation and sustainability measures.[129] For example, Finland, as one of the leaders in the HiAP approach, has a strong legal basis for the program, which legally substantiates needs assessments in order to determine priority actions and their appropriate accountability markers.[130] In lieu of legislation, however, an alternative recommendation is to have HiAP added to policy structures and frameworks that already exist and to have it established as part of normal business practices, as opposed to a new optional/voluntary task force.[131] Leveraging pre-existing broad national policy frameworks can be an alternative pathway to legislation that can still provide fertile grounds for effective implementation whilst incremental policy changes continue to be developed.[132]
Reporting, monitoring and evaluation frameworks can also be developed for HiAP implementation, which helps to contribute to the accountability measures of states toward sustainable development progress by providing empirical evidence,[133] in lieu of binding enforcement mechanisms. For example, China’s HiAP scheme (The Healthy China 2030 Plan) includes an additional 13 core indicators, which are measured through its own reporting, monitoring and evaluation framework to ensure key policy goals are effectively tracked and implemented.[134] Thus, the HiAP framework, again, helps to overcome one of the core challenges faced by law and policy implementation toward SDG progress, as it enables additional enforcement and accountability measures to be created, in line with its dedicated political and socio-economic focus on improving health and wellbeing across all sectors.[135]
As such, I argue HiAP has the political potential to circumvent all major implementation challenges currently faced by sustainable development law and policy toward achieving the SDGs, particularly if tailored toward global progress markers. It has the capacity to provide a coordinated response framework toward one central SDG (SDG3), which holds one of the highest number of synergistic relationships with all other goals;[136] through which it can contribute to multilateral policy cohesion by providing clarity and direction for national and multilateral government and political actors toward a common implementation and funding goal;[137] it ensures that health and wellbeing are unifying, cross cutting themes,[138] thus providing a consistent focus to assert/direct political will and agenda; and it is able to provide additional accountability measures for national policy makers, and therefore assists in bridging the accountability and enforcement gaps that arise from voluntary international agendas.[139]
B The Circular Humansphere (CE/HD)
Policy coherence is paramount for the success of both sustainable development progress and HiAP implementation.[140] Transnational development coordination therefore plays an important role in supporting the interrelationship of HiAP against the SDG framework, to enable greater intersectoral synergies between health and others, and multilateral policy solutions with a dedicated political direction.[141] However, given the complex and evolving nature of development coordination generally, I posit that transnational cooperation on its own is not comprehensive enough to achieve timely and succinct progress toward the SDGs, particularly if we are to employ a central focus toward SDG3 such as through the HiAP paradigm mentioned previously. Schröder et al. have a similar thought and explore a new, integrative conceptual framework that combines the Circular Economy (‘CE’) model with Human Development (‘HD’).[142] Such a policy framework could be transformational in the coordination with HiAP paradigms as we champion for the rapid improvement toward SDG3 and its cascading synergies with SDGs 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 10 (at minimum),[143] and toward the achievement of all SDGs, generally.[144]
There is debate concerning the CE model overlooking social and humanity aspects,[145] and similarly, that the traditional human development model lacks considerations of environmental sustainability.[146] As such, the CE/HD fusion aims to amalgamate two comprehensive and synergistic[147] sustainable development frameworks, so that they can be applied effectively, as one.[148] It endeavours to align the commonly accepted and proven Human Development approach toward human-focused sustainable development, with the up and coming environmental sustainability and innovative technology model of the Circular Economy.[149] Essentially, it cross pollinates the Human Development Index with circulatory indicators to address the current shortcomings of the HD approach to include long term environmental sustainability markers.[150] This human-embedded circular economy approach goes beyond the normative techno-centric CE framework and acknowledges humans and human concerns as integral components within the circular paradigm.[151] So for example, whilst it includes the principle CE application toward waste elimination (related to SDG12, and its synergy with SDG7), it also extends itself to eliminating the HD issues of poverty (related to SDG1) and various social inequalities (interrelated with SDGs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10).[152]
While this framework is still relatively new and conceptual, Schröder et al. and Lima et al., among others,[153] encourage further exploration, discussion and test implementation of the CE/HD framework toward achieving the SDGs in a holistic, and inclusive way.[154] Using the CE/HD framework to guide local and national SDG implementation would also allow for evidence collection and analysis.[155] Utilising the framework in this way is hypothesised to prove that the existing trade-offs between social, economic and environmental targets of SDGs can be mitigated.[156] If this hypothesis is correct, then it would ultimately allow for further investigation, research and refinement so the CE/HD fusion model can substantially deliver better outcomes than existing, siloed law and policy frameworks toward achieving the SDGs.[157]
From this exploration, I therefore believe that integrative, cross-sectoral policy frameworks, such as the CE/HD framework, is a welcomed and necessary ally for the holistic and sustainable progress of the SDGs, providing a ‘complete symbiotic perspective’; mimicking that of nature itself.[158] Through the adoption of an integrated framework such as the Circular Humansphere that considers all humans within the wider circular system,[159] we provide ourselves with an opportunity to close the law and policy gaps between human development, economy and environment that are faced by Agenda 2030.[160]
I propose that both HiAP and CE/HD are formidable reform considerations for sustainable development. Whether used together or separately, I believe this analysis has showcased their significant strengths and abilities to overcome each of the implementation barriers identified throughout this article. As such, we have two policy recommendations that provide at least a theoretical optimisation of sustainable development law and policy toward achieving the SDGs by 2030, with room for further research and development.
Both reform recommendations support my thesis that although law and policy toward sustainable development is deemed restricted to discursive impact,[161] optimising law and policy to overcome its challenges is possible, and discursive change is a palpable precursor in developing institutional, normative and transformative law and policy change toward achieving Agenda 2030.
Having identified some of the fundamental challenges faced by the SDG framework and law and policy for its effective progress, such as weak international coordination, disputed political responsibilities and their subsequent challenges of funding, inconsistent multilateral political will/agenda and lack of accountability and enforcement mechanisms, I can somewhat agree with the assessment from Biermann et al that transformative progress toward achieving the broad, global ambition of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs by 2030 is limited.[162] However, I support my argument that although law and policy toward sustainable development progress has been primarily discursive, it does not mean it has been ineffective in providing tangible and meaningful impact toward global sustainable development.
Throughout this article, language and discourse have shown to be substantive tools that drive political and legal progress, and I propose that all transformative law and policy change begins at the discursive level, and is a palpable precursor toward collective action[163] and the development of tangible legal and political impact.[164] I could even go so far as to say that the creation and adoption of Agenda 2030 itself stemmed from discursive changes regarding climate change and protection over 50 years ago.[165] As such, we should not discount the crucial role that discursive impact has in generating greater institutional, normative and transformative change.
Although current progress and remaining challenges ahead can paint an alarming picture, I retain a sense of hope and that we should not succumb to defeatism just yet.[166] Salient changes to cooperative development such as effective measuring and accountability tools,[167] and a cohesive approach to multilateral government collaboration, have the potential to significantly drive us toward SDG progress.[168] This article has provided at least two policy reform recommendations to assist with overcoming these challenges, the Health in All Policies (HiAP) framework and the Circular Humansphere model (CE/HD).
Thankfully, we have also seen pertinent developments in the sustainable development law and policy environment in the last six months alone. 2022-2023 to date has already shown a significant shift from discursive to tangible impact as evidenced by the recent UN General Assembly resolution toward ICJ advisory opinion on state accountability for climate action, the GBF as a result of COP 15 2022 and 2023 UN High Seas Treaty. As such, I sustain my realistic yet hopeful disposition for timely and substantial sustainable development law and policy progress toward institutional, normative and transformative change.
Ultimately, I conclude in a similar sentiment to that of Secretary-General António Guterres, in that sustainable development and the climate emergency may be “a race we are losing, but it is a race we can win.”[169]
[1] Frank Biermann et al, ‘Scientific Evidence on the Political Impact of the
Sustainable Development Goals’ (2022) Nature Sustainability (5), 795–800.
[2] UN General Assembly, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, A/RES/70/1, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/57b6e3e44.html (last accessed 21 Mar 2023).
[3] Biermann et al (n 1) 798 [8].
[4] Adolf Kloke-Lesch, The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation
for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration, ed Chaturverdi,
S.et al. 127-163 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) 6.
[5] Biermann et al (n 1) 798 [8].
[6] António Guterres, ‘Remarks at 2019 Climate Action Summit’ United Nations Secretary-General (23 September 2019) [44] <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-23/remarks-2019-climate-action-summit>.
[7] Adolf Kloke-Lesch., ‘The Untapped Functions of International Cooperation’ in The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration, ed Chaturverdi, Set al, 127–163 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) 141 [3].
[8] A/RES/70/1 (n 2), 35 [2].
[9] Global Land Outlook, 2nd edn, ‘Summary for Decision Makers’ (2022) United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, [2] <https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/2022-04/GLO2_SDM_low-res_0.pdf>.
[10] Monisha Ravisetti, ‘Warming Oceans Threaten Dinosaur-Like Extinction of Marine Life - but It’s Avoidable’, CNET (online, 1 May 2022) <https://www.cnet.com/science/climate/how-the-climate-crisis-could-lead-to-a-modern-great-dying/>.
[11] ‘Atmospheric CO2 Reaches Highest Level in More Than 4 Million Years’, Earth.Org (online, 9 June 2021) <https://earth.org/atmospheric-co2-reaches-highest-level-in-4-million-years/>.
[12] United Nations, ‘Sustainable Development Goals Progress Chart 2022’ [2] <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2022/Progress-Chart-2022.pdf> (last accessed 18 Mar 2023).
[13] Deena Robinson, ‘14 Biggest Environmental Problems of 2023’ Earth.Org (online, 9 January 2023) <https://earth.org/the-biggest-environmental-problems-of-our-lifetime/>; Diego Oré, ‘Climate Change will Fuel Humanitarian Crises in 2023 - Study’ (online, 14 February 2022) Reuters <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/climate-change-will-fuel-humanitarian-crises-2023-study-2022-12-14/>; ‘Public Health and Environment’, World Health Organisation (online, 2023) <https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/public-health-and-environment>.
[14] Sachin Chaturvedi et al, ‘Development Coordination in the Context of Contested Global Governance’ in The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration, ed Chaturvedi, S et al 127–163 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) 6 [5].
[15] Kloke-Lesch (n 4) 141.
[16] Taylor Kilduff, ‘The Difficulties of Enforcing Global Environmental Law’,
Georgetown Environmental Law Review (Blog Post, 1 February 2019) [2] <https://www.law.georgetown.edu/environmental-law-review/blog/214/>.
[17] Ibid [4]; Biermann et al (n 1) 798 [8].
[18] Christian Kroll et al, ‘Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): Are We
Successful in Turning Trade-offs into Synergies?’ (2019) Palgrave
Communications (5), 1, 5 [1], 8 [2], 9 [3].
[19] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 6 [5]; Biermann et al (n 1) 798 [8].
[20] Mariska Meurs et al, ‘How Healthy is a ‘Healthy Economy’? Incompatibility Between Current Pathways Towards SDG3 and SDG8’ (2019) Globalization and Health (15)83, 4 [2].
[21] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 6 [3]–8 [2].
[22] Biermann et al (n 1) 798 [7].
[23] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 6 [3]–[5].
[24] Kroll et al. (n18) 2 [1].
[25] Måns Nilsson et al, ‘Policy: Map the Interactions Between Sustainable
Development Goals’ (2016) Nature (534), 321 [3].
[26] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 6 [5].
[27] Nilsson et al (n 25) 320 [2].
[28] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 7 [2].
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid 7 [3].
[34] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 7 [3].
[35] ‘3: Ensure Healthy Lives and Promote Well-Being for All at All Ages’, United Nations (online, 2023) <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3>.
[36] Rachel Nugent et al, ‘Investing in Non-Communicable Disease Prevention
and Management to Advance the Sustainable Development Goals’ (2018)
Lancet (391)10134, 2029 [1].
[37] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 7 [2].
[38] Ibid.
[39] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 6 [3].
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid 7 [4].
[42] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 7 [4].
[43] Ye Jiang, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Its Effect on the
Post-2015 Development Agenda’ (2015) China International Studies (54), 24
[1].
[44] United Nations (2021) Synthesis Report of Climate SDGs ‘Raising Ambition in the Era of Paris +5 and Pandemic Recovery’, 34 [3], retrieved from <https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Raising%20Ambition%20in%20the%20Era%20of%20Paris%2B5%20and%20Pandemic%20Recovery.pdf>.
[45] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 7 [4].
[46] Kloke-Lesch (n 7) 141 [3].
[47] ‘Bridging Climate Ambition and Finance Gaps’, United Nations Climate Change (News Article, 13 November 2017) [4] <https://unfccc.int/news/bridging-climate-ambition-and-finance-gaps>.
[48] UN Global Climate and SDG Synergy Conference (2022) Conference Report, 38 [2], retrieved from <https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/the_third_global_conference_report_11.08.2022.pdf>.
[49] UNDP, ‘Closing the SDG Financing Gap in the COVID-19 Era’ 2020 [1]. available online at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/OECD-UNDP-Scoping-Note-Closing-SDG-Financing-Gap-COVID-19-era.pdf>.
[50] ‘Closing Investment Gap in Global Goals Key to Building Better Future’, UNCTAD (News Article, 23 September 2022) [8]. <https://unctad.org/news/closing-investment-gap-global-goals-key-building-better-future>.
[51] UNDP (n 49).
[52] UNCTAD (n 50) [7].
[53] Ibid.
[54] Walter Leal Filho et al, ‘The Economics of the UN Sustainable Development Goals: Does Sustainability Make Financial Sense?’ (2022) Discover Sustainability (3)20, 2 [3].
[55] Suborna Barua, ‘Financing Sustainable Development Goals: A Review of Challenges and Mitigation Strategies’ (2019) Business Strategy & Development (3)3, 283.
[56] Karin Stenberg et al, ‘Financing Transformative Health Systems Towards Achievement of the Health Sustainable Development Goals: A Model for Projected Resource Needs in 67 Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries’ (2017) Lancet Global Health, (5)9, e875 [3].
[57] Antonia Wulff (Ed.), ‘Grading Goal Four: Tensions, Threats, and Opportunities in the Sustainable Development Goal on Quality Education’ 171 [2] available online <https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/53875/9789004430365.pdf?sequence=1#page=197>.
[58] Sanjeet Singh, Jayaram Ru, ‘Accessibility, Affordability, and Efficiency of Clean Energy: A Review and Research Agenda’ (2022) Environmental Science and Pollution Research (29), 18333 [2].
[59] United Nations (2022) The Sustainable Development Goals Report, 14, retrieved from <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2022/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2022.pdf>.
[60] Chaturvedi et al (n 14) 6 [5].
[61] UNCTAD (n 50) [10].
[62] UN Synthesis Report (n 44) 36 [2].
[63] Ibid 35 [8].
[64] Ibid 36 [2].
[65] Ibid 34 [2], 36 [4].
[66] Ibid 36 [8].
[67] Djeneba Doumbia and Morten Lykke Lauridsen, ‘Closing the SDG Financing Gap - Trends and Data’ (2019) International Finance Corporation, Note 73, 6 [9].
[68] Barua (n 55) 283.
[69] Filho et al (n 54) 2 [2].
[70] Biermann et al (n 1) 797 [6].
[71] Kroll et al (n 18).
[72] Kilduff (n 16).
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Jiang (n 43) 24 [1].
[76] Barua (n 55) 283; UN Synthesis Report (n 44) 34 [3].
[77] Kilduff (n 16).
[78] Ibid.
[79] Biermann et al (n 1) 796 [10].
[80] UN General Assembly Seeks World Court Ruling on Climate Change: Landmark Resolution Addresses Rights, Obligations’, Human Rights Watch (online, 29 March 2023) [7] <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/29/un-general-assembly-seeks-world-court-ruling-climate-change>.
[81] Ibid [6].
[82] Ibid [1].
[83] Ibid [11].
[84] Ibid [11].
[85] Human Rights Watch (n 80) [11].
[86] Frank Biermann, ‘The Future of ‘Environmental’ Policy in the Anthropocene: Time for a Paradigm Shift’ (2021) Environmental Politics (30)1-2, 70 [2].
[87] Ibid.
[88] ‘COP15 Ends with Landmark Biodiversity Agreement’, UN Environment Programme (online, 20 December 2022) [1] <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/cop15-ends-landmark-biodiversity-agreement>: COP15 concluded in Montreal, Canada on 19 December 2022.
[89] Ibid [2].
[90] ‘The Global Biodiversity Framework - What’s Next for Financial Policy and Regulation?’, UN Environment Programme (online, 2 February 2023) [7]–[8] <https://www.unepfi.org/themes/ecosystems/the-global-biodiversity-framework-whats-next-for-financial-policy-and-regulation/> (last accessed 18 Mar 2023).
[91] Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Decision 15/4, 15th mtg, 2nd pt, Agenda Item 9A, UN
Doc CBD/COP/15/DEC/4 (19 December 2022) 2 [5]: Points 2a through f; 2
[10]: Point 7; 2 [11]: Point 8.
[92] Ibid, annex 1, 5: Section B, Points 5 - 6.
[93] ‘Ocean Biodiversity: Global Agreement on Protection and Sustainable Use of Resources and Biodiversity in High Seas’ (Press Release, European Commission, 4 March 2023) [1] <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1382> (last accessed 7 April 2023).
[94] European Commission (n 93).
[95] ‘UN Delegates Reach Historic Agreement on Protecting Marine Biodiversity in International Waters’, UN News (News Article, 5 March 2023) [1] <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134157>.
[96] Karen McVeigh, ‘High Seas Treaty: Historic Deal to Protect International Waters Finally Reached at UN’, The Guardian (online, 5 March 2023) [6] <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/mar/05/high-seas-treaty-agreement-to-protect-international-waters-finally-reached-at-un>.
[97] Nugent et al (n 36) 2029 [1].
[98] Patrick Schröder et al, ‘Making the Circular Economy Work for Human
Development’ (2020) Resources, Conservation and Recycling (156) 1.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid 7 [7].
[101] Ibid 1.
[102] Louis W Niessen et al, ‘Tackling Socioeconomic Inequalities and Non-Communicable Diseases in Low-income and Middle-Income Countries Under the Sustainable Development Agenda’ (2018) Lancet (391)10134, 2036.
[103] World Health Organization, ‘Towards a Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-Being For All: Uniting to Accelerate Progress Towards the Health-Related SDGs’, 2018, 6 [1] <https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311667/WHO-DCO-2018.3-eng.pdf>.
[104] Oriana Ramirez-Rubio et al, ‘Urban Health: An Example of a “Health In All Policies” Approach in the Context of SDGs implementation’ (2019) Globalization and Health (15)87, 10; ‘Promoting Health in All Policies and Intersectoral Action Capacities’ World Health Organization (Web Page, 2023) [1] <https://www.who.int/activities/promoting-health-in-all-policies-and-intersectoral-action-capacities>.
[105] World Health Organization (n 103).
[106] Niessen et al (n 102) 2036, 2037 [Figure 1].
[107] Kroll et al (n18) 9 [2].
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid 8 [3].
[110] Ramirez-Rubio et al (n 104) 5 [3].
[111] World Health Organization, ‘Key learning on Health in All Policies
implementation from around the world’ (Information Brochure, 2018)
(WHO/CED/PHE/SDH/18.1). 2 [1].
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ana Raquel Nunes et al, ‘The Importance of an Integrating Framework for
Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals: The Example of Health and
Well-being’ (2016) BMJ Global Health (1), 4–5 [Table 2].
[114] Nugent et al (n 94) 2030 [4].
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Nugent et al (n 36) 2030 [2]; Niessen et al (n 102) 2036.
[118] Niessen et al (n 102).
[119] United Nations (n 35).
[120] WHO/CED/PHE/SDH/18.1 (n 111) 1 [1].
[121] Ibid 1 [3].
[122] Ibid 1 [2].
[123] Government of South Australia, ‘South Australia’s HiAP Approach’ (2023) online at <https://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/public+content/sa+health+internet/about+us/about+sa+health/health+in+all+policies/south+australias+hiap+approach>.
[124] Ramirez-Rubio et al (n 104) 16 [7].
[125] Biermann et al (n 1) 797 [6].
[126] WHO/CED/PHE/SDH/18.1 (n 111) 3 [7].
[127] Timo Stahl, ‘Health in All Policies: From Rhetoric to Implementation and
Evaluation - the Finnish experience’ (2018) Scandinavian Journal of Public
Health, Supplement (20).
[128] Ibid 41 [1].
[129] Ibid 45.
[130] Ibid 41 [1].
[131] WHO/CED/PHE/SDH/18.1 (n 111) 5 [2].
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ramirez-Rubio et al (n 104) 17 [3].
[134] WHO/CED/PHE/SDH/18.1 (n 111) 9 [2].
[135] Ibid.
[136] Kroll et al (n 18) 9 [2]; Nugent et al (n 36) 2030 [2].
[137] Nunes et al (n 113) 1.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ramirez-Rubio et al (n 104) 17 [3].
[140] WHO/CED/PHE/SDH/18.1 (n 111) 7 [2].
[141] Kroll et al (n 18) 10 [3]; WHO/CED/PHE/SDH/18.1 (n 111) 7 [2].
[142] Schröder et al (n 98).
[143] Nunes et al (n 114) 4‑–5 [Table 2].
[144] Luz Elba Torres-Guevara et al, ‘Human Development in Circular Economy: A New Conceptual Framework for Sustainability’ (2021) 27nd International Sustainable Development Research Society Conference, Mid Sweden University, 15 [4].
[145] Torres-Guevara et al (n 144) 3 [2].
[146] Ibid.
[147] Charbel Jose Chiappetta Jabbour et al, ‘Who is in Charge? A Review and a
Research Agenda on the ‘Human Side’ of the Circular Economy’ (2019)
Journal of Cleaner Production (222), 794 [7].
[148] Ibid,794 [4].
[149] Schröder et al (n 98) 7 [7].
[150] Ibid 7 [6].
[151] Ibid 5 [4].
[152] Ibid.
[153] Pedro A B Lima, et al, ‘Sustainable Development as Freedom: Trends and
Opportunities for the Circular Economy in the Human Development
Literature’ (2021) Sustainability (13)23, 13407 [2].
[154] Schröder et al (n 98) 8 [2].
[155] Ibid 8 [2]–[3].
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid; Torres-Guevara et al (n 144) 15 [4].
[158] Schröder et al (n 98) 5 [4].
[159] Torres-Guevara et al (n 144) 15 [2].
[160] Schröder et al (n 98) 8 [1]; Torres-Guevara et al (n 144) 15 [4].
[161] Biermann et al (n 1) 798 [9].
[162] Ibid.
[163] Paulo Gerbaudo, ‘Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary
Activism’ (Pluto Press, London 2012), 21 [2].
[164] Bronwyn Leebaw, ‘Subtle Transformations: International Law, and
Indigenous Rights’ (2018), Human Rights Quarterly, (40)2, 478–484;
‘Voice to Parliament’, Reconciliation Australia (Web Page) <https://www.reconciliation.org.au/reconciliation/support-a-voice-to-parliament/>; Siobhan B. Somerville, ‘Queer Loving’ (2005) GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies (11)3, 335 [2]; Gaudi Delgado Falcón, ‘Advancing Women’s Rights in the Age of Social Media; An Analysis of the #MeToo Movement’ (2019) Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society. Transformative legal changes which have stemmed from ‘discursive’ advocacy include the international advancement of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and FPIC; Australia’s First Nations Voice to Parliament; interracial, same-sex marriage, LGBQTI+ rights; international advancements of women’s rights, among innumerable other political and rights-based movements.
[165] Justice Mensah and Sandra Ricart Casadevall, ‘Sustainable Development:
Meaning, History, Principles, Pillars, and Implications for Human Action:
Literature Review’ (2019) Cogent Social Sciences (5)1, 7 [2].
[166] Alan Whaites, ‘Achieving the Impossible: Can We Be SDG 16 Believers?’ (Background Paper No 2, OECD 2016) 9 [5] – 10 [3] <https://www.peaceinfrastructures.org/sites/g/files/zskgke471/files/Home%20Documents/Achieving%20the%20Impossible-Can%20we%20be%20SDG%2016%20believers/Whaites_OECD_Achieving%20SDGs_2016.pdf>.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid, 10 [4]–11 [1].
[169] Guterres (n 6) [44].
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