does not to that of insanity. Third, Holmrs lays down and I ; ~ I J ~ disagree, that it is for the court, not counsel, to sa!. whether there is evidence of insanity. Thc present position may be summarized by saying that in Quecnsland the tendency seems to be to cope with automatism by taking a broad view of the insanity rules, whereas in Western Australia automatism is seen as a category of involuntary action distinct from i n ~ a n i t y . ~ COLIT H o ~ ~ A K I ) . In Hall a. Husst (34 A.L.J. 332) the High Court made a decision on the law concerning restraints on alienation that could be the beginning of a general restatement of the law on this subject. Hitherto the voidness of such restraints has been based on the concept of repugnancy to the grant; and there has been doubt and difference of opinion as to whether the repugnancy rule is an expression of a general principle of public policy in favour of free alienation. Thc High Court decision was based on this principle; and the result rnay be that the narrower repugnancy rule ib thereby superseded. I3rieflj. the facts of the case were as folloxvs. In 1949 the proprietor of an ibland off the coast of Sorth Queenkind sold the land together wit11 fixed improvements and certain chattels on it for L3,157 4s. On the same da!~ the vendor and the purchaser entered into an indenture by which the purchaser unterdook not to assign the land without the consent in writing of the purchaser and which also provided, in case the purchaser should desire to sell for a first option of purchase by the vendor at the original sale price plus thc \ d u e of additions and improvement:, and minus the value of deficiencies of chattels and a reasonable sun1 to cover depreciation. In 1!157 the original purchaser resold the property to otllcr persons for L8,500, without obtaining the consent of the original vendor, who thereupon surd the original purchaser for damages, for breach of contract. The imperfect drafting of the indenture made it difficult to determine \vhetlier the prohibition of aliclnation without consent was absolute, or whrthcr it ceased to operate if the original vendor 9. Since this note \\.as written the report of the deci~ionby t h e Full Court of Queenslatid in Cooper v. 12lcKenpza [10ti0: Qd.11. 406 has come to hand. A majority of the Court decided (1) t h a t the effects of concussion from a 1)low on t h e head did not necessarily amount t o insanity and (2) t h a t no Oltrden of proof falls on Il in autdmatism. This decision may show t h a t the appnmcl~\\.llich will he taken t o insanity in relation t o automatism in Quecnsland \\.ill not, after all, be significantly wider than clsr\\.lirre. failcd t o taktx advantage of the first option to purchase. Two mernl)er. of the ('ourt co~lstruedthe rwtrnint as being absolutc~, and anothcbr- considered tliat, although clualified, it was still sufficient to attract ;L I-ule against restraint 011 alic~nation. Thc question for tI1c.m to dc,cidc was whether- a covenant agairlst alienation was to 11etrrsatctl in thc same way as a condition against alienation. TI~IIY .. I: A con\.c-!-. to X on condition t h a t S doc5 not alitxnatcs witlioiit -1'con-ent, it is \\,ell settled that the col~ditioli void. \\'hat ha. is iiot hitherto 11et.n settleti is whether if : convcyh to N , atlrl indvI pendently of the conveyance S covenants not to alienatc~\ v i t h o ~ ~ t . i ' y conhent, the covenant is void. Thc principle on \vllich conditions against alienation liave been declared \.aid ih that of repugnance to the essential incidents of the interest granted. It tlie rule of law rests entirely on this principle (wllethcr (11- not tlir principle i i an expression of a public policy in favour of freedom against alienation), contracts not t o alienate are outside tlle rtlle a n d are not yoid. However, the majority of the High Court (on<, ~nemlrcrexpressing no opinion) appear to have accepted the. view that "it i.i a principle of the law t h a t private property sklo~ildI>(. freely alienable" (p. :135), a n d a contract fettering alienation, as well as a condition, is void. 'The acceptance of this p r i ~ ~ c i p l e would appear to displace the, repugnancy rule as the statement of the law on tliis point. Tho rule perhaps still stands, and will continue to apply t o condition5 in\-olving repugnancy other than conditions against alienation, e.g. in a casc \\,here it is not freedom to alienate that is restricted, hut frcetlom not to alienate: see Sltuu st. Ford [1877] UKLawRpCh 300; (7 Ch.D. 669) and Jarman oil IYills (8th ed. p. 1480). But the rule of law that give> concretc expression t o the public policy of freedom of alienation now goch beyond the repugnancy rule and in effect supersedes it. Thi~ development of the law raises the question whether further ~lovelopments or modifications should not follow. L1ndcr the repugnancj- rule a condition against alienation was vvitl evcn though it operated for only a short period, because a repugnant condition, i f objectionable merely because of repugnancj,, must be void ho~vevershort niay be the period of its operation. But the gt:~ieral policy in favour of freedom of alienation is not in most cases puslied to extremes, and restrictions are allowed for a !imited period, that laid clown by t h e rule against perpetuities. This is so when freedom of alienation is restricted by executory limitations o17er, c.g. where there is a gift to h in fee .;imple, hut if Ile should dic. leaving no child surviving him, then to LZ in fee simple; atid similarll. where property is given on tlie terms that i t shall be held and applied to a particular purpose (with of course an exception in the case of charitable gifts). This gives rise to an anom:~loussituation. The t i c ci-ion in Hall 7 ' . Bzrsst rests on the view that if a condition against i~lic%n;ltion void, I ) ~ ~ c a uitcinfringcts a princil)l(. of frcxc. alir~nation, is s YO ;~lso slrol~ld co\.c,nant that has tlie samcl 1)ractic;il c.firct be void. a effect that is lookcd to, for a co\.cnant riot to alienate It is .;)r;~tic;xl clocs not in fact prevent alienation, evc'ri to a person \\.it11 notice of tllcs covenant (unless this sort of covenant is \onlcho\v to lje I)ro~rgl~t within tilt, 7 ' d k 1'. ~lfos/zay rulc). ISut if a col-cna~it having tliis practical c + f t ~ t i.; void in all cases, why sho~ll(l an esecutory not limitation o\.c>rI~iiving same practical effect b t . void in all cases ? the I t wo~rlds c ~ ~to i I)<) nlorc ri~asonable o treat all re~trictions the r ~ t in same \\.a>-. Ilir~c.can bc no question of making csecutor!- limit a t i o n ~o\.er void, so that equal treatment m u i t involve allowing I-cxstrictions on a1icn;ltion t o operate for tlic perpetuity period. , 1 his of course \vouItl in\-011-eallowing conditions agair1.t alienation for a lirnitcd 1)eriod to l)i, valid which hitherto have I~ccninvalid ~ i n d c r I-c,pugn:Lncy rult,. Rut if t h a t rule liai gone b t h r Ijoarcl tlltx ! . ---'11l(1 it seems to l,c ~lnnc>ccisar~. in view of the nc\v \vitlt. formulation of tllrt governing rule-absolute invalidity go?. \\.it11 it. It i,< I ) C . I - I I ; I ~ I not likcl!- that the further d e ~ ~ e l o p m e nsuggc..;tc.d will in ~ ts fact occur, I n ~ t thcy do not, this decision adds t o tlie anomalie? if in thv 1:1\v tlittt go\-crms the t!.ing u p of land, and crentc,~ tht~orctical as \v(.11 ;I l)r-:tctic.;tl inconsistencies that did not prel-iousl!- exist: for thrx rc.l)ugn;rnc!. rille, having a ground of it5 own to Ytand o n , \\.;li not tlicort~tic;ill\. inconsistent with tlic pc.1-petuitie? rulc in it. \.ar-iou. ap~)lic:~tior-ii. I t \r.;Ls :~d!.c~l-tcd aim\-? that the ri.[)ugnanc.T- ~-ulc, to ma!. cont ~ n l l tt o xtand ancl :rl>plyt o conditions otllcr than conditions against ~ I i t i t i . I f i t c1oc.s continue t o stand, this must hi, on the I)asis .~iggcl~tcd3 , S\vc.tst (Restraints on Alienation, 33 1-.Q.K. .'Y(i, 241) 1 t h a t "attrmptb to dcsprive ownership of its essential incidents are contrary to pnl~lic ~)olicy". B u t the history of thc rcpugnancLrule inclicatcs that the. incident of owner.;hi;) mainlj- iri \.irw wab tlrr pon.tlr of alitmition; and Hall 2,. Hz/.\-st now re-ts the maintcniince of this p o \ v c r dir t ~ t l y a principle cf puljlic polic!- in fa\-our of on fl-cxcdornof alit~n;~tion, so takes atmy mobt crf vclisorl ti'efrf of arid the. ~-c~])ugn:lricy rule,. Furthermore, thc rc1)ugnanc~.rult, has not 1)c.t.n fully apl)lic,tl to incidcnts other than the pon-(11-of ;dienation. Iqor ('s;i1~ipIe,;I covenant restricting the free use i ~ fland by an uwnt~r-, in ' ~ z r l f7'.~ rk'n.~hfi,,is just a repugnant t o tllc cwential as . incidcnts of onnc-I-stlip aa a covenant not to alirnntc,: 1111t such covcnant.; .;c.c:ni ntx\.tsro 1l;lr.c been considi.rcd i n ~ - ~ ~ l i tlli. grou~id t on d of rcSpugnanc!.. 'fllvir c>nforceal)ilit!. iri Ic;~sei 11;l. ~~c,\-c>r n I~et clurstioncd, ant1 \\.hen attached t o estates in fer .-iml)lc tlicy at. cnforccablr rlnclor the law concerning rcstricti\-c co\-cmant.;. .fhlis. being displaced I)\ an0thc.r rule in its main field of :il)l)licatio~r, and never having I~ctwal)plied in thc ficld 110st in ini~:ortancc,tlic repugnnncj7 rulc, it \votrld secm, should go into diic.:trd. 7 . ~ I ; ~ ~ ; I I ~ /1O6I2I, I l<.l<.2!10) i ~ t i ( 1(700/) ?,. l.utz(> ( l!152! I .All E, ( ! I<. I I!)!)) ; i > 111stanc.c.s. I'llt, High ('ourt, on tiles o t l ~ c hand, 11;idf reatcd r c,\c.luhi\ct l)oss"cssior~;IS rnuc.11 morc dcscisir~,. See cspcciallj. tht. 111clg1nt~11t\Yinclc.ycyr .I. I t is 1)ro1);~1)1\.~ l t xtll;~tlsaac T . Hoti,l dr, of trI'(~vI.\ I.[((. c.oultl I I ~ I \ . ~ ,Iwcn d(xcidc.d kvitho~~t a1jpro\.al of the I~road ~~~.inc.ri~lt,s laid do\vr~n th(, ('ourt o f .Appt~ald(.cisions, just as Ig;~rclc-d :~s holding tllr~ticld in .lustralia. I T . S . H.\RIonlcx1 4 \.c.;irs agci an ;lr;ii, stc\.c~tlorc~, a g e d in tl~c.\r.ork of cq ti~~i~l~:i~g~ng c.,~~.go fronl ;I slii~jin C'asal?lanc;~harlwur-, rarc~lt~ssl!. .rllo\\-c.il ,I ~ ) l : i ~ r l ; to fall into thc hold of thy \.cssel. From tht. I ; ; c~ I c.onsecluenccs I : ! ~ ~ I I , , ; N ) ~ ~ I(L.I -<~ S (!T T of~ this act tllcr-c f o l l o \ v ~ ~ l I;or thc jdank that fell causrd a sliark o I I I t ~ t d c . 1 t 1 l i c . h 1~11rted III,' \-CSSC~'S c;1rgo of 1)~troI d in tlic' ensuing fire m i l ) ~ . I , I I ~ I I - ~shil) \v;~s , destroyed. ~\-l~ic-h follo\\.c.d tlic.sc. c>\.c1nts, l(xg;~l tlitt 1)robl~~rn. it tin;~ll!~~-f~;~chctl thc. ('ourt of AAl)l)cxal, this: \r.;is \\'(.I , t 11,.c.Ir;~~-tc,r-c'rs 1 li;il)le t o thi. o\vrlc91-s loss of tlicir ship \vllc,n for ,111 1 1 1 ; i t c-o~lld rc>:l.;onal,l\.1)c. ic>ri~scten t1:c. result of dropping tl~c. as 111;111lc\\.,is that \ ~ I I I ~ (clarnagc. \-iould 1)t. c-ai~scdo thc vessel, 1,ut not , t t i i t , tl,i~n;i:;.c~ (d('srl-ilction ljy tirt,) wl~ic-I1in fact occurrtd Tllr ( 0111 1 i ) t .il)])t.:~l \v,Lrc.1ln;rnimolls in Iiultlillg th(\ cllartcrers l i : i l ~ l c ~ : t 1 1 1 . ( . , it \vns said, was tht, "di~.c.ct" c.onscilut.nc.t. of nc~gli~c.nc-c, 101- \ \ l l i c . l ~ tllv clc~ft~ndants wl.cr-t, ~ - c ~ s ~ ~ o n s 'fhc l < ~ . that s n c i ~ i l ~ fact ii c-orli(~ll~c.~lct>~~nforcsccablt~ irrc~l(~\.ant, \v;!b \~-:1s for consideratior1 of this kind "got's to culpability, not to con~l)c>ns;ition".' Or as Ilolri~c,s latcr 1)11ti t , "the. tort once cstat~lishcdt11c tortfeasor takes: r l ~ c~-i&111 t l ~ ccorlsccluc~nccs".' 111 !l i t i-l,liri~ 111 t l i ( , 1or.111 in \\-llic,l~ 'l'irt, lxil~c-il)lt> thus c~stal11isl1c.d ;irltl I;llo\rri as ttit, rule it1 Rir l ' ~ I i ~ i r ~llas tr-ol~\)lctl i\l l;l\vycrs c.\rc,r- sirict.. Its antcc:cdents r\.ixrcL t c . 1 ~; ~ ~ lclo~~l,tfr~i tl .:' its I>r.ogcn\-in tlrc, .c-;Lrs that follo\vcd \vi.rc' 3 f i . l ( .i(iO a t I). 371 per H;~nlit,iI..] , cititig I , C I I - I ~ S u l n n e r ' i t \ i c t l l l l l !)>ti, !)X4. li't,l(l-111~111~1~~11~ ~ l ~1920 i s\ . ( ~ . i', , S t t ' j~~ 2 . tlolti~c~-~'oll~~cl~ \ ol. I I . X X . I.etter>, . 3. ( t~tcfl!..O~,iiiii,. l.ol~do,, "+.S.H'. I I ' ! ~('(I. ( l X 7 0 1 [ . . I < (i( ' . I 1 . 14, \\liicli c a n 11rcxl'lai~rc~d l ottirr groutitl.. oi I. I!lL'I 111