Surrogacy in Israel: A Model of Comprehensive Regulation of New Technologies
Jacqueline Hand*
Fifteen percent of the population of the United States (and of Israel)
are infertile. Unlike earlier generations who had little choice
but to live
with this limitation, the accelerating development of new reproductive
technologies has provided an ever increasing number
of options for these
couples, options unthinkable even two decades ago. (Baby Louise, the first test
tube baby has just turned 27.[1] These new technologies came onto the scene precisely as traditional principles
of family law have been transformed by the women’s
movement (enhanced by
another technological fix—contraception) and the gay rights movement. The
result is a high level of uncertainty
as to the legal status of the various
parties to the new arrangements, particularly those who have moved ahead of the
law by participating
in a surrogate mother arrangement.
The institutional
response to this situation varies widely from essentially no regulation
(California) to complete prohibition to
partial or piecemeal regulation. The
only jurisdiction that has legalized surrogacy, while regulating it under a
complex and comprehensive
regulatory scheme, is Israel. The genesis of this
scheme, in the experiences and ideologies of the individuals responsible for
this
Surrogate Motherhood Agreements
Law[2], is the subject of Professor D.
Kelly Weisberg’s new book, The Birth of Surrogacy in
Israel.[3]
This chronicle is
valuable on several levels. First it provided a sort of pilot program of how a
complex regulatory scheme can be
effective at managing this controversial, but
often deeply desired practice. Secondly, it illustrated the impacts of
technology
on the core structures of society. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, it exemplifies a deep legal history of how individuals
have
lasting effects on legal development.
The book, which was researched while
Professor Weisberg was a Visiting Professor of Law at Hebrew University, begins
with an in-depth
description of the first two cases of surrogacy which occurred
immediately after the passage of the law. In each case Weisberg provided
a
vivid journalistic portrait of the parties, both the intended parents and the
surrogates and their partners. The contrasting experiences
of these two sets of
participants led to several changes in the regulations under the statute. The
first contract between the infertile
couple,[4] Rachel and Ben and Sara,
their surrogate, resulted in healthy twins for the intended parents and a
looming feeling of exploitation
on the part of the surrogate. The
surrogate’s perception of being ill-used was a result of the intended
parents’ efforts
to control all aspects of her life during the pregnancy
and left her to feel as if her role was that of “a paid
domestic”.[5]
By contrast,
in the second case 40 year old surrogate Hanna sustained a warm relationship
with the intended parents, Naomi and Dan,
which continued long after the birth.
In fact, she indicated a willingness to carry a second child for them. The very
particular
experiences of these two families acted as a sort of pilot for
implementing regulations under Israel’s newly passed statutes.
After
these two cases the regulations were fine tuned to standardize the contract (but
not the level of compensation), to provide
additional personal privacy for the
parties and to limit both the age of the surrogate (between ages 22 and
40)[6] and the number of times she can
be a surrogate (no more than twice, both for the same family).
Having
illustrated the real world impact of the legislation, Weisberg then explores its
genesis. In many ways, the legal treatment
of surrogacy throughout the world
developed in reaction to the notorious case of In re Baby
M.[7] In that case, the surrogate
mother (who was the source of the ovum as well as the carrier of the baby),
refused to fulfill her contract
with the intended father (source of the sperm)
by refusing to relinquish the baby to him. His wife, having no genetic
relationship
to the child, had no legal connection to the transaction.
Ultimately the intended father sued for custody of the child; after months
of
unrelenting publicity the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the surrogacy
contract, arranged by a commercial surrogacy center,
was invalid because its
enforcement constituted “baby selling”. The Court granted the
father custody based on the same
standards as any other custody
dispute—the best interests of the child. This spectacle, together with
the public reaction
to baby selling, generated an immediate response
worldwide.[8] Australia, Britain,
France, Germany and Israel banned commercial
surrogacy.[9]
In Israel the
ban was accomplished by a series of three regulations issued by the Health
Ministry, which, without ever mentioning
the term “surrogacy”, had
the practical effect of banning it. In short order, many of the numerous
infertile couples
in Israel began circumventing the law by traveling to the
United States (particularly California), where surrogacy centers operated.
While effective, these pilgrimages were not without problems. The most obvious
is the expense of travel, as well as of the surrogacy
arrangements themselves,
limiting the procedure to wealthier couples. The second, which continues to
complicate the practice, is
that Jewish law provides that the religion of a
child is that of the birth mother. Thus, if the surrogate is not Jewish, the
child
potentially loses his or her Jewish
identity.[10]
The unsatisfactory
nature of this state of affairs was dramatically brought to the attention of
Israeli politicians and public by
another high profile case, that of Ruti and
Danny Nachmani. Ruti was unable to carry a child, having lost her uterus to
cervical
cancer, but since her ovaries were not damaged she was able to have her
egg fertilized with her husband’s sperm to produce
an embryo, which was
genetically connected to both herself and her husband. After numerous requests
to the Health Ministry to allow
the first portion of the process (in vitro
fertilization of her eggs) to take place in Israel (which would save the
Nachmanis substantial
money and time), they sued the Ministry, asserting that
the Ministry [11] rules were
promulgated without proper authority and that the rules lacked a
“reasonable basis.”
Fearing the results of a judicial decision,
the Ministry settled the case, allowing the egg to be fertilized in Israel so
long as
the implantation in the surrogate took place abroad. This waiver of the
rules was granted solely to the
Nachmanis.[12] In addition, the
Ministry agreed to set up an expert committee to investigate the whole practice
of surrogacy.
This committee, named the Aloni Commission after its chair,
laid the groundwork for the legislation that was ultimately passed.
Weisberg’s detailed description of the parties who were appointed again
highlights the impact that individual personalities
make in the development of
the law. The key example of this is Ministry of Justice Attorney Carmel Shalev,
who after graduating
from Hebrew University in Jerusalem, acquired a
post-graduate degree from Yale University. Her doctoral dissertation examined
surrogate
motherhood from a feminist perspective, concluding that by recognizing
a woman’s right to contract, including the right to
receive economic
compensation for supply of reproductive services, surrogacy empowered rather
than enslaved women.[13] Not only
was Shalev appointed to the commission herself, but her boss, the Minister of
Justice, accepted many of her recommendations
for other appointees. These
included, in addition to two physicians appointed by the Health ministry,
professors of psychology, sociology
and medical ethics. Three of the members
were women and as the sociologist member, Lela Amis commented, “This was
the first
committee in the history of Israel, to study issues that were related
to women that actually was composed of half women
members.”[14] Even more
startling, three of the four were self proclaimed feminists. Their influence
was further enhanced by the fact that one
of the two rabbis appointed resigned
after being named one of Israel’s two chief rabbis.
The resulting
135 page report dealt broadly with fertility issues, including right of access
to fertility treatments, definitions
of parenthood and information and privacy
concerns on the part of both parents and of children. The committee recommended
that surrogacy
be permitted, then proposed a structure under which it should be
regulated. This included setting up a government committee providing
for
psychological examination and counseling for all parties, and setting the amount
of payment allowed to surrogates by government
regulation. If the surrogate
revoked her consent, the contract would not be enforceable, and if the couple
refused custody, the
surrogate should have first right of refusal. Two minority
reports also supported surrogacy, but disagreed on the details, particularly
on
issues such as who should be allowed to serve as a surrogate. This report was
expected by most parties to languish on bureaucratic
desks because of its
controversial nature and the expected opposition of religious parties.
The fact that the exact opposite result occurred is directly attributable to
another strong woman, Michal Zabaro. Michal, who
was born without a uterus,
filed suit against the Health Ministry challenging the validity of its
regulations. After the suit was
made public, 49 other couples joined as
plaintiffs in the case. After several months of legal maneuvering the Supreme
Court ordered
the regulations cancelled in five and one half months (the interim
allocated to allow the government time to enact new
legislation).[15] Acting with
amazing speed, particularly given the deeply controversial nature of the matter,
the Knesset enacted the legislation
within eight months of the Court’s
ruling. This is particularly remarkable because of the strong beliefs of the
various constituencies.
The religious parties were deeply suspicious of
surrogacy because of concerns about incest and
adultery.[16]
Feminist
organizations also had strong, but sometimes contradictory, views on whether
surrogacy protects or exploits women. The
“liberal feminists” (like
Carmel Shalev) were in favor of believing that by affirming women’s
ability to contract
they are empowered and recognized as autonomous persons. By
contrast the “radical feminists” took the position that
in a
paternalistic society, women’s freedom to contract is an illusion and that
surrogacy is simply another opportunity for
men to take control of women’s
bodies.[17] As a result of this
split, they had less influence on the final shape of the law than in the Aloni
Commission recommendations.
The Surrogacy Law that finally
passed reflected (as might be expected) both the general concerns that have been
raised about surrogacy, particularly
by the Aloni Commission, and Israel’s
unique status as a Jewish state. Weisberg does an excellent job of explaining
how the
final law emerged. At the same time as both traditional Jewish culture
and Israel’s political situation militate toward laws
that encourage
reproduction, the inclination of the religious parties is profoundly
conservative. As a result, the legislation
reflects many of the Aloni
Commission recommendations, such as an approvals committee made up equally of
men and women, also requiring
that a surrogate be unrelated to either of the
intended parents and of the same religion. Similarly it only allows gestational
surrogacy
and prohibits the use of sperm other than that of the intended father.
These requirements reflect the Rabbinates extreme concern
about the possibility
of incest and illegitimacy.
Weisberg concludes that generally surrogacy
itself is a positive development and that the Israeli law has been a success.
She points
out that under the law 78 children have been born and that there has
been no instance where the surrogate has attempted to breach
the
agreement.[18] In her concluding
chapter she provides a very interesting and useful discussion of the current
practice of surrogacy worldwide,
noting that the growth of the Internet has
facilitated the matching of infertile couples with potential
surrogates.
The Birth of Surrogacy in Israel is a valuable resource
not only for family and contract lawyers, but is useful for attorneys and legal
scholars with broader concerns
than the practice of surrogacy itself. At the
most basic level it provides a template of a comprehensive system regulating the
sensitive
area of reproductive technology. While it exemplifies many useful
ideas, it also has peculiarities generally not likely to be compatible
which
other jurisdictions. For example, the requirement that the surrogate be
unmarried and that the sperm must come from the intended
father reflects a
religious concern related to a technical definition of adultery not shared in
much of the world. On the other
hand, aspects of surrogacy that have troubled
many scholars and legislators were relatively uncontroversial in Israel,
particularly
those revolving around payment to the surrogate beyond expenses and
her right to change her mind after the baby is born (the Israeli
law allows
reneging only under very limited circumstances).
On a broader level, the
book provides a comprehensive study of the impact of technological change on the
core structures of society.
As we follow the historic progression from
artificial insemination, to in vitro fertilization, to surrogacy, first
with the birth mother’s ovum, then to gestational surrogacy, we see the
definition of family transforming.
The social aspects of parenthood have been
gradually uncoupled not only from sexual intercourse, but from childbearing and
the genetic
raw materials. The resulting possibilities have not only allowed
couples with reproductive limitations to have genetically connected
children,
but also enabled male gay couples to form families with genetic
links.[19]
By presenting
the personal history that shaped the personalities of the key players throughout
the process that ultimately resulted
in the Surrogacy Law, Weisberg
illuminated the importance of individuals in legal development. In effect, it
suggests that Thomas Carlisle’s Hero
Theory of History is at least as
applicable to legal events as to military ones. While this law is the
culmination of social forces
from feminism to the profound importance Judaism
places on family, both its enactment and its particulars are the product of a
complexity
of forces not usually available in the legislative history of even
the most well documented legislation.
* Professor of Law, University of Detroit, Mercy School of
Law.
[1] Test Tube Baby Comes of Age, BBC NEWS, July 25,
1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/403116.stm.
[2]
Surrogate Motherhood Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of Newborn)
Law 5756-1996, 1996, S.H. 1577, 176 (unofficial English
translation available
from Aryeh Greenfield Publications, P.O. Box 7422, Haifa,
Israel 31070).
[3] D. KELLY
WEISBERG, THE BIRTH OF SURROGACY IN ISRAEL
(2005).
[4] The names of
individuals who were not part of publicized legal cases were changed to preserve
their privacy.
[5] WEISBERG,
supra note 3, at 29.
[6]
Ultimately, in the interests of the child, the ages of the intended parents were
limited as well, in that the intended father could
be no older than 59 and the
intended mother no older than
48.
[7] In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
[8]
Immediately thereafter, 27 state legislatures considered bills to restrict or
outlaw surrogacy. These were often prefaced by comments
that one of the
purposes of the legislation was to “avoid a Baby M case. WEISBERG,
supra note 3, at 38.
[9]
Britain has since recognized private surrogacy arrangements but still bans
payment of compensation to the surrogate for her services.
It is allowed in
parts of Australia, but continues to be banned in France as well as inter
alia China, Italy and Vietnam. Id. at
203-04.
[10] Id. at
56.
[11] Id. at
74.
[12] Id. at 91-92.
This victory turned out to be a pyrrhic one for Ruti Nachmani because after the
embryos were created and frozen, but
before they could be implanted, the
marriage broke up and Danny refused to allow the embryos to be implanted. Ruti
initiated a second
high profile lawsuit that she ultimately won, but attempts at
implantation were not successful. (This is often the case when frozen
embryos
have been stored for a lengthy
period.)
[13] CARMEL SHALEV,
BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY
(1989).
[14] WEISBERG,
supra note 3, at 99.
[15]
Id. at 127.
[16] Under
the interpretations of Jewish law by some rabbis, artificial insemination of a
married surrogate with a fertilized egg from
an intended couple would constitute
adultery because the sperm was from a man not her husband. Id. at 192-93
(for the basis of the concern regarding sex with a genetic
relative).
[17] Id. at
147-48.
[18] Id. at 202.
The Approvals Committee has approved 169 of 191
applications.
[19] Ginta
Bellafante, Surrogate Mothers’ New Niche: Bearing Babies for Gay
Couples, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2005, at A1. The surrogates interviewed in the
article suggest that working with gay couples is particularly
satisfying because
it does not require dealing with the emotional needs of the intended mother, who
may have struggled, often for
a number of years, to bear a child.
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