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2002-2003
THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA
HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
MARITIME TRANSPORT
SECURITY BILL 2003
EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDUM
(Circulated
by authority of the Minister for Transport and Regional Services,
the Honourable John Anderson, MP)
The purpose of the Maritime Transport Security Bill (MTSB Bill) is to
enhance maritime transport security by:
• establishing a maritime
transport security regulatory framework, and providing for adequate flexibility
within this framework to reflect a changing threat
environment;
• implementing the mandatory requirements in Chapter XI-2
and the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code of the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, 1974, to ensure that Australia is aligned with the
international maritime transport security regime;
• ensuring that
identified Australian ports, port facilities within them, and other maritime
industry participants operate with approved maritime security
plans;
• ensuring that certain types of Australian ships operate with
approved ship security plans;
• issuing International Ship Security
Certificates (ISSCs) to Australian ships which have been security verified so
that these ships will be able to enter ports in other SOLAS Contracting
Countries; and
• undertaking control mechanisms to impose control
directions on foreign ships that are not compliant with the relevant maritime
security requirements in this Bill.
The Bill has thirteen
parts:
Part 1 – Preliminary: This Part includes the objects
of the Bill, its application, both inside and outside Australia, and
definitions. A detailed definition of the meaning of ‘unlawful
interference with maritime transport’ is included to clarify the
application of the Bill. Other detailed definitions include those of
‘security regulated ports and port operators’ and ‘security
regulated ships’. The Bill is intended to prevail over other Commonwealth
and State laws to the extent of any inconsistency when necessary to meet the
objects of the Bill. The Bill will not apply to state ships or navel vessels.
Neither the Australian Defence Force, nor the Australian Customs Services or
other Commonwealth agencies prescribed in the regulations will be included in
the definition of a ‘maritime industry participant’.
It
should also be noted that by virtue of Section 2.2(2) of the Criminal Code
Act 1995, Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (which is found at the
Schedule to that Act) applies to all offences against this Bill. Chapter 2 of
the Criminal Code contains all the general principles of criminal
responsibility that apply to any offence, irrespective of how the offence is
created. Chapter 2 covers elements of an offence, circumstances in which there
is no criminal responsibility, extensions of criminal responsibility, corporate
criminal responsibility and proof of criminal responsibility. Where no element
is specified, the default elements under Chapter 2 of the Code
apply.
Part 2 – Maritime security levels: This Part outlines
the application of maritime security levels, security directions, and a system
for notification. Maritime security level 1 will be the default level. Maritime
security level 2 and maritime security level 3 will be declared by the Secretary
when it is appropriate for a higher level of security to be put in place. In
addition, in a security direction which can be issued at security level 1, 2 or
3, the Secretary may direct maritime industry participants to comply with
additional security measures when an unlawful interference with maritime
transport is imminent or probable. The notification system ensures that those
maritime industry participants and other persons who need to know about
essential security level and security direction information are
contacted.
Part 3 – Maritime security plans: This Part
requires certain maritime industry participants to have maritime security plans
in force which must include security measures and activities to be undertaken at
security levels 1, 2 and 3. Regulations will provide additional detail on the
content and form of the maritime security plans. The plans will be approved by
the Secretary if adequate, may be cancelled by the Secretary in certain
circumstances, and will be reviewed over time to maintain
relevance.
Part 4 – Ship security plans and ISSCs: This Part
requires certain Australian ships to have ship security plans in force which
must include security measures and activities to be undertaken at security
levels 1, 2 and 3. Regulations will provide additional detail on the content and
form of the ship security plans. The plans will be approved by the Secretary if
adequate, may be cancelled by the Secretary in certain circumstances, and will
be reviewed over time to maintain relevance. Ships will be required to have
ISSCs that will be issued on ISSC verification. Part 4 sets out the requirements
in relation to obtaining such a certificate.
Part 5 – Regulated
foreign ships: This Part requires certain foreign ships to provide
pre-arrival information and their ISSCs to demonstrate their compliance with the
Bill. Foreign ships are also obliged to comply with the existing security
levels. Ship operators of regulated foreign ships and masters of such ships are
required to acknowledge communications regarding security levels and security
directions. Part 5 includes compliance checking and control directions that
regulated foreign ships may be subject to in the event of non-compliance with
the Bill.
Part 6 – Maritime security zones: Under this Part,
the Secretary may establish port security zones within a security regulated
port, declare ship security zones around a security regulated ship, and
establish on board security zones on board a security regulated ship. The
purpose of such zones is to subject these areas to access control measures for
the prevention of unlawful interference with maritime transport. These zones
will be supported by an effective enforcement regime. Regulations will identify
the requirements that apply to each zone.
Part 7 – Other
security measures: This Part establishes security requirements in relation
to screening and clearing, weapons and prohibited items. The Part creates a
number of offences relating to carriage of weapons and other items that, while
not strictly weapons, could be used to threaten or cause injury (ie. prohibited
items).
Part 8 – Powers of officials: This Part deals with
five classes of persons who may exercise powers for the purposes of checking
compliance with this Bill and/or preventing unlawful interference with maritime
security. The five classes of persons are:
1. Maritime security inspectors
(Division 2);
2. Duly authorised officers (Division 3);
3. Law enforcement
officers (Division 4);
4. Maritime security guards (Division 5);
and
5. Screening officers (Division 6)
This Part sets out eligibility
criteria for each class of person, grants specific powers to each class and
places limits upon the exercise of those powers. Powers given to law enforcement
officers under this Part are intended to complement existing powers conferred
upon them under other State, Territory or Commonwealth
legislation.
Part 9 – Reporting maritime transport security
incidents: This Part formalises a communications system to ensure that
adequate information is reported to relevant persons, including industry
organisations and the Australian Government, in the event of a maritime
transport security incident. This Part details the form, content and manner of
reporting, clarifying the roles of all persons with incident reporting
responsibilities in the event of any incident that is related to maritime
security.
Part 10 – Information-gathering: This Part enables
the Secretary to collect security compliance information from maritime industry
participants. The collection of information is essential for the Secretary to
deal with, and to resolve, compliance concerns before they become serious and
compromise maritime security.
Part 11 – Enforcement: This
Part provides for a number of different enforcement options in circumstances
where contraventions of the Bill have occurred or are suspected to have
occurred. These enforcement options are:
• infringement
notices;
• enforcement orders;
• injunctions; and
• a
demerit points system.
This Part is structured so that the regulator has a
range of options to enforce compliance with the Bill, instead of or in addition
to referring matters to the Director of Public Prosecutions for the purposes of
prosecuting. Prosecutions are resource intensive and while prosecution is an
appropriate remedy for serious breaches of maritime security, the fundamental
purpose of maritime security regulation is to encourage and effect
compliance.
Part 12 - Review of decisions: This Part sets out the
decisions which can be made under this Bill, which are reviewable by the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Whilst the AAT is limited in undertaking
merits review to the decisions listed in this clause, this does not limit the
scope for judicial review to occur under the Administrative Decisions
(Judicial Review) Act 1976, or at common law.
Part 13 –
Miscellaneous: This Part contains technical information about the operation
of this Bill and its intended effect on the application of existing legislation
such as the Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1972, Defence (Visiting
Forces) Act 1963, the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967.
It allows for delegation of certain powers and functions of the Bill. This
Part also includes provisions relating to compensation for damage to a maritime
industry participant’s equipment or data and compensation for acquisition
of property. This Part also allows further regulations to be made as required to
give effect to this Bill.
The 2003-4 budget allocation is $15.6 million over two years for
DOTARS’ administrative, compliance and monitoring duties which
include:
• assessment of port, port facility and ship security
plans;
• verification of ship security and issuing of International
Ship Security Certificates;
• checking of
compliance;
• management of sensitive security threat
information;
• negotiating agreement on Memoranda of Understanding with
other Australian Government departments which will be assisting with the ISPS
compliance checking of Australian and foreign ships;
• establishment of
a communications network with maritime industry participants;
• regular
liaison with other Commonwealth departments and State and Northern Territory
authorities;
• undertaking of compliance checking of foreign ships and
control functions regarding non-compliant foreign ships;
• regular
reporting on compliance issues to the IMO; and
• staff
training.
The Commonwealth receives no direct financial benefit but
Australia’s economy benefits from the uniform regulation of security
aspects of the maritime industry and its beneficial impact on international
trade.
A Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) has been prepared for this Bill.
Part 1 Problem
The terrorist attacks since 11 September 2001, the attack on the French
tanker Limburg, and the Bali bombing have raised global awareness and
concern of the devastating effects terrorist attacks can have on human life,
public infrastructure, and private industry assets and operations. At the
international level and in many cases at the national level there has been a
realisation that public and private assets, critical infrastructure, and
business operations may not be adequately protected from the risk of being the
target of a terrorist attack or other equally disruptive unlawful
activity.
In the case of the maritime industry, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), the principal maritime industry body at
international level, addressed this problem by developing a new preventive
security regime to enhance security at ports, terminals, facilities, and on
board ships. The new regime has been given effect through amendments to the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, 1974. The relevant amendment to SOLAS
is the newly inserted Chapter XI-2 and its companion, the two-part International
Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code. Part A of the ISPS Code is mandatory for
Contracting Governments, and Part B is recommendatory. It should be emphasised
that Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code establish a preventive security
system with commonsense security measures and activities for operators of ports,
facilities, terminals and ships to implement. It is not intended to replace any
national or international counter-terrorism response mechanisms or other law
enforcement activities.
Australia is a signatory to SOLAS and adopted
the amendments to SOLAS at the IMO’s Conference of Contracting Governments
in December 2002. The deadline for implementation of Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS
Code is tight. Contracting Governments will have been deemed to have accepted
the amendments by the end of 2003 – unless an objection is lodged - and
are required to ensure that the requirements in Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
have been adequately implemented by 1 July 2004. To do so, the Australian
Government has deemed it appropriate to establish a regulatory system to guide
the Australian maritime industry towards compliance with the international
regime by 30 June 2004.
The consequences of not establishing an
efficient regulatory maritime security regime to compliment the international
one range from significant reduction in business operations for those Australian
maritime industry participants (eg. ports, facilities, terminals, ships) who are
not compliant and may therefore be excluded from trading with compliant
international maritime industry participants to serious infrastructure and asset
damage due to a terrorist incident which could have been prevented by
implementing the preventive security arrangements contemplated in the Maritime
Transport Security Bill (the Bill). The map below demonstrates the maritime
security challenges Australia faces.
The Australian shipping
task
99 % of trade by weight
goes by ship
73.5% of trade by
value goes by ship
99% of trade
by volume goes by foreign flagged
vessels
2.5 million container
movements - Forecast growth in containers over
next 10 years – 48%.
The Maritime Security
Challenge
Australia
– a shipper nation, highly dependent on the international shipping
fleet
12.2% of the
World’s Shipping Task
Biggest Maritime Trade
Relationships
JAPAN
IMPORT
VALUE
$13 830 179
000
EXPORT VALUE
$21 470 726
000
UNITED
STATES
IMPORT VALUE
$11 559 420
000
EXPORT VALUE
$8 797 792 000
A report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) from July 2003 entitled ‘Security in maritime [sic] transport: risk
factors and economic impact’ indicates that world trade depends on
maritime transport and that the vulnerabilities of the maritime transport sector
range from the possibility of physical breaches of the integrity of shipments
and ships to document fraud and illicit money-raising for terrorist groups. The
stakes, the OECD report emphasises, are extremely high because any major
breakdown in the maritime transport sector would fundamentally cripple the
world’s economy. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
estimates that 5.8 billion tonnes of goods were traded by sea in 2001 which
accounts for 80% of world trade by volume. The bulk of trade is carried by over
46,000 vessels servicing nearly 4,000 ports throughout the world. The OECD
report makes two critical
conclusions:
1.
v 70 ports
v 300 port
facilities
v 70
Australian flagged vessels
v 10,000
voyages p.a.
v 22,000
port calls
v 282 945
foreign seafarers visit p.a.
v 232,000
cruise ship passengers visit p.a
the costs of inaction are
potentially tremendous because the costs of government and/or industry reaction
to an attack are far greater than the costs of adequately equipping a port, port
facility or ship with preventive security measures; and
2. benefits will flow
from enhancing security at ports, port facilities and on board ships, such as
reduced delays, faster processing times, better asset control, decreased payroll
due to improved information management systems, fewer losses due to theft, and
decreased insurance costs.
These conclusions align with the policy
position of the Australian Government and underpin the rationale for the
Maritime Transport Security Bill.
Part 2 Objectives
Interstate movement of cargo, bulk vessels on Coastal Trade Permits
The primary objective for the Australian Government in taking action is to
adequately safeguard against unlawful interference with maritime transport in
Australia. A secondary objective is to establish a national regulatory framework
to assist maritime industry participants to comply with the requirements in
Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. This will enable the Australian Government to
inform the IMO by the deadline of 1 July 2004 that Australian ports, facilities,
terminals and ships are compliant with the new international rules. As a result
there will be no disruption to trade with other SOLAS signatories. The Problem
identified in Part 1 above will be adequately addressed through the
implementation of these objectives.
When pursuing these objectives the
Australian Government is not intending to impact adversely
on:
• existing counter-terrorism arrangements, law enforcement
legislation and police operations at the Commonwealth, State or Northern
Territory level;
• other Commonwealth operations and activities at
ports (such as border protection);
• the relationship between State and
Northern Territory governments with ports under their jurisdiction;
or
• the efficient operations of the maritime industry participants to
be regulated.
Part C Options
The main options available to the Australian
Government are described below.
Option 1: Explicit government
regulation
To ensure that Australian maritime industry
participants are compliant with the IMO maritime security regime, the Bill
proposes an outcomes based maritime security framework to regulate the maritime
industry. The universal application of a single regulatory system for maritime
security will provide maritime industry participants throughout all States and
the Northern Territory with a consistent approach and a central regulator, which
is the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS). DOTARS will
assume the responsibility for and costs associated with the assessment of
security plans, verification of ship security, liaison with industry,
coordination of national maritime threat information, and communication with the
IMO on industry compliance issues.
At the last Australian Transport
Council (ATC) meeting in May 2003, State and Northern Territory Transport
Ministers agreed to the National Maritime Transport Security Framework - the
precursory to this Bill - as developed by the Australian Government with the
stakeholders from the States, the Northern Territory and industry. The key
element of the framework is to put in place preventive security measures to
protect Australia’s ships, ports and port facilities from the threat of
terrorism in accordance with Australia’s obligations as signatory to
SOLAS. The Transport Ministers also expressed commitment to meeting the
international deadline for compliance of 1 July 2004.
This option is
considered optimal.
Self-regulation refers to the circumstances where industry formulates the
rules for its own operation and where industry is solely responsible for the
enforcement of these rules. An example of this would be a code of conduct
developed by a peak industry body. A voluntary code would contain the
requirements in Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, and it would operate in a
similar way to the International Standards Organization (ISO) system. Ships,
ports and facilities that wished to comply with the code would seek a
certificate of compliance from the organisation administering the code in
Australia.
It is suggested that this option would not result in adequate
implementation of the IMO security measures because there would be no
legislative backing to ensure compliance by Australian flag ships, ports and
facilities and therefore no need to comply. A voluntary code would create
significant uncertainty as to whether ports, facilities and ships are complying
with requirements to upgrade security measures to meet increased risks. In
addition, a voluntary code may not satisfy the requirements of foreign ship
operators and ports, in which case they may prefer not to trade with Australian
ports, facilities and ships.
The general public, for example those
undertaking holiday cruises or living in the vicinity of a port facility or
port, are becoming increasingly sensitive to maritime security issues. Allowing
industry to set security standards would not assuage increasing public concern
over maritime security. A terrorist incident involving a major port near
residential areas or on board an international cruise liner with Australian
citizens aboard would have a major impact on the Australian community.
The potential social and economic consequences of an ineffective
industry self-regulatory scheme are too great to permit industry to determine
their own standards through a voluntary code of conduct on the matter of
maritime transport security.
Under this option the Australian Government would enact legislation to
set out minimum security standards, and the responsibility for regulating the
industry would be devolved to the States and the Northern Territory. The
legislation would also need to include obligations placed on States and Northern
Territory authorities to undertake the administration of the requirements in the
amendments to SOLAS and the ISPS Code. The regime would need to be agreed to by
the State and Northern Territory governments. The most likely administrative
model would be for the Australian Government to enact an overarching statutory
framework which would be mirrored at the State and Territory level according to
jurisdictional responsibilities, administrative arrangements and local industry
needs.
The two-step process of, firstly, the Australian Government enacting legislation and, secondly, each State and Northern Territory following suit would be time consuming and costly. It would be extremely unlikely for this process to be completed in enough time to ensure industry compliance with the international deadline of 1 July 2004.
Even if State and Northern Territory legislation was introduced in time for
security plans to be approved and ships to be issued with International Ship
Security Certificates, it is likely that each State and the Northern Territory
would not have matching systems in place. This might lead to unfair advantages
and confusion, particularly where foreign masters and crew have to adapt to
seven different regulatory systems when visiting different State and Northern
Territory ports in Australia. It would not be in Australia’s best trading
interests, or in the interests of Australia’s maritime industry, to have
seven different, locally controlled regulatory schemes.
As mentioned
above, State and Territory Transport Ministers have acknowledged the need for
the Australian Government to take the lead role in maritime transport security
regulation.
Part 4 Impact Analysis
Due to the urgency of
the task and the international compliance deadline, there has not been time to
subject the regulatory model proposed in the Bill to detailed quantitative and
qualitative research to determine the impact of the Bill on the Australian
maritime transport industry, other jurisdictions, and consumers. Nonetheless,
information gathered during the period leading up to the development of the Bill
strengthens the need for the enhancement of transport security in the maritime
sector and is supportive of the proposed regulatory action. The conclusions
drawn from the above mentioned OECD report reinforce this view. Ultimately, the
cost of enhancing security whether in the maritime transport sector, aviation
transport sector, or at home, can only be measured against the benefits from
preventing unlawful interference, and the adverse economic impact unlawful
interference can have on commercial enterprises and the adverse psychological
impact it can have on personal wellbeing.
The assessment of the options
discussed below are based on quantitative research undertaken by an independent
consultant employed by DOTARS in December 2002, the OECD report referred to
above, and the outcome of consultations DOTARS held with industry and State and
Northern Territory government stakeholders.
Option 1: Explicit
government regulation
Benefits
Under the Australian
Constitution, the Australian Government has the responsibility for the
obligations arising from adopted and accepted international treaties. The
international obligations arising from Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code are
considerable, and the Australian Government will need to be able to report
positively to the IMO on, or before, 1 July 2004 about the domestic
implementation of the treaty obligations. With this in mind and despite the
tight deadline, the Australian Government has prepared a Bill which provides
certainty to state-regulated entities, privately operating port facilities and
the Australian shipping industry, sets penalties for offences including serious
penalties for trespassing, and creates a new centralised regulatory regime with
DOTARS as the regulator. Universal application is critical to ensure
Australia’s international obligations are met on time and to a standard
acceptable to all Australian jurisdictions and affected industry participants.
A direct benefit of the Bill is that it provides a nationally consistent
framework for a preventive maritime security system. The consequences of
non-compliance is high and ranges from detrimentally affecting relations with
international trading partners to the adverse consequences of a terrorist attack
on the public health and safety as well as government and private industry
assets and business operations.
There are numerous indirect benefits to
managing maritime security through explicit government regulation, including
upholding Australia’s reputation as a ‘secure’ trading
partners, centralising the cost of administration, improving waterfront
occupational health and safety, and reducing maritime industry
participants’ insurance costs by reducing the instances of theft and
property damage.
Costs
The Bill places obligations on port authorities and/or those entities
controlling vital areas of water in ports or approaches to ports to take an
active role in port security. This is necessary because the definition of a
‘port facility’ in Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code refers to a
location which covers areas where ship-port interfaces take place rather
than an entity, such as a port authority or a Harbourmaster. The definition of
the international term ‘port facility’ includes areas where direct
interfaces take place as well as indirect interfaces, such as anchorages,
waiting berths and seaward approaches. In the Bill, security regulated ports
will be those ports which interface directly or indirectly with the types of
ships which are subject to the Bill.
The regulation of ports is not
without jurisdictional complexities. Ports are traditionally under the
jurisdiction of the States and the Northern Territory. As a result, this Bill
will have cost and resource implications for the States and Northern Territory
governments. At the Australian Transport Council (ATC) meeting in May 2003 it
was agreed with States and Northern Territory Transport Ministers that for the
purpose of implementing the international maritime security regime the
Australian Government would need to be able to regulate the entities controlling
waterways. The States and the Northern Territory will be obliged to provide
adequate security of their assets as owners of these assets. This is in line
with the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments’ principles on the
protection of critical infrastructure as outlined in the National
Counter-Terrorism Committee’s paper ‘Critical Infrastructure
Protection in Australia’.
The following statutory obligations on
operators of security regulated ports, and port facilities within these ports,
are most likely to have the greatest cost impact:
• Security
regulated ports, and relevant port facility operators, will be obliged to
self-assess existing security arrangements. On completion of security
assessments, port operators, and port facility operators, will need to prepare
security plans based on existing arrangements and identify additional security
measures and activities to ensure compliance with the Bill. The plans will
include security measures and activities to be implemented at security level 1
(default level), security level 2 and security level 3. The security plans will
need to be submitted to the Secretary of DOTARS for approval, and DOTARS will
assess compliance as required.
• When undertaking security assessments,
port operators, and relevant port facility operators, should identify areas
within their ports, and port facilities, which may require stricter access
control arrangements and may qualify for the establishment of a maritime
security zone under the Bill. The location of the proposed maritime security
zones must be submitted to the Secretary for consideration. Once the Secretary
has established such a zone the port operator, or port facility operator, will
be obliged to comply with extra statutory requirements, for example, screening
of passengers and public notification of the boundaries of a zone. This is
essential to support the enforcement regime outlined in the Bill.
• The Secretary may direct a port operator and/or one or more port
facility operators within a security regulated port to implement extra security
measures and activities on top of those already established in the port or port
facility operator’s security plan at the existing security level (1, 2 or
3) when an unlawful interference with maritime transport is imminent or
probable.
At this early stage of implementation, it is extremely
difficult to estimate the cost of enhancing security at the approximately 70
ports which will become security regulated ports, and the up to 300 port
facilities within these ports. The local security assessment might show that a
port or port facility is adequately equipped to be considered compliant with the
provisions in the Bill. For example, some ports and port facilities may already
have security equipment, such as hand-held radios, gates, closed circuit TV
(CCTV), lights, communications system, fencing and security guards. In this
case, additional costs due to upgrading security to meet the new requirements
will be minimal. DOTARS is not in the position at this early stage of
implementation to know exactly what security arrangements exist at each port and
port facility.
The OECD report referred to in Part 1 does not provide
conclusive figures for port security costs as it acknowledges that these costs
will vary dramatically from port to port and will depend on what security is
already in place. For example, container facilities will have security in place
to reduce theft. For some types of cargo there are already extra security
requirements in place, for example, for dangerous goods. Staffing costs will
also vary according to local labour costs. The report concludes that the highest
cost items for ports are most likely to be security officers and security
guards.
Given the above caveats, the figures below must be treated with
caution. They are based on an early estimate made by an independent consultant
engaged by DOTARS, who undertook a desktop audit of potential security costs to
50 Australian ports based on a prescriptive regulatory model. The ports were
grouped into four different risk categories, ranging from the high risk Category
A to the low risk Category D. A Category A port would typically comprise a range
of diverse port facilities and terminals, such as container terminals,
multi-purpose terminals, passenger ship terminals, liquid bulk terminals, and
tug and pilot boat facilities. These terminals and port facilities would have
different security needs and requirements. The consultant estimated that a
Category A port would require physical security measures (eg. fencing, patrols,
CCTV, etc) and procedural measures (eg. access control, etc). Table 1 reproduces
an aggregate figure for Category A ports based on the consultant’s
estimates.
Items
|
$ million
|
Closed circuit TV (CCTV) to monitor access to the port or port
facility
|
33
|
Communications, such as radios, data links, etc
|
33
|
Guards and patrols
|
33
|
Vehicle booking/community system for the tracking and management of
vehicles access and departing from port facilities
|
28
|
Perimeter lighting
|
11
|
Perimeter fencing
|
11
|
Security briefings/security committees
|
3
|
Personnel ID system
|
2.6
|
Uninterrupted power supply
|
2.4
|
Personnel x-ray system, including bag conveyor, for passenger
facilities
|
2
|
Training
|
1
|
Possible additional cargo security prior to loading containers at major
ports
|
80
|
Other, including cost of security assessments and security plan
development
|
36
|
Total
|
276
|
Lower risk ports are expected to incur significantly lower costs in
meeting the requirements in the Bill. For these types of ports the initial costs
have been estimated to be up to $24 million.
In summary, total set-up
costs to security regulated ports, including the port facilities within these
ports, could be up to $300 million with ongoing costs up to $90 million p.a.
Increasing from security level 1 to 2 could mean introducing extra
security measures such as additional patrols, limiting access points, increasing
searches of persons, personal effects and vehicles, denying access to visitors,
and using patrol vessels to enhance waterside security. The cost of such
measures could be about $5,000 per day for each port or port facility concerned.
Port and port facility operations should be able to continue without significant
delays at this level.
Maritime security level 3 is unlikely to be imposed
on a national basis. The Secretary may declare that maritime security level 2 or
3 is in force for a port or a number of facilities or terminals if a heightened
security risk to maritime transport has been identified. As the intelligence
used to trigger a move to maritime security level 3 will be specific, DOTARS, in
consultation with other Commonwealth agencies, such as the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), will
issue specific and targeted advice, aimed at reducing the risk associated with
the specific threat. In extreme circumstances coordination and response
arrangements will be progressed in accordance with the National
Counter-Terrorism Plan.
The costs of augmenting security at maritime
security level 3 could be considerable and could result in operations being
slowed down. For example, a container terminal could lose about $100,000 per day
in revenue from suspension of container ship operations. Costs at liquid bulk
terminals (for example, petroleum products, gas) and dry bulk terminals (for
example, coal, iron ore, grain) would be considerably less as there are less
people and equipment involved in the operations of such terminals.
In
addition to the higher maritime security levels, the Secretary may also issue
security directions to individual ports and facilities that may be affected by a
particular threat. The Secretary must not give this kind of direction unless an
unlawful interference with maritime transport is imminent or probable. A
security direction can be given at security level 1, 2 or 3 and will be revoked
by the Secretary once intelligence information has been received that the
imminent or probable threat has subsided.
There will be penalties for
non-compliance with the Bill. The penalties for breaching provisions which could
seriously compromise maritime security are 200 penalties units for a port or
port facility operator, 100 for penalties units for a minor maritime industry
participant, and 50 penalty units for any person. In monetary terms, 200
penalties units for an individual equals $22,000, and for a body corporate
$110,000. Infringement notices can be issued for less serious breaches of the
Bill. The maximum amount of an infringement notice may not exceed one-fifth of
the maximum fine that a court could impose, ie. the above monetary
fines.
Australian ships which are of a certain type will be considered regulated
Australian ships and as such will need to comply with the requirements in the
Bill. The new security arrangements in the Bill apply to all Australian
passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards on inter-state
and international voyages. The Bill also has provisions which apply to foreign
ships on intra-state and inter-state voyages which are referred to as regulated
foreign ships.
While SOLAS and Chapter XI-2 only apply to certain types
of ships on international voyages, the Australian Government decided to extend
the maritime security regime to ensure broader coverage and better security of
Australian ships and ports. The external affairs power in the Constitution
provided the necessary head of power for the Australian Government to extend the
application of the Convention to Australian ships on inter-state
voyages.
The following statutory obligations on the operators of
regulated Australian ships are most likely to have the greatest cost
impact:
• Operators of regulated Australian ships will be obliged
to self-assess existing security arrangements for their ships. On completion of
the security assessments, ship operators will need to prepare security plans
based on existing arrangements and identify additional security measures and
activities to ensure compliance with the Bill and to qualify for an
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). The plans will include security
measures and activities to be implemented at security level 1 (default level),
security level 2 and security level 3. The security plans will need to be
submitted to the Secretary of DOTARS for approval, and DOTARS will assess
compliance as required. The ISSC will be issued by the Secretary once security
measures have been adequately implemented on board a regulated Australian ship.
This certificate ensures compliance with the ISPS Code, and it is essential that
ship operators obtain ISSCs for their ships if they wish their ships to trade
with ports classified as secure under the ISPS Code.
• When undertaking
a security assessments, ship operators should identify areas on board their
ships which may require stricter access control arrangements and may qualify for
the establishment of an on board security zone under the Bill. The location of
the proposed zones must be submitted to the Secretary for consideration. Once
the Secretary has established such a zone the ship operator will be obliged to
comply with extra statutory requirements, for example, screening of passengers
and public notification of the boundaries of a zone. This is essential to
support the enforcement regime outlined in the Bill.
• The Secretary
may direct a ship operator to implement extra security measures and activities
on top of those already established in the ship’s security plan at the
existing security level (1, 2 or 3) when if an unlawful interference with
maritime transport is imminent or probable.
At present, there are
approximately 70 Australian registered trading ships (8 on international voyages
and 62 on coastal voyages) that could be engaged in international or inter-state
coastal trading and would be classified as regulated Australian ships under the
Bill. In addition, the Bill will also apply to mobile offshore industry units.
These units will be classified as ships if able to navigate the high seas. While
DOTARS has not been able to obtain an accurate figure, the number of such units
which are Australian registered appears to be very small.
It should be
noted that ship operators could easily switch trading ships between
international, inter-state and intra-state voyages. The cost estimate below
assumes that all Australian registered ships that come within the ambit of SOLAS
Convention Regulation 3 could be used on international or inter-state
voyages.
Table 2: DOTARS cost estimates for Australian regulated ship
(security level 1)
Items
|
$ million
|
Security in port, such as guards, watchmen, offside patrols when
required
|
4.55
|
Training
|
3.77
|
Structural modifications to secure access to on-board security zones
|
1.65
|
Equipment, including the ship security alert system
|
0.45
|
Personal identification
|
0.45
|
Admin/record keeping
|
0.35
|
Other, including cost of security assessments and security plan
development
|
1.78
|
Total
|
13
|
On the above basis it is estimated that the initial costs for complying
with the requirements in the Bill will be around $13 million. Ongoing costs have
been estimated to be at around $6 million per year.
For the sake of
comparison, the US Coastguard (USCG) figures for ship compliance with the ISPS
Code have been reproduced here from the OECD report. The USCG requires a high
standard of compliance from the shipping industry. The costings per item per
ship provide a benchmark for investment costs. According to the USCG assessment,
the highest costs to ship operators will be crew training, the ship security
alert system, auto-intrusion alarms, and additional locks and lights on board
ships to detect unlawful interference.
Table 3: US Coastguard cost
estimates for ship compliance with the ISPS Code (in Australian dollars)
Items
|
Initial cost
per ship over 1,000 gross tonnage |
Ongoing cost
per ship over 1,000 tonnage |
Ship security alert system
|
$3,070
|
$153
|
Key crew training
|
$7,678
|
$7,678
|
Ship security assessment
|
$2,457
|
0
|
Ship security plan
|
$614
|
0
|
Ship security officer (function to be given to Master who on average would
be occupied 5 days per year in this role)
|
$1,045
|
$1,045
|
Ship security training and drills (1 hour 4 times per year)
|
$581
|
$581
|
Total
|
$15,445
|
$9,457
|
In addition, ships to which Chapter XI-2 applies will need to be fitted
out with security equipment. Tables 4, 5 and 6 are based on US Coastguard
figures for compliance with Part B of the ISPS Code, which is beyond the
intention of the Bill as Part B was designed by the IMO to be recommendatory
only. Australian ship operators who wish to trade with the US will need to be
aware of the US maritime security laws and make the necessary arrangements.
Table 4: US Coastguard figures for security equipment for a tanker (oil,
gas, chemical) required to comply with Part B of the ISPS Code (in Australian
dollars)
Equipment with USCG recommended quantity
|
Initial cost
per ship |
Ongoing cost
per ship |
1 hand-held metal detector
|
$306
|
$15
|
5 hand-held radios
|
$1,530
|
$76
|
10 locks
|
$4,590
|
$229
|
5 lights
|
$3,060
|
$153
|
5 auto-intrusion alarms
|
$3,825
|
$191
|
Total
|
$13,311
|
$664
|
Table 5: US Coastguard figures for security equipment for a freighter
required to comply with Part B of the ISPS Code (in Australian dollars)
Equipment with USCG recommended quantity
|
Initial cost
per ship |
Ongoing cost
per ship |
2 hand-held metal detectors
|
$612
|
$30
|
5 hand-held radios
|
$1,530
|
$76
|
10 locks
|
$4,590
|
$229
|
5 lights
|
$3,060
|
$153
|
5 auto-intrusion alarms
|
$3,825
|
$191
|
1 portable vapour detector (for explosives)
|
$12,240
|
$612
|
Total
|
$25,857
|
$1,291
|
Table 6: US Coastguard figures for security equipment for ships under
1,000 gross tonnage required to comply with Part B of the ISPS Code (in
Australian dollars)
Equipment with USCG
Recommended quantity |
Initial cost
per ship |
Ongoing cost
per ship |
3 hand-held radios
|
$918
|
$15
|
5 locks
|
$2,295
|
$114
|
5 lights
|
$3,060
|
$153
|
2 auto-intrusion alarms
|
$1,530
|
$76
|
Total
|
$7,803
|
$358
|
Ship operators will also need to consider employing a company security
officer who will have a key role in enabling communication between a ship, the
company and relevant authorities. If the company is operating less than 10 ships
on international voyages the USCG estimates the annual salary for this function
to be US$37,500 which is AU$57,575. The training for this officer is estimated
to be US$3,500 per year which is AU$5,374. The salary for a company security
officer in a company operating more than 10 ships on international voyages is
substantially higher. There are only 8 Australian flagged ships on international
voyages so this figure has not been included in this comparison.
As for
security regulated ports and the facilities within these ports, increasing from
security level 1 to 2 will mean introducing extra security measures. The cost of
such measures could be about $2,000 per day for each ship involved in the
heightened security situation. Ship operations should be able to continue
without significant delays at this level.
The costs of augmenting
security at level 3 depends on the type of ship. Operators of container ships
are more likely to face higher security costs at security level 3. Costs to
container shipping companies could be about $30,000 for each day that a
container ship is delayed. The operating costs of most bulk ships are
significantly less than for container ships. However, as mentioned above, the
Secretary may only impose security level 3 when a threat is imminent or probable
in which case the ship operator would have a vested interest in incurring the
costs of higher security to protect the asset and the crew.
As for port
and port facility operators, there will be penalties for non-compliance by the
ship operator, or master in certain instances. The same graduated penalty scheme
as above applies.
The best estimate that can be made at this stage of the set-up costs to
the Australian maritime sector (ports and ships) of complying with the IMO
security measures would be $313 million in the first year. It is estimated that
ongoing costs will be around $96 million p.a. for ships and ports.
It is
important to remember that because these expenses are being required for
compliance with a significant international agreement, these costs will not just
apply to the Australian maritime industry sector but to shipping and port
services sectors in all countries which are signatories to the SOLAS Convention.
In fact, even those countries which are not SOLAS signatories, will have a
vested commercial interest in complying with the minimum security requirements
in Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code to be able to continue their current trading
arrangements with the maritime sector in SOLAS countries. The global necessity
for compliance investment means that the need for Australian maritime industry
participants to budget for compliance with the Bill should not have a major
impact on the competitiveness of Australia’s shipping and port services
industry.
Table 6: Summary of aggregate cost estimates (security level
1)
Maritime industry participant
|
Initial investment
$ million |
Ongoing expenses
$ million |
Security regulated ports, including port facilities within these
ports
|
$300
|
$90
|
Regulated Australian ships
|
$13
|
$6
|
Total
|
$313
|
$96
|
For illustrative purposes, the cost impact on cargo could represent about
$2 per tonne on containerised cargo and 40 cents per tonne on bulk cargo. While
shipping companies and port facility operators can be expected to recover the
costs of security measures through their normal charging mechanisms, the final
cost impact on consumers of goods carried by sea is expected to be very
small.
The above costs relate to security measures and activities at
security level 1. The costs would increase proportionate to the additional
measures or activities to be undertaken at security levels 2 and 3. Additional
costs would be incurred when the Secretary issues security directions, which can
happen at security level 1, 2 or 3. Additional costs would be greatest if the
Secretary issued a security direction to a maritime industry participant who was
already operating at security level 3. However, in this case the probability of
the terrorist incident or other unlawful interference occurring would be so high
that the maritime industry participant would have a vested interest in incurring
additional costs to protect his or her assets, staff and business operations
from the attack or other serious damage.
It should be noted that these
costs must be seen in an operational context. Firstly, the set-up costs
associated with raising standards in order to meet the new security requirements
will largely be capital in nature. Although purchased in Year 1, the capital
assets purchased will have an effective life which is much greater. In some
cases, the effective life of an asset may be 20 years. These costs would
typically be represented over this 20-year period under an accrual accounting
system - not on a cash basis. Secondly, the costs which are incurred through the
implementation of the security measures, although principally required for
security reasons, are expected to also provide business benefits. Examples
include reduced criminal activity and efficiencies from improved
procedures.
A difficulty in quantifying the ‘costs’ to
industry is that the real costs are difficult to determine. Some of the costs
mentioned above are in addition to the costs which would otherwise be expended
through the normal course of doing business. Introducing the new security
measures will effectively bring many costs forward, when infrastructure may have
actually been upgraded on replacement in any event. Additionally, whilst costs
are easier to quantify - at least in ‘book’ terms - the benefits
resulting from the costs are much more difficult to quantify, and may not be
immediately apparent. Reduced criminal activity and improving the integrity of
cargo and confidence in the business all have commercial merit and inherent
value. Some of these benefits will accrue over time and are not possible to
include in an informed cost/benefit analysis at this time.
It is
implicit in the OECD report that lax security at ports, facilities and on board
ships will be perceived to be less attractive to trading partners which
strengthens the argument that compliance with the new security measures is a
cost of doing business in the maritime sector.
It is the Australian Government’s view that preventive security is
a cost of doing business. Maritime industry participants are in a position to
recover the costs of additional security measures through existing cost recovery
mechanisms. The Bill does make provision for the sharing of security
arrangements. This opens up the option of local arrangements between the public
and private sector to assist the development of viable cost-effective approaches
to maritime security. Once again, it needs to be emphasised that the cost of
security at an individual port, port facility, terminal, ship, or other maritime
industry service provider will depend on existing security arrangements.
In some cases, upgrading security could result in reduced insurance
premiums through a reduction in the perceived level of risk. The shipping
industry is already imposing surcharges arising from increased insurance
premiums on ships trading to a number of countries in the Middle-East. These
surcharges have ranged from $50 per container to about $290 per container for
ships calling at Yemen where the terrorist attack on the French tanker
Limburg occurred.
The costs of additional security at ports will need to be borne by State
and the Northern Territory governments and the private sector. This is in line
with the existing arrangements which recognise that while the Australian
Government’s role is to, among others, provide coordination and national
leadership in areas of joint responsibility such as maritime transport, the
owners and operators of critical infrastructure have the responsibility of
providing adequate security of their assets. In this case, the Bill provides a
system for assessing the security at State and Territory owned ports and
privately owned or leased maritime facilities, and based on these assessment
further investments may be necessary to ensure national compliance, consistency
and fairness across all jurisdictions and ports.
In addition to potential
costs for upgrading security at ports, States and the Northern Territory
governments and the private sector will also need to consider the costs of
enforcement. The new trespassing penalties may result in an increase in requests
for police presence at ports and waterside police patrols.
DOTARS’ regulatory roles and responsibilities will
include:
• assessment of port, port facility and ship security
plans;
• verification of ship security and issuing of International
Ship Security Certificates;
• checking of
compliance;
• management of sensitive security threat
information;
• negotiating agreement on Memoranda of Understanding with
other Australian Government departments which will be assisting with the ISPS
compliance checking of foreign ships;
• establishment of communications
network with maritime industry participants;
• regular liaison with
other Commonwealth departments and State and Northern Territory
authorities;
• undertaking of compliance checking of foreign ships and
control functions regarding non-compliant foreign ships;
• regular
reporting on compliance issues to the IMO; and
• staff
training.
The 2003-4 budget allocation is $15.6 million over 2 years for
DOTARS’ administrative, compliance and monitoring
duties.
Option 2: Self-regulation
The voluntary nature of self-regulation means that maritime transport
security initiatives would be implemented at the discretion of industry. There
would be a fair amount of freedom and flexibility for industry to decide on how
to implement the obligations under Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code through a code
of conduct. Industry would retain ownership of the problem and the solution.
Self-regulation by industry may result in the implementation of security
measures which minimise costs to industry participants and reduce need for major
investment in security treatments. Industry may benefit from reduced compliance
costs in comparison to explicit government regulation.
The lack of
government involvement would mean that public resources would be allocated to
other portfolios.
There would be administrative costs associated with the development of the code and the consultation period with key industry groups. It would be administratively advisable to establish a peak regulatory body to administer the code. There would be costs involved with the administration of this national body and its subsidiaries, if any, in all States and the Northern Territory. These costs would be passed on to code members and would add to their costs of doing business. Annual conferences and seminars would need to be held to update members on new approaches and amendments to the code. Event hosting and travelling to events are costly, and would need to be subsidised by the members.
In return, the discretionary self-regulatory scheme may provide cost savings
to members in the form of lenient security standards. There would be little
incentive to comply as there will be no strict compliance and enforcement
provisions in a voluntary industry code of conduct, apart from, for example,
excluding members from the code or providing commercial disincentives or fines.
Non-compliance with the standards set in the ISPS Code would seriously
disadvantage the reputation of Australia as a secure trading nation. To ensure a
nationally consistent approach and be able to justify this approach and the
impeccability of its implementation to the IMO the Australian Government would
need to allocate resources to setting up a body to monitor the compliance with
the code or determine a governance structure with strict terms of reference to
temper industry’s discretionary decision making powers regarding maritime
security.
In the end, the seriousness of the problem identified in Part 1
of this RIS, and the international obligations which flow from Chapter XI-2 and
the ISPS Code do not lend themselves to industry self-regulation.
Option 3: Devolution of the responsibility for maritime security
regulation to the States and Northern Territory
A benefit that would result from this approach is that the administrative
costs for the implementation of Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code are transferred
from the Australian Government to the States and Northern Territory governments.
This would result in a freeing up of Commonwealth resources for other
portfolios’ responsibilities.
Having local knowledge of an issue
and being able to determine local solutions to local problems can have positive
effects on all involved. Local industry would benefit from being able to come to
cooperative arrangements with their State or Northern Territory Government and
associated maritime and/or transport authority. Local enforcement arrangements
would be made to accommodate all budgets and human resource
capabilities.
In addition, the Australian Government would not need to
introduce a major piece of legislation as is being proposed here. Instead, and
for the purposes of regulating how State and Northern Territory governments
implement the international requirements, the Australian Government could
introduce an overarching statutory framework which would enable the devolution
of authority on maritime security to the other jurisdictions and result in State
and Northern Territory legislation being developed. The Commonwealth framework
would need to include strict reporting mechanisms because the Australian
Government, as the signatory to SOLAS, would retain the responsibility of
communication on industry compliance with Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code to the
IMO.
Having seven authorities - one in each State and Northern Territory - with responsibility for implementing the IMO security measures is likely to cost significantly more than having a central authority. There could be problems with the consistency of enforcement of the security standards and this could impact adversely on Australia’s export trades, particularly if other signatories to SOLAS believes that the Australian arrangements were not applied according to the international agreement across all Australian jurisdictions. The aggregate costs to business are therefore likely to be higher not only due to administrative duplication, but also through inconsistency of application. These costs would be greatly magnified if Australia’s reputation as a secure trading partner were undermined.
The Australian Government would need to maintain and resource an administrative function in order to report back to the IMO on the implementation of Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code.
DOTARS has consulted extensively with representatives from the maritime
industry, Commonwealth departments, and State and Northern Territory governments
and relevant authorities. Attachment A lists the groups of stakeholders
consulted and types of forums used for consultation and information
dissemination. Overall, there has been a high level of cooperation from all
concerned. At State and Northern Territory level it was acknowledged at the
Australian Transport Council (ATC) meeting in May 2003 that the Australian
Government needed to take the lead role in maritime security
regulation.
The most significant consultation process was the recent
release of the exposure draft of the Bill to peak maritime industry
organisations, State and Territory transport and maritime authorities, and a
number of other influential organisations and senior staff. Around 40
submissions were received by the deadline. Key issues identified
were:
• differences in the use of terminology between Chapter XI-2
and the Bill;
• lack of detail in the Bill;
• overlap with
maritime safety issues, particularly in the definition of unlawful interference
with maritime operations;
• enforcement of waterside
issues;
• zoning provisions too top down;
• relationship
between a port security plan and a port facility security plan
unclear;
• definition of a security regulated ship difficult to
understand;
• definition of critical installation
unclear;
• demerit points system questioned;
• implications
for existing cost recovery mechanisms at State and Territory level for port
services mentioned;
• penalties on non-compliant foreign ships
considered too lenient; and
• some concerns about the responsibilities
attached to incident reporting.
DOTARS considered the merits of these
issues and where reasonable have reflected these in the Bill. In some cases,
further clarification of the intention of a particular provision, or group of
provisions, in the Bill has been provided in the Explanatory Memorandum. Many of
the issues raised will be addressed in the regulations as they relate
predominantly to operational matters.
It is recommended that Option 1 be adopted.
The exposure draft was sent to all key Commonwealth departments with a
presence at ports, otherwise involved in the maritime industry, or with an
interest in law enforcement and legal matters. The draft was also sent to peak
industry bodies, State and Northern Territory premier departments and transport
agencies and other relevant authorities, police agencies in all States and the
Northern Territory, the Australian Local Government Association, and a number of
maritime unions.
During the consultation period bilateral discussions
were held with relevant Commonwealth departments and agencies, the NSW
government, peak industry bodies, and the Maritime Union of Australia.
The primary vehicle for consultation relating to the IMO’s security
framework is the Maritime Security Working Group. Membership comprises senior
representatives of relevant Commonwealth departments, State and Northern
Territory maritime and transport agencies, and peak industry bodies. The MSWG
met 5 times in 2002.
The Australian Transport Council (ATC) is a Ministerial forum for
Commonwealth, State and Territory consultations and provides advice to
governments on the coordination and integration of all transport policy issues
at a national level. The new maritime security measures were presented to ATC at
meetings, most recently in May 2003.
ATC is supported by the Standing Committee on Transport (SCOT) comprising a nominee of each ATC Minister, generally at Head of Department/Agency level. Maritime security issues were presented to SCOT at 3 meetings in 2002 and 1 meeting in 2003.
The Australian Maritime Group is a sub-committee of SCOT. It brings together
senior Commonwealth, State and Territory officials for consultations on the
maritime sector. AMG discussed maritime security issues at 3 meetings in 2002
and 2 meetings in 2003.
The AMG has an ad hoc group on maritime security,
which met 3 times in 2002 and 5 times in 2003. The ad hoc group has closely
scrutinised the policy and implementation model developed by DOTARS from the
perspective of State and Territory governments with constitutional
responsibility for ports, and as the owners and operators of ports and port
facilities in several jurisdictions.
Briefings and general presentations were provided to a range of key
industry stakeholders, often at the invitation of the stakeholder organisation
or group. Industry groups have included port authorities/port owners, shipping
companies, State Counter-Terrorism Units, law enforcement organisations, and
peak industry associations. There were 6 meetings in December 2002 and over 40
meetings in 2003.
From May to July 2003 DOTARS held preventive maritime security workshops
in each State and the Northern Territory to inform industry and other interested
persons about the broad approach taken in the Bill to maritime security.
This clause provides that the Bill, once enacted, will be known as the
Maritime Transport Security Act 2003.
This clause provides that the Bill commences in two stages:
1. the day
on which the Bill receives the royal assent;
2. a day fixed by
proclamation.
The provisions of the Bill commencing on Royal Assent are those that
establish definitions, various processes (for example, the declaration of
security regulated ports and for approval and cancellation of plans), describe
the powers of maritime security inspectors and allow for review of
decisions.
All remaining provisions of the Bill will commence on the same day fixed by
proclamation. If the provisions do not commence within 12 months of the Act
receiving Royal Assent, then the provisions will commence immediately after 12
months from Royal Assent. The provisions commencing by proclamation are for
example those that create an obligation on a maritime industry participant to
comply with their security plans, provide for some powers of officials and the
enforcement provisions. It is anticipated that the date of proclamation will be
1 July 2004 when Australia's obligations under the maritime security amendments
to the SOLAS Convention enter into force.
The two stage commencements
allows maritime industry participants time to recognise their obligations and to
have their maritime security plans approved by the Secretary and in place before
the obligations and associated penalties come into force.
This clause describes the purposes of the Bill. The main purpose of the Bill
is to establish a regulatory framework that will safeguard maritime transport
against unlawful interference. In particular, the framework is aimed at
protecting ships, ports and port facilities within Australia, and Australian
ships operating outside of Australia. The Bill will establish certain security
requirements for maritime activities, requiring persons involved in these
activities to meet certain obligations. A particular obligation is the
requirement of certain maritime industry participants to develop, and comply
with, maritime security plans.
The regulatory framework established by
this Bill is based on the four maritime security outcomes listed under subclause
3(4). The maritime security outcomes are:
(a) Australia’s obligations
under Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code, including those
with regard to the welfare of seafarers are met;
(b) the vulnerability to
terrorist attack of Australian ships, ports and other ships within Australia is
reduced without undue disruption to trade;
(c) the risk that maritime
transport is used to facilitate terrorist or other unlawful activities is
reduced; and
(d) security information is communicated effectively among
maritime industry participants and government agencies with maritime transport
security responsibilities.
The purpose of the outcomes-based framework is
to enable maritime industry participants to develop security measures relevant
to their particular circumstances. Maritime security plans will outline security
measures that respond to the security risks identified by regulated Australian
ships, ports and port facilities.
This clause provides a simplified overview of this Bill.
This clause provides that the Bill will apply in Australia and all its
external territories, eg. Christmas Island and Norfolk Island.
This clause notes that section 15.2 of the Criminal Code (extended
geographical jurisdiction – category B) applies to an offence against this
Bill. The extension of geographical jurisdiction under section 15.2 of the
Criminal Code requires the offending conduct to have a connection with
Australia. There may be occasions where a person should be liable under
Australian law for conduct that occurs outside Australia due to the impact that
conduct might have on our maritime security system. The fact that the conduct is
not a crime under the law of the foreign country where the conduct occurred may
be used as a defence for persons who are not Australian citizens or Australian
companies.
Because of the definition of this Act any
regulations made under the Bill will also have extended geographical
jurisdiction.
This clause provides that the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and all the
States and Territories is subject to the Bill, but it cannot be prosecuted for
an offence under the Bill.
This clause provides that the Bill will not exclusively regulate maritime
security and that State or Territory laws relating to maritime security remain
in force except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the operation of
this Bill.
This clause provides that the Bill does not apply to warships or other ships
operated for naval, military, customs or law enforcement purposes by Australia
or by a foreign state, nor will it apply to other ships owned, leased, chartered
by, or in the operational control of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory and
being used wholly for non-commercial activities (such as government-operated
scientific research vessels).
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the
Australian Customs Service are not included in the definition of a maritime
industry participant. The provisions of this Bill also do not apply to ports and
port facilities operated exclusively by the ADF. Provision has also been made to
exclude from the operation of this Bill other Commonwealth agencies that may
have been inadvertently captured by the definition of a maritime industry
participant by prescribing the agency in the regulations.
This clause defines certain terms used in the Bill. The definitions appear in
alphabetical order in the Bill. The definitions are best read in conjunction
with the relevant parts of the Bill. A number of key definitions are included
here.
Australian waters means the following:
• the
territorial sea of Australia which extends 12 nautical miles from the
territorial sea baseline; and
• the waters of the sea on the landward
side of the territorial sea; and
• the territorial sea of each
Territory; and
• the waters of the sea on the landward side of the
territorial sea of each external Territory; and
• inland waters
prescribed in regulations.
The regulations may prescribe a security
regulated port extends beyond what are considered to be the waters of the sea.
For example, where port facilities are located upriver.
Declaration of
Security means an agreement reached between a ship and other party (ship or
a person) which identifies the security activities or measures to be undertaken
or implemented by each party in specified circumstances.
Cleared
area means an area that can only be entered by persons who have received
clearance. A cleared area is considered a secure environment, as all persons
within that area have been screened for weapons and other prohibited items or
otherwise deemed cleared. A cleared area can no longer be considered secure, and
ceases to be a cleared area, if uncleared persons or goods move into the area.
Part 6 has the required regulation making powers for the establishment of
cleared areas within certain zones. Part 7 has the provisions for screening and
clearing persons, goods, vehicles and vessels.
ISSC means an
International Ship Security Certificate, a document issued to a ship operator
upon verification that the ship meets particular security requirements. Ship
operators of regulated Australian ships will apply to the Secretary for an ISSC.
Ship operators of regulated foreign ships will need to present a valid ISSC
issued for or on behalf of their flag state at any time while in Australian
waters.
Maritime industry participant is defined to include
persons who must have regard to maritime security matters as part of their
business activities. A maritime industry participant includes:
• A port
operator;
• A port facility operator;
• An operator of a
regulated Australian ship;
• An operator of a regulated foreign
ship;
• A person (other than a maritime security inspector) appointed
by the Secretary to perform a maritime security function;
• A
contractor who provides services to persons mentioned above;
• A person
who conducts a maritime-related enterprise and is prescribed in the
regulations.
Maritime security levels means the security levels as
advised by the Secretary which will inform maritime industry participants which
measures in their security plans need to be implemented at any given time.
Maritime security level 1 will be in place unless the Secretary advises
otherwise.
Maritime security plan is defined as a plan prepared
for the purposes of Part 3. The plan includes a security assessment and details
of measures to be implemented at each of the three maritime security levels. The
maritime security plan is the key mechanism which maritime industry participants
will use to guide their management of risks and implementation of security
measures within their areas of responsibility.
Passenger means a
passenger travelling by maritime transport and includes an intending passenger.
A passenger need not be a fare paying passenger.
Prohibited item
means an item that:
• could be used for unlawful interference with
maritime transport; and
• is prescribed in the regulations for the
purposes of this definition.
This definition recognised that many items,
which are not strictly considered to be weapons, could be used to threaten,
injure or in any way commit an act of unlawful interference with maritime
transport. The penalties that pertain to prohibited items are significantly
lower than those for weapons to reflect the relative seriousness of the
offences. The reference to unlawful interference with maritime transport
appropriately limits the regulation making power given there are serious
offences attached to the definition.
Port operator is defined as
a person designated by the Secretary through the Gazette to be the
operator of a security regulated port.
Port facility operator
means a person who operates a port facility, being an area within a security
regulated port used wholly or partly for the loading or unloading of
ships.
Port security zone means a zone within a security regulated
port established for the purposes of controlling movement, restricting access
and generally preventing unlawful interference with maritime transport as
described in clause 102. The Secretary will establish a port security zone by a
written notice to the port operator and any relevant maritime industry
participants controlling areas within the zone (eg. port facility
operators).
Recognised security organisation means an organisation
that the Secretary has determined in writing and to whom all or some of the
powers and functions under Part 4 of this Act in relation to ship security plans
and ISSCs has been delegated.
Regulated Australian ship means a
Australian ship that is:
(a) a passenger ship used for overseas or
inter-State voyages; or
(b) a cargo ship of 500 or more gross tonnes used for
overseas or inter-State voyages; or
(c) a mobile offshore drilling unit on an
overseas or inter-State voyage; or
(d) a ship of a kind prescribed in the
regulations.
The regulations may prescribe that a ship which is covered
by one of categories (a), (b) or (c) is not a regulated Australian
ship.
Regulated foreign ship means a foreign ship that
is:
(a) a passenger ship; or
(b) a cargo ship of 500 or more gross tonnes;
or
(c) a mobile offshore drilling unit; or
(d) a ship of a kind prescribed
in the regulations.
Security officer means a person designated by
a maritime industry participant to implement and maintain:
(a) the
participant’s maritime security plan; or
(b) the ship security plan for
a ship operated by the participant.
Ship operator means the owner
of a security regulated ship, or a person who has an agreement with the owner of
a security regulated ship to be the ship operator for the ship for the purposes
of this Bill, for example ship management company or bareboat
charterer.
Security regulated port is defined as areas of water or
land declared by the Secretary in the Gazette to be wholly or partly
intended for use in connection with the movement, loading, unloading,
maintenance or provisioning of security regulated ships.
Security
regulated ship includes regulated Australian ships and regulated foreign
ships which are subject to the security regulatory framework set out in this
Bill.
Ship security records will be prescribed in the regulations
and may include:
• the ISSC for the ship;
• details of the
ship’s previous ten port calls and the security level at which the ship
operated at those calls; and
• certain parts of the ship security plan,
consistent with the ISPS Code
Ship security zone means a zone
declared by the Secretary under section 104 to operate around a ship while the
ship is in a security regulated port, for the purpose of protecting the ship
from unlawful interference. The declaration will be given both to the ship
operator and the port operator of the port, or ports, where the zone will
apply.
Weapon means:
(a) a firearm of any kind; or
(b) a
thing prescribed by the regulations as a weapon; or
(c) a device that, except
for the absence of, or defect in, a part of the device, would be a weapon of a
kind mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b); or
(d) a device that is reasonably
capable of being converted into a weapon of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b).
It is essential to allow the regulations to prescribe what a weapon
is because new weapons may be developed and new threats may arise. Amendments in
response to these situations may need to be inserted into the regulatory
framework quickly, which is not achievable by having to amend an Act.
This clause defines the term unlawful interference with maritime
transport. The term is central to the application and understanding of the
Bill and its purpose. It defines the types of activities that constitute
unlawful interference with maritime transport and thus the types of activities
the Bill is aimed at safeguarding against. It covers conduct that threatens the
safe operation of ports and ships and which may cause harm to passengers, crew,
port personnel and the general public or damage to property (whether on board or
off a ship).
This Division allows the Secretary to establish security regulated ports.
The establishment of a security regulated port brings that particular port, port
facilities and associated port services under the regulatory framework in this
Bill.
This clause provides that a port is defined as an area of water, or land and
water (including any buildings, installations or equipment situated in or on
that land or water) intended for use either wholly or partly in connection with
the movement, loading, unloading, maintenance or provisioning of
ships.
To further clarify this meaning, a port may include:
(a) areas
of water, located between the land of the port and the open waters outside the
port, which are intended for use by ships to gain access to load, unload or
other land-based port facilities. For example, it includes the channels and
approaches through which ships move from the open water to a berth.
(b) areas
of open water intended for anchoring or otherwise holding before they enter
areas of water described in paragraph (a).
(c) areas of open water between
the areas of water described in paragraphs (a) and (b). For instance, at
roadsteads and other areas of open water where a ship loads or unloads cargo or
passengers brought from a land-based port facility by smaller vessels.
This definition has been used to comprehensively cover the meaning and
intention of the term ‘port facility’ as used in Chapter XI-2 of
SOLAS. In Chapter XI-2 the definition of a ‘port facility’ refers a
location where ship-port interfaces take place rather than an entity
which controls, or has responsibility for, such interfaces. The definition
refers to areas where direct ship-port interfaces take place as well as indirect
interfaces, such as anchorages, waiting berths and seaward approaches.
This clause provides that the Secretary may publish a notice in the
Gazette declaring areas of a port which meet the definition in clause 12
to comprise a security regulated port. Security regulated ports are those
ports which interface directly or indirectly with the security regulated ships.
The Gazette notice must include a map showing the boundaries of the
security regulated port. The gazetted boundaries of a security regulated port
indicate where some of the key regulatory obligations for maritime industry
participants under this Bill commence and terminate. The gazettal serves the
purpose of public notification of the boundaries of the security regulated port.
This process is most likely to occur concurrently with the gazettal of the port
operator (clause 14 refers).
A security regulated port will include the
activities of a port operator, one or more port facility operators and other
port service providers. For the purposes of this Bill, a ‘port
facility’ does not have the same meaning as in Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS. In
this Bill a ‘port facility’ will be those areas at which direct and
indirect ship-port interfaces take place, including, but not limited to,
container terminals, bulk terminals, passenger terminals, common user
facilities, and other port service providers which fall under the meaning of a
‘maritime industry participant’ and are regulated under this
Bill.
Subclause 13(3) clarifies that as naval ships are excluded from
this Bill, the boundaries of a security regulated port may not include areas
controlled exclusively by the Australian Defence Force.
In practice, the
Government anticipates that ports wishing to be considered security regulated
ports will identify themselves to the Secretary and provide a map of the
boundaries of the port for the Secretary’s consideration.
This clause provides that the Secretary may publish a notice in the
Gazette designating a person as the port operator for the security
regulated port. The port operator must be able to demonstrate that it has
responsibility for the relevant waterside and landside areas within a proposed
or an established security regulated port, for example, control of vessel
movement and management of port infrastructure.
The person designated as
port operator will then be a maritime industry participant and responsible for
ensuring that relevant obligations under this Bill are met.
Subclause
14(2) places an obligation on the Secretary to take into account certain
criteria when designating the port operator, for example the ability of the
person to undertake the functions of a port operator, the physical and
operational features of the port, and the views of the person, or persons,
responsible for managing the operations of the ports.
In practice, the
Government anticipates that appropriate persons will identify themselves as port
operators to the Secretary.
This clause defines the term security regulated ship and outlines the types
of ships that are included in the regulatory framework established by this Bill.
Security regulated ships comprise regulated Australian ships and regulated
foreign ships.
This clause defines that regulated Australian ships are Australian ships that
fall into one of the following categories:
(a) passenger ship used for
overseas or interstate voyages; or
(b) cargo ship of 500 or more gross tonnes
used for overseas or inter-State voyages; or
(c) a mobile offshore drilling
unit that is on an overseas or inter-State voyage; or
(d) a ship of a kind
prescribed in the regulations.
A passenger ship is a ship that carries
more than twelve passengers. Passenger ships may also be cargo ships and vice
versa.
Government ships on commercial voyages are included if they fit
into one of the categories outlined above.
Note that category (d) allows the regulations to prescribe other Australian
ships to become regulated Australian ships should circumstances warrant the
inclusion of other ships.
This clause defines regulated foreign ships to be foreign ships that
fall into one or more of the following categories:
(a) a passenger ship;
or
(b) a cargo ship of 500 or more gross tonnes; or
(c) a mobile offshore
drilling unit; or
(d) a ship of a kind prescribed in the
regulations;
and are in Australian waters and in, or intending to enter,
an Australian port. Regulated foreign ships are defined as such regardless of
the nature of the voyage they are undertaking while in Australian waters (ie.
overseas, interstate or intrastate). Foreign government ships on commercial
voyages are included if they fit into one of the categories outlined
above.
This clause allows for a person to be excused from an offence under this Bill
when that person engages in conduct which would otherwise amount to an offence.
For the excuse to operate the conduct must arise from circumstances where it was
necessary and reasonable for the master of a ship to take steps to protect the
safety or security of the ship or its cargo, a person on or off the ship,
another ship or a port, port facility or other installation within a
port.
An offence is also not committed if a person is required to do
something in accordance with a security direction or a control direction that
would otherwise be an offence or a contravention of the Bill. For example, a
security direction may be issued requiring a port facility to do something that
conflicts with the measures set out in its maritime security plan. In such a
case, if the port facility operator complies with the direction, he or she would
not be taken to have committed the offence of not complying with the
plan.
This clause provides that, where a person is required to give a notice or
direction to a ship operator, the person may give that direction to the shipping
agent for the ship. This provision is in recognition of industry practice of
communicating with ship operators and masters through the shipping
agent.
A system of three maritime security levels will operate according to the
prevailing threat environment, providing direction to maritime industry
participants on the security measures that should be implemented. Maritime
industry participants will be required in their security plans (plans are
covered in Part 3 of the Bill) to include information on the measures to be
undertaken at each level and must implement the measures according to the
security level. The Secretary may also provide specific security directions on
particular measures to be implemented.
This clause provides an overview of each Division in this Part.
This clause provides that the default level is maritime security level 1.
That is, unless the Secretary advises otherwise, maritime security level 1
applies at all times to each:
• security regulated port;
• regulated Australian ship;
• area within a security
regulated port; and
• maritime industry participant.
This clause provides that where there are grounds for raising the security
level to 2 or 3, the Secretary will declare this in writing. A declaration may
apply to one or more ports, regulated Australian ships or class of ships, areas
within a security regulated port, operations within or in connection with a
security regulated port or ports, or maritime industry participants.
The
Secretary may also declare in writing that maritime security level 2 or 3 is in
force for a regulated foreign ship. To clarify, this does not mean that, if a
foreign regulated ship is operating at a higher security level than the port
operator or port facility operator or other maritime industry participant, that
any of these maritime industry participants will be obliged to match the foreign
regulated ships security level. A declaration of security will be required in
such circumstances.
Subclause 22(3) notes that the Secretary must only
make a declaration of maritime security level 2 or 3 when a heightened risk to
maritime transport has been identified and it is subsequently appropriate for
increased security measures to be implemented for the port, ship, area (within a
security regulated port), port facility or participant concerned.
This clause provides that a security level declaration will remain in place
for the port, ship, area or participant concerned until any period specified in
the Secretary’s declaration expires, or the declaration is revoked in
writing by the Secretary.
This clause provides that where the Secretary makes a declaration for a
security regulated port, the declaration applies to each area or security
regulated ship and any operations conducted by a maritime industry participant
within the boundaries of the security regulated port.
This clause provides that where maritime security level 2 or 3 is in force,
any affected maritime industry participant, area, port facility and operations
of the participant, must comply with the corresponding measures set out in the
security plan for that participant, area or operations. Subclause 44(1) states
that it is an offence for a maritime industry participant to fail to comply with
their security plan.
Similarly, where the declaration affects a
regulated Australian ship, the corresponding measures set out in the ship
security plan must be complied with; subclause 63(1) states that it is an
offence for a ship operator to fail to comply with the security plan.
This clause provides that when a security direction is given, the entity to
which the direction is given must comply with the requirements of that
direction, but all other measures remain in place at the existing security
level. For example, if maritime security level 2 is in force and a security
direction is given, security level 2 measures remain in force and the specific
security direction must also be complied with. Where any conflict occurs between
the maritime security level 2 measures and the security direction, the security
direction takes precedence.
This clause describes the manner in which the Secretary is required to
communicate to affected port operators and maritime industry participants the
fact that a maritime security level 2 or 3 declaration has been made.
The Secretary must notify the port operator and maritime industry
participant with a maritime security plan in force of the declaration as soon as
practicable. In turn, the port operator must, as soon as practicable, advise the
following persons of the change in the security level:
• maritime
industry participants covered by the port operator’s plan, or who operate
within the boundaries of the port (for example a tug operator or pilot);
and
• the master of every security regulated ship within the port or
about to enter the port. This will most likely occur when the security regulated
ship confirms with the port operator that they are intending to enter a
port.
Communicating the advice about the security level to be implemented
will be critical to ensuring that all relevant maritime industry participants
operating in the port and ships in or approaching the port have implemented
measures commensurate with the security level, as outlined in each
participant’s security plan. The level of protection implemented by the
measures will reflect the risks faced by each maritime industry participant as
outlined in each participant’s plan. If one or more participants are not
notified of the change in security level, the port may be inadequately
protected.
Clause 28 states that when a declaration of a maritime security level is made
for a security regulated ship, either the ship operator or master of that ship
must be notified by the Secretary. The ship operator may be required to notify
the master.
This clause provides that declarations of a maritime security level made for
an area within a security regulated port must be notified by the Secretary to
maritime industry participants controlling those areas, and the port
operator.
This clause provides that declarations of a maritime security level made for
maritime industry participants must be notified by the Secretary to both the
participant concerned and the port operator of the port in which that
participant conducts operations, if the participant is not the port
operator.
This clause provides that where the Secretary has advised a person that
maritime security level 2 or 3 is in force and the declaration is revoked, he
must, as soon as practicable, notify the person of the revocation. Similarly, if
a port or ship operator has notified a person that security level 2 or 3 is in
force, and the Secretary revokes the declaration, the port or ship operator must
as soon as practicable advise the person of the revocation. Adequate lines of
communication when a maritime security level is revoked are important as
maritime industry participants should not have to have security measures in
place which are not commensurate with the risks faced at a particular
time.
This clause provides that specific requirements relating to the notification
and cancellation of declarations may be prescribed in the regulations. This may
include, for example, requirements for electronic or oral notification.
This clause provides that the Secretary may direct that additional security
measures be undertaken or complied with. These directions are known as
security directions and must be committed in writing before taking
effect. Security directions may be issued by the Secretary only if he or she has
reason to believe that an unlawful interference with maritime transport is
probable or imminent and that specific measures are appropriate to prevent the
unlawful interference from occurring. Security directions are additional to the
measures which maritime industry participants must comply with according to
their approved plans.
Regulations may provide for specific requirements
in relation to the giving of security directions, eg oral or electronic
transmission.
This clause provides that a security direction may include a requirement for
confidentiality. This is intended to preserve the effectiveness of security
measures that may be compromised if the details were known to those intending to
interfere with maritime security. Where a person is advised of the requirement
for confidentiality they have an obligation to protect the content of the
security direction from unauthorised access or disclosure.
This clause sets out the persons to whom security directions may be given.
These may include maritime industry participants and their employees,
passengers, and persons who are otherwise within the boundaries of a security
regulated port. Where the Secretary issues security directions to passengers and
persons other than maritime industry participants, the direction is given if it
is clearly displayed at a place where the direction will be complied
with.
A security direction given to a port operator may require the
operator to communicate all or part of the direction to specified maritime
industry participants who operate within the security regulated port. Failure to
pass the direction on is an offence punishable by 50 penalty units. This is a
strict liability offence. The offence does not apply if the port operator has a
reasonable excuse.
This clause provides that security directions may be given to security
regulated ships, either to the ship operator of the ship, who must pass it on to
the master, or directly to the master of the ship.
Failure by the ship
operator to communicate the direction to the master of the ship is a strict
liability offence punishable by 50 penalty units. The offence does not apply if
the ship operator has a reasonable excuse.
In general, it is envisaged that because security directions are a threat
response mechanism they will need to be in place as soon a practicable. In
practice, the Secretary recognises that the maritime transport industry may
often require time to put the required measures in place. This clause provides
that a security direction comes into force at the time specified in the
direction, although if no time is specified or the specified time is before the
time when the direction is given, the direction comes into force 24 hours after
it is given. Further, if the specified time is seven days or more after the
direction is given, the direction comes into force at the start of that
day.
Security directions remain in force until the Secretary revokes them
or the direction has been in force for 3 months. This requirement ensures that
the security direction is current and appropriate to the circumstances. Any risk
to maritime transport that requires increased security measures that go beyond
three months duration will need to be addressed by changes to maritime security
plans.
This clause provides that a security direction must be revoked if the
unlawful interference, which was the subject of the direction, is no longer
probable or imminent. The Secretary must notify the person to whom the direction
was given of the revocation. Where a direction has been displayed, for example,
to passengers or other persons, the displayed direction must be removed.
This clause provides that it is an offence not to comply with a security
direction that is in force and given to a person. The maximum level of penalty
ranges from 200 penalty units for port operators, ship operators and port
facility operators, 100 penalty units for other maritime industry participants,
and 50 penalty units for any other person.
This clause provides that it is an offence to fail to comply with a
confidentiality requirement set out in a security direction. It is not an
offence if the disclosure is to a court, tribunal or other authority or person
who has the power to require documents or answers to questions (eg. a Royal
Commission). This is a strict liability offence punishable by 20 penalty
units.
Certain maritime industry participants will be required to have maritime
security plans approved by the Secretary. Part 3 of the Bill describes the
requirements for these plans and the processes for approving, revising and
cancelling plans. The security plan will detail the measures that will be
undertaken or implemented in order to prevent unlawful interference with the
participant’s operations having regard to their identified security risks
and specific physical and operational characteristics. In this way, flexibility
is available for individual participants to tailor their security plans
according to their particular needs, risks faced and other
circumstances.
This clause provides a simplified overview of this Part.
This clause provides that the maritime industry participants who must have a
maritime security plan in place are:
• port operators;
• port
facility operators;
• participants of a kind prescribed in the
regulations; and
• particular participants prescribed in the
regulations.
Division 6 of Part 1 deals with the identification of port
operators of security regulated ports. Port facility operators required to have
maritime security plans are those port facility operators located within
security regulated ports, in addition some port service providers whose
operations are not covered in either a port or port facility operators plan may
be required to have a security plan.
This clause makes it an offence for a maritime industry participant to
operate without a maritime security plan in force when one is required.
This clause provides that the purpose of a maritime security plan will be to
detail the measures which the maritime industry participant will implement at
any given security level. In order to protect against unlawful interference with
maritime transport, the participant must ensure that the measures are fully
implemented as set out in the plan. Failure to comply with a maritime security
plan could potentially result in an opportunity for unlawful interference to
occur. Therefore it will be an offence to fail to comply with a plan which is in
force as approved and notified by the Secretary.
This clause provides that where a maritime security plan covers, or may
cover, the activities of another maritime industry participant, that the other
participant is given the relevant parts of the plan. The maritime industry
participants must not hinder or obstruct compliance with the maritime security
plan of another maritime industry participant. For example, a maritime industry
participant (who is not required to have an approved security plan) must take
all reasonable steps to comply with a port facility operator’s approved
security procedures when operating at the port facility’s premises.
Maritime industry participants with security plans in force must not
only be given the relevant parts of another maritime industry
participant’s security plan with which they are required to comply, they
are required to agree, in writing to their activities being covered by another
maritime industry participant’s security plan. This is intended to create
a record of each party’s knowledge of the arrangement and their
obligations under it.
Where a maritime industry participant does obstruct
compliance with another participant’s plan, the participant does not
commit an offence but may be subject to an enforcement order or an injunction.
The objective of this provision is that the participant ceases the conduct which
is obstructing compliance.
This clause provides that the operations of a regulated Australian ship must
not interfere with or obstruct compliance with a maritime security plan. Where
the operations do obstruct compliance, either or both of the ship’s
operator or master may be subject to an enforcement order or an
injunction.
Obligations on regulated foreign ships are dealt with in
Division 2 of Part 5.
This clause provides that a key component of the maritime security plan is
the security assessment of the participant’s operation. The purpose of the
security assessment is to ensure that a risk-based systematic and analytical
process is conducted on the likelihood and consequences of a potential security
incident. The security plan will set out the security activities or measures to
be undertaken or implemented at maritime security levels 1, 2 and 3. These
activities or measures will be informed by the security assessment and will
address the individual circumstances and operational requirements of maritime
industry participants.
The plan must demonstrate that implementation will
contribute towards the achievement of the maritime security outcomes. In
particular, a security plan must provide the contact details of the
participant’s security officer and make provision for the use of
declarations of security. A declaration of security may be required for
specific situations, such as a ship calling at a port when the ship is operating
at a higher level of security than the port.
The Secretary may require
maritime industry participants to take into account certain documents in
completing their security assessments, for example, threat and security
environment information.
The regulations may set out other matters to be
covered in the security assessment, for example the basic elements of security
assessments and the key matters to be covered in security assessment
submissions.
The Department will issue guidance material to assist
maritime industry participants in the preparation of maritime security plans
that should be taken into account when the plan is prepared.
This clause provides that the regulations may set out specific matters that
are to be dealt with in maritime security plans, whether in all plans, plans for
a particular kind of maritime industry participant, or plans for a particular
class of a particular kind of maritime industry participant. For example,
different security requirements may be set out for operators of bulk liquid
facilities than for container terminals.
This clause provides that maritime security plans must be in writing and
prepared according to the requirements prescribed in the regulations.
A
maritime security plan must be accompanied by a map displaying any port security
zones established for the area covered by the plan, and, where any changes to
port security zones are proposed, a map showing the proposed changes. Divisions
3 and 4 of Part 6 deal with maritime security zones.
This clause states that a maritime industry participant wishing to operate
with a maritime security plan may submit the plan to the Secretary for approval.
This provision reflects the procedure to be adopted by a maritime industry
participant that operates within a declared security regulated port and is
required to have a security plan in force.
This clause provides that the Secretary will approve a plan in writing if he
is satisfied that the plan addresses the relevant requirements under Division 4.
If the Secretary is not satisfied, he or she must refuse to approve the plan and
advise the participant in writing of the refusal and outline reasons for the
refusal.
The Secretary is taken to have refused to approve the plan if a
participant has given the Secretary a plan and the Secretary does not provide
any written notice of approval, or refusal to approve, within 90 days after the
plan was submitted. The participant may seek a review of a decision or deemed
decision to refuse to approve a plan. Review mechanisms are detailed in Part
12.
This clause provides that the plan comes into force (ie. the operator
implements the plan and compliance may be enforced) at a time specified in the
notice of approval. If the time specified in the notice is earlier than the time
at which the notice is given, or the notice does not specify a time, the plan is
deemed to come into force when the notice is given.
The plan remains in
force until it is replaced or the approval of the plan is cancelled.
This clause reflects that in changing circumstances, the Secretary is able to
direct a participant to carry out specific variations to a plan. The Secretary
may, by written notice, give a direction to vary where he or she is no longer
satisfied that the plan is adequate for the purposes of Division 4. The directed
variation should address the requirements under Division 4. The notice must
detail what the required variation is, and the timeframe within which the
participant must give the Secretary the varied plan. If the participant does not
give the Secretary the varied plan within the specified period, or within any
further allowed period, the Secretary must cancel the approval of the
plan.
This clause provides that maritime industry participants may also provide
revised plans to the Secretary for approval on their own initiative. Where the
participant wishes to revise the plan, the approval process as described in
clauses 51 and 52 applies. The revised plan, once approved, replaces any other
plan for the participant in force at that time.
This clause provides that the Secretary may direct the participant in writing
to revise the plan (and submit the revised plan for approval) where he or she
believes that the plan no longer adequately addresses the relevant requirements
under Division 4. The direction to revise the plan must include a specified time
period within which the participant must give the Secretary the revised plan. If
the participant does not give the Secretary the revised plan within the
specified time period, or within any further period allowed by the Secretary,
the Secretary must cancel the approval of the plan in writing. This provision
reflects the need to have security plans remain current and responsive to the
security environment during the life of the plan.
This clause requires that plans must be revised every five years, unless the
Secretary has approved a revised plan for the participant within that period. If
the maritime industry participant does not submit a revised plan for approval
(in accordance with the established approval procedures) when the existing plan
has been in force for 5 years, the approval of the existing plan is
automatically cancelled.
This clause provides that a plan may be cancelled if the Secretary believes
that the plan no longer adequately addresses the requirements under Division 4
and that it would not be appropriate to direct either a variation or a revision
of a plan. The Secretary must cancel the approval of the plan in
writing.
This clause provides that a plan may be cancelled when a maritime industry
participant has accumulated a prescribed number of demerit points in respect of
non-compliance with the plan, as described in Division 6 of Part 11. The
Secretary must cancel the approval of the plan in writing.
Where the
Secretary believes it is necessary to cancel a plan due to non-compliance, he or
she may request the participant to show cause why the plan should not be
cancelled.
This clause provides that a maritime industry participant may request the
Secretary in writing to cancel the approval of the participant’s
plan.
This Part deals with the requirement for regulated Australian ships to
have ship security plans and International Ship Security Certificates (ISSCs).
The responsibilities of regulated foreign ships are dealt with in Part
5.
This clause provides a simplified overview of this Part.
This clause provides that regulated Australian ships are required to have
ship security plans in place. Regulated Australian ships are defined in Division
7 of Part 1.
This clause makes it an offence, punishable by a maximum of 200 penalty
units, for a ship operator to operate a regulated Australian ship without a ship
security plan in force, unless the operator has a reasonable excuse.
This clause makes it an offence, punishable by a maximum penalty of 200
penalty units, for a ship operator to operate a regulated Australian ship not in
accordance with the plan, unless the operator has a reasonable excuse.
This clause is intended to prevent the operations of a regulated Australian
ship from interfering with the compliance of a ship security plan of another
ship. Where such obstruction does occur, an enforcement order or injunction may
be sought against the ship operator, the master of the ship, or the maritime
industry participant causing the obstruction.
Clause 65 Maritime
industry participants must not hinder or obstruct compliance with ship security
plans
This clause is intended to prevent the operations of a maritime
industry participant from interfering with the compliance of a ship security
plan. Where such obstruction does occur, the participant may be subject to an
enforcement order or injunction.
This clause provides that a ship security plan must include a security
assessment. The purpose of the security assessment is to ensure that a
risk-based systematic and analytical process is conducted on the likelihood and
consequences of a potential security incident.
The security plan will
set out the security activities or measures to be undertaken or implemented at
maritime security levels 1, 2 and 3. These activities or measures will be
informed by the security assessment and will address the individual
circumstances and operational requirements of the ship. The plan must
demonstrate that implementation will contribute towards the achievement of the
maritime security outcomes.
In particular, a security plan must provide
the contact details of the ship’s security officer and make provision for
the use of declarations of security. A declaration of security may be
required for specific situations, such as a ship visiting a port which is not a
security regulated port or the ship calling at a port when the ship is operating
at a higher level of security than the port.
The Secretary may require
certain documents to be taken into account in completing security assessments,
for example, threat and security environment information.
The regulations
may set out other matters to be covered in the security assessment, for example,
the basic elements of security assessments and the key matters to be covered in
security assessment submissions.
The Department will issue guidance
material to assist in the preparation of ship security plans that should be
taken into account when the plan is prepared.
This clause provides that the regulations may set out specific matters that
are to be dealt with in maritime security plans, whether in all plans, plans for
operators of a particular kind of ship, or plans for operators of a particular
class of a particular kind of ship. For example, different security requirements
may be set out for operators of bulk liquid ships than for container
ships.
This clause provides that ship security plans must be in writing and in a
form prescribed in the regulations.
This clause reflects the process that operators of Australian ships wishing
to operate their ships as security regulated ships will need to prepare a ship
security plan and submit it to the Secretary for approval.
This clause provides that the Secretary will approve a plan in writing if he
or she is satisfied that the plan addresses the relevant requirements under
Division 4. If the Secretary is not satisfied, he or she must refuse to approve
the plan and advise the participant in writing of the refusal and outline
reasons for the refusal.
The Secretary is taken to have refused to
approve the plan if the ship operator has given the Secretary a plan and the
Secretary does not provide any written notice of approval, or refusal to
approve, within 90 days after the plan was submitted.
The ship operator
may seek a review of a decision or deemed decision to refuse to approve (Part 12
refers).
This clause provides that once the plan has been approved, it comes into
force (ie it is operational and compliance may be enforced) at the time
specified in the approval notice. Where the approval notice does not specify a
time, or the time specified is earlier than the time the notice was given, the
plan comes into force when the notice is given.
This clause reflects the potential for changing circumstances and the need
for the Secretary to be able to direct specific variations to a plan. The
Secretary may, by written notice, direct the operator of the ship to vary the
plan if the Secretary is no longer satisfied that the plan adequately addresses
the requirements set out in Division 4. The notice must set out the required
variation and specify the period within which the operator must provide the new
plan. If the operator does not provide a new plan in accordance with the notice
and within the timeframe specified, or any further time allowed by the
Secretary, the Secretary must cancel the approval of the plan.
This clause provides that ship operators may also provide revised plans to
the Secretary for approval on their own initiative. Where the operator wishes to
revise the plan, the approval process as described in clauses 70 and 71 applies.
The revised plan, once approved, replaces any other plan for the ship in force
at that time.
This clause provides that the Secretary may, by written notice, direct the
operator of a security regulated ship to revise the ship security plan if the
Secretary believes that the plan is no longer adequate with regard to the
requirements set out in Division 4. Where the operator does not provide a
revised plan within the specified period, or within any further period allowed
by the Secretary, the Secretary must cancel the approval of the plan.
This clause requires that ship security plans must be revised every five
years, unless the Secretary has approved a revised plan for the participant
within that period. If the ship operator does not submit a revised plan for
approval (in accordance with the established approval procedures) when the
existing plan has been in force for 5 years, the approval of the existing plan
is automatically cancelled.
This clause provides a ship security plan may be cancelled if the Secretary
believes that the plan no longer adequately addresses the requirements under
Division 4 and that it would not be appropriate to direct either a variation or
a revision of a plan.
This clause provides that a ship security plan may be cancelled when a ship
has accumulated a prescribed number of demerit points in respect of
non-compliance with the plan, as described in Division 6 of Part 11. The
Secretary must cancel the approval of the plan in writing.
Where the
Secretary believes it is necessary to cancel a plan due to non-compliance, he or
she may request the participant to show cause why the plan should not be
cancelled.
This clause provides that a ship operator may request the Secretary in
writing to cancel the approval of the ship security plan.
This clause provides that regulated Australian ships will be required to hold
an International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) in order to visit security
regulated ports in Australia. An ISSC will be required for all regulated
Australian ships wishing to visit overseas ports which are regulated by another
SOLAS Contracting Government.
For regulated Australian ships, the
possession of an ISSC will verify that the ship has implemented its approved
security plan.
This clause provides that it will be an offence for the ship operator of a
regulated Australian ship to operate without an ISSC or interim ISSC in force,
unless there is a reasonable excuse.
This clause provides that the process to obtain an ISSC is for the operator
of a regulated Australian ship to apply in accordance with the prescribed
requirements.
This clause provides that the Secretary must issue an ISSC to the ship
operator of a regulated Australian ship if the applicant has a ship security
plan in force (which has been approved in accordance with the provisions under
Division 5), and the ship has been ISSC verified.
ISSC verification forms part of the process for the issuing of the ISSC. This
clause provides that following application for the ISSC, the ship will be
ISSC verified by a maritime security inspector in accordance with
procedures determined in writing by the Secretary. The verification will signify
that the ship meets the requirements determined in writing by the Secretary, and
an ISSC will be issued. Generally speaking, the maritime security inspector will
inspect the ship to verify that the ship is operating in accordance with the
procedures set out in its approved ship security plan.
Subclause 83 (3)
provides that if an ISSC is in force and a maritime security inspector finds
that the ship does not meet the Secretary’s requirements for ISSC
verification, the ship is no longer ISSC verified. The inspector may allow a
period of time for the ship to rectify compliance with the requirements for
verification.
This clause provides that an ISSC comes into force when it is issued and will
remain in force until:
• cancelled by the Secretary; or
• the
ship operator is no longer the operator of that ship; or
• five years
expire after the ISSC was issued.
This clause provides that the Secretary must cancel an ISSC if the ship no
longer has a security plan in force (ie. if the security plan has been
cancelled), or the ship no longer meets the requirements for ISSC
verification.
This clause provides that an interim ISSC may be issued by the Secretary if
the ship operator has applied for an ISSC, has a security plan in place but has
not yet been ISSC verified, and the Secretary believes that the ship would be
ISSC verified if it were to be inspected.
To facilitate the transfer of
ships from one operator to another, interim ISSCs may be issued to a ship
operator who has become the operator of a regulated Australian ship which held
an ISSC before the transfer of operations.
Interim ISSCs remain in force
for a period specified in the interim ISSC but not exceeding six months.
This clause makes it an offence punishable by a maximum 50 penalty units for
a master of a regulated Australian ship to engage in conduct which suggests that
an ISSC or interim ISSC is in force for the ship when this is not the case. The
offence also applies if the false or misleading conduct is made to another SOLAS
Contracting Government.
These clauses provide for the delegation of any of the Secretary’s
powers and functions under Part 4 to a person satisfying prescribed criteria and
engaged by a recognised security organisation. A recognised security
organisation will be an organisation determined in writing by the Secretary.
This provision is to allow for suitably qualified organisations to carry out the
functions of approving ship security plans, ISSC verification and issuing ISSCs.
The Secretary may choose to delegate all or any of these functions. For example,
it may be the case that a recognised security organisation is authorised to
carry out ISSC verifications but that the Secretary continues to issue the ISSC
on the advice of the recognised security organisation. Clause 89 provides in
particular that the Secretary may authorise a person to conduct inspections for
ISSC verification purposes. That person is considered to be a maritime security
inspector for the purposes of subclause 83(1).
For the time being, the
Australian Government intends that the Secretary will exercise all of the
functions and powers described in this Part and will not delegate any functions
to a recognised security organisation. Such delegation may be required in the
future and this Division has been included in the Bill to allow for that, if
required.
This clause provides a simplified overview of this Part.
This clause requires that the ship operator for a regulated foreign ship must
have a valid International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) or an approved ISSC
equivalent for the ship. The ship must also carry the prescribed ship security
records.
A valid ISSC will be issued to a foreign ship by or on behalf of
its flag state in accordance with that state’s acceptance of the ISPS
Code. ISSCs may be issued by another flag state or a recognised security
organisation (such as classification societies), where for example a foreign
state has delegated this function to an RSO or a flag state is not a signatory
to the SOLAS Convention.
The Secretary may approve in writing a
certification to be an approved ISSC equivalent. The provision will facilitate
the entry into Australian regulated ports of ships that meet ISPS Code security
standards but have not been issued with an ISSC.
The master of a
regulated foreign ship must be able to show the ISSC or ISSC equivalent and
other ship security records to Australian authorities. This is likely to occur
during port inspections but may also occur at any time while the ship is in
Australian territorial waters.
If the ship operator fails to have the
required ship security records on-board the master or the ship operator may be
given a control direction by the Secretary under clause 99.
This clause compels masters of regulated foreign ships to provide certain
security information prior to their arrival in Australian waters or entry into a
port, as part of pre-arrival reporting procedures.
The regulations will
prescribe the requirements for the provision of pre-arrival information
including the information to be provided, to whom, when, the circumstances, and
the form and manner in which this information is to be given. The regulations
may prescribe that different pre-arrival information is to be provided before
entering different places or areas within Australia.
If the master fails
to comply with this provision the Secretary may under clause 99 give a control
direction to the master or the ship operator.
This clause provides that the master of a regulated foreign ship must allow a maritime security inspector to board the ship for inspection in accordance with the powers of a maritime security inspector set out in Division 2 of Part 8 of the Bill. For clarity this clause provides that the master must provide the ship security records to an inspector when requested to do so. If the master does not allow an inspector to inspect the ship then the master, or the ship operator, may under clause 99 be given a control direction by the Secretary.
This clause sets out a number of security measures that regulated foreign
ships must comply with when in Australian waters. The ship must be at security
level 1 unless otherwise declared by the Secretary. If the Secretary declares
that security level 2 applies to a security regulated port a foreign ship in
that port must implement ISPS level 2 measures. ISPS level 2 measures are
measures that should, under the ISPS Code, be implemented when maritime security
level 2 is in force. The ship specific measures to be implemented by the ship at
ISPS level 2 will be contained in the ship’s security plan, as approved by
its flag state (country of ship registration). Similar requirements apply if the
Secretary declares that security level 3 applies to a port.
The provision
also acknowledges that a ship may have been directed by its flag state to
implement a higher security level than would otherwise apply under this clause.
In these circumstances, the ship must comply with the directions received from
its flag state.
If a foreign regulated ship does not implement security
measures appropriate to the security level declared by the Secretary the ship
operator for the ship or the ship’s master may be given a control
direction by the Secretary under clause 99.
This clause defines that ISPS level 1, 2 and 3 measures applicable at
security levels 1, 2 and 3 respectively are those that should be implemented as
provided in the ISPS Code. The types of measures to be implemented are described
in general terms in the ISPS Code. Foreign regulated ships with ISSCs will have
details of specific security measures to be implemented at these security levels
in their individual ship security plans.
This clause states that if the Secretary gives a security direction to a
regulated foreign ship the ship must comply with this direction. If the ship
does not comply, the ship operator or master may be given a control direction
under clause 99.
In addition to the control direction, the master of the
ship and the ship operator may incur a penalty for failing to comply with a
security direction under clause 39. The penalty for a ship operator is 200
penalty units and 50 penalty units for a master. This is an offence of strict
liability. The penalty does not apply, however, if the person has a reasonable
excuse.
This clause provides that a regulated foreign ship must not operate so as to
compromise compliance with a maritime security plan of a maritime industry
participant or a ship security plan of an Australian regulated ship. If the
operations do compromise compliance, the ship operator or the master of the
foreign regulated ship may be given a control direction under clause 99.
This clause provides that if the master of a foreign regulated ship has
received notice from the Secretary or port operator that maritime security level
2 or 3 is in place for the ship or a control direction has been given to the
ship, and the master does not acknowledge receipt of such notice or direction to
the Secretary the master commits an offence. This is an offence of strict
liability.
Similar offences may also apply to the operator of the foreign
regulated ship.
This clause provides the major regulatory powers over regulated foreign
ships. Under this clause the Secretary may give control directions to the ship
operator or master of a regulated foreign ship to either control the movement of
the ship or require the master or operator to take specific action or refrain
from specific action. The Secretary may only give a control direction if is
required to ensure compliance with the obligation imposed on regulated foreign
ships under the Bill or in respect of a special measure to enhance maritime
security as set out in Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention. For example, if a
master fails to provide a valid ISSC for a ship the ship may be denied entry
into an Australian port.
Control directions include, but are not limited
to:
• removing the ship from Australian waters;
• removing the
ship from a security regulated port;
• moving the ship to another
location within the port;
• holding the ship in a certain position for
a specified period or until a specified event occurs;
• taking
particular actions on board the ship;
• allowing a maritime security
inspector on board the ship to inspect the ship or the ship security records
carried by the ship.
It should be noted that authority to remove a ship
from Australian waters is provided for in Article 25 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The Secretary may not issue a direction
requiring the payment of money other than an amount of money that is already
recoverable at law. The clause also provides that a control direction is not a
valid direction unless the Secretary has committed it in writing, although the
regulations may provide the method or circumstances in which a direction is
given, for example orally or electronically.
This clause provides that if a foreign regulated ship fails to comply with a
control direction, an injunction may be sought to compel compliance by the ship
operator or master
This Part make provisions for the establishment of maritime security
zones within the boundaries of security regulated ports. These zones may be
subject to tighter access control arrangements than other parts of the port. The
intention is to prevent the possibility of unlawful interference with maritime
transport by developing a system designed to deter and detect unauthorised entry
and unauthorised carriage of weapons and prohibited items into maritime security
zones. This is one of the key elements in the national maritime transport
security framework being established by this Bill.
This clause provides a simplified overview of this Part.
This clause allows the Secretary to establish one or more port security zones
within a security regulated port. The zones must be of a type prescribed in the
regulations. The Secretary is obliged to give the port operator of the security
regulated port a written notice about the establishment of port security zones.
The notice must include a map of the port with the boundaries of the zones. The
Secretary must also notify each maritime industry participant (other than the
port operator) who controls an area affected by the zone. The notification must
include a map that shows the boundaries of the zones.
In practice, most
port security zones will be established at the request of a port or port
facility operator and the operator will include a map of the areas to be
designated as port security zones in the port or port facility security
plan.
This clause provides that the regulations may prescribe different types of
port security zones. This will provide flexibility to specify particular types
of zones to meet the needs of a diverse industry. For example, there could be
port facility restricted access zones, cleared zones, critical equipment zones,
cargo handling zones, etc.
Subclause 103(2) lists the purposes for which
different types of port security zones may be prescribed. These include, but are
not limited to, controlling movement within a port, restricting access to
certain areas within a port, establishing cleared areas (eg for screened
passengers) in ports, preventing interference with ships, and ensuring the
security around areas of the port considered critical for the safe operation of
a port or ship.
Port Facility
eg.
Cruise ship terminal
Could include, for example intra-state operations OR naval base
Common user berth with international
plus inter and
intra-state operations
Port Facility
eg.
Bulk Liquid Facility,
common user
berth
fishing vessels/ local marina
Bulk Liquid Storage
Tug Berth
Ship Security
zones
May be permanent (around facilities)
or temporary (around ships). Identified in the Port Security
Plan.
On Board security
Zones
May be cleared areas to facilitate
passenger screening or zones around critical parts of the
ship.
Will be identified in the ship
Security Plan for Australian regulated ships
Container X Ray Facility
Customs bonded area
Channel
Boundary of security regulated
port
‘an area of land or water ... for
use wholly or partly in connection with the loading, unloading, maintenance or
provisioning of ships’.
Must be published in
the Gazette
Anchorage or off-shore load/unload
Port Security
Zones
Allow additional access control
requirements for sensitive zones, and provide additional powers over the people
and objects in the zones. Identified in the Port and Port Facility security
plans.
Will include ‘cleared
areas’ to facilitate passenger screening and zones around critical
installations.
Must be declared in writing by
the Secretary.
washing facility
AQIS container
Cleared area
Port Facility
eg.
Container terminal
Contingency plans
•
Training/ exercises
•
Access control
•
areas
Restricted shipboard
•
Ships
•
Contingency plans
•
Training/ exercises
•
measures
Additional security
•
Port Security Committee
•
Cargo/ Stores handling
•
Access control
•
Exclusion zones
•
Clred zones
•
Restrcted zones
•
Security controlled area
•
Ports
ConcepPort ts:
This clause provides that when establishing a port security zone the
Secretary must have regard to the purpose of the zone, and take into account the
physical and operational features of the port and the views of the port operator
and each person who controls an area of land (including any buildings on the
land) that is to be included in the zone.
This clause provides that the regulations may prescribe requirements in
relation to port security zones to safeguard against unlawful interference with
maritime transport. The reference to unlawful interference with maritime
transport limits the extent of requirements that can be prescribed by
regulations made under this clause.
The regulations may prescribe issues
such as access control, identification and marking of zones, regulate movement
in a zone, the integrity of the zones and the management of people and goods
including suspicious and abandoned items. The intention is that the regulations
will as far as possible be outcomes based. There will be exceptions to this, for
example national standards will be set for passenger screening.
Subclause
105(3) provides that the regulations may prescribe penalties. The penalties for
an offence committed by a port operator, ship operator or port facility operator
must not exceed 200 penalty units. The penalties for an offence committed by
other maritime industry participants may not exceed 100 penalty units. An
offence committed by any other person may not exceed 50 penalty units. This
graduated penalty range reflects the different levels of responsibility for
maritime security and the size of the penalties reflects the seriousness and
importance of maintaining the security of Australia's maritime industry.
This division allows the Secretary to declare security zones within a
security regulated port that may operate around a security regulated ship in
order to protect against unlawful interference with maritime transport.
Unauthorised persons, vehicles and vessels must remain outside of the ship
security zones.
The Secretary may declare a ship security zone around a security regulated
ship while the ship is within a security regulated port, including while it is
moving within the port. The zone must of a type prescribed in clause 107. The
purpose of ship security zones is to protect ships, they do not restrict people
or things on-board the ship.
The Secretary is obliged to give a written
notice to the ship operator or the master of the ship and the relevant port
operator about the declaration of the ship security zone.
In practice,
for example, when a port is expecting a ship which is considered to be of a high
security risk, the port operator may request the Secretary declare a ship
security zone around that ship.
Clause 107 Types of ship security
zones
This clause provides that regulations may prescribe different types
of ship security zones. For example, there could be flexible zones (ie. no fixed
dimensions to suit narrow port entrances), rigid zones (ie. fixed dimensions),
dangerous cargo zones, limited time period zones, special access zones,
etc.
Subclause 107(2) lists the purposes for which different types of
ship security zones may be prescribed. These include, but are not limited to,
limiting contact with other security regulated ships, controlling movement of
ships and other things near ships, establishing cleared areas around ships,
preventing interference with ships and those people or goods about to board
ships.
This clause provides that when declaring a ship security zone the Secretary
must have regard to the purpose of the zone and take into account the
operational features of the ship and the existing physical and operational
features of the port or ports and port services to be used by the ship.
This clause provides that the regulations may prescribe requirements in
relation to ship security zones to safeguard against unlawful interference with
maritime transport. The reference to unlawful interference with maritime
transport limits the extent of requirements that can be prescribed by
regulations made under this clause.
The regulations may prescribe issues
such as access control, identification or marking of zones, regulating movement
in a zone, integrity of the zone and the management of people and goods
including suspicious and abandoned items. The regulations will be as far as
possible outcomes based.
Subclause 109(3) provides that the regulations
may prescribe penalties. The penalties for an offence committed by a port
operator, ship operator or port facility operator must not exceed 200 penalty
units. The penalties for an offence committed by other maritime industry
participants may not exceed 100 penalty units. An offence committed by any other
person may not exceed 50 penalty units. This graduated penalty range reflects
the different levels of responsibility for maritime security, and the size of
the penalties reflects the seriousness and importance of maintaining the
security of Australia's maritime industry.
This Division allows the Secretary to establish on-board security zones
on regulated Australian ships in order to protect against unlawful interference
with maritime transport. Additional security requirements will apply to the
different types of zones and unauthorised people and things must remain outside
of the zones.
This clause provides that the Secretary may establish one or more on-board
security zones on a regulated Australian ship. The zone must of a type
prescribed in clause 111. The Secretary is obliged to write to the ship operator
of the ship about the establishment of the zone or zones on-board the ship. The
notice must identify clearly which areas and parts are to be covered by the
on-board security zone or zones.
This clause provides that the regulations may prescribe different types of
on-board security zones. For example, on board a passenger ship there may be
restricted access zones to operational areas such as engine rooms, communication
rooms, etc.
Subclause 111(2) lists the purposes for which different types
of on-board security zones may be prescribed. These include, but are not limited
to, controlling access, maintaining security, establishing cleared areas,
preventing interference with the operation of ships and people or goods
involved.
This clause provides that when establishing an on-board security zone on a
regulated Australian ship the Secretary must have regard to the purpose of the
zone and take into account the operational features of the ship and the views of
the ship operator for the ship.
In practice, a ship operator will
request on-board security zones be established.
This clause provides that the regulations may prescribe requirements in
relation to on-board security zones to safeguard against unlawful interference
with maritime transport. The reference to unlawful interference with maritime
transport limits the extent of requirements that can be prescribed by
regulations made under this clause.
The regulations may prescribe issues
such as access control, identification and marking of zones, regulation of
movement in a zone, and the management, integrity of the zone and the management
of people and goods including suspicious and abandoned items. The regulations
will be as far as possible outcomes based, although there may be exceptions to
this.
Subclause 113(3) provides that the regulations may prescribe
penalties. The penalties for an offence committed by a port operator, ship
operator or port facility operator must not exceed 200 penalty units. The
penalties for an offence committed by other maritime industry participants may
not exceed 100 penalty units. An offence committed by any other person may not
exceed 50 penalty units. This graduated penalty range reflects the different
levels of responsibility for maritime security and the size of the penalties
reflects the seriousness and importance of maintaining the security of
Australia's maritime industry.
This Part makes provision for the screening and clearing of people,
goods, vehicles and vessels for unauthorised weapons and prohibited items.
Screening will assist in maintaining the security integrity of a security
regulated port or a security regulated ship.
This clause provides a simplified overview of this Part.
This Division establishes rules for screening and clearing people, goods,
vehicles and vessels prior to entry into a cleared zone in a security regulated
port or on-board a security regulated ship.
The process of screening
contains three elements:
• the process to be undertaken
(screening);
• the decision made (ie cleared or not cleared);
and
• if cleared, the maintenance of the cleared state.
The Bill
separates the screening and clearing of people, goods, vehicles and vessels to
allow regulations to be made that specifically deal with the different
treatments that are required for effective screening outcomes for each. For
example, goods being loaded onto a passenger ship would be screened and cleared
in a different way to passengers.
This Part also contemplates that a
small number of people or classes of people will not need to be screened or may
need to enter a cleared area or zone other than through a screening point.
Screening is intended to be non-intrusive and consensual. The purpose of
screening is to meet maritime security outcomes and promote public confidence in
the system aimed at preventing unlawful interference with maritime
transport.
This clause provides that a person is screened when they undergo screening.
The regulations made under clause 119 will set out requirements for screening
prior to entry into a cleared area or zone within a security regulated port or
on-board a ship. Screened refers to the outcome of
screening.
Subclause 115(2) outlines the three ways to receive clearance.
Firstly, the standard method is for a person to be screened and receive
clearance from a screening officer. A person receives clearance if they are
allowed to proceed through a screening point. Secondly, a person may pass
through a screening point without being screened if the regulations provide or
the Secretary has permitted this action in writing. Paragraph 115(5)(a)
clarifies that the Secretary’s written notice may provide that a class of
persons may pass through the screening point without being screened, for example
certain Customs officers on duty at ports. Thirdly, a person can enter a cleared
area or board a cleared vessel through an entry point other than a screening
point if the regulations provide that this person may enter in this way or the
Secretary has given written permission that the person may enter in this way.
Paragraph 115(5)(b) clarifies that the Secretary’s written notice may
provide that a class of persons may enter a cleared area or board a cleared
vessel other than through the screening point, for example Australian Defence
Force members on duty.
Subclause 115(3) states that a person will be
considered cleared if the person has received clearance in accordance with
subclause 115(2), and the person has been in a cleared area or on a cleared
vessel at all times since receiving clearance. In addition, subclause 115(4)
emphasises that the cleared person will be taken to be in a cleared area if the
person is under the supervision or control prescribed in regulations. This will
also allow for the screening of people offsite, for example the transporting of
cleared passengers from an airport to a passenger ship.
It is essential
that cleared persons retain that status and are kept separate from those persons
not cleared. If this separation did not occur the integrity of the clearance
system, the ability of screening officers to undertake their screening duties
and the security of the vessel to be boarded or the cleared area to be entered
may be compromised.
These clauses have equivalent provisions for goods, vehicles and vessels as
those mentioned above for people. The same principles and grounds for screening
and clearance apply.
Note: the term goods has its natural meaning and
includes cargo, baggage and stores.
This clause provides the framework for regulations to be made for screening,
receiving clearance, and the circumstances in which persons, goods, vehicles or
vessels are required to be cleared. These regulations are for the purposes of
safeguarding against unlawful interference with maritime
transport.
Subclause 119(2) limits the matters for which regulations
under subclause 119(1) can be made. Most of these are self-explanatory and
typical for a screening process, such as who can conduct screening, what things
are to be detected by screening, the circumstances in which people, ship’s
stores, baggage, cargo, vehicles and vessels must be cleared before being taken
on-board another vessel or into a cleared area within a security regulated port,
where screening is done, etc.
It should be noted that regulations made
under Division 6 of Part 8 will prescribe the training and qualifications that
screening officers must have as well as the form, issue and use of identify
cards.
Full compliance is expected from those maritime industry
participants who will need to screen people, goods, vehicles and vessels.
Subclause 119(4) provides that the regulations may prescribe penalties. The
penalties for an offence committed by a port operator, ship operator or port
facility operator must not exceed 200 penalty units. The penalties for an
offence committed by other maritime industry participants may not exceed 100
penalty units. An offence committed by any other person may not exceed 50
penalty units. This graduated penalty range reflects the different levels of
responsibility for maritime security and the size of the penalties reflects the
seriousness and importance of maintaining the security of Australia's maritime
industry.
The control of weapons within certain areas related to maritime transport
is an important aspect of preventing unlawful interference with maritime
transport. Although it may be ordinarily permitted to carry certain weapons in a
public place, it may be necessary for the purpose of preventing unlawful
interference with maritime transport to prohibit the possession of weapons in
certain areas of ports and on-board ships.
A weapon is a firearm or a
thing prescribed in the regulations to be a weapon. Different areas within a
security regulated port may have different weapon restrictions.
Clause 120 makes it an offence for a person to have a weapon in a maritime
security zone, unless the person is a law enforcement officer, a member of the
Australian Defence Force who is on duty, or a person authorised by the
regulations or in writing by the Secretary to have a weapon in the maritime
security zone, for example a class of employees who require knives to perform
their duties. Reference to a zone limits the application of this
clause.
This offence may be prosecuted as either a strict liability or
general offence. The strict liability offence carries a penalty of 100 penalty
units. The general offence, where a fault element must be proved, has a maximum
of 7 years’ imprisonment, for example a person who intentionally carries
or is reckless as to the fact that he or she is in an area where carriage of a
weapon is not permitted. The higher penalty for a general offence recognises
that intentional conduct of this type warrants more serious punishment than
inadvertent breaches of the offence provisions.
Clause 122 makes it an offence for a person to possess a weapon when passing
through a screening point, unless the person is a law enforcement officer or
authorised by the regulations or in writing by the Secretary to do so.
Consistent with clause 120 the general offence carries a higher penalty than the
strict liability offence.
These clauses provide offences for the carriage or possession of accessible
weapons on board Australian regulated ships, if the person is not a law
enforcement officer or the carriage or possession is not authorised by the
regulations or the Secretary and the weapon is not under the control of the
master of the ship. Consistent with clause 120 the general offence carries a
higher penalty than the strict liability offence.
This clause makes it an offence for a person to fail to comply with any
conditions contained in the authorisation or permission to carry or possess a
weapon in a maritime security zone or on board a regulated Australian ship. This
clause reinforces the principle that weapons are generally prohibited in certain
areas of ports and on board ships and that an authorisation or permission is
given in limited circumstances. The inability to enforce compliance with
conditions would undermine the ability to give authorisations and permissions.
This is a strict liability offence. The offence does not apply if the person has
a reasonable excuse.
This clause clarifies that the Secretary may give permission in relation to
particular conduct relating to the carriage or possession of weapons by giving
permission to a class of persons.
This clause provides that regulations may be made to prescribe requirements
for the purposes of safeguarding against unlawful interference with maritime
transport in relation to the carriage and use of weapons in maritime security
zones or on board regulated Australian ships, including penalties for offences
against those regulations. The regulations may set out the detail of
authorisations for the carriage of weapons (for example specifying the
circumstances), procedures for dealing with a person who is suspected of an
offence under this Division, and procedures for handling a surrendered
weapon.
This Division sets out similar offences for prohibited items to those in
Division 3 in relation to weapons. This Division recognises that many items,
which are not considered to be weapons, could be used to commit an act of
unlawful interference with maritime transport even though they were not
manufactured for that purpose.
As different areas within a security
regulated port may be more security sensitive than other areas they may have
different prohibited item restrictions. The penalties that relate to prohibited
items are lower than those for weapons to reflect the relative seriousness of
the offences.
This clause makes it an offence for a person to have a prohibited item in a
maritime security zone, unless the person is a law enforcement officer, a
maritime security guard, a maritime security inspector, a member of the
Australian Defence Force who is on duty, or a person authorised by the
regulations or in writing by the Secretary to have the prohibited item in the
maritime security zone.
This offence may be prosecuted as either a strict
liability or general offence. The strict liability offence carries a penalty of
20 penalty units. In the case of the general offence, a fault element must be
proved. That is, a person who intentionally carries a weapon or is reckless as
to the fact that he or she is in an area where this is not permitted faces a
maximum of 2 years’ imprisonment. The higher penalty recognises that
intentional conduct of this type warrants more serious punishment than
inadvertent breaches of the offence provision.
This clause makes it an offence for a person to possess a prohibited item
when passing through a screening point, unless the person is a law enforcement
officer, a maritime security guard, or a maritime security inspector, or a
person authorised by the regulations or in writing by the Secretary to do so.
The general offence carries a higher penalty than the strict liability offence
for the reason discussed in clause 127.
These clauses provide offences for the carriage or possession of accessible
prohibited items on board Australian regulated ships, if the person is not a law
enforcement officer, a maritime security guard or a maritime security inspector,
or the carriage or possession is not authorised by the regulations or the
Secretary and the prohibited item is not under the control of the master of the
ship. Consistent with clause 127 the general offence carries a higher penalty
than the strict liability offence.
This clause makes it an offence for a person to fail to comply with any
conditions contained in the authorisation or permission to carry or possess a
prohibited item in a maritime security zone or on board a regulated Australian
ship. This clause reinforces the principle that prohibited items are generally
not allowed in certain security sensitive areas of ports and on-board ships and
that an authorisation or permission is given in limited circumstances. The
inability to enforce compliance with conditions would undermine the ability to
give authorisations and permissions. This is a strict liability offence. The
offence does not apply if the person has a reasonable excuse.
Clause 132 clarifies that the Secretary may give permission in relation to
particular conduct concerning the carriage or possession of a prohibited item by
giving permission to a class of persons.
This clause provides that regulations may be made to prescribe requirements
for the purpose of safeguarding against unlawful interference with maritime
transport in relation to the carriage and use of prohibited items in maritime
security zones or on board regulated Australian ships, including penalties for
offences against those regulations. Regulations may set out the detail of
authorisations for the carriage of prohibited items (for example, specifying the
circumstances), procedures for dealing with a person who is suspected of an
offence under this Division, and procedures for handling a surrendered
item.
This Part deals with the powers, functions and responsibilities of
certain persons under this Bill in preventing unlawful interference with
maritime transport. Some categories of officials will be responsible for
checking the compliance of regulated entities with their obligations, other
officials will be responsible for specific duties under the Bill. In some
instances, officials will require specific qualifications and meet other
requirements.
This clause provides a simplified overview of this Part.
This Division sets out who may be a maritime security inspector, their
powers and the limits on their powers. The primary role of maritime security
inspectors is to conduct ISSC verifications and to audit and investigate the
compliance of maritime industry participants with the Bill. In order to do this
effectively, they require a number of powers, including the power to enter
premises and ships and inspect documents.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
This clause provides that the Secretary may appoint an Australian Public
Service (APS) employee of the Department, a law enforcement officers or persons
satisfying criteria prescribed in the regulations to be maritime security
inspectors. Appointments must be in writing.
This clause provides that the Secretary must issue each maritime security
inspector with an identity card. The requirements in relation to identity cards,
including their form, issue and use and use in combination with another identity
card will be prescribed in regulations.
Clause 138 provides that a maritime security inspector may inspect a
regulated Australian ship for ISSC verification including the inspection of ship
security records and other security related documents on board the ship. The
purpose of the inspection is to determine whether the ship has implemented
security measures in order to meet the requirements for ISSC verification.
Clause 83 sets out those requirements.
Subclause 138(2) states that the
maritime security inspector’s powers are limited to the extent that the
inspector must not subject a person to greater indignity than is reasonable or
necessary.
Clause 139 provides a maritime security inspector with a number of powers he
or she may exercise in determining whether a person or ship is complying with
the Bill and if non-compliance is suspected to investigate a possible
contravention. These powers are essential to the ability of the Secretary to
monitor and investigate compliance with the Bill and fulfil his or her role as a
regulator. This clause gives maritime security inspectors the ability to board
and inspect any part of a security regulated ship, inspect and photograph
equipment, observe and record operating procedures (including training drills),
discuss operating procedures with crew or other maritime industry participants
(eg port service providers) and inspect and copy a range of security related
documents.
Subclause 139(3) states that the maritime security
inspector’s powers are limited to the extent that the inspector must not
subject a person to greater indignity than is reasonable or necessary.
This clause limits when a maritime security inspector may exercise his or her
powers on-board a ship. In the operational areas of a ship a maritime security
inspector may exercise his or her powers at any time and without notice if the
ship is within the boundaries of a security regulated port. However, if the
power is to be exercised outside those boundaries, reasonable notice must be
given to the ship operator or the master of the ship.
Subclause 140(5)
defines an operational area on a ship as one which is not a private living
area.
In recognition that people live on-board ships subclause 140(2) and
(3) specify that a maritime security inspector may not inspect private living
areas of a ship unless both the master and any person or persons who occupy the
private living area consent to the inspection, or a warrant has been issued in
accordance with clause 144. In any inspection of a private living area the
maritime security inspector must be accompanied by the master of the ship or a
person nominated by the master.
Subclause 140(4) defines a private living
area on a ship as an area which is used for the purposes of providing
accommodation for passengers or crew of the ship and to which all crew or
passengers do not have general access.
This clause provides a maritime security inspector with a number of powers he
or she may exercise in determining whether a person or ship is complying with
the Bill and if non-compliance is suspected investigate a possible
contravention. These powers are essential to the ability of the Secretary to
monitor and investigate compliance with the Bill and fulfil his or her role as a
regulator. This clause gives maritime security inspectors the ability to enter
and inspect any area, building, vehicle or vessel under the control of a
maritime industry participant. If a maritime industry participant operates from
a residence the inspectors powers of entry are limited to that part of the
residence that are used for those operations. The maritime industry inspector
may also inspect and photograph equipment, observe operating procedures
(including training drills), discuss operating procedures with employees or
other maritime industry participants (eg port service providers), inspect and
copy documents and operate equipment in order to access a document or record
kept by a maritime industry participant.
Subclause 141(3) provides that
the maritime security inspector’s powers are limited to the extent that
the inspector must not subject a person to greater indignity than is reasonable
or necessary.
This clause provides that a maritime security inspector may exercise the
powers in clause 141 within the boundaries of a security regulated port at any
time and without notice. However, if the power is to be exercised outside those
boundaries, reasonable notice must be given to the maritime industry
participant.
This clause makes is an offence for a person to engage in conduct which
hinders or obstructs a maritime security inspector from exercising the powers
set out in this Division. This is a strict liability offence. The offence does
not apply if the person has a reasonable excuse. The maximum penalty is 50
penalty units.
This clause enables a maritime security inspector to apply to a magistrate
for a warrant to inspect a private living area on-board a security regulated
ship. The clause provides that a magistrate may only issue a warrant if he or
she is satisfied that the warrant is necessary for one of the purposes listed.
The magistrate may require further information concerning the reason why a
warrant is sought. A warrant must stipulate the terms, time, day and purpose for
which the warrant is issued.
Clause 145 sets out the requirements for the issuing of an urgent warrant by
a magistrate. In an urgent situation a maritime security inspector may apply for
a warrant by phone, fax or other electronic means. The clause provides that
certain requirements are to be met by the maritime security inspector and the
magistrate in such circumstances. These requirements are in place both to
facilitate the provision of a warrant in urgent circumstances and to safeguard
that proper procedure and accountability requirements are met.
This Division enables the Secretary to appoint officers of certain
Commonwealth agencies as duly authorised officers to perform limited functions
associated with the checking of compliance by security regulated ship with the
Bill.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
This clause provides that the Secretary may appoint a person who is a customs
officer, ADF member, immigration officer, AMSA surveyor, or quarantine officer
to be a duly authorised officer for the purposes of the Bill. Appointments must
be in writing.
This clause limits the powers of a duly authorised officer to operational
areas of a ship for the purposes of determining whether a person or ship is
complying with the Bill.
Subclause 148(2) states that, among others, a
duly authorised officer may board a security regulated ship and inspect its
operational areas (including restricted access areas), observe and record
operating procedures, and inspect and copy security related documents and
operate equipment in order to access such documents.
Subclause 148(3)
provides that a duly authorised officer may exercise the powers mentioned in
this clause within the boundaries of a security regulated port at any time and
without notice. However, if the power is to be exercised outside those
boundaries, reasonable notice must be given to the ship operator or master of
the ship.
Subclause 148(4) states that the duly authorised
officer’s powers are limited to the extent that the officer must not
subject a person to greater indignity than is reasonable or necessary.
This clause makes it an offence for a person to engage in conduct which
hinders or obstructs a duly authorised officer from exercising the powers set
out in this Division. This is a strict liability offence. The offence does not
apply if the person has a reasonable excuse. The maximum penalty is 50 penalty
units.
Law enforcement officers are granted relatively extensive powers because
it is recognised that there may be circumstances where coercive powers are
necessary to safeguard against unlawful interference with maritime transport.
Police and certain customs officers, due to the nature and level of their
training and expertise, are seen as the most appropriate people to exercise
coercive powers in security regulated ports and on board security regulated
ships.
The powers set out in this Bill are in addition to any powers that
a law enforcement officer may have apart from this Bill. They are not intended
in any way to limit those other powers.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
This clause provides that the law enforcement officers who will be able to
exercise powers under this Bill are members of the Australian Federal Police,
the police force of a State or Territory and customs officers prescribed in the
regulations.
This clause provides that law enforcement officers will be able to enter, and
remain in, any part of a security regulated port at any time. However, before
entering a part of a security regulated port that is under the control of a
maritime industry participant (for example a container terminal) the law
enforcement officer must identify himself or herself to the maritime industry
participant and inform the participant why they are entering that part of the
security regulated port.
These clauses provide that a law enforcement officer may stop and search any
person, vehicle or vessel within a maritime security zone or on-board a security
regulated ship if the officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to do so
to safeguard against unlawful interference with maritime transport. The officer
must identify himself or herself to the person being stopped, tell the person
why he or she is being stopped, and if a search is to take place, the reasons
for the search. The power is limited to ordinary searches and frisk searches,
which have the same meaning as in the Crimes Act 1914. Where a vehicle or
vessel is not stopped by the officer, the officer must, if the person in control
of the vehicle or vessel is present, identify himself or herself and tell the
person the reasons for the search.
It is an offence for a person to
hinder or obstruct a law enforcement officer from exercising these powers. The
maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for 2 years.
This clause provides that a person may be asked to leave a maritime security
zone or a security regulated ship if the law enforcement officer has reason to
suspect that the person is committing, or has committed, an offence against this
Bill. Failure to comply with the request to leave is a strict liability offence
punishable by a maximum of 50 penalty units.
This clause provides that a law enforcement officer may remove a person from
a ship or zone, without any more force than necessary and without subjecting the
person to greater indignity than necessary or reasonable, if the person fails to
comply with a request to leave. This clause recognises that a balance must be
struck between the legitimate use of force to protect maritime transport
security and the civil liberties of individuals.
These clauses provide that if a law enforcement officer has reason to suspect
that a vehicle or vessel in or near a maritime security zone presents a risk to
maritime transport security or is not authorised to be in a maritime security
zone he or she may remove the vehicle or vessel. Before removing the vehicle or
vessel the officer must make reasonable efforts to have the person in control of
the vehicle or vessel remove it. A law enforcement officer must not use more
force, or subject a person to greater indignity than is reasonably necessary to
remove the vehicle or vessel. A law enforcement officer must make reasonable
efforts to avoid damaging the vehicle or vessel.
Clause 160 clarifies that other powers held by law enforcement officers apart
from those set out in this Bill are not affected by this Bill.
This division sets out the framework for maritime security guards and
provides them with limited powers to restrain and detain persons. The operators
of security regulated ships, ports, port facilities and other maritime industry
participants may choose to employ maritime security guards to safeguard against
unlawful interference with their maritime operations.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
Subclause 162(1) defines that a maritime security guard is a person who
satisfies the requirements prescribed in the regulations, is on duty at a
security regulated port, and is not a law enforcement officer. Regulations will
provide training and qualification requirements that limit who may be classified
as a maritime security guard for the purposes of this Bill.
Subclause
162(2) requires the regulations to prescribe the training and qualification
requirements, as well as any requirements in relation to the use and form of
identify cards.
Subclause 162(3) allows regulations to be made in
relation to uniforms and any other requirements in relation to maritime security
guards.
This clause grants a maritime security guard a limited power of physical
restraint. This power recognises that there are circumstances where law
enforcement officers will not be available to attend to suspected breaches of
security, and in these circumstances it is appropriate for maritime security
guards to exercise limited powers. This clause provides that a maritime security
guard may use reasonable force to physically restrain a person if the maritime
security guard reasonably suspects the person is committing or has committed an
offence against this Bill. In addition, if the maritime security guard
reasonably believes that it is necessary to restrain a person who is not cleared
from entering a cleared area the security guard may restrain the person, for
example a person who goes though a screening point without being screened. A
security guard may also restrain a person to protect the integrity of a maritime
security zone, for example an intruder.
Subclause 163(2) specifies that
the power of restraint may only be exercised until the person can be dealt with
by a law enforcement officer.
Subclause 163(3) provides that a maritime
security officer must not use more force than necessary and not subject the
person to greater indignity than necessary or reasonable to detain a person.
This clause recognises that a balance must be struck between the legitimate use
of force to protect maritime transport security and the civil liberties of
individuals.
This Division sets out the parameters of acceptable behaviour from a
person employed as a screening officer and provides them with limited powers to
restrain and detain persons. These provisions complement those in Division 2 of
Part 7.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
This clause defines that a screening officer is a person who is authorised or
required to conduct screening. The regulations will prescribe the training and
qualification requirements that must be met for a person to be a screening
officer, as well as any requirements in relation to the use and form of identity
cards.
Subclause 162(3) allows regulations to be made in relation to
uniforms and any other requirements.
This clause limits the powers of a screening officer. The clause provides
that if a screening officer considers it necessary to adequately screen a
person, the officer may request a person to remove any item of clothing
to assist the process. The power is non-coercive, and it is an offence for a
screening officer to require the removal, remove or cause the removal of any
clothing. Subclause 166(3) states that this penalty does not apply if the
screening officer has a reasonable excuse. For example, a senior citizen may
seek assistance in removing his or her coat.
Subclause 166(5) clarifies
that where a person has been requested to remove an item of clothing
under subclause 166(1) and refuses to do so the person may be asked to proceed
to a private room to be screened by a screening officer of the same sex as the
person. If the person refuses this option, the screening officer is not be able
to complete the screening task and the person must not be permitted to pass
through the screening point.
Clause 167 grants screening officers the same powers as maritime security
guards to restrain a person. However, the screening officers’ power to
physically restrain a person are restricted to cleared areas. This power has
been included in recognition that there are circumstances where law enforcement
officers will not be available to attend to breaches of security arrangements,
and in these circumstances it is appropriate for screening officers to exercise
limited powers.
Subclause 167(2) specifies that the power of restraint
may only be exercised until the person can be dealt with by a law enforcement
officer.
This clause provides that a screening officer when exercising his or her
powers under this Division must not use more force or subject a person to
greater indignity than is necessary and reasonable.
This Part establishes the requirements relating to the provision of
information about maritime transport security incidents to the Secretary and the
Department. This will ensure that the Secretary, as the regulator of maritime
transport security, has adequate information in the event of a maritime
transport security incident.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
This clause defines two types of maritime transport security incidents.
Firstly, if a threat of unlawful interference with maritime transport is made
(for example, a bomb threat) and this threat is, or is likely to be, a terrorist
act, then the threat is a maritime transport security incident. Secondly, if an
unlawful interference with maritime transport is, or is likely to be, a
terrorist act (for example, damage to property with the intention of advancing a
political, religious or ideological cause), then the unlawful interference is a
maritime transport security incident.
This Division establishes that certain maritime industry participants
must report maritime transport security incidents to the Secretary.
These clauses make it an offence for port operators, ship masters, ship
operators and port facility operators not to report a maritime transport
security incident according to the reporting requirements set out in Division 4
when they become aware of the incident. These are strict liability offences. The
penalty will not apply if the operator or master believes on reasonable grounds
that the person to whom the report has to be made is already aware of the
incident.
This clause makes it an offence for the persons listed in subclause 175(4)
who become aware of a maritime transport security incident not to report that
incident as soon as possible as required under clause 181. The classes of
persons listed are maritime security inspectors, duly authorised officers,
maritime security guards, screening officers and maritime industry participants
and their employees otherwise required by this Division to report maritime
transport security incidents.
This is a strict liability offence. The
penalty will not apply if the person with incident reporting responsibilities
believes on reasonable grounds that the person to whom the report has to be made
has already been informed of the incident.
Clause 176 makes it an offence for employees of maritime industry
participants who become aware of a maritime transport security incident to fail
to report the incident to their employer as soon as possible. This clause
reflects the fact that, while the organisation has overall responsibility for
maritime transport security, individual employees also have an important role in
ensuring the security of Australia's maritime industry. This is a strict
liability offence with a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units. The penalty does
not apply if the employee has a reasonable excuse.
This Division deals with the requirements for reporting incidents by
those with incident reporting responsibilities as defined in Division 3. This
Division reflects the fact that while the Secretary needs to be made aware of
maritime transport security incidents the relevant police forces are the first
response agencies to an incident.
Clause 177 stipulates the reporting requirements for port operators. Under
clause 171 it was established that port operators must report maritime transport
security incidents when they become aware of them. An incident that relates to
the port of the port operator must be reported by the port operator to the
Secretary and the Australian Federal Police or the police force of the relevant
State or Territory. If the incident is directed at a part of a port controlled
by another person, the operations of another person or a security regulated
ship, the port operator must also report the incident to the person who controls
that part, operation or ship. Subclause 177(4) also stipulates that if the
incident relates to a port of another port operator then the incident must be
reported to that port operator.
The intention of this clause is to ensure
that the relevant people and organisations are aware of any incident that has
security implication for them, their business, or their property.
These clauses stipulate similar incident reporting requirements to those
specified in clause 177 for other maritime industry participants. Reports of
maritime transport security incidents must be given to the Secretary, the
Australian Federal Police or the relevant State or Territory police, the port
operator and to any other maritime industry participant or security regulated
ship affected by the incident.
Subclause 181 stipulates that a person with incident reporting
responsibilities must report incidents to the Secretary. If the incident relates
to a security regulated port, the person must report this incident to the
relevant port operator. And, similarly, if the incident relates to a security
regulated ship, the incident must be reported by the person to the relevant ship
operator or master of the ship. This clause reflects the fact that in practice
it will be the port operator, port facility operator or ship's master who will
report maritime transport security incidents to the police. However, nothing in
this clause is intended to prevent immediate reporting of a maritime transport
security incident to the relevant police force by any person.
This clause allows that a notice may be published by the Secretary in the
Gazette setting out what information is be included in an incident report
or the way in which the report must be made, or both.
This notice must
be tabled in Parliament and may be disallowed.
Subclause 182(3)
clarifies that if a maritime industry participant or a person with incident
reporting responsibilities does not report a maritime transport security
incident in compliance with the gazetted requirements, then the report will be
considered not to have been made for the purposes of this Part. This means that
the maritime industry participant or person with incident reporting
responsibilities may face a penalty under Division 3 if they do not report an
incident in the required manner, unless they have a reasonable excuse.
This Part allows the Secretary to obtain security compliance information
from maritime industry participants. The collection of security compliance
information is important for ensuring that appropriate security measures are
implemented and maintained to safeguard against unlawful interference in
maritime transport, and that Australia has met its international
obligations.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
Clause 184 enables the Secretary to require information from maritime
industry participants which can be used to assess participants’
compliance, or non compliance, with their maritime security plans, ship security
plans, or other security-related obligations under this Bill. Such information
is security compliance information. If the Secretary has reasonable grounds to
believe that the participant has security compliance information he or she may
require the information from a participant under subclause 184(2). The
information must be given within the period and in the form and manner specified
in the Secretary’s written notice. Subclause 184(3) limits the time period
to not less than 14 days. The Secretary may specify that the participant provide
the information orally, in writing, and/or by electronic transmission. Failure
to comply with the Secretary’s request under subclause 184(2), without a
reasonable excuse, is a strict liability offence with a maximum penalty of 45
penalty units.
This clause will allow the Secretary to assess the health
of the security of the maritime industry and will enable the Secretary to
recognise possible weaknesses in the maritime security system and rectify
problems before the safety of the industry and the public is
compromised.
Subclause 185(1) clarifies that whenever a person is required to give
security compliance information that person cannot be excused from giving the
information on the grounds that it might incriminate them or expose them to a
penalty.
In acknowledgment that coercive information-gather powers, where
the common law privilege is removed, must be accompanied by appropriate
protection for the informant, subclause 185(2) provides that the individual
giving the information and any information, document or thing obtained directly
or indirectly as a result of giving information cannot be admitted as evidence
in a criminal proceeding, or any other proceeding for the recovery of a penalty,
against the person. This protection does not extend to the giving of false or
misleading information or documents as provided under section 137.1 or 137.2 of
the Criminal Code. This clause reinforces the concept that the processes
of gathering compliance information to improve maritime security and those
relating to judicial proceedings, particularly criminal proceedings, should be
separate to ensure a continued free flow of security compliance information.
Giving security compliance information should be encouraged so that issues
regarding compliance can be addressed before they compromise maritime transport
security or put the general public in danger.
Nothing in this Part
prevents agencies separately collecting and using compliance information for the
purpose of judicial or other proceedings.
This Part provides a range of enforcement options that are available to
the Secretary as an alternative to, or in addition to, prosecution. Making a
range of enforcement options available enables appropriate enforcement measures
to be selected to meet the nature and circumstances of a particular
contravention.
The Division provides a simplified overview of the Part.
This clause enables regulations to be made which allow infringement notices,
or ‘on-the-spot’ fines, to be issued as an alternative to
prosecution where it is alleged that an offence under the Bill or the
regulations has occurred. Offences for which this option would not be made
available are those against subclauses 43(1), 62(1), 120(3), 121(3), 127(3),
128(3), 153(3), 154(4), 155(4) or clauses 123 or 130, because these are
considered to be serious acts that should be subject to criminal sanction (for
example, a maritime industry participant operating without a maritime security
plan in force or the intentional carriage of an unauthorised weapon into a
maritime security zone).
A fine issued through an infringement notice
must not exceed one-fifth of the maximum fine that could be imposed by a court
as a penalty for the offence. This is in keeping with current Commonwealth
criminal law policy.
An enforcement order is a regulatory instrument which may be issued when
the Secretary is of the opinion that a breach of the Bill has occurred and that
specific action is required (or stopped or restricted) in order to safeguard
against unlawful interference with maritime transport. Use of an order reflects
the policy that rectification of a problem is the preferred outcome to
prosecution. As an enforcement order is a civil enforcement remedy, the
Secretary will only need to be satisfied of these matters on the balance of
probabilities rather than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. If
an enforcement order is contravened an injunction may be sought from a court.
This clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
This clause allows the Secretary to make enforcement orders prohibiting or
restricting specified activities or requiring specific action by a maritime
industry participant named in the enforcement order. The Secretary’s power
to issue an enforcement order must be based on a reasonable belief that the
maritime industry participant has contravened a provision in this Bill and that
the order is necessary to safeguard against unlawful interference with maritime
transport.
An enforcement order must bear a clear and direct
relationship to the contravention and be proportionate to the contravention. In
addition, the Secretary cannot require the payment of money other than an amount
that is already recoverable at law.
This clause provides that an enforcement order comes into force at the time
specified in the order, for example 1:00am on a particular day, or if there is
no specified time, at the beginning of the 7th day after the order is
made. The provision for a shorter period will allow for orders to be given in
emergency situations. An enforcement order remains in force either for the
period specified in the order, or if a period is not specified, until the order
is revoked by the Secretary.
To ensure enforcement orders remain current and relevant, this clause
provides for their regular review. Under this clause the Secretary must review
enforcement orders at least every 3 months, and after each review, confirm, vary
or revoke the order in writing. This reflects the fact that enforcement orders
are aimed at rectification of a particular problem and should be monitored to
ensure the activities or actions specified in the order continue to address that
particular contravention.
An order must be revoked unless the Secretary
is satisfied that the order is still required to safeguard against unlawful
interference with maritime transport.
The Secretary must not vary the
order unless he or she is satisfied that the order as varied adequately
safeguards against unlawful interference with maritime transport and the varied
order bears a clear and direct relationship to the contravention and remains
proportionate to the contravention.
Subclause 191(4) clarifies that an
order continues in force as varied, and will require a further review after an
additional 3 months.
This clause provides that the Secretary must, as soon as is practicable after
making or reviewing an enforcement order, inform the maritime industry
participant named in the order of the making or review of the
order.
Subclause 192(2) provides that failure by the Secretary to comply
with subclause 192(1) does not affect the validity of an order.
This clause provides that a person must not engage in conduct that
contravenes an enforcement order. While non compliance with an enforcement order
is not an offence, it may be enforced through injunctive relief under clause
197.
This Division details provisions for the issuing of enforcement orders to
the ship operator or master of a regulated Australian ship. The provisions are
similar to the enforcement orders able to be issued to other maritime industry
participants in that the conditions which must be satisfied and the
circumstances under which an order may be issued are the same but an order is
limited to the taking or stopping of specified action in relation to the
ship.
This Clause provides a simplified overview of the Division.
This clause allows the Secretary to issue a ship enforcement order to the
ship operator for a regulated Australian ship or the master of the ship
requiring the ship operator or the master to take specified action, or
refraining from specified action, in relation to the ship.
The
Secretary’s power to issue a ship enforcement order is limited to those
instances where the Secretary reasonably believes that the regulated Australian
ship has contravened a provision in this Bill and it is necessary to make the
order to safeguard against unlawful interference with maritime transport.
An enforcement order must bear a clear and direct relationship to the
contravention and be proportionate to the contravention. Some of the actions
that may be required include removing the ship from specified waters or port, or
moving or holding the ship within a port. In addition, the Secretary cannot
require the payment of money other than an amount that is already recoverable at
law.
These orders are similar to the control directions the Secretary may
give to regulated foreign ships in certain circumstances under subclause
99(4).
Subclause 195(6) requires that the Secretary must commit the ship
enforcement order to writing before giving it, however the order may be given
orally or by any other means.
This clause provides that a ship operator or master must not engage in
conduct that contravenes a ship enforcement order. While contravention of an
enforcement order is not an offence, it may be enforced through injunctive
relief under clause 197.
The Federal Court may grant an injunction to restrain a person from
taking action which contravene this Bill, or to require a person to do an act or
thing. Such a power allows action to be taken before a contravention occurs,
rather than waiting until it has occurred and then prosecute. The phrase
engage in conduct, in this context, covers both acts or omissions, such
as if a person fails to do something which he or she would otherwise be required
to do.
This injunction power is not intended to limit any other powers
the Federal Court may have which would impact on maritime transport
security.
An example of where an injunction may be sought is when a
maritime industry participant who is required to be operating with an approved
security plan in force, operates without such a plan. An injunction could stop
the maritime industry participant from operating immediately. In addition to
being subject to a penalty of up to 200 penalty units for committing an offence
under clause 43, the granting of an injunction in such circumstances could mean
that individual directors of such an operation would be in contempt of court if
they breached the injunction, and would face the usual penalties associated with
such a breach.
Subclause 197(1) provides that the Federal Court may on application by the
Secretary grant an injunction to restrain a person from engaging in the conduct
in contravention of this Bill or require the person to do an act or a
thing.
Subclause 197(2) empowers the Federal Court to grant an injunction
where consent is given by all parties to the proceedings, regardless of whether
the Court is satisfied that the circumstances necessary to grant an injunction
are satisfied.
Subclause 197(3) allows the court to grant an interim
injunction.
Subclause 197(4) provides that the court is not to require
the Secretary, or anyone else, as a condition of granting an interim injunction
to give an undertaking as to damages. This clause limits the court’s usual
discretion to require undertakings as to damages. This recognises that the
Commonwealth, as represented by the Secretary, does not represent a risk in
relation to its ability to pay damages.
Subclause 197(5) allows the court
to release or vary an injunction it has granted.
Subclause 197(6) and
197(7) clarifies that the court has the discretion to grant or vary an
injunction irrespective of previous or continuing conduct or intention of a
person or imminent danger of substantial damage to any person if an action or
thing is not done.
This Division allows regulations to be made to establish a demerit point
system attached to the approval of a maritime security plan or a ship security
plan. The purpose of the demerit points system is to allow for a regulatory
framework that builds a security profile for each regulated entity, and records
systemic breaches of the Bill and/or regulations. Such a system provides
flexibility with enforcement measures and ensures that regulated entities are
aware of how their organisation is performing from a compliance perspective. It
therefore encourages a maritime industry participant to make the necessary
changes to their operations so as to ensure that the operations can
continue.
This clause provides that the regulations may establish a demerit point
system under which the approval of a maritime security plan or a ship security
plan may be cancelled.
This clause provides that the demerit point system may provide that the
approval of a maritime security plan may be cancelled if the maritime industry
participant has accrued a prescribed number of demerit points. Clause 58 deals
with the cancellation of a maritime security plan based on the accumulation of
demerit points.
Demerit points only accrue if a participant is found
guilty of an offence against this Bill or regulations, or the person pays an
infringement notice or other alternative to prosecution as set out in the
regulations.
The demerit points scheme may differentiate between kinds of
maritime industry participants, as well as between different classes of
participants within a kind of maritime industry participant.
Clause 200 mirrors the provisions in clause 199 with regard to a ship
operator operating without a ship security plan or not operating in compliance
with a ship security plan.
This clause sets out the decisions that can be made under this Bill which are
reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Whilst the AAT is
limited in undertaking merits review to the decisions listed in this clause,
this does not limit the scope for judicial review to occur under the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1976, or at common
law.
The following decisions made by the Secretary are
reviewable:
(a) refusing to approve a maritime security plan or a ship
security plan;
(b) giving a maritime industry participant or ship operator a
direction to vary a plan;
(c) giving a maritime industry participant or ship
operator a direction to revise a plan;
(d) cancelling a maritime security
plan or ship security plan;
(e) refusing to give an interim
ISSC;
(f) declaring a particular port, or part of a particular port, as a
security regulated port;
(g) designating a person as a port
operator;
(h) establishing a port security zone;
(i) declaring a ship
security zone around a ship; or
(j) establishing an on-board security
zone.
Through its Secretary, the Department of Transport and Regional Services will
be the administering authority of this Bill. Subclause 202(1) permits the
Secretary to delegate in writing all or any of his or her powers under the Bill
to a Senior Executive Service (SES) employee or person acting as an SES employee
in the Department.
Subclause 202(2) provides that the Secretary may
delegate most of his or her powers to an APS employee in an Executive Level 2 or
equivalent position in the Department, (whether ongoing or otherwise). The
exception to this Executive Level 2 delegation are the powers under Division 3
of Part 11, which relate to the issuing of enforcement orders. These are
significant powers and exercise of them has been restricted to senior managers
to promote consistency and accountability.
All delegates must comply with
any directions issued by the Secretary in relation to the exercise of any
delegated powers or functions.
This clause provides details of the circumstances in which compensation for
damage to electronic equipment must be made when such equipment has been
operated by maritime security inspectors in exercise of their powers under
clauses 139 and 141 and by duly authorised officers in exercise of their powers
under clause 148. This is a common provision in legislation which permits the
operation of electronic equipment of another person by a Commonwealth
official.
This clause provides for compensation for acquisition of property where
compensation is required for constitutional reasons.
This clause provides for compensation to be paid by the Commonwealth if the
Secretary has given a control direction to a regulated foreign ship or a ship
enforcement order to a regulated Australian ship, and compliance with the
direction or order causes a ship to be delayed and in the circumstances the
delay is unreasonable.
Subclause 206(1) provides for compensation to be paid by a person to the
Commonwealth if the Commonwealth incurs costs for the detention or inspection of
a ship due to the person’s failure to comply with this Bill and the
detention or inspection is reasonable in the circumstances.
Subclause
206(2) mirrors the above provision in the respect of a ship operator of a
non-compliant security regulated ship’s failure to comply with this Bill
irrespective of whether the detention or inspection was to the non complying
ship or another ship.
Under international law, representatives of foreign governments, such as
diplomats, consular officials and heads of state, are immune from many
Australian laws. These immunities have been recognised in several existing
Commonwealth Acts that are listed in this clause. This clause ensures that this
Bill does not affect those existing immunities.
This clause provides for continued operation of the Bill (or provisions of
the Bill) in the event of a successful constitutional challenge. It sets out the
various constitutional heads of power upon which the Bill can draw if its
operation is expressly confined to acts or omissions under those constitutional
powers.
This clause allows regulations to be made where required or permitted by this
Bill, or where necessary or convenient for the purposes of the
Bill.
Regulation making powers are spread throughout the Bill. In
particular, Parts 3 and 4 provide for extensive regulations to be made regarding
the form and content of maritime and ship security plans. Providing for a wide
range of issues to be dealt with in regulations builds in a necessary degree of
flexibility as the nature and extent of terrorist and other unlawful
interference with maritime transport and their countermeasures change. Providing
for much of the detail to be set out in regulations allows the Government to
respond to changes in the maritime transport security environment promptly while
still maintaining the necessary parliamentary oversight.
In addition to
the regulation making powers specified elsewhere in the Bill, provision is made
in this clause for the prescription of fees and penalties (not exceeding 50
penalty units). Many other clauses in the Bill provide for higher penalties to
be prescribed in the regulations; these higher penalties will still apply to any
regulations made under those clauses.