Commonwealth Consolidated Regulations Commonwealth Consolidated Regulations(1) For section 25A of the Act, this section prescribes the criteria to which the Minister must have regard in deciding whether a thing (being the supply of, or arranging for other persons to supply, DSGL goods or DSGL technology, or the provision of DSGL services or the publication of certain DSGL technology) would, or would not, prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia.
(2) The criteria set out in the following table are prescribed for a thing other than a supply mentioned in subsection (3) of this section.
Criteria for deciding whether things prejudicial to security, defence or international relations of Australia | |
Item | Criterion |
1 | The risk that the DSGL goods or DSGL technology may go to or become available to, or the DSGL services or information provided through those services may be provided or become available to a country upon which the Security Council of the United Nations or Australia has imposed a sanction |
2 | The risk that the DSGL goods or DSGL technology may go to or become available to, or the DSGL services or information provided through those services may be provided or become available to a country where it may be used in a way contrary to Australia's international obligations or commitments |
3 | The risk that the DSGL goods or DSGL technology, or the DSGL services or information provided through those services, may be used to commit or facilitate serious abuses of human rights |
4 | Whether the supply of the DSGL goods or technology, the provision of the DSGL services, or the publication of the DSGL technology: (a) may aggravate: (i) an existing threat to international peace and security or to the peace and security of a region; or (ii) a particular event or conflict of concern to Australia; or (b) may otherwise contribute to political instability internationally or in a particular region |
5 | Whether the DSGL goods or DSGL technology, or the DSGL services or information provided through those services may: (a) be used for conflict within a country or for international conflict by a country; or (b) further militarise conflict within a country |
6 | Whether the supply of the DSGL goods or DSGL technology, the provision of the DSGL services, or the publication of the DSGL technology, may compromise or adversely affect Australia's defence or security interests, its obligations to its allies or its international obligations and responsibilities |
7 | Whether the DSGL goods or DSGL technology may go to or become available to, or the DSGL services or information provided through those services may be provided or become available to a country that has policies or strategic interests that are inconsistent with the policies and strategic interests of Australia or its allies |
8 | The risk that the supply of the DSGL goods or DSGL technology, the provision of the DSGL services, or the publication of the DSGL technology, may: (a) adversely affect Australia's military capability; or (b) substantially compromise an Australian defence operation; or (c) increase the military capability of a country that is a potential adversary of Australia |
9 | The risk that the DSGL goods or DSGL technology may go to or become available to, or the DSGL services or information provided through those services may be provided or become available to a country: (a) that is developing, or is reasonably suspected of developing: (i) weapons that may be capable of causing mass destruction; or (ii) the means of delivering such weapons; or (b) that supports, or is reasonably suspected of supporting, terrorism; or (c) whose actions or foreign policies pose a risk of major disruption in global stability or the stability of a particular region |
10 | Whether the supply of the DSGL goods or DSGL technology, the provision of the DSGL services, or the publication of the DSGL technology, may lead to a reaction by another country that may damage Australia's interests or relations with the other country or with a particular region |
11 | Whether the DSGL goods or DSGL technology, or the DSGL services or information provided through those services may be used for mercenary activities or a terrorist or other criminal activity |
12 | Whether preventing the supply of the DSGL goods or DSGL technology, the provision of the DSGL services, or the publication of the DSGL technology, may have an adverse effect on Australian research industry, trade and economic prosperity to the extent that it may adversely affect the security, defence or international relations of Australia |
(3) The criteria set out in the following table are prescribed for a supply of DSGL technology to a foreign person in Australia.
Criteria for deciding whether things prejudicial to security, defence or international relations of Australia--supply of DSGL technology to foreign person in Australia | |
Item | Criterion |
1 | The risk that the supply of the DSGL technology may: (a) adversely affect Australia's military capability; or (b) substantially compromise an Australian defence operation; or (c) increase the military capability of a country or organisation that is a potential adversary of Australia |
2 | The risk that the DSGL technology may go to or become available to a country or organisation: (a) that is developing, or is reasonably suspected of developing: (i) weapons that may be capable of causing mass destruction; or (ii) the means of delivering such weapons; or (b) that supports, or is reasonably suspected of supporting, terrorism; or (c) whose actions, or foreign policies (if applicable), pose a risk of major disruption in global stability or the stability of a particular region |
3 | Whether preventing the supply of the DSGL technology may have an adverse effect on Australian research, industry, trade and economic prosperity to the extent that it may adversely affect the security, defence or international relations of Australia |