AG2002/53, Transcript of Proceedings [2002] AIRCTrans 964 (26 March 2002)

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS COMMISSION

DEPUTY PRESIDENT McCARTHY

AG2002/53

AGREEMENT FOR CERTIFICATION
OF AGREEMENT

Application under section 170LK of the Act
by St John of God Health Care Inc trading as
St John of God Pathology for certification
of the St John of God Pathology Enterprise
Agreement 2002

PERTH

3.39 PM, FRIDAY, 8 MARCH 2002

Continued from 7.3.02

PN90

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, gentlemen. I take it, appearances are the same as they were.

PN91

MR PANIZZA: I am sorry, Deputy President. I have Mr Hill with me and if he is required, he is available to - - -

PN92

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Okay, thanks, Mr Panizza. I hope it is not needed but I note your accommodation there. Perhaps if I turn to you, first, Mr Panizza. There are issues that were raised and I think you were given the opportunity to examine and if I can turn to you and see whether there is anything you can further add or enlighten us on.

PN93

MR PANIZZA: You can be sure I have spent a lot of hours on this now and - - -

PN94

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Sorry to do that to you.

PN95

MR PANIZZA: Well, I am actually - I was quite pleased that you did give me the opportunity and I thank the Commission for that because otherwise I was caught a little flat footed, coming into register something effectively. Essentially where we go to, as I understand the proceedings, the Commission had indicated that the employer's application for a 170LK agreement was in order and would be certified. I think it is important that we - because it relates back to 170M. The application of the Health Services Union of Australia is made pursuant to section 170M. And it is an application to be bound to the agreement. And that application has not been made but was adjourned until the HSUA makes submissions to the Commission in regard to the right to intervene.

PN96

Rule 49 of the Commission's rules and the actual application. And the commencement of proceedings the HSUA had sought to intervene at the invitation of the Commission. And then the Commissioner raised some questions, both in regard to that application to intervene and in regard to rule 49(2). And whilst some submissions have been made in regard to these matters, submission were incomplete and in addition the Commissioner raised the implications of the decision of the Federal Court in the Professional Officers Association, Victoria v Australian Industrial Relations Commission 2001, FCA 296 (28 March 2001). Sir, that is where I understand the proceedings have reached.

PN97

The application is the employer's application. And there is two applications in this, will be our submission. The employer's application is for certification of an industrial agreement pursuant under section 170LK of Part VIB, Division 2 of the Act. The Health Services Union of Australia's application is for an order for the Health Services Union of Australia, an employee organisation, to be bound to the said 170LK agreement. That is, the HSUA is an applicant before the Commission in our own right. And we are there by virtue of section 170M(3). And the application, as I said, made pursuant to section - our application is made pursuant to section 170M(3). We have given notification of that.

PN98

We are prepared to make - we are going to make the application. I will come back to that in a minute in writing. And when we came before the Commission we formally made that application. If I didn't, I am formally making that application now. So, in addition - as I said before, at the commencement of proceedings we made a separate application to intervene. The application of intervention was treated as an application for intervention pursuant to section 43. Intervention generally. So it is the HSUAs first submission that it is not necessary for the HSUA to be granted leave to intervene pursuant to section 43. For it to be able to pursue our primary application which is to be bound as an employee organisation to the said 170LK agreement pursuant to 170M(3).

PN99

Our right to be here as an applicant is not as an applicant to be a party to the agreement but to be bound by it. We are actually a separate application. And we are not there as an intervener in the normal sense of the word. So it will be our submission that if it is found that HSUAs application pursuant to section 170M(3) can be pursued without leave to intervene pursuant to section 43 being granted, then the HSUA has no need to seek leave to intervene generally. And without referring to the cases, we are just - given that I believe that you have these matters in mind. Those matters where people were seeking to intervene and to speak about the actual agreements and their terms and whether they were acceptable or not aware they should be changed or whatever, we are not making that application.

PN100

While there was a time when we, the HSUA, were in dispute with the employer in regard to the way in which they went about the agreement, and our preference that - and that of our members for a union employer agreement, we are not intending to pursue that dispute or challenge any of the provisions of the agreement and, thus, have no need in that regard to intervene on the request of members pursuant to section 43(2)A though I might add, we do have the necessary request from members should that be deemed that we necessarily need to pursue that line of argument. So I would just like to look at - turn to the 170M(3) application if I may. I think it helps to clarify what we are saying.

PN101

Section 170M(3) is, in our submission - is a specific code of the Act which stands alone within the wider scheme of Part VIB of the Act. Provides a specific right to organisations of employees to apply to be bound by a section 170LK agreement. And provided the application to be bound meets specific requirements as are set out in section 170M(3), the Commission is bound by the section to grant the union's application and bind it to the said agreement. That is what is set out in the Act itself.

PN102

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Let me get this right. I am sorry if I am interrupting you. But I think it is better if - on the way through. So what you are essentially saying is 170M(3) gives you a right to be bound to the agreement. 43(2)A gives you a right to intervene if you have made application under 170M(3). But the fact that you have made application under 170M(3) doesn't mean that you need to seek 43(2)A intervention and you are not so doing?

PN103

MR PANIZZA: That is correct.

PN104

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Okay. Thank you.

PN105

MR PANIZZA: That is correct. And the section 170M(3), the provision therefor us to apply to be bound. And that is - - -

PN106

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: So you are saying that stands - - -

PN107

MR PANIZZA: It is a limited application.

PN108

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: So you are saying that stands alone and it stands isolated from 43 but 3(2)B in this matter but it may not for other organisations in other circumstances?

PN109

MR PANIZZA: May not in other circumstances. Next time we are here looking to be bound, we might have some problems with the agreement that we feel need to be addressed and we may be raising those.

PN110

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes.

PN111

MR PANIZZA: In which case we would have had the necessary directives from our members and we would be seeking to intervene on that basis. But that would be to talk about the content of the agreement, rather than the application to be bound which, we say, is a limited provision. It gives us limited rights. It is essentially about ensuring that we have met the requirements of the Act in regard to being bound. And then assisting the Commission essentially in the exercise of the Commission's quite limited jurisdiction and quite limited discretion under this section. So in respect of what we are saying, the provision is specific and prescriptive and allows the Commission minimal discretion beyond overseeing the administration of the provision and actually requires the Commission to do something, should those things be met.

PN112

Now, it is trite law and well established principle or maxim of law that specific provisions of the Act override the general provisions. See, for example - I think the classic authority for this is the King v Wallace ex parte Employers Association of Wool Selling Brokers [1949] HCA 30; 1949, 78 CLR 529. I think it was a Clerks Union case, from memory, which takes me back a bit. And in that matter, there is - I mean, I have got the authority here. I think it is fairly common knowledge that it is essentially the rules. And in this case we have, provided we are staying within just the limitations of the section, and the limitations of that only, then that stands alone. And that is all we need to deal with. I do have the authority here if the Commission requires it.

PN113

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: No, that is fine.

PN114

MR PANIZZA: Arguably, given that the organisation of employees has sworn that it has met the requirements of the provision by the form R30 statutory declaration - provided all of the required actions have been sworn as being met and the Commission accepts that, there would be no reason even for the union to appear, arguably. I am not saying that we don't need to appear but there wouldn't necessarily be a need to appear. And I refer to section 170M(3) and that section sets out a series of requirements. It says that if certain things have happened, then the Commission is duty bound to determine that the agreement binds the organisation. Now, the things that need to occur is that the application certification states that the application is made in Division 2 which we heard yesterday, it does.

PN115

And it is made in accordance with section 170LK, which we have heard and it has been accepted that it is. And that a majority of persons made the agreement with the employer and we have already - I mean, I understand the Commission has indicated in preliminary - that that has been met as well. And in the view of the Commission we would certainly be our submission that it had been met. And before the agreement is certified, an organisation of employees has to notify the Commission and the employer in writing that it wants to be bound by the agreement. And we have. And those letters are before the Commission. And the employer has indicated that they received the letter. I have copies here if - - -

PN116

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I think it would be helpful if you could tender them as exhibits, just to ensure that we are all talking about exactly the same documents, Mr Panizza.

EXHIBIT #H1 LETTER DATED 14/2/02 TO THE ST JOHN OF GOD HEALTH CARE INC

EXHIBIT #H2 COPY OF LETTER DATED 14/2/02 TO REGISTRAR, AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION. ATTACHED LETTER TO ST JOHN OF GOD HOSPITAL

PN117

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Panizza.

PN118

MR PANIZZA: I assume there is no need to swear to these letters. They are copies of the letters only but - - -

PN119

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: No, that is fine.

PN120

MR PANIZZA: - - - it has been on the record that they have occurred. So these letters are simply notification of intention to - as is required by the Act which is 170MC(3):

PN121

Before the agreement is certified, an organisation of employees notifies the Commission in writing that it wants to be bound by the agreement.

PN122

And we have notified the Commission we want to be bound. So, technically, that is not the actual formal application. It is just the process. And while the letter is written in general terms rather than perhaps as specific terms as it might have been, quite clearly if the Health Services Union of Australia WA No 3 Branch is seeking that - it is actually the Health Services Union of Australia that we are seeking to be bound to the agreement. To the extent of the coverage of the West Australian No 3 Branch in reality or in practice. And that is automatically covered by the scope of the award. And the scope of the application. So it is simply to clarify our application. I have lost myself here.

PN123

And then the final matter that we needed to do was to satisfy the Commission that there is at least one member whose employment will be subject to the agreement. Who industrial interests, the organisation are entitled to represent in relation to the work that will be subject to the agreement and who requested the organisation to give notification. We have provided a statutory declaration in the form of form 30 to the Commission in - that sets out at paragraph 4.2 - or sworn at paragraph 4.2 that those things have been met.

PN124

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Do you have, I am not necessarily saying this would be fatal if you didn't, but do you have any documentation of any authority signed by an employee making a request?

PN125

MR PANIZZA: I do. Yes, I do have copies of them asking us to make a request.

PN126

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes. Do you have reticence in tendering that?

PN127

MR PANIZZA: Only because it could lead to confusion, given the way that the HSOA and the HSUA operate intermingled. And members don't distinguish.

PN128

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: No, I think as long as the intent is clear.

PN129

MR PANIZZA: The intent is very clear and I have a copy of it here.

PN130

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes. Could you tender that.

PN131

MR PANIZZA: I can tender the original document. Just to clarify the record, I will explain.

PN132

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

EXHIBIT #H3 LETTER DATED 8/2/02 TO THE SECRETARY OF HSOA, SIGNED BY A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO APPEAR TO BE EMPLOYEES OF ST JOHN OF GOD PATHOLOGY

PN133

MR PANIZZA: You ma note beside the names that have been written, hand-written, onto the document, that there is an M. I think it is in red ink on your document.

PN134

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I assume that means member.

PN135

MR PANIZZA: That means that they are members. That we have checked our records that they are members. And they are recorded in our register - also I might say they are recorded in our register as being employed at the relevant employer. But, I mean, this was provided to us by those members. Now, it is addressed to the Hospital Salaried Officers Association. Just by way of explanation, as an organisation, while they are two very distinct and separate organisations, they are marketed under one trade name which is the HSOA.

PN136

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes.

PN137

MR PANIZZA: And so the majority of our members simply see us and don't distinguish between the HSOA and the HSUA. They have dual membership and all of these have membership of the HSUA, I might add. And from the point of view of the members, they don't distinguish. But it is quite clear, I would submit, in the terms of this agreement, they are referring to the Federal Workplace Relations Act 1996 and it is 170LK. And so while they might have addressed to the Hospital Salaried Officers Association, the clear intention was a request to the Federal union to be registered.

PN138

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: You market all the organisations under the one banner of HSOA?

PN139

MR PANIZZA: Under the one banner of HSOA.

PN140

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes.

PN141

MR PANIZZA: It is too difficult to sell it otherwise.

PN142

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Okay, thanks, Mr Panizza.

PN143

MR PANIZZA: I think there is a lot of organisations, employee organisations, that do similar - - -

PN144

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, well, I am thinking of the matter the other day. The ASU. Similarly, there is in effect a brand name for the union that is not the formal name of the organisation. Yes.

PN145

MR PANIZZA: In fact, it is trading as.

PN146

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes.

PN147

MR PANIZZA: So the Commission, as I said before, a copy of the sworn - sorry, the statutory declaration of Mr Hill, form R30, pursuant to rule 49. And to the extent that it is able to be complied with. Now, it is interesting because, in fact, technically, the application is publicly made when the advocate from the union takes his or her feet in the Commission and makes application, given the terms of rule 49. But in any case, that raises the issues that the Commission raised in regard to rule 49(2). And I intend to go to those points right now. Depending on how rule 49(2) is read, it may or may not be inconsistent with the Act. In particular, 170M(3) of the Act. To the extent that it requires form R30 to be lodged with the application for the section 170LK agreement.

PN148

Because the problem we have is that with the rule is that - and it was pointed out by the Commission, in fact. Is that:

PN149

The following persons must lodge with the application a statutory declaration in accordance with form R30 made by the person or other person authorised by the person to do so.

PN150

And yet section 170M does not require the application by the organisation seeking to be bound by the agreement to be made at the time that the application is made. It is simply to be made at some time prior to the application for the certification of agreement actually being - the certification process being completed. So there is an inconsistency, a clear inconsistency, between the requirements of the Act itself and the requirements of the rule. Now if we were to refer to firstly the section 48 of the Act.

PN151

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes. Just taking you back there, 170M(3) says:

PN152

If (a) the application for certification -

PN153

so it talks about "the application", and then "and" in accordance with 170K and what you are saying (c):

PN154

Before the agreement is certified an organisation notifies -

PN155

so what you're saying is that the Act specifies that the notification by the organisation simply has to be before the certification whereas the rules specified as a statutory declaration together with the application. Yes, I see where you are coming from.

PN156

MR PANIZZA: I think we can go a bit wider than that too. The section 170M(3) does not assume that it's a friendly application in the sense of the employer and employee agreeing. The employer has no say on whether or not we might be bound. The Act sets out the only say and the say is that these things are met, provided those things are met. I mean, the employer might want to argue whether or not we meet these things but at the end of the day it's a question of fact as to whether or not we meet these requirements and then if we meet those requirements it's a matter of fact that the Commission is bound by the Act to make the necessary determination.

PN157

So if we have a look at then section 48 I think it is, I've got myself mixed up here. Yes, 48 refers to the rules of the Commission and 48(1) refers to the power of the president and if I just might read briefly 48(1) says:

PN158

The power of the President. The president after consultation with the members of the Commission may by signed instrument make rules not inconsistent with this Act - - -

PN159

I emphasise, "with respect to". And:

PN160

The practice and procedures followed by the Commission, the conduct of the Commission, in particular the manner in which the time in which the application, submissions and objections may be made to the Commission and the manner in which applications, submissions and objections may be dealt.

PN161

So it's about procedural things, it's about making sure the procedure of the Commission worked fairly and properly and it is limited, the power is limited that it has to be rules that are not inconsistent with this Act. It's not saying it couldn't accidentally happen but certainly that's what would have to be done. So if we look further down we will see that the rules of the Commission it refers in fact at 48(2) to the Interpretations Act 1901 and in any case that Act does apply as I understand it to such matters. Section 46 of the Act Interpretation Act 1901, I only have one copy with me at the moment.

PN162

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I happen to have a copy here.

PN163

MR PANIZZA: Yes, and it makes very clear in section 46 that the rules and regulations have to be again consistent with the Act and it makes it also clear that - I'm trying to find the bit that it must be, that to the extent that it's not consistent with the requirements of the Act it becomes ultra vires in effect. That's the import of that I think for our purposes there. We then refer to rule 6 of the Commission's rules. It talks about relief from the rules and rule 6 and I quote says:

PN164

The Commission may dispense with compliance with any of the requirements of these rules before or after the occasion for compliance arises.

PN165

And I would also submit that that authority arises out of section 48 rather than any other, that's the authority to make the rules rather than that of any other authority of the Act and the general scheme of the Act that allows the Commission to just look at procedures and it's quite clear the authority that's given to the Commission in regard to the rules, it stands alone. Now I think we can gain some more ideas perhaps or just further clarification in regard to the intention of the rules. It may be of some assistance in fact to the Commission although these don't directly apply is that under the regulations, regulation 133 in regard to regulations, not in regard to rules there's a more limited or a more described power of the Commission to waive procedural requirements, in effect of non compliance of regulations as well.

PN166

To some extent because it is a little bit more descriptive, it just perhaps gives a feel for how some of the circumstances in which in regard to regulations that power might be exercised and to that extent might provide the Commission with some guidance but it's certainly not binding because the rule, rule 6 stands alone, stands on its own right. It arises out of section 48 and certainly one doesn't apply to the other. Now the other area I think we can gain a little bit of assistance from shall I say is that - if you look at form R28 which arises out of rule 40A and relates to the making of section 170LJ agreements or agreements pursuant to those sections. It makes clear that each party to the agreement must complete the separate statutory declarations and they're to be included with the applications.

PN167

Similarly if we were to refer to form R29 which relates to the section LK agreement itself, the making of the application for section LK agreement itself, then we see that again that's required to be lodged with the application. It's stated on the form, I know it says it in the regulations, it's stated in the form. Whereas form 30 is just required in regard to the particular and the only declaration that organisations' employees have to make when they're making the application. So there seems to be a little bit of inconsistency in the scheme of things and I think it probably helps to clarify, help us to understand the intention. I mean, given the size of this and the size of the drafting at the time one can well understand how a very small error like that could creep through.

PN168

So on the basis of those submissions we would move that the Commission exercise its powers pursuant to rule 6 in so far as is necessary to remove the inconsistency which in any case due to its inconsistency with the Act was probably ultra vires. My submissions in regard to the approach of saying this is an application would end at that point and while I'm able to continue looking at the question of intervention we would - - -

PN169

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I think it's clear where you've got to so far, I don't think you really need to address the intervention issue, Mr Panizza, given that you are really saying, well you're not seeking to intervene. But what I would find helpful is if you - and I assume you intended to address the Federal Court Full Court decision and where that leaves us.

PN170

MR PANIZZA: I looked fairly thoroughly at that decision. The Federal Full Court of Australia and Professional Officers Association of Victoria, the matter of applications for writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiore, I'm not sure the correct reference of 2001 FCA 296. When we have a look at that application, when we look at that decision we need to be fairly careful how we're going through it. Firstly, the first point I would make is that while in the decision the Court does very briefly refer to, I'm looking at part of this here, 170M, it briefly reports 170M on page 7 of the copy that I have from the Internet or that I've printed out anyway. But it just says, it just sort of refers to it in passing:

PN171

It is convenient to refer to section 170M which deals with who is bound by a certified agreement and provides - - -

PN172

And it just sets out the provision. It doesn't really make any further comment in regard to it, so it makes no comment and has no discussion in regard to that. It's very important that we look at that issue for a start. Secondly I would suggest that the parties really weren't dealing with the same sort of a matter, the same circumstances so it was a different kind of application. And the sections of the Act that were being considered primarily by the Commissioner's decision were not section 170M. So 170M when we go down to the end of the decision of the Court is not referred to at all in the decision of the Court. So it doesn't look at that issue, it doesn't look at the issue that it's an application. It doesn't look at the question at all.

PN173

It's looking at the question of intervention and it doesn't discuss the question of an application per se. I think that's what I saw in that decision. At the end of the day had we been seeking to intervene then I think it does create some interesting questions but I'm not standing here as an intervener and I cannot see how that section of the Act prevails because it's a general provision, it relates to intervention generally. We're not seeking to intervene generally we're seeking - making an application, a very specific and very narrow form of application. So I don't think I really need to say much more about the decision in that sense because I appreciate the restriction that it refers to but I don't know that in that sense that it applies. And if we were accepted as an applicant to be bound by the agreement that's not a party to the agreement in any case. Once we had done that we would be then seeking to be an applicant.

PN174

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Paragraph 49 of that decision, I think it's probably consistent with your line.

PN175

MR PANIZZA: Well when I - - -

PN176

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: It refers to section 43(ii)(b).

PN177

MR PANIZZA: Yes, but it doesn't - but it's about intervention, people seeking intervention it's not about people making an application. You can get into the Commission in all sorts of ways, not just by intervention. Most of us get here by application. I mean, application to intervene is just one form and that's why I don't think it's - when we look at the scheme of 130 and we look at - sorry, 170M it doesn't seem to me to knock us out or to affect us. It's perhaps one of the reasons why I went back and thought about the nature of the application.

PN178

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes. So what you seem to be saying is that if you comply with - by documentation to the Commission with the requirements of 170M(3) and in particular C and D, then you are of the view you don't even need to front?

PN179

MR PANIZZA: Well, technically you mightn't need to. I think you would be brave if you didn't, the Commission may feel that they need to get further information from you but technically you may not need to front because the application has been made, the information is before the Commission.

PN180

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: All you need to do is to - you have no need to front to prove that you've complied with 170M(3(c) and (d).

PN181

MR PANIZZA: Well, it also depends on whether notification to the Commission is seen to be an application.

PN182

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes.

PN183

MR PANIZZA: Or whether it's just notification and that by actually fronting the Commission and taking my place before it and making the application to the Commission to be bound that's when the application takes place. The Act is a little unclear on that procedurally and it seems to me there's an expectation that you will front the Commission but I've just said it's arguable that you need not front.

PN184

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Okay, Mr Panizza, I find that very helpful. Is there further you wish to add?

PN185

MR PANIZZA: I don't think there's anything more that I could add that would be helpful except to say that if it were necessary I can demonstrate that we've got all the necessary request to - - -

PN186

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Well I think you have demonstrated that sufficiently for my purposes. Thanks, Mr Panizza. Mr Oakley, is there anything that you wish to - - -

PN187

MR OAKLEY: Deputy President I don't think there is anything that I could necessarily add to - - -

PN188

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Still sitting on the fence?

PN189

MR OAKLEY: To add to my friend's submission. No, in my submission we have made an application for certification of an agreement under 170LK. We believe we have complied with the requirements of the Act and in that regard I see that the application by HSUA under 170M is a part of that process and shouldn't necessarily preclude the certification process. But if it does help in terms of the last matter you raised I can confirm that during the period of consideration of the agreement the employer also got letters from employees indicating their wish for the union to - well, to use their words, negotiate on their behalf and the employer did, in fact, meet with the union during that period of - during the consideration period and I was aware prior to the application being filed that the union had made a decision by its management committee that they would seek to be bound by the agreement and obviously that process followed through. But our priority clearly is to get the agreement certified and we don't - I don't believe there's any scope within the Act for us to object or otherwise to the HSUA being bound by the agreement but their application in that respect would stand alone.

PN190

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Thanks, Mr Oakley. What I will do is I will certify the agreement. As I mentioned the other day it had met all the requirements that it is required to meet and it will come into force on and from today, I think, Mr Oakley.

PN191

MR OAKLEY: Yes, that's correct.

PN192

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT: And the paperwork for that will duly follow. As separate exercise I will deliberate on the issue of whether the union will be bound by the agreement and I will issue reasons when I make my determination on that and should they be - should I find that they have met the requirements and the obligations of the Act, etcetera and I am able to, I shall issue an order determining that they are bound the agreement as a - in effect, as a separate exercise. But I will ponder that for a while and what you said, Mr Panizza, and issue a decision in due course and on that basis this matter is adjourned.

ADJOURNED INDEFINITELY [4.19pm]

INDEX

LIST OF WITNESSES, EXHIBITS AND MFIs

EXHIBIT #H1 LETTER DATED 14/2/02 TO THE ST JOHN OF GOD HEALTH CARE INC PN117
EXHIBIT #H2 COPY OF LETTER DATED 14/2/02 TO REGISTRAR, AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION. ATTACHED LETTER TO ST JOHN OF GOD HOSPITAL PN117
EXHIBIT #H3 LETTER DATED 8/2/02 TO THE SECRETARY OF HSOA, SIGNED BY A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO APPEAR TO BE EMPLOYEES OF ST JOHN OF GOD PATHOLOGY PN133