AG2004/7149, Transcript of Proceedings [2004] AIRCTrans 3922 (7 October 2004)

AUSCRIPT AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD
ABN 72 110 028 825

Level 7, ANZ House 13 Grenfell St ADELAIDE SA 5000
Tel:[phone] Fax:[phone]

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

O/N 2266
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS COMMISSION

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT O'CALLAGHAN

AG2004/7149

APPLICATION FOR AGREEMENT ABOUT
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE (DIVISION 3)

Application under section 170LS of the Act
by the Australian Nursing Federation-South
Australian Branch and Another for certification
of the Nurses/Midwives (South Australian
Public Sector) Enterprise Agreement 2004

ADELAIDE

3.05 PM, TUESDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER 2004

Continued from 23.9.04

PN104

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, I note there are no changes in appearances. I have listed this matter this afternoon because I have received advice from the parties following the hearing of the matter last week. I thought it best to raise one particular issue appertaining to that advice, which I once again invite the parties to comment on today. That goes specifically to the issue addressed in clause 14 of Mr Bonner's advice to me of yesterday's date.

PN105

It relates to sub-clause 19.2 of appendix 10 and, in particular, I must say I'm still seeking advice from the parties as to how I can consider a provision of that nature to be fundamentally to do with a matter between an employee and an employer. Given that concern that I have I thought it appropriate to alert the parties to that continuing concern. There are a number of other matters of concern but I have noted the advice of the parties in that respect.

PN106

There is a second issue that I will raise with the parties later having heard them on this particular matter. Now, Mr Bonner, do you want to say anything more to me about that clause, 19.2, or are you satisfied that paragraph 14 of your written submissions addresses that matter?

PN107

MR BONNER: Well, paragraph 14 of the submission does, in my view, go to the issue. It is apparent that the purpose behind clause 19.2 is to deal with the fact that the Caseload Midwifery Agreement is based on employees moving to a more or less annualised salary arrangement and, de-activating if you like, a number of award-based salary-related condition entitlements, that in return attracts a loading, or an allowance equating to 29.5 per cent of the base rate of pay to those employees.

PN108

Now, that rate of compensation was devised by the parties by reference to the working patterns that were expected of those employees in moving to those new working arrangements. However, it is entirely possible that through the course of actually operationalising the agreement and through analysis of the time records of the employees at the end of a 12-month time, determining that the actual compensation should, for example to pull a number out of the air, be 35 per cent rather than 29.5 per cent, and the employer and the Department of Health say to us: well, 29.5 per cent is as high as we are going to go.

PN109

In those circumstances, the ANF on instruction from the employees who are covered by this agreement may well say to the employer: well, we want to return therefore to the award-based conditions of employment, or the agreement and award-based conditions of employment. You can continue to work the midwives in that mode of practice, but the annualisation of salary arrangements that are provided for through this vehicle should cease to operate.

PN110

Now, it is in that context that we say that clause 19.2 is absolutely at the heart of the terms and conditions of employment that operate between the employer and each of those midwives, because the only reason that the ANF would be withdrawing or seeking leave to withdraw from the operation of that appendix would be if the remuneration was not adequate enough to compensate those employees for the loss of the conditions.

PN111

Those conditions are conditions set by this Commission as a result of dispute findings, they have been contained within logs and then hearings of dispute findings have been made and awards made in relation to those conditions, so we submit that those matters are absolutely conditions that arise from a dispute, are properly matters that the Commission has found to be matters going between the employer and the employee and this clause, to the extent that it is not directly a matter affecting the employees and the employers, is directly incidental to that relationship.

PN112

We believe that it is absolutely in keeping with previous decisions of this Commission previous to Electrolux. It is also our primary submission, as your Honour will be aware, that Electrolux does not change the law in relation to the operation of this particular issue for division 3 agreements.

PN113

We say to the Commission that to the extent the Commission had power to incorporate that clause in the amendment to the previous agreement, that power is not affected by Electrolux in terms of you making that decision now. So I guess that might be a long way around dealing with the question that you have raised, your Honour, but that would be my summary of what you are saying to you at clause 14.

PN114

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: It is actually a shorter way than I had anticipated you going, Mr Bonner. If I look at clause 19.2, the first component of that clause is the dissatisfaction of the ANF.

PN115

MR BONNER: Yes.

PN116

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: The second is the incapacity, as I read the clause, of the ANF to reach agreement to increase the level of remuneration. The third, is the capacity of the ANF to effectively terminate this agreement. By "this agreement" I take it that the parties are referring to appendix 10.

PN117

MR BONNER: The appendix, correct.

PN118

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Now, I have referred in summarising the clause in that way, in effect, to the ANF on three separate occasions, the first being the dissatisfaction, the second being the inability to reach an agreement and the third being the capacity to withdraw from the agreement so as to terminate its operation. Now, at what point does the clause provide for employees to be involved in that process because I simply don't see it and nor, in fact, can I see it in the response as it is set out in paragraph 14.

PN119

MR BONNER: I think that the Commission in looking at the provisions of 19.2 needs to look at, first of all, the words in the second line which your Honour didn't read, which was to amend the level of remuneration to the employees, now, that is the crux of the clause. If the level of remuneration is amended by the employer to reflect the actual experience there is no dispute.

PN120

There is no disagreement between the ANF and the employer, or the employees and the employer in terms of that issue, therefore, there is no cessation or no intention, no right, to walk away from that provision of the agreement. Our submission to you is that the crux of that whole sub-clause is the remuneration level of the employees concerned. The rest of it is all about the mechanics of addressing or fixing it, or the consequences of not fixing it.

PN121

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: What defines whether it is fixed, if I can use your terminology?

PN122

MR BONNER: Whether agreement is reached about whether or not it is adequate.

PN123

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Agreement with whom?

PN124

MR BONNER: Well, it would be between the employees and the employers fundamentally because the ANF, of course, would take instruction from its members who are employed within the context of this agreement. In exactly the same way as we were about the original conditions in determining whether the 29.5 per cent was adequate for the purposes of the duration of the agreement.

PN125

Of course, the employer would be consulting with all of its employees, who would be affected and covered by the agreement. In terms of the ANF being there, the ANF is the respondent to that appendix on behalf of its members who are midwives employed within the context of that caseload practice and that is why it is couched in those terms.

PN126

MR GREEN: If it helps at all, I mean, the employer takes the view that the Australian Nursing Federation stands for that union and also the employees or the members.

PN127

MR BONNER: Yes.

PN128

MR GREEN: The employers and employees and the ANFs members that it represents, so we would accept that where the word "ANF" is used in that context, it is ANF and its members who are the employers and employees.

PN129

MR BONNER: That takes you back to clause 2 of appendix 10, which says:

PN130

In the ANF in respect of midwives employed by the Women's and Children's Hospital in the program.

PN131

So the ANF in terms of 19.2 needs to be read in that context of who the parties are to that appendix.

PN132

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you, Mr Bonner. Mr Green, is there anything further you want to say to me about that clause 19.2?

PN133

MR GREEN: No, sir. Other than I support my friend's submission on the point and we would hope that reading the whole thing holistically, 92 is but one element of a large set of conditions that we have constructed and which sit there and can be accessed by health units, or parts of health units that want to apply the caseload approach to the provision of midwifery services.

PN134

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes. Mr Bonner, the second category of question that I have for you might be far harder for you to answer off the cuff, and I'm very happy for you to take it as a question on notice, if you wish to do so. It goes to the basis upon which the application is made. You repeated this afternoon your primary submission that the High Court in dealing with Electrolux was dealing with a division 2 agreement that as this application is made pursuant to division 3, the extent to which Electrolux has immediate import is at best dubious. Is that a fair summation of the position you are putting to me?

PN135

MR BONNER: What I was putting to your Honour is that it is my reading and our advice that Electrolux does not change the law insofar as it impacts on division 3 agreements.

PN136

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes. The joint judgments of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, at paragraph 162, say and I quote:

PN137

The phrase about matters pertaining to the relationship appears not only in section 170LI and with respect to division 2 agreements, the provisions respecting division 3 agreements -

PN138

and in brackets -

PN139

(In particular section 170LN), draw in the definition of 'industrial dispute' into section 4. This still contains the phrase about matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees. The inference that in this respect division 2 and division 3 share a basic precept is very strong and the weight of authority construing the definition of 'industrial dispute' is considerable. The field of industrial relations legislation in Australia is not one where the Parliament may readily be taken to have legislated without awareness of the interpretation placed by this Court on pivotal definitions. Nor can it be said that to apply to the terms of division 2 and division 3, the reasoning in Portus v Alcan is merely to perpetuate an erroneous construction.

PN140

If I look at division 3, can I put to you that successive that a range of Full Commission decisions with the most recent one being the Unilever appeal decision, have considered the operation of division 2, and a contrast of that with the operation of division 3. In Electrolux the High Court was dealing fundamentally with the provisions of section 170LI, which might be taken and described as somewhat of a jurisdictional section, underpinning the operation of division 2, namely that if the provisions of section 170LI were not to be met, then it is difficult to see how an application for certification can be made to the Commission.

PN141

Section 170LN, and I put to the parties performs a not dissimilar function relative to division 3. In effect, it establishes the jurisdiction which must be in existence for a division 3 agreement to be sought by the parties. The question upon which I seek advice, or a response from the parties goes to the extent to which an agreement sought under division 3 is proposed to settle, further settle, or maintain the settlement of or prevent industrial disputes and, in particular, whether that establishes an obligation on the Commission to look at the industrial dispute concerned, or whether it is simply the case that the parties might say to me that I should only look at the terms of the agreement being proposed.

PN142

On the one hand, if all of the Commission is supposed to look at is the agreement being proposed, then it might be argued that the original industrial dispute, in effect, defines the arena within which the division 3 agreement might operate. Now, were that to be the case, then it is difficult for me to see how I could meet the requirements set out in Electrolux which link back to the concept of matters pertaining. If I'm to look at the industrial dispute and the dispute finding, then I note that the dispute finding which is relied upon in the application was determined by Deputy President McBean on 11 September 1990, and it followed a log of claims and letter of demand circulated to a broad range of employers in July of 1990.

PN143

I do need to say, if I am looking at that log of claims, there are a number of aspects of that log of claims which might conceivably be reviewed in the context of whether or not they are matters that pertain to the employment relationship. Section 101 of the Act deals with the dispute finding process. It establishes at section 101(1) that the Commission has the obligation to determine the parties to an industrial dispute and the matters in dispute and to record its findings. It gives the Commission the capacity to vary or revoke any of the findings. Section 101(3) says that:

PN144

The determination or finding of the Commission on a question as to the existence of an industrial dispute is, in all Courts and for all purposes, conclusive and binding on all persons affected by the question.

PN145

It might be argued to me that section 101(3) deprives the Commission of the requirement or the necessity to go back and revisit that particular dispute finding. Now, I thought it appropriate to raise those questions. I'm very conscious that this is, for want of a better phrase, a high profile agreement. It is, nevertheless, one of the very early agreements to be sought pursuant to Division 3 of the Act and I am conscious that there are numerous other agreements that will follow this one.

PN146

On that basis, a second key purpose of this afternoons hearing was to give the parties the opportunity to either respond to the issue that I've raised or to take that as a question on notice so that the parties might either return for another hearing or alternatively present a written response. Now, before you respond to my invitation in that regard, if you wish to put your head together with Mr Green so as to develop a coordinated approach or response to my concern, feel free to do so. I am in your hands.

PN147

MR BONNER: If the Commission would give us a couple of minutes to confer, that would be helpful.

PN148

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, I will adjourn the matter for a few minutes.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT [3.27pm]

RESUMED [3.40pm]

PN149

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Mr Bonner?

PN150

MR BONNER: Thank you for the opportunity to confer with my friend, your Honour. If I can perhaps deal with your question by going back through the sequence that we find ourselves in from the issuing of the log in, I think, 1989 which led to the dispute finding in C31999. That log, of course, was necessary to create a finding that an interstate dispute existed between the employees of the union and the employers in a range of areas in relation to the employment of nurses and midwives in their various facilities.

PN151

The Commission in finding the dispute in 31999 then established a scope in which it could then operate to make awards if they were sought by the parties in settlement or partial settlement of that dispute. I'm sorry if I am going back over ground you need me to traverse but I think I would be - - -

PN152

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: No, I'm right with you, Mr Bonner. I'm along for the ride, as it was.

PN153

MR BONNER: Now, at that time, the Commission made a finding based on the legal limitations that then applied as to what fell within the scope of that dispute. That dispute finding still holds because it has, as you have correctly pointed out, never been narrowed or reinterpreted by the Commission to this time. That does not mean, in our submission, that the Commission still has the capacity to make awards or agreements that traverse the full scope of that dispute finding.

PN154

For example, the enactment of section 89A in 1996 created limitations on the power of the Commission to make awards in that and other areas and indeed, led to the removal from awards of previously existing conditions of employment. That fell within the dispute finding of that and other disputes. So there is not necessarily, in our submission, a direct relationship between what is within the scope of the dispute and what the Commission is able to incorporate within industrial instruments that it approves.

PN155

The effect of Electrolux, moving forward again, is such that again the impact of Electrolux for Division 3 agreements is that it reinforces the law all the way through. That industrial awards and agreements that are made in relation to interstate disputes have to pertain to the relationship between employees and their employers. Now, that is not, in our submission, new ground. Unlike the situation that is dealt with in LI where the Court was dealing with agreements that were, for the first time before it, based on a separate constitutional power, namely the constitutional corporations power.

PN156

So on terms of Division 3, you are still dealing with the power from the constitution dealing with preventual settlement of disputes that extend beyond the boundaries of any particular State. That has been unchanged by Electrolux and it is our submission that the Commission does not need to go back to the dispute finding or indeed the award to be satisfied that it has the power to authorise all of the items in the agreement. The issue is, do they or do they not assist with a settlement, further settlement, or maintain a settlement or prevent industrial disputes, arising or preventing industrial situations from giving rise to industrial disputes, to use the provisions of LN.

PN157

Now, in terms of the troublesome clause 19.2 of the appendix, it is our submission that clearly the purpose of that particular subclause is about avoiding industrial disputation arising, if in the course of operationalising that appendix, it becomes clear that employees are being inadequately recompensed for the work they do, given the best of attentions of the parties at the time. Now, there needed to be an out provided to those employees that did not require them from taking industrial action in order to get reversion back to their principle award entitlements.

PN158

It is upon that basis that 19.2 was constructed. That is, to allow those employees to say, we are not being - our wages and conditions have actually been reduced by the operation of this agreement. They have not been maintained. We want therefore to go back to the regime that has been established by the Commission in the award in the principle body of the agreement and therefore we are instructing you, ANF, to notify the employer that you wish to withdraw from this appendix operating.

PN159

Now, that is as we would submit the scenario that you are confronted with and we don't believe that your powers have been effected in any substantial way at all by the recent High Court decision.

PN160

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Mr Bonner, the statutory declarations that have with the agreement required at paragraph 2.1, the parties state the basis on which the application is made under Division 3 of Part VIB. The parties advise that the agreement is made in settlement, further settlement, maintenance of settlement or the prevention of an industrial dispute. C31999 of 1990 was nominated.

PN161

MR BONNER: Yes.

PN162

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: If I understand what you are telling me, it is to the effect that the dispute finding in C31999 (1990) can be relied upon to meet the constitutional or establish the constitutional basis upon which Division 3 then operates.

PN163

MR BONNER: Correct.

PN164

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: The question that I'm grappling with here is the extent then to which I'm obligated to look at whether or not C31999 of 1990 could be properly described in today's terms as a finding about an industrial dispute. Now, if I ignore that question, then how would you put to me that I could conclude that this application is intent upon settling, further settling or maintaining the settlement? It is quite conceivable that looking forward I could look at this particular agreement and simply satisfy myself that this agreement operates to prevent industrial disputes or to prevent industrial situations from giving rise to industrial disputes?

PN165

MR BONNER: Yes.

PN166

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: The dilemma on which I'm seeking your observations goes to the retrospective function which may or may not be inherent in section 170LN.

PN167

MR BONNER: Yes, I understand that. Your Honour, our submissions are that the Commission needs to turn its mind to the dispute finding only in so far as you need to be satisfied that there is a jurisdictional base to operationalise Division 3. The time that your Honour needs to then determine whether or not the provisions - the test about whether or not there is a valid capacity for the Commission to make the award or agreement based on the relationship issue, if I can put it that way in shorthand, is when the Commission is being invited to make an award or agreement as a consequence of the industrial dispute.

PN168

Now, that is where we are at today and we are not asking you to make an award or agreement that extends to all of which may have been in 31999. We are asking you to make an agreement or to certify an agreement that is in very specific terms and we are saying to you is appropriately about matters pertaining to the relationship between an employer and employees. So in our submission, it would not matter if there were matters in 31999 that if you were asked to make an agreement about that you would find were outside power, it is whether or not you are being asked to do that in this circumstance, and you are not, in our submission.

PN169

Now, in terms of the scope of dispute, the parties did, I agree, indicate to you that 31999 was the dispute that you being referred to but you were also referred to a series of bargaining notices which, at 6.10, bargaining notices to 2004, 1001 through 1123 respectively which also then set out a range of matters that were to be negotiated and dealt with in the form of an agreement between the employees and the employer concerned.

PN170

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Those bargaining notices do not, by themselves, establish the constitutional foundation for the application of Division 3.

PN171

MR BONNER: I absolutely accept that they do not but I'm saying to you, there are two things going here simultaneously. The first is, does the Commission have the head of power to make an agreement pursuant to Division 3? That is dealt with through the existence of 31999. You are not being asked to go back to 31999 to determine whether or not the content is applicable to this agreement.

PN172

The content of the agreement has been described between the parties as coming out of the negotiations that were, if you like, updated by the notice of initiation 1001 of '04 through to 1123 of '04. So the content of the agreement, if you like, has been circumscribed to be within those issues and the issue is already dealt with in the awards and agreements of the Commission, not going back to the head of power provided under 31999.

PN173

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you, Mr Bonner. Mr Green, do you want to participate in this discussion?

PN174

MR GREEN: Well, if I could add, I would want to participate but I support what my friend has said. We discussed that at the break and I've got nothing to add.

PN175

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. Mr Bonner, one last issue. I might be traversing old ground but in paragraph 22 of the transcript of last week, I indicated to the parties that it may be if I can find that appendix 10 does not represent an impediment to certification, some of those issues, and in that regard I was referring to clause 18, could be dealt with by way of undertaking in which case the parties might want to turn their minds to those questions. How does the written material subsequently provided to me do that?

PN176

MR BONNER: This is in relation to clause 18?

PN177

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, clause 18 of the mainstream agreement.

PN178

MR BONNER: Yes. The submissions that we put to you really go to the issue that I think was inherent in the Commission's questions which was the extent to which clause 18 binds future health units and employees of that health unit to the terms of appendix 10. Having adopted the provisions of appendix 10, how do they get themselves out of it in the event that it does not work out the way that they had hoped or anticipated that it might?

PN179

What we were putting to you in our submissions from paragraph 15 of our further submissions was that clause 18 does not in fact lead to other health units or health unit sites or the employees of those sites becoming bound by the appendix. Clause 18 is no more and no less than a facilitative arrangement that allows further agreement between the nominated parties set out in the clause to adopt the terms of appendix 10 so as to implement case load midwifery practice within their own organisations. They are not there for automatically subject to the termination arrangements, for example the now infamous clause 19.2 of appendix 10.

PN180

So we are saying to you that the process, the response to the three questions that you raised at the last question, the process would be that the employer would seek to implement case load midwifery practice, and they would do that through the consultation provisions set out in the agreement. There would then be a process of discussion involving the effected employees and the ANF and an agreement would be reached between the parties as to whether or not it was appropriate to pick up all of the content of appendix 10 or most of it or modify it in the way that was appropriate to that new application of the model.

PN181

As part of that, the parties would have to reach agreement pursuant to those negotiations about how that would be evaluated, modified or cancelled in the event that things did not work out. For example, clause 19 as a whole of appendix 10 operates at the end of 12 months of the operation of case load midwifery at Womens' and Children's Hospital. I think that time frame is rapidly approaching us. It would be a nonsense therefore to adopt clause 19 of appendix 10 in a new site that was just about to adopt that model, say in March of next year with that 12 months already having expired.

PN182

So clause 18 of the principle agreement, in our view, needs to be read down as a facilitative condition, not as one that enables or somehow captures other parties that are not within the language of appendix 10 already parties to that appendix at some stage in the future. That is how we sought to address your Honour's concerns in relation to those three issues. Now, the parties, when we were before you in relation to the adoption of the approval of an amendment to the previous certified agreement by the inclusion of what was then appendix G, the case load agreement to the previous Public Sector agreement gave certain undertakings to the Commission in terms of how we would behave if we were to seek to exit from that agreement.

PN183

That is, that we would revert to the broadly applicable conditions of employment for nurses and midwives, that is the award and the conditions that were embodied in the principle part of the agreement and that that appendix would continue to sit there but not be operationalised for the duration of that agreement. Now, if your Honour is asking whether or not we are prepared to give similar commitments today, then I can indicate that we are.

PN184

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: So can I just apply that approach to clause 18 in the mainstream agreement? What you are saying to me is that an individual health unit, the Department and group of employees who are the effected employees and the ANF may reach agreement such that they would apply the approach in appendix 10. In the event that the group of employees was not unanimous and in the event that some of those employees possibly weren't even members of the ANF, to what extent would you then say to me that the provisions of appendix 10 could be relied upon so as to override the obligations set out elsewhere in the agreement?

PN185

MR BONNER: I think that it is integral to the way clause 18 is operationalised that it is noted that appendix 10 provides that the employees have to be volunteers to move into this model. So we would be saying to your Honour that no employee could be forced to welter their terms and conditions of employment. Let us look at a real example and assume that Flinders Medical Centre was seeking to adopt a case load model of practice based on the Womens' and Children's model.

PN186

The expectation there would be that the midwives at Flinders would be asked who wished to move into that particular team to practice case load midwifery. Those that did not would remain within the labour and delivery suite, the other services of the hospital that continued a practice and be employed on the traditional mechanisms. But the model is fundamentally based on a fact that people have to opt in to the case load model of practice. They cannot be compelled to do so.

PN187

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Can I understand that with reference to paragraph 27 in your submissions, then they can opt out at will?

PN188

MR BONNER: It would certainly be a matter in negotiating under clause 18 with the other health unit, we would have to work through how people could then move out of that agreement. Certainly at Womens' and Children's the deal was that they move in for a 12 month period of time, subject to that evaluation. Now, because that was a new effectively pilot site for the program, people were prepared to sign up for that kind of duration but otherwise it would have to be in a capacity for employees to opt out and go back to their principle conditions of employment.

PN189

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. Mr Green, do you want to say anything to me about this issue?

PN190

MR GREEN: Again, your Honour, my friend has covered it in a way that I've got nothing to add except to say that I adopt what he has put and can confirm that the method of going into the case load system, and for that matter coming out, I agree with that too.

PN191

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.

PN192

MR GREEN: I have really nothing more than that to add.

PN193

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Thank you. I'm conscious that the parties are very anxious to have this agreement certified. I'm equally conscious that the parties are anxious to have it certified very quickly. There are issues that I want to take on board and consider. I will be producing a decision relative to the application and hope that I can have that decision available to the parties within the next few days. I will adjourn the matter .

PN194

MR BONNER: Before we adjourn, your Honour, we did hand up last week a package of materials that were explanatory notes that were provided to employees. I'm wondering if that bundle of documents could be marked, just for the record?

PN195

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, I am happy to mark them.

EXHIBIT #ANF1 DOCUMENT HEADED PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISE BARGAINING 2004

PN196

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I take it you did give me two copies of the same document, Mr Bonner?

PN197

MR BONNER: Yes, I think I handed one to your associate. There should be two there.

PN198

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, for the record, I will also mark the material sent to me on Monday of this week as ANF2.

EXHIBIT #ANF2 MATERIAL

PN199

MR BONNER: Thank you, your Honour.

PN200

THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I will adjourn the matter on that basis.

ADJOURNED INDEFINITELY [4.06pm]

INDEX

LIST OF WITNESSES, EXHIBITS AND MFIs

EXHIBIT #ANF1 DOCUMENT HEADED PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISE BARGAINING 2004 PN196
EXHIBIT #ANF2 MATERIAL PN199