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AUSCRIPT AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD
ABN 72 110 028 825
Level 4, 179 Queen St MELBOURNE Vic 3000
(GPO Box 1114 MELBOURNE Vic 3001)
Tel:(03) 9672-5608 Fax:(03) 9670-8883
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
O/N 9096
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS COMMISSION
SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT LLOYD
AG2004/7847
APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATION OF
AGREEMENT
Application under section 170LJ of the Act
by University of Melbourne and Others for
certification of University of Melbourne
Enterprise Agreement 2003
MELBOURNE
2.07 PM, THURSDAY, 18 NOVEMBER, 2004
PN1
MR N. RUSKIN: I seek leave to appear on behalf of the University of Melbourne. With me is MR N. WAUGH of the University of Melbourne.
PN2
MS S. ROBERTS: I appear for the National Tertiary Education Industry Union.
PN3
MS L. BZOVY: I appear for the CPSU.
PN4
MS V. ILIAS: I appear on behalf of the LHMU.
PN5
MR J. COONEY: I appear for the Communications, Electrical and Plumbing Union. And also entering an appearance on behalf of the CFMEU.
PN6
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Is there any objections to the leave?
PN7
MS ROBERTS: No, your Honour.
PN8
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Thank you. Yes?
PN9
MR RUSKIN: Thank you, your Honour. Your Honour, the university has made application for the certification of the University of Melbourne Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 2003. The university has filed the application and the relevant statutory declarations as have all the parties to the agreement. The university submits that the Commission should be - the agreement should be certified under the powers of 170LT as it meets, we submit, 170LI in that it contains matters that pertain to the relationship between an employer and its employees and it satisfies the tests in 170LT; the no disadvantage test.
PN10
It contains a dispute settling procedure. It satisfies 170LT(7) about certain groups whose situation should be taken into account and it has been approved by a valid majority and the procedures for the making of the agreement have otherwise been met. If the Commission wishes me to address any particular issue of the agreement I would be pleased to do so, sir.
PN11
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I will just go to page 88 of the agreement which is clause 99. Could you explain to me what that clause is about?
PN12
MR RUSKIN: Yes, I am pleased to explain it. The - under the policies and procedures of the university itself there is a committee called the human resources management advisory committee and it operates through the office of the Vice Chancellor of the university. It has certain membership which is a Deputy Vice Chancellor, three members appointed by the Vice Chancellor, three members appointed by the academic board, the academic registrar and an elected general staff member of the university council. I can hand up, if the Commission wishes, a copy of those - of the committee and its operation, if it would assist the Commission.
PN13
PN14
MR RUSKIN: Thank you, sir. In clause 3, your Honour, it sets out the functions of the committee and that is essentially why I handed it up. And you will see that the functions deal with human resource issues. So that is a committee - an advisory or consultative committee of the university. Now, under the agreement the parties have agreed that the university will recommend that the university council, under which this committee might be said to sit, vary the terms - the membership of this committee so that an additional person is added to the committee being an existing council member being in fact the elected academic staff member of the council.
PN15
That is the purpose of the clause, is merely to invite the council to consider varying the committee membership and if the Commission wishes me to explain further on that matter - - -
PN16
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: No, that suffices, thank you, Mr Ruskin. I have got another clause I would be interested in some explanation of. It is clause 101 found on page 91.
PN17
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN18
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Particularly 101.2 and then sub clause (2) of that point, which is at the top of page 91.
PN19
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN20
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: And it describes the disputes committee:
PN21
... and will be comprised of equal numbers of nominees, management and of the unions.
PN22
It is a question I raised with some other institutions in this field about how that clause operates in the context of a dispute which involves non union members.
PN23
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN24
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: And whether there is any potential impact on their freedom of association rights particularly as clause 170LT(8) - I am talking about the dispute settlement procedures, talks about:
PN25
Preventing and settling disputes between employer and the employees whose employment is subject to the agreement.
PN26
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN27
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Do you have a view on that?
PN28
MR RUSKIN: Yes, sir, did you want me to address you just on that point? You referred me to 101, was it 101 in toto, or was it only the issue about which you had a question - was limited to that?
PN29
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Essentially, the issue, that sub paragraph - - -
PN30
MR RUSKIN: That sub clause.
PN31
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Sub clause (2), yes.
PN32
MR RUSKIN: Yes, well, I can address you on that. The function of the disputes committee which is the committee set out in 101.2(2) is that of a mediation committee and no more. It is not a representative body. It is a body brought together during a dispute between parties whose task is to work to find a solution to the problems at issue. There can be no doubt that in a dispute settling procedure it is open to the parties to propose mediators, conciliators, disputes committees or the like to facilitate the resolution of a dispute. Indeed, such a committee can under the width of 170LT(8) determine a dispute if the parties want a committee to determine - either the Commission to determine it or some other body.
PN33
There is no bar in a dispute settling procedure about matters to do with an employment relationship for that procedure to provide for an outside conciliator, mediator or arbitrator. It so happens in this procedure that the dispute committee, whose task it is to assist the resolution of the dispute, is made up of equal representatives of management and unions. It could have provided as - I mean, unlikely to - but commercial agreements might often say that the dispute shall be determined by someone nominated by the president of the Law Institute of Victoria or the like.
PN34
It so happens this dispute committee is made of equal representatives of management and unions. Therefore, as its task is to facilitate a resolution of disputes as such and to achieve an agreement between the disputing parties and not itself, no issue of the freedom of association provisions, we say, apply. That is to say, the dispute is not within the committee, the dispute is outside of the committee and a committee has been brought in, being nominees of the union and management, to help those disputing parties resolve it.
PN35
In the McDonalds case, which I can hand up if the Commission wishes, the Commission - the Full Bench of the Commission considered the obligations under 170LU(2)(a) which are the provisions of the Act that talk about that agreement shouldn't contain provisions which are in breach of Part XA. LU(2)(a) says:
PN36
Despite section 170LU(2) the Commission may refuse to certify an agreement if the Commission is satisfied that it contains objectionable provisions, that is, 298Z type provisions.
PN37
Now, adopting a Full Bench decision in Unilever the Full Bench in McDonalds held that it must refuse certification if the agreement contains objectionable provisions,t hat is, provisions that positively, not negatively, but positively requires or permits conduct that would contravene those freedom of association provisions. Now, there is nothing to suggest in the dispute committee membership that a breach of the freedom of association provisions occurs because there are nominees of the union on that committee.
PN38
Of course it doesn't mean that the nominees of the union will be union members themselves. No doubt it is likely to be but it doesn't have to be. Just because nominees of the union are on a mediation committee or resolution committee doesn't mean that that committee can't deal with non union members and union members equally because the dispute committee is not in the dispute. Naturally, if any person, be it a nominee of management or a nominee of the union, on that committee, acts in an objectionable way within the meaning of the freedom of association provisions then those provisions could be invoked.
PN39
But on the face of the document there is nothing that requires or permits freedom of association breaches to occur.
PN40
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: What happened if there was, say, one or two staff members of the university who were in dispute in some way and these provisions were triggered - - -
PN41
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN42
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: - - - and they might be in dispute with management who might be a union member.
PN43
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN44
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: How are their interests protected from their decision not to be a member of the union, how are their interests protected in how this clause would operate?
PN45
MR RUSKIN: Well, if there is a dispute between themselves and the management it might be that it is a single dispute and it might be that the grievance procedure is invoked. That is clause 100 which talks about disputes about - grievances with one staff member.
PN46
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Well, I suggested two.
PN47
MR RUSKIN: Yes and assuming there is more than one, then it would operate this way. There would be a dispute between management people and staff people and you say the staff people are not union members and the management people happen to be union members. The task of the dispute committee is to sort out the dispute by encouraging the parties to reach agreement. It can't compel an agreement. It has no power to compel an agreement between the disputing parties. Its interest, as in any mediating body, is to resolve it.
PN48
And that might mean that - and it can do so in any way that it is capable of doing but if the parties won't enter an agreement under the next sub clause then there is no agreement. So it is not a matter of their interests being affected, it is a matter of the dispute committee - these experienced people trying to resolve it.
PN49
THE COMMISSIONER: I just noticed under clause 101.4 - - -
PN50
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN51
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: - - - it contemplates:
PN52
That the parties may refuse to engage in the process.
PN53
Which could be an outcome if you were a non union member, I suppose.
PN54
MR RUSKIN: Yes, it could be. It could be that a union member could equally say, I don't want to be part of the process because I don't like any of the nominees that anyone has nominated. I want the Vice Chancellor to be on it and I want the - whoever to be on it. I want my friend to be the nominee. There certainly could be, but I don't think the clause contemplates, that because the nominees are from the union, that therefore there is a clear breach of the freedom of association provisions. The difficulties with the process may occur with a union person as much as a non union person.
PN55
Once people understand that the role of the committee is not to represent anyone but to be nominated to play an impartial dispute resolution role, that is when it is - one sees that there is no freedom of association provision.
PN56
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thanks, I think that is all I need.
PN57
MR RUSKIN: Okay. Are there any other matters that you - - -
PN58
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I don't think so, Mr Ruskin, no.
PN59
MR RUSKIN: Thank you.
PN60
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Ms Roberts?
PN61
MS ROBERTS: Thank you, your Honour, we support the submissions made by the university. We would simply add in respect of clause 101 that our understanding of how these disputes committees work is that the nominees, I suppose, on the committee don't act so much as advocates for the individual concerned in any - say an individual dispute, but as nominees, of say, both sides of the dispute as a class. And in doing so there is nothing in the agreement that I can see, just having a quick read of that clause, that would prevent individuals who are going to the disputes committee to actually bring their own representatives to act as a personal advocate.
PN62
But the fact of the union having nominees on that committee would not be taking on that advocating role in, say, the way that a solicitor would be acting for their client. It is not that kind of relationship. What we would further add is, also your Honour raised the question of how a person's interests would be protected if they were to come to the disputes committee in the circumstance where there was a staff member who was not a union member and a management person who was - or a number of people who were union members.
PN63
What we would say in that circumstance that in terms of those individuals seeking individual advice before going to the disputes committee is that, on the part of the NTU, certainly, if a management nominee who was a member of the union were to ask us for advice about how they should conduct their behaviour in respect of the conduct of a disputes committee, we would not give that advice because we would view that as advising management. And we would refer that union member, in fact, to consult with his or her management colleagues in order to gain that advice.
PN64
So that may assist your Honour in terms of how such a situation might come about in the disputes committee. Other than that I think, your Honour, we concur with the submissions of the university but if your Honour has other particular questions about how, in custom and practice, that would work, we would, of course, be open to answer any.
PN65
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so. I have just got one additional query which also Mr Ruskin might want to make a comment on. It is clause 48.2 headed, "Remuneration packaging" and the second last dot point permits salary packaging for payment of union dues, 48.2.
PN66
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN67
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: I would be interested to know how that - if you have got any submissions about that, about how that stands against Electrolux type issues - - -
PN68
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN69
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: - - - or 170LI.
PN70
MR RUSKIN: So that is specifically the second last dot point in - - -
PN71
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes.
PN72
MR RUSKIN: - - - 48.2.
PN73
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: 48.2, yes, payment of union subscriptions.
PN74
MR RUSKIN: Yes. Okay, well, I have some submissions that I could make on those matters. Clause 48 provides for remuneration packaging benefits and as you will see the second last dot point is not alone, there are a range of benefits set out there which can be salary packaged. In fact all the items that are listed there, bar one - I include the second last dot point - are FBT free. So there is no cost to the employer in the salary packaging arrangement other than the packaging administration fee which can be packaged itself. So there is actually no cost to the employer.
PN75
The one item that is - there is one item - there is a concessional FBT rate that applies to it. Now, this clause provides that in accessing non cash benefits staff members must meet the full cost of the remuneration packaging benefit. As I say, there is no cost to the employer and the university, if there is a change in the legislation, can elect to discontinue the arrangement unless the staff member elects to bear the additional cost. So there is no cost to the employer in this arrangement. I should say in making these submissions, I would like to acknowledge the Australian Higher Education Industry Association which provided the university with much of these submissions.
PN76
I would like to thank them for providing those submissions as they were put in a matter before the Commission earlier this week. It is accepted that for an agreement to be suitable for certification the terms must be about the employer/employee relationship and I think everyone in Australia has just learned that. The university submits that clause 48 in its entirety pertains to that relationship. Remuneration packaging is about the form of remuneration that employees receive for work performed which is a key incident of the employment relationship, that is to say, it is about - the clause is about how to remunerate staff and that is the way it should be seen.
[2.31pm]
PN77
It is not about the disbursement of payments to third parties after a right to remuneration has been earned, because these packaging arrangements are before you get the cash you agree to some other remuneration arrangement. Instead of getting $50,000 you get $45,000, together with these other remuneration benefits. Now, it is not about disbursement of payments to third parties leading to a debtor creditor relationship, which, of course, were the problems with the Alcan and the Portus decisions and I have got those decisions if you would like me to hand them up. I think they are reasonably familiar. Remuneration packaging represents remuneration that can be distinguished from any other arrangement to disperse employee benefits to third parties as it is a benefit to the employee.
PN78
These arrangements - and I include the second last dot point - are benefits to employees. They can subscribe to a professional journal. They can pay their self education expenses. They can pay professional subscriptions and they can subscribe to - another benefit - to a union. As such it can be characterised as a form of remuneration of additional benefit to the employee because this ultimately is a cash benefit to the employee. They get something more than the $50,000 they would otherwise have got if they just took the cash. The use of remuneration packaging as a mechanism to facilitate the recruitment and retention of staff is now common practice amongst employers and these arrangements simply reflect that.
PN79
Whilst a distinction has been drawn in the past between employer payments to third parties for superannuation, as in the Manufacturing Grocers case, and other payments to third parties like Portus and Alcan which are not pertaining to that relationship, we submit that the distinction should not be made due to that common use of remuneration packaging and the purpose for which this clause operates. And the purpose for which this clause operates is to provide greater benefits to employees. This clause is about the method by which remuneration is paid to employees which is a direct incident of the employment relationship.
PN80
There is no qualitative difference between a situation where the actual form of remuneration is agreed and recorded in an agreement and where the employer and employee agree on the total amount of remuneration, but agree to packaging. There is no difference. In Schefenacker Vision Systems, that recent decision of Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan, he felt himself bound by Portus and Alcan and, indeed, Ballantyne, a decision of Vice President Ross recently, where such decisions - because those decisions held that the payment of union dues to a third party did not involve a matter pertaining to the employment relationship, and that is so, but we think that his decision was incorrect in that this clause is not about the payment of union dues to a third party.
PN81
It is about providing benefits to employees where they choose to take those benefits to provide them with a greater overall remuneration outcome. We say that the decision of Senior President O'Callaghan, by focusing on who would be the recipient of any payment, failed to ask a critical question and the question was does the term as to remuneration packaging pertain to the employment relationship? That is, is remuneration packaging about remuneration - about the employment relationship, and we say remuneration is about the employment relationship, as is remuneration packaging, because packaging merely provides for a greater overall benefit to the employee than if it was not packaged, should they adopt it.
PN82
In Portus it was the very nature of the union dues' arrangement, being payment from the salary of the employee to the union - and that is what the demand said - if one reads the actual demand in Alcan and in Portus, the demand was that the wages of every employee who elects to be a member of the Federation, be increased by a payment equivalent to the pro rata union dues and that amount, if so directed by the employee, be sent each pay day without reduction to the union - to the Federation. It was - that was the demand that was what caused it to fail because it was about a third party relationship, whereas this is not. It doesn't matter who is to receive the payments, be it the lease payments for a laptop, be it the company that has arranged that; be it the sports and physical recreation centre or be it the Melbourne Theatre Company or the union.
PN83
It doesn't matter who; it matters what is the purpose of it. Central to the employment relationship is the provision of services for reward. Payment of union dues by an employer after accrual of the right to wages is unrelated to any payment in return for services rendered. That is what happened in Portus and Alcan. So it is - the payment of union dues by the employer after accrual of the right to wages is not about return for services rendered. It is this fact which distinguishes the character of these payments from the character of payments by way of remuneration packaging into superannuation or other forms of remuneration. I might note that in Portus Stevens J held that the payment of retirement benefits were of the character describing an employer employee relationship.
PN84
Remuneration packaging concerns issues as to how and in what manner an employee will be rewarded for their services and we say there is a profound qualitative difference in the character of these matters to the payment of union dues. Where an employer is directed to merely pay a third party - to a third party a debt, as in Portus and Alcan, as agent for the employee, that has got nothing to do with the remuneration packaging arrangements. With remuneration packaging the employer is at all times acting in the capacity of an employer in relation to providing a benefit to the employee in return for the employee's services. That is to say the employee is choosing how the employee wishes to be rewarded, just cash or some other benefits.
PN85
Remuneration packaging merely dictates the manner in which the remuneration is provided. The Court in Alcan that one must look beyond the mere mechanical act as to whether an employer is paying a third party or not and examine the true qualitative character of the conduct of the employer. In Alcan it was found that the concerns raised by the demand that you shall pay union dues to the Federation, was a demand that concerned employees in their capacity as union members and not as employees as such, and, therefore, it didn't have that necessary requisite relationship. Now, that doesn't apply to salary packaging.
PN86
Remuneration packaging arrangements are not simply about an employer making a payment to a third party; they involve a redistribution of an employee's pay to provide a tax benefit to the employee - a lawful tax benefit, nevertheless, but a tax benefit to the employee. As such they are of additional value to the employee in the context of their reward for their labour. That is different from Alcan and Portus, where no such tax benefit was put in those terms. It is acknowledged that in the Schefenacker case, Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan, he made similar observations but despite his observations he concluded that the salary packaging clause before him was akin to the deduction of union dues.
PN87
He followed the decision of Vice President Ross on union dues as it was put in that case and concluded that salary packaging did not pertain to the relationship. But he didn't really provide any further explanation as to why the approach needed - the same approach needed to be applied to remuneration packaging. If one looks at his decision it just does not address how he came to that conclusion, other than saying it is like a demand for union dues be deducted and paid to a union. It may be that he took the view that this clause really did not amount to remuneration packaging in the true sense. That is an entitlement directed at maximising the net benefit that may be received by an employee in return for their services by adjusting the manner in which that employee is rewarded.
PN88
And that is what it really is; it is about an adjustment of the remuneration - the cash remuneration to provide a net benefit to the employee in a lawful way without cost to the employer. His Honour may have merely viewed the clause as providing a procedure for an employer to provide third parties for the provision of goods and services to the employee, but that is not the way we say it should be seen. He seemed, we think, to have found the salary packaging clause was an ineffective clause which actually couldn't have generated any nett benefit to the employee and we say that the arrangements in clause 48.2 are a net benefit to the employee and it is up - it is for them to decide whether they want those benefits and whether they regard them as benefits, but if they wish to take them then they are tax effective.
PN89
Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan appears to have formed this conclusion that this was contrasted with the tax situation in respect of superannuation, in the absence of any expert tax evidence, and I haven't produced any tax evidence today other than asserting that all these benefits bar one are tax effective and the one which is not fully tax effective is the car and that is just concessionally - sorry, not tax effective, FBT tax effective, and the car is only concessional. But they are all in part or in whole tax effective. We would say that it - with respect, that it doesn't fall to this Commission to make assessments as to the tax effectiveness and viability of a particular remuneration packaging clause, which is perhaps the way that his Honour reached his conclusion, it appears didn't think there was any net benefit.
PN90
If you, your Honour, are satisfied that the clause has been agreed to by the parties in a bona fide attempt to obtain additional tax advantages to employees by way of salary packaging, and we assert that it is, the clause should be found to pertain to the employer employee relationship. To do otherwise would be to give the clause a character that wasn't intended by the parties because the Commission's particular assessment of how the clause may operate in practice after the Commission has made an assessment of the tax laws. I don't think the issue of whether they are, in fact, net tax beneficial is necessarily relevant.
PN91
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: No.
PN92
MR RUSKIN: The fact is that they are and that they provide a benefit to employees than if the employee themselves paid those benefits after receiving the cash salary. I have nearly finished. I wanted to deal with the Manufacturing Grocers decision about superannuation where the High Court found that a requirement that an employer made contributions to third parties, being superannuation schemes, did involve an industrial matter pertaining to an industrial - to the employment relationship. In that case the Court observed that superannuation benefits were frequently offered as part of the total remuneration of a prospective employee and were common means of attracting labour and rewarding labour for their services. This is before the compulsory superannuation scheme came into effect.
PN93
It is an historical and industrial fact that an entitlement to salary package plays the same role in the marketplace, being an entitlement - an inducement to attract labour and to reward labour and I think this is recognised at 41.8 of the agreement which states the purposes, and it says the purpose of the clause is to facilitate the recruitment and retention of quality staff. The salary packaging arrangement is a form of salary enhancement and, therefore, an integral part of remuneration benefits which are of themselves matters pertaining to the employer employee relationship. If it please the Commission.
PN94
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thanks, Mr Ruskin. Ms Roberts, do you have anything?
PN95
MS ROBERTS: Your Honour, I don't have anything to add in respect of the salary packaging matter, but we confer with the submissions made by the university.
PN96
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Are there any other submissions from the union representatives about the agreement at all?
PN97
MS BZOVY: Elizabeth Bzovy from the CPSU. Just that we again concur with the submission of Melbourne University and the comments made by our colleague from the NTEU.
PN98
MS ILIAS: The same, your Honour, we support the submissions already made.
PN99
MR COONEY: Yes, your Honour, we would support the submissions made from the table.
PN100
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Mr Ruskin, you mentioned the Vision Systems, I think, decision of his Honour SDP O'Callaghan.
PN101
MR RUSKIN: Yes.
PN102
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Was that a salary sacrificing clause involved in that case? Can you enlighten me on that?
PN103
MR RUSKIN: I will take you to the clause, sir. It was. Clause 26 of the agreement provided - it said that:
PN104
Employees may choose to salary sacrifice part of their wage for pre tax benefits. In accordance with the rules of the Australian Taxation Office the amount of salary sacrifice will be deducted from the employee's gross wage.
PN105
And then it says it mustn't reduce the ordinary time earnings and then:
PN106
If there are any changes in tax laws the company will advise the employees concerned and the salary sacrifice contribution arrangement will be amended or terminated.
PN107
It was just a blanket statement about salary sacrifice. It didn't have the purpose which is set out in this clause, nor the - the purpose being to enhance remuneration benefits, and I think perhaps if such a clause was before his Honour maybe the outcome may have been different.
PN108
THE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. In respect of the earlier matter which was canvassed here today, which was the operation of clause 101.2(2) I think there has to be careful - I should say care taken in the operation of that clause. However, noting the submission of the NTEU that they would refuse to give advice to a management person involved in a dispute about their role in respect of a dispute and how the committee operated, and also noting that clause 101.4 contemplates a party's capacity to refuse to engage in the process, I accept that the clause operates in a way which is not objectionable in terms of section 170LU(2)(a).
[2.53pm]
PN109
In respect of clause 48.2, I note the submissions of the University about the purpose of the clause and the fact that it is a salary packaging arrangement covering a range of issues, but not limited to those issues, and that it is related to the manner in which employees may choose to receive their remuneration. I am persuaded by the University's submission that the clause is a clause which pertains to the employment relationship in terms of 170LI. On that basis, I can advise the parties that I am satisfied that the agreement is reached through a process consistent with that set out in section 170LJ of the Act.
PN110
I can also advise that I consider that the agreement meets the necessary prerequisites for certification in accordance with sections 170LT and 170LU of the Act. I will certify the agreement with effect from today. I note the agreement's expiry date is 30 June 2006. Commission is adjourned.
ADJOURNED INDEFINITELY [2.56pm]
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EXHIBIT #R1 DOCUMENT RE HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE PN14
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