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Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights |
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Purpose
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These regulations declare the Republic of North Macedonia to be an
'extradition country' for the purposes of section 5 of the Extradition Act
1988 and repeal the Extradition (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
Regulations 2009
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Portfolio
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Attorney-General
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Authorising legislation
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Last day to disallow
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Exempt from sunsetting by section 12 item 26 of the Legislation (Exemptions
and Other Matters) Regulation 2015
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Rights
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Life; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; liberty; fair trial; presumption of innocence
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1.12 To reflect Australia's recognition that the country previously known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia, these regulations repeal regulations declaring the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be 'an extradition country' for the purposes of the Extradition Act 1988 ('the Act'), and instead declare the Republic of North Macedonia to be 'an extradition country' for the purposes of the Act.
1.13 The effect of this is that Australia can consider and progress extradition requests from the Republic of North Macedonia relating to persons in Australia. A person may be subject to extradition where either a warrant is in force for their arrest in relation to an alleged serious offence;[2] or where they have been convicted of such an offence and there is either an intention to impose a sentence on them, or the whole or a part of a sentence imposed on the person as a consequence of the conviction remains to be served.[3] The Act also establishes that a person may be prosecuted in Australia for the conduct for which they may have been extradited, rather than being subject to extradition.[4]
1.14 A person may object to their extradition on limited grounds,[5] including where: the surrender of the person is actually sought for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of their race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions or for a political offence in relation to the extradition country; or where, on surrender, the person may be prejudiced at their trial, or punished, detained or restricted in their liberty because of their race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions.[6]
1.15 Facilitating the extradition of persons in Australia to the Republic of North Macedonia to face proceedings in relation to serious offences (including alleged offences) pursuant to the Act engages and may limit multiple rights. Assessing the compatibility of the regulations with international human rights law requires consideration of the compatibility of the Act as relevant to these regulations.[7]
1.16 These regulations are exempt from disallowance, meaning that no statement of compatibility with human rights is required. As such, no assessment of the compatibility of the measure is available.
1.17 As extradition would facilitate removal to a country in relation to an offence or alleged offence for which the punishment may include the death penalty, the measure engages and may limit the right to life. The right to life[8] imposes an obligation on the state to protect people from being killed by others or identified risks.[9] While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not completely prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, international law prohibits states which have abolished the death penalty (such as Australia) from exposing a person to the death penalty in another state. This prohibits states such as Australia from deporting or extraditing a person to a country where that person may face the death penalty.[10]
1.18 In this regard, the Act provides that the Attorney‑General may only determine that a person be surrendered to an extradition country if they are satisfied that there is 'no real risk' that the death penalty will be carried out upon the person in relation to any offence.[11] Section 22 further provides that a person is only to be surrendered in relation to an offence punishable by a penalty of death, if, by virtue of an undertaking given by the extradition country to Australia: the person will not be tried for the offence; or if the person is tried for the offence, the death penalty will not be imposed on the person; or, if the death penalty is imposed on the person, it will not be carried out.[12] In this regard, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee has cautioned that States Parties must: ensure that they monitor individuals who have been extradited, refrain from relying on diplomatic assurances where they cannot effectively monitor the treatment of people concerned, and take appropriate remedial action where assurances are not fulfilled.[13] As such, further information is required as to whether the statutory requirements in the Act would meet Australia's obligations under international human rights law with respect to the death penalty, and whether and how compliance with diplomatic assurances as to the non-use of the death penalty are monitored in practice.
1.19 Noting that persons extradited to foreign countries may be at risk of torture and other poor treatment, this measure also engages the prohibition against torture.
1.20 Australia has an obligation under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights not to subject any person to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[14] This prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is absolute and may never be subject to any limitations. The UN Human Rights Committee has held that article 7 prohibits extradition of a person to a place where that person may be in danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[15] Australia also has obligations under article 3 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment not to extradite a person to another country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
1.21 In this regard, the Act provides that the Attorney-General cannot determine that a person be surrendered to an extradition country if they have substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.[16] The Act also provides a broad discretion for the Attorney-General not to surrender a person in relation to an offence.[17] However, it does not explicitly require the Attorney-General to consider whether there are substantial grounds to believe there is a real risk that a person may be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and does not explicitly prohibit extradition where such a risk is established. It is not clear why the Act does not explicitly prohibit extradition where a risk of such treatment exists. Further information is therefore required as to whether the measure is consistent with Australia's obligations under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 3 of the Convention against Torture.
1.22 Three elements of the Act raise questions as to compatibility with the right to a fair trial and fair hearing.
1.23 In not allowing for an extradition objection on the basis that a person may suffer a flagrant denial of justice in the extradition country, the measure engages and may limit the right to a fair hearing. It also engages Australia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights not to return a person to a jurisdiction where they may face a serious violation of rights guaranteed by article 14 and other provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
1.24 The right to a fair trial and fair hearing requires that all persons shall be equal before the courts and that everyone has the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of any criminal charge. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in turn sets out a series of minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, such as the right to be tried without undue delay. The right to a fair trial may be permissibly limited, but only where a limitation seeks to achieve a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective, and is a proportionate means of achieving it.
1.25 An extradition request of itself does not amount to determination of a criminal charge.[18] However, jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights has recognised that fair trial rights may be engaged where a person is extradited in circumstances where there is a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice in the country to which the individual is to be extradited.[19] Such circumstances, the Court has stated, would render proceedings 'manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 [the right to a fair trial in the European Convention] or the principles embodied therein'.[20] This means that, in the European context, the right to a fair hearing and fair trial includes an obligation not to return a person (non-refoulement) to a country where they risk a flagrant denial of justice.
1.26 The UN Human Rights Committee has not yet ruled on whether article 14 engages non-refoulement obligations.[21] However, the interpretation of the right to a fair trial and fair hearing under the European Convention on Human Rights is instructive.[22] Further, the position in European human rights law jurisprudence is consistent with the UN Model Treaty on Extradition, which includes a mandatory ground of refusing extradition if the person whose extradition is requested would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, as contained in article 14.[23]
1.27 The Act does not provide that the risk of denial of a fair trial or fair hearing in the extradition country is a ground for an extradition objection. Although, the Act provides a broad discretion for the Attorney-General not to surrender a person in relation to an offence,[24] it is not clear that such a non-compellable discretion would be a sufficient safeguard to protect the right to a fair trial and fair hearing. Consequently, further information is required as to whether this aspect of the Act is consistent with the right to a fair trial.
1.28 The Act does not require (or permit)[25] the production of any evidence about an alleged offence before a person can be extradited. The review provisions in the Act also expressly prohibit a person from adducing such evidence, and the court from receiving such evidence, on review or appeal.[26] This also engages and may limit the right to a fair hearing, as there is no requirement for a prima facie case to be established in order for extradition to be facilitated.
1.29 The absence of any requirement that there be a case to answer before a person is extradited raises questions as to whether there are sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that extradition of persons occurs in a manner that is compatible with the right to a fair hearing and fair trial. In 2001, the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties reviewed Australia's law and policy on extradition. It considered the 'no evidence' model and noted that 'the consequences for a person who is facing extradition to a foreign country, where the legal system, language and availability of legal assistance may present great difficulties, mean that extradition cannot be treated merely as an administrative step'.[27] The committee noted concerns regarding the situation where another country sought the extradition of an Australian to face trial in circumstances where, if the alleged offence were committed in Australia, there would be insufficient evidence to justify prosecution.[28] The committee concluded that to provide better protection for the rights of individuals whose extradition was being sought, there were persuasive grounds to consider increasing Australia's evidentiary requirements from the default 'no evidence' model'.[29]
1.30 Further information is required as to whether not requiring any evidence to be produced before a person can be extradited and preventing a person subject to extradition from producing evidence about the alleged offence, is consistent with the right to a fair hearing under article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
1.31 Section 45 of the Act makes it an offence, where a person has been remanded in custody for an extradition offence, for the person to have earlier engaged in conduct which would have constituted an offence against Australian law if the conduct had occurred in Australia. The purpose of this provision is to enable a person to be prosecuted in Australia for the offence rather than being extradited. Subsection 45(2) provides that absolute liability applies to the requirements that the person has been remanded, that they engaged in conduct outside Australia at an earlier time, and that the conduct would have constituted an offence under Australian law had the conduct occurred in Australia. Absolute liability means the prosecution is not required to prove fault and so such provisions limit the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
1.32 The right to a fair trial protects the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.[30] It usually requires that the prosecution prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable double (including fault elements and physical elements). Absolute liability offences engage the presumption of innocence because they allow for the imposition of criminal liability without the need to prove fault. They will not necessarily be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence provided that they are within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of the objective being sought and maintain the defendant's right to a defence. In other words, such offences must be reasonable, necessary and proportionate to that objective.
1.33 When this provision was amended in 2012, the explanatory memorandum explained that this means that the prosecution need not prove that the person was reckless as to the elements required to establish the offence:
This will ensure that the prosecution is not required to prove that the person intended to engage in conduct outside Australia at an earlier time or that the person was reckless as to whether that conduct would have constituted an offence in Australia had the conduct or equivalent conduct occurred in Australia. Further, new subsection 45(3) will set out the physical and fault elements that need to be established by the prosecution.[31]
1.34 Further information is required as to whether section 45, in applying absolute liability to the offence, is consistent with the right to be presumed innocent under article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
1.35 The Act establishes a presumption against bail except in special circumstances. This presumption applies with respect to all stages of the extradition process: holding persons arrested under an extradition warrant on remand; committing a person to prison where they have consented to the surrender; where a magistrate or Judge is determining whether the person is eligible for surrender; where review of an order of a magistrate or Judge relating to extradition surrender is sought; and where judicial review is sought of a determination by the Attorney-General that the person is to be surrendered for extradition.[32] As such, a person subject to an extradition warrant will be presumed to be held in jail until the matter is resolved. In addition, extradition may result in lengthy detention in the foreign country while the person is awaiting trial. Consequently, the measure engages and limits the right to liberty.
1.36 The right to liberty prohibits the arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty.[33] The notion of 'arbitrariness' includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability. Accordingly, any detention must be lawful as well as reasonable, necessary and proportionate in all of the circumstances. Detention that may initially be necessary and reasonable may become arbitrary over time if the circumstances no longer require detention. In this respect, regular review must be available to scrutinise whether the continued detention is lawful and non-arbitrary. The right to liberty applies to all forms of deprivations of liberty.
1.37 The right to liberty includes the right to release pending trial. Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that the 'general rule' for people awaiting trial is that they should not be detained in custody. The UN Human Rights Committee has stated on several occasions that pre-trial detention should remain the exception and that bail should be granted except in circumstances where the likelihood exists that, for example, the accused would abscond, tamper with evidence, influence witnesses or flee from the jurisdiction.[34] Measures that expand the circumstances in which there is a presumption against bail engage and limit this right.[35] Where a person poses a flight risk, refusing the grant of bail may be a proportionate limitation on the right to liberty.[36] However, a presumption against bail fundamentally alters the starting point of an inquiry as to the grant of bail.
1.38 In general, the right to liberty may be subject to permissible limitations where the limitation pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.
1.39 It is unclear why the Act establishes a presumption that a person subject to extradition proceedings be held in jail at each stage of the extradition process, unless 'special circumstances' exist. Australian jurisprudence has established that 'special circumstances' are to be interpreted narrowly,[37] and that considerations of whether a person poses a flight risk are not relevant to an assessment of special circumstances.[38] As such, further information is required as to whether these provisions constitute a permissible limit on the right to liberty.
1.40 The legislation establishes grounds for an extradition objection where a person may be prosecuted or punished on the basis of certain personal attributes. However, the list of personal attributes is limited and does not cover all attributes protected under international law. As such, the measure engages and may limit the right to equality and non-discrimination.
1.41 The right to equality and non-discrimination provides that everyone is entitled to enjoy their rights without discrimination of any kind and that all people are equal before the law and entitled without discrimination to equal and non‑discriminatory protection of the law.[39] The right to equality encompasses both 'direct' discrimination (where measures have a discriminatory intent) and 'indirect' discrimination (where measures have a discriminatory effect on the enjoyment of rights).[40] Indirect discrimination occurs where 'a rule or measure that is neutral at face value or without intent to discriminate' exclusively or disproportionately affects people with a particular protected attribute.[41]
1.42 Differential treatment (including the differential effect of a measure that is neutral on its face) will not constitute unlawful discrimination if the differential treatment is based on reasonable and objective criteria such that it serves a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.[42]
1.43 A person may object to extradition where they will be prosecuted or punished, or may be prejudiced at trial or have their liberty restricted, on account of their 'race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions'. This is an important safeguard against limits on the right to equality and non-discrimination on those grounds. However, the list does not include all the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited under international human rights law, including disability, language, opinions (other than political opinions), or social origin. This raises concerns that extradition may be allowed in circumstances which could give rise to unlawful discrimination on these grounds. As a result, further information is required as to whether the Act is consistent with the right to equality and non-discrimination.
1.44 The committee notes that this legislative instrument facilitates the extradition of persons in Australia to the Republic of North Macedonia to face proceedings in relation to serious offences (including alleged offences) pursuant to the Extradition Act 1988, and so extends the application of this Act to this country. The committee notes that questions relating to the compatibility of the Extradition Act 1988 with human rights do not necessarily relate to the Republic of North Macedonia itself but relate to the operation of the Act more broadly. The committee considers that the measure therefore engages and may limit multiple rights, and notes that the committee has considered the compatibility of the Extradition Act 1988 on previous occasions.[43]
1.45 As this legislative instrument is exempt from disallowance, and so no statement of compatibility with human rights is required to be provided, further information is required to assess the compatibility of this measure with human rights. As such, the committee seeks the Attorney General's advice in relation to:
(a) whether the statutory requirements in the Act meet Australia's obligations under international human rights law with respect to the death penalty, and whether and how compliance with diplomatic assurances relating to non-use of the death penalty are monitored in practice;
(b) whether the measure is consistent with Australia's obligations under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 3 of the Convention against Torture, and why the Act does not explicitly prohibit extradition where there is a risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(c) whether the Act is consistent with the right to fair trial and fair hearing, and in particular:
(i) why the Act does not include an extradition objection if, on surrender, a person may suffer a flagrant denial of justice in contravention of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(ii) whether, not requiring any evidence to be produced before a person can be extradited, and preventing a person subject to extradition from producing evidence about the alleged offence is compatible with the right to a fair trial and fair hearing; and
(iii) whether section 45 of the Act, in applying absolute liability, is consistent with the right to be presumed innocent;
(d) noting that extradition largely results in the detention of a person pending extradition and often lengthy detention in the foreign country while awaiting trial, whether allowing the extradition and detention of someone without first testing the basic evidence against them, is consistent with the right to liberty;
(e) whether the presumption against bail except for in 'special circumstances' is a permissible limit on the right to liberty; and
(f) whether the measure is consistent with the right to equality and non-discrimination, including why the Act does not permit an objection to extradition where a person may be persecuted because of personal attributes set out in international human rights law, including disability, language, opinions (other than political opinions), or social origin.
Mr Josh Burns MP
Chair
[1] This entry can be cited as: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Extradition (Republic of North Macedonia) Regulations 2023 [F2023L00447], Report 7 of 2023; [2023] AUPJCHR 66.
[2] Section 5 of the Extradition Act 1988 provides that an extradition offence means an offence for which the maximum penalty is death or imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for 12 months or more, or conduct which, under an extradition treaty, is required to be treated as an offence for which the surrender of persons is permitted by the requesting country and Australia.
[3] Extradition Act 1988, section 6.
[5] Sections 19 and 22 provide that a magistrate or Judge, or the Attorney-General may consider extradition objections.
[6] Section 7. Further bases include where the extradition is for a political offence, where the conduct would not have constituted an offence under Australian criminal law, where the person has been pardoned or acquitted for the offence, and where the person has already been punished for the offence.
[7] Parts of the Extradition Act apply only to extradition proceedings with New Zealand, and extradition to Australia.
[8] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6(1) and Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 1.
[9] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: article 6 (right to life) (2019) [3]: the right should not be interpreted narrowly and it ‘concerns the entitlement of individuals to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity’.
[10] Judge v Canada, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No.929/1998 (2003) [10.4]; Kwok v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No.1442/05 (2009) [9.4], and [9.7].
[11] Extradition Act, subsection 15B(3)(b).
[13] See, UN Human rights Committee, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kazakhstan, CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/2 (9 August 2016), at [44].
[14] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 7; and Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment, articles 3–5.
[15] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment) (1992) [9]; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (2004) [12]. See also UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No.4 on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22 (2018) [26].
[18] Griffiths v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 193/2010 (2014) [6.5].
[19] See, Al Nashiri v Poland, European Court of Human Rights Application No.28761/11 (2014) [562]-[569]; Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights Application No. no. 8139/09 (2012), [252]-[262]; R v Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323, per Lord Steyn at [41].
[20] See, Stoichkov v Bulgaria, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 9808/02 (24 March 2005) at [54].
[21] The question has been raised in several individual complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee; however, the committee has decided these complaints on other bases without ruling on the question: see, for example, ARJ v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 692/1996 ( 1997) [6.15]; Kwok v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1442/2005 (2009) [9.8]; and Alzery v Sweden, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1416/2005 (2006) [11.9].
[22] In 2007 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted the reluctance of states to extend the application of the prohibition of refoulement to articles 9 and 14. However the Working Group continued by stating that 'to remove a person to a State where there is a genuine risk that the person will be detained without legal basis, or without charges over a prolonged time, or tried before a court that manifestly follows orders from the executive branch, cannot be considered compatible with the obligation in article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires that States parties respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and under their control': see Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/40 (2007) [44]–[49].
[23] Model Treaty on Extradition, adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 45/116 as amended by General Assembly resolution 52/88.
[25] Subsection 19(5) prohibits a person to whom extradition proceedings relate from adducing evidence to contradict an allegation that the person has engaged in conduct constituting an extradition offence for which the surrender of the person is sought.
[27] Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report 40: Extradition – a review of Australia's law and policy (August 2001) at [3.80].
[28] Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report 40: Extradition – a review of Australia's law and policy (August 2001) at [3.76].
[29] Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report 40: Extradition – a review of Australia's law and policy (August 2001) at [3.80].
[30] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14(2).
[31] Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation Amendment Act 2012, explanatory memorandum, p. 31.
[32] See, remand (subsection 15(6)); consent to surrender (subsection 18(3)); determination of eligibility for surrender (subsection 19(9A)); review (section 21); and judicial review (section 49C).
[33] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 9.
[34] Smantser v Belarus, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1178/03 (2008); WBE v the Netherlands, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 432/90 (1992); and Hill and Hill v Spain, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 526/93 (1997).
[35] See, In the Matter of an Application for Bail by Isa Islam [2010] ACTSC 147 (19 November 2010): the ACT Supreme Court declared that a provision of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) was inconsistent with the right to liberty under section 18 of the ACT Human Rights Act 2004 which required that a person awaiting trial not be detained in custody as a 'general rule'. Section 9C of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) required those accused of murder, certain drug offences and ancillary offences, to show 'exceptional circumstances' before having a normal assessment for bail undertaken.
[36] Smantser v Belarus, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1178/03 (2008); WBE v the Netherlands, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 432/90 (1992); and Hill and Hill v Spain, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 526/93 (1997).
[37] The High Court of Australia has stated that: '[I]t is an error in a bail application in an extradition matter to take into account that there is "a predisposition against unnecessary or arbitrary detention in custody". The Parliament has made it plain that bail is not to be granted unless special circumstances are proved...[I]t is erroneous to take into account "those circumstances which ordinarily would fall for consideration on an application for bail where a person is charged domestically for the commission of a crime". Those circumstances ...can play no part in determining whether the applicant has established special circumstances.' See, United Mexican States v Cabal [2001] HCA 60 at [72].
[38] See, most recently Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services [2023] FCAFC 58 (13 April 2023).
[39] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 2 and 26. Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also prohibits discrimination specifically in relation to the human rights contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
[40] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination (1989).
[41] Althammer v Austria, UN Human Rights Committee Communication no. 998/01 (2003) [10.2]. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Under 'other status' the following have been held to qualify as prohibited grounds: age, nationality, marital status, disability, place of residence within a country and sexual orientation. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are often described as 'personal attributes'. See Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, [23.39].
[42] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination (1989) [13]; see also Althammer v Austria, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 998/01 (2003) [10.2].
[43] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report of 2013 (6 February 2013), p. 111; Sixth Report of 2013, pp. 149–160; Tenth Report of 2013, pp. 56–75; Twenty-second Report of the 44th Parliament (13 May 2015), Extradition (Vietnam) Regulation 2013 [F2013L01473] pp. 108–110; Report 2 of 2017 (21 March 2017), Crimes Legislation Amendment (International Crime Cooperation and Other Measures) Bill 2016, pp. 8–9; Report 4 of 2017 (9 May 2017), Extradition (People's Republic of China) Regulations 2017 [F2017L00185], pp. 70-73, and Crimes Legislation Amendment (International Crime Cooperation and Other Measures) Bill 2016, pp. 90–98; Report 3 of 2018 (27 March 2018), Extradition (El Salvador) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01581] and Extradition Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No. 1) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01575], pp. 16–29; and Report 5 of 2018 (19 June 2018) Extradition (El Salvador) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01581] and Extradition Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No. 1) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01575], pp. 77–108.
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