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Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights |
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Purpose
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These regulations declare the Republic of North Macedonia to be an
'extradition country' for the purposes of section 5 of the Extradition Act 1988
and repeal the Extradition (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) Regulations
2009
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Portfolio
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Attorney-General
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Authorising Legislation
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Last Day to Disallow
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15 sitting days after tabling (tabled in the House of Representatives and
Senate on 9 May 2023. Notice of motion to disallow must
be given by
7 August 2023 in the
Senate)[2]
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Rights
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Life; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; liberty; fair hearing; presumption of innocence
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2.61 The committee requested a response from the minister in relation to the instrument in Report 7 of 2023.[3]
2.62 To reflect Australia's recognition that the country previously known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia, these regulations repeal regulations declaring the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be 'an extradition country' for the purposes of the Extradition Act 1988 ('the Act'), and instead declare the Republic of North Macedonia to be 'an extradition country' for the purposes of the Act.
2.63 The effect of this is that Australia can consider and progress extradition requests from the Republic of North Macedonia relating to persons in Australia. A person may be subject to extradition where either a warrant is in force for their arrest in relation to an alleged serious offence;[4] or where they have been convicted of such an offence and there is either an intention to impose a sentence on them, or the whole or a part of a sentence imposed on the person as a consequence of the conviction remains to be served.[5] The Act also establishes that a person may be prosecuted in Australia for the conduct for which they may have been extradited, rather than being subject to extradition.[6]
2.64 A person may object to their extradition on limited grounds,[7] including where: the surrender of the person is actually sought for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of their race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions or for a political offence in relation to the extradition country; or where, on surrender, the person may be prejudiced at their trial, or punished, detained or restricted in their liberty because of their race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions.[8]
2.65 Facilitating the extradition of persons in Australia to the Republic of North Macedonia to face proceedings in relation to serious offences (including alleged offences) pursuant to the Act engages and may limit multiple rights.[9] Assessing the compatibility of the regulations with international human rights law requires consideration of the compatibility of the Act as relevant to these regulations in relation to the multiple rights.[10]
2.66 As extradition would facilitate removal to a country in relation to an offence or alleged offence for which the punishment may include the death penalty, the measure engages and may limit the right to life. The right to life[11] imposes an obligation on the state to protect people from being killed by others or identified risks.[12] While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not completely prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, international law prohibits states which have abolished the death penalty (such as Australia) from exposing a person to the death penalty in another state. This prohibits states such as Australia from deporting or extraditing a person to a country where that person may face the death penalty.[13]
2.67 Noting that persons extradited to foreign countries may be at risk of torture and other poor treatment, this measure also engages the prohibition against torture. Australia has an obligation not to subject any person to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[14] This prohibition is absolute and may never be subject to any limitations. The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee has held that this prohibits extradition of a person to a place where that person may be in danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[15]
2.68 Further, in not allowing for an extradition objection on the basis that a person may suffer a flagrant denial of justice in the extradition country, the measure engages and may limit the right to a fair hearing. The right to a fair trial and fair hearing requires that all persons shall be equal before the courts and that everyone has the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of any criminal charge. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in turn sets out a series of minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, such as the right to be tried without undue delay.
2.69 An extradition request of itself does not amount to determination of a criminal charge.[16] However, jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights has recognised that fair trial rights may be engaged where a person is extradited in circumstances where there is a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice in the country to which the individual is to be extradited.[17] Such circumstances, the Court has stated, would render proceedings 'manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 [the right to a fair trial in the European Convention] or the principles embodied therein'.[18] This means that, in the European context, the right to a fair hearing and fair trial includes an obligation not to return a person (non-refoulement) to a country where they risk a flagrant denial of justice.
2.70 The UN Human Rights Committee has not yet ruled on whether article 14 engages non-refoulement obligations.[19] However, the interpretation of the right to a fair trial and fair hearing under the European Convention on Human Rights is instructive.[20] Further, the position in European human rights law jurisprudence is consistent with the UN Model Treaty on Extradition, which includes a mandatory ground of refusing extradition if the person whose extradition is requested would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings.[21]
2.71 In addition, the imposition of absolute liability in subsection 45(2) engages the right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial protects the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.[22] It usually requires that the prosecution prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt (including fault elements and physical elements). Absolute liability offences engage the presumption of innocence because they allow for the imposition of criminal liability without the need to prove fault.
2.72 The Act also establishes a presumption against bail except in special circumstances. This presumption applies with respect to all stages of the extradition process: holding persons arrested under an extradition warrant on remand; committing a person to prison where they have consented to the surrender; where a magistrate or Judge is determining whether the person is eligible for surrender; where review of an order of a magistrate or Judge relating to extradition surrender is sought; and where judicial review is sought of a determination by the Attorney-General that the person is to be surrendered for extradition.[23] As such, a person subject to an extradition warrant will be presumed to be held in jail until the matter is resolved. In addition, extradition may result in lengthy detention in the foreign country while the person is awaiting trial. Consequently, the measure engages and limits the right to liberty.
2.73 The right to liberty prohibits the arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty.[24] The notion of 'arbitrariness' includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability. Accordingly, any detention must be lawful as well as reasonable, necessary and proportionate in all of the circumstances. Detention that may initially be necessary and reasonable may become arbitrary over time if the circumstances no longer require detention. In this respect, regular review must be available to scrutinise whether the continued detention is lawful and non-arbitrary. The right to liberty applies to all forms of deprivations of liberty.
2.74 The right to liberty includes the right to release pending trial. Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that the 'general rule' for people awaiting trial is that they should not be detained in custody. The UN Human Rights Committee has stated on several occasions that pre-trial detention should remain the exception and that bail should be granted except in circumstances where the likelihood exists that, for example, the accused would abscond, tamper with evidence, influence witnesses or flee from the jurisdiction.[25] Measures that expand the circumstances in which there is a presumption against bail engage and limit this right.[26] Where a person poses a flight risk, refusing the grant of bail may be a proportionate limitation on the right to liberty.[27] However, a presumption against bail fundamentally alters the starting point of an inquiry as to the grant of bail.
2.75 Finally, the legislation establishes grounds for an extradition objection where a person may be prosecuted or punished on the basis of certain personal attributes. However, the list of personal attributes is limited and does not cover all attributes protected under international law. As such, the measure engages and may limit the right to equality and non-discrimination. The right to equality and non-discrimination provides that everyone is entitled to enjoy their rights without discrimination of any kind and that all people are equal before the law and entitled without discrimination to equal and non‑discriminatory protection of the law.[28] The right to equality encompasses both 'direct' discrimination (where measures have a discriminatory intent) and 'indirect' discrimination (where measures have a discriminatory effect on the enjoyment of rights).[29] Indirect discrimination occurs where 'a rule or measure that is neutral at face value or without intent to discriminate' exclusively or disproportionately affects people with a particular protected attribute.[30]
2.76 The committee considered that the measure engages and may limit multiple rights, and sought the advice of the Attorney-General as to:
(a) whether the statutory requirements in the Act meet Australia's obligations under international human rights law with respect to the death penalty, and whether and how compliance with diplomatic assurances relating to non-use of the death penalty are monitored in practice;
(b) whether the measure is consistent with Australia's obligations under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 3 of the Convention against Torture, and why the Act does not explicitly prohibit extradition where there is a risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(c) whether the Act is consistent with the right to fair trial and fair hearing, and in particular:
(i) why the Act does not include an extradition objection if, on surrender, a person may suffer a flagrant denial of justice in contravention of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(ii) whether, not requiring any evidence to be produced before a person can be extradited, and preventing a person subject to extradition from producing evidence about the alleged offence is compatible with the right to a fair trial and fair hearing; and
(iii) whether section 45 of the Act, in applying absolute liability, is consistent with the right to be presumed innocent;
(d) noting that extradition largely results in the detention of a person pending extradition and often lengthy detention in the foreign country while awaiting trial, whether allowing the extradition and detention of someone without first testing the basic evidence against them, is consistent with the right to liberty;
(e) whether the presumption against bail except for in 'special circumstances' is a permissible limit on the right to liberty; and
(f) whether the measure is consistent with the right to equality and non-discrimination, including why the Act does not permit an objection to extradition where a person may be persecuted because of personal attributes set out in international human rights law, including disability, language, opinions (other than political opinions), or social origin.
2.77 The full initial analysis is set out in Report 7 of 2023.
2.78 The Attorney-General advised:
(a) whether the statutory requirements in the Act meet Australia's obligations under international human rights law with respect to the death penalty, and whether and how compliance with diplomatic assurances relating to non-use of the death penalty are monitored in practice;
As the Committee has noted, Australia is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Second Optional Protocol, which obliges it to ensure that no person within its jurisdiction is executed and that the death penalty is abolished. Article 6 of the ICCPR contains an implied non-refoulement obligation (to refrain from removing persons from Australia to another country) where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the person being subjected to the death penalty.
The Extradition Act requires the Attorney-General to consider death penalty risks before determining whether to surrender a person in response to an incoming extradition request. Paragraph 22(3)(c) of the Extradition Act provides that a person is only able to be surrendered for an offence that carries the death penalty if the requesting country provides an undertaking that either the person will not be tried for the offence; or if the person is tried for the offence, the death penalty will not be imposed; or if the death penalty is imposed on the person, it will not be carried out. This practically operates as a mandatory ground for which the Attorney-General must otherwise refuse extradition, and implements Australia's non-refoulement obligations under Article 6 of the ICCPR. Where a person elects to waive the extradition process, paragraph 15B(3)(b) of the Extradition Act also provides a safeguard by stipulating that the Attorney-General may only make a surrender determination where satisfied that there is no real risk that the death penalty will be carried out on the person in relation to any offence should they be surrendered to the extradition country.
The use of death penalty undertaking is a well-established tool in international extradition. Undertakings are written government assurances and a breach of an undertaking would have serious consequences for both Australia's extradition relationship and broader bilateral relationship with the relevant foreign country. Breach of an undertaking may also have reputational consequences and negatively impact the relevant foreign country's law enforcement relationship with other countries. It is the Australian Government's long-standing experience that undertaking in relation to the death penalty in extradition cases have always been honoured.
The Attorney-General considers the reliability of any death penalty undertaking on a case by case basis, in line with the test for an acceptable death penalty undertaking in the Full Federal Court decision of McCrea v Minister for Justice and Customs.[32] The test requires that the Attorney-General be satisfied that 'the undertaking is one that, in the context of the system of law and government of the country seeking surrender, has the character of an undertaking by value of which the death penalty would not be carried out'.[33] If, notwithstanding the receipt of an undertaking, the Attorney-General considered that a real risk remained that the person will be subject to the death penalty, it would be open to the Attorney-General to refuse extradition as an exercise of the general discretion under paragraph 22(3)(f) of the Extradition Act.
Given the public nature of extradition, the Australian Government would most likely be made aware of a breach of a death penalty undertaking. The Australian Government monitors compliance with undertakings through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Australia also monitors Australian citizens who have been extradited through its consular network, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
The Attorney-General's Department has provided information on extradition matters in its annual reports to Parliament since the establishment of the Extradition Act, including whether there have been any breaches of undertakings by a foreign country in relation to a person extradited from Australia. No breaches of death penalty undertakings have been recorded to date.
Further detail on the monitoring of Australian citizens who have been extradited is outlined at paragraphs 40-41 of the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights.
(b) whether the measure is consistent with Australia's obligations under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 3 of the Convention against Torture, and why the Act does not explicitly prohibit extradition where there is a risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
Both the measure and the Extradition Act more broadly are consistent with Australia's non-refoulement obligations under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture (CAT) and Article 7 of the ICCPR in relation to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDTP). The measure does not change the substance of Australia's existing extradition regime nor its consistency with obligations under the CAT or the ICCPR.
Torture
Paragraphs 15B(3)(a) and 22(3)(b) of the Extradition Act provide that the Attorney-General may only surrender a person if, among other things, the Attorney-General does not have substantial grounds for believing that, if the person were surrendered, they would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
When making a decision under section 15B or subsection 22(3) of the Extradition Act, the Attorney-General may consider all material reasonably available to assist in determining whether the person may be subjected to torture. This may include relevant international legal obligations, any representations or assurances from the requesting country, country-specific information, reports prepared by government or non-government sources, information provided through the diplomatic network and those matters raised by the person who is the subject of the extradition request.
Therefore, the decision on whether to surrender a person is made by the Attorney-General on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the safeguards in the Extradition Act which are consistent with Australia's international obligations in Article 3 of the CAT and Article 7 of the ICCPR, with respect to torture.
CIDTP
As the Committee has noted, Australia also has non-refoulement obligations under Article 7 of the ICCPR in relation to CIDTP.
Although the Extradition Act does not explicitly reference CIDTP, the Attorney-General practically considers risks of CIDTP when determining whether to surrender a person under the Extradition Act. In particular, the Attorney-General's general discretion under subsection 15B(2) and paragraph 22(3)(f) of the Extradition Act provides a basis to refuse extradition where the Attorney-General has concerns based on CIDTP considerations.
The Extradition Act does not contain an exhaustive list of circumstances in which the Attorney-General may refuse surrender or factors that the Attorney-General must consider. This ensures that decisions can be made on a case-by-case basis. In relation to paragraph 22(3)(f), the Federal Court of Australia has held that the Attorney-General's discretion 'is unfettered, and the Minister may, in the exercise of the discretion, take into account any matters, or no matters, provided that the discretion is exercised in good faith and consistently with the objects, scope and purpose of the [Extradition] Act.'[34]
The Attorney-General therefore makes surrender determinations on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the safeguards in the Extradition Act and in line with Australia's international legal obligations, including under Article 7 of the ICCPR. Subsection 15B(2) and paragraph 22(3)(f) therefore provide a mechanism for compliance with Australia's international obligations in relation to CIDTP.
(c) whether the Act is consistent with the right to fair trial and fair hearing, and in particular:
(i) why the Act does not include an extradition objection if, on surrender, a person may suffer a flagrant denial of justice in contravention of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Article 14 of the ICCPR sets out fair trial rights and a number of specific minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings.
As the Committee has noted, the UN Human Rights Committee has not yet provided views on whether Article 14 engages non-refoulement obligations.[35] Scholars, such as Manfred Nowak, note that in the ICCPR context, it is well accepted that the principle against refoulement applies to Articles 6 and 7, with no consistent opinion as to the application to Article 14.[36]
It is the Australian Government's view that Article 14 of the ICCPR does not extend to an obligation not to return a person to a country where they face a real risk of an unfair trial which could breach the obligations under Article 14. In other words, the Australian Government considers that Article 14 does not contain non-refoulement obligations and therefore is not engaged in the context of Australia potentially surrendering a person to another country under the Extradition Act.
Nonetheless, as noted above, the Attorney-General has a general discretion to refuse surrender under subsection 15B(2) and paragraph 22(3)(f) of the Extradition Act. This enables the Attorney-General to consider fair trial or other human rights concerns where these arise.
Considerations may include whether an extradited individual would have access to a fair trial or whether to surrender a person convicted in absentia (and whether a person tried in absentia will have an opportunity to be retried). It is therefore not necessary to include an explicit extradition objection for this concern.
Further detail on the protections under the Extradition Act relevant to fair trial protections is outlined at paragraphs 66-71 of the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights.
(ii) whether, not requiring any evidence to be produced before a person can be extradited, and preventing a person subject to extradition from producing evidence about the alleged offence is compatible with the right to a fair trial and fair hearing
The guarantee to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR is not engaged in relation to extradition proceedings in Australia, including in relation to the evidentiary standard that magistrates and eligible Judges apply to determine surrender eligibility under section 19 of the Extradition Act. This is because extradition is not a criminal process or trial designed to assess guilt or innocence, but rather an administrative process to determine whether a person in to be surrendered to face justice in the Requesting Party.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has noted in its General Comment No. 32 that the right to a fair hearing by a court or tribunal under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR does not apply to extradition proceedings (amongst other types of proceedings) as, in these circumstances, there is no determination of criminal charges nor presence of a suit at law.[37]
However, the United Nations Human Rights Committee noted that other procedural guarantees may apply in extradition proceedings, including judicial review by an independent and impartial tribunal and, in these circumstances, guarantees of impartiality, fairness and equality as provided for in the first sentence of Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.[38] The availability of independent judicial review under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and section 75(v) of the Constitution at various stages of the extradition process satisfies these requirements.
(iii) whether section 45 of the Act, in applying absolute liability, is consistent with the right to be presumed innocent;
Section 45 of the Extradition Act enables the Attorney-General to consent to the prosecution of a person in Australia for conduct constituting an offence in another country where Australia has refused extradition. This is consistent with the principle that States should prosecute a person who has committed serious crimes in lieu of extradition (this exists as an obligation under a range of multilateral treaties for specific offences).
It also assists in preventing Australia from becoming an attractive safe haven for fugitives from countries whose criminal justice systems might give rise to grounds for refusal under the Extradition Act.
To achieve this, subsection 45(1) creates an offence to facilitate a person's prosecution in Australia. In order to establish this offence, the prosecution must prove that the person has been remanded in a State or Territory by order of a magistrate under section 15 of the Extradition Act (paragraph 45(1)1(a)). This establishes a nexus to the extradition process, as remand can only occur pursuant to section 15 if a person is arrested under an extradition arrest warrant issued in response to a request made by a foreign country.
Second, the prosecution must prove that the person has engaged in conduct outside Australia at an earlier time (paragraph 45(1)(b)), which would have constituted an offence had the conduct or equivalent conduct occurred in Australia (paragraph 45(1)(c)). This is referred to as the 'notional Australian offence'.
Subsection 45(2) provides that absolute liability attaches to the conduct described in paragraphs 45(1)(a) and 45(1)(b) and to the circumstances in paragraph 45(1)(c). This means that the prosecution need not prove that the person was reckless as to the elements required to establish the offence under subsection 45(1). These paragraphs are effectively factual preconditions for the existence of the offence. This ensures that the prosecution is not required to prove that the person intended to engage in conduct outside Australia at an earlier time or that the person was reckless as to whether that conduct would have constituted an offence in Australia had the conduct or equivalent conduct occurred in Australia.
However, the prosecution is still required to establish physical and fault elements to make out the offence, in line with subsection 45(3).
Subsection 45(3) provides how the prosecution is to prove the notional Australian offence. Paragraph 45(3)(a) requires the prosecution to prove the physical and fault elements applicable to the notional Australian offence, which are the physical and fault elements for the relevant offence in the State or Territory in which the person is on remand. Paragraph 45(3)(b) provides that any defences or special liability provisions that apply in relation to the notional Australian offence will have effect.
The use of absolute liability in this provision is consistent with the right to the presumption of innocence. As noted above, the relevant paragraphs in section 45 attracting absolute liability are factual pre-conditions rather than substantive elements of the offence. There is still a requirement to establish the relevant physical and fault elements of the notional Australian offence.
This approach is consistent with the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, which notes that strict or absolute liability may be appropriate for certain kinds of physical elements, such as jurisdictional elements which link the offence to the relevant legislative power of the Commonwealth.[39]
(d) noting that extradition largely results in the detention of a person pending extradition and often lengthy detention in the foreign country while awaiting trial, whether allowing the extradition and detention of someone without first testing the basic evidence against them, is consistent with the right to liberty;
Australia has an obligation under Article 9(1) of the ICCPR to protect the right to freedom from arbitrary detention. Further, Article 9(4) of the ICCPR imposes an obligation on States to ensure that persons who are arrested and detained are entitled to take proceedings before a court to decide the lawfulness of their detention.
As a matter of law, Australia considers the determining factor for arbitrary detention is not the length of the detention, but whether the grounds for detention are justifiable.
The test for whether detention is arbitrary under Article 9(1) of the ICCPR is whether, in all the circumstances, detention is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the end that is sought.[40]
Factors relevant to assessing whether detention is arbitrary include the existence of avenues of review on the appropriateness of detention, as well as whether less intrusive alternatives to detention have been considered.[41]
An assessment of the compatibility of extradition detention with Article 9 of the ICCPR is set out below in response to paragraph (e) of the Committee's request.
(e) whether the presumption against bail except for in 'special circumstances' is a permissible limit on the right to liberty;
The presumption against bail as currently in place in the Extradition Act is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the achieve the purposes of the Extradition Act and to comply with Australia's international obligations.
Bail is available as a statutory right at each stage of the extradition process, namely under section 15, subsection 18(3), subsection 19(9), paragraph 21(6)(f) and section 49C of the Act. At each stage, the test for grant of bail is whether there exist 'special circumstances' justifying release on bail. Where a person has elected to waive the extradition process, bail is not available, noting that a waiver will typically be chosen by the individual to facilitate return as soon as possible to the requesting country.
As outlined in paragraphs 51 to 63 of the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights, the 'special circumstances' test is clearly defined in case law and is applied by decision-makers on a case-by-case basis, where the decision-maker is required to carefully consider whether the circumstances relied upon by a person, either individually or in combination, meet the test.
Notwithstanding the nature of the 'special circumstances' test, bail is available as a statutory right at various stages of the extradition process[42] and applicants can and do successfully obtain bail in Australia during the extradition process. The bail test is necessary as the 'special circumstances' test for bail upholds Australia's international obligations to secure the return of alleged offenders to face justice, given the serious flight risk posed in many extradition matters.
The case-by-case nature of these decisions, as well as the established review mechanisms, ensure that the bail test is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the overall legitimate objective of facilitating the apprehension and surrender of individuals for the purposes of criminal prosecution or to serve a prison sentence in another country, upholding Australia's international legal obligations and ultimately combatting serious transnational crime. Accordingly, the bail test ensures that detention is not arbitrary for the purposes of Article 9(1).
The Extradition Act and the Regulations are therefore consistent with the right to freedom from arbitrary detention in Article 9 of the ICCPR. To the extent that the Extradition Act and the Regulations may limit these rights, any limitation is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to achieve the legitimate objectives of the Extradition Act and Australia's extradition regime.
(f) whether the measure is consistent with the right to equality and non-discrimination, including why the Act does not permit an objection to extradition where a person may be persecuted because of personal attributes set out in international human rights law, including disability, language, opinions (other than political opinions), or social origin.
The Extradition Act is consistent with Australia's obligations under Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR to respect the right to equality and non-discrimination.
The Extradition Act contains safeguards to protect rights of equality and non-discrimination.
Sections 7(b) and 7(c) set out that there is an 'extradition objection' in relation to an extradition offence for which a person's surrender is sought if:
• the person is actually sought for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of his or her race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions; or
• the person may be prejudiced at his or her trial, or punished, detained or restricted in his or her personal liberty, by reason of his or her race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions.
The presence of an extradition objection, including on the grounds listed above, has the effect of preventing both a finding by a magistrate or eligible Judge that a person is eligible for surrender pursuant to paragraph 19(2)(d), and a surrender determination by the Attorney-General pursuant to paragraph 22(3)(a) in those circumstances.
While the Extradition Act does not provide an extradition objection where a person may be persecuted because of other personal attributes set out in international human rights law, including disability, language, opinions (other than political opinions), or social origin, the Attorney-General would practically consider all relevant protected attributes when determining whether to surrender a person under the Extradition Act, including when exercising the general discretion in paragraph 22(3)(f).
Further, any person subject to extradition has an opportunity to make representations to the Attorney-General on any matter before the Attorney-General makes a surrender determination, including in relation to any of the protected attributes in Article 26 of the ICCPR, so that such matters can be taken into consideration before reaching a decision.
As noted above in response to paragraph (b) of the Committee's request, paragraph 22(3)(f) provides the Attorney-General 'unfettered' discretion when determining whether to surrender a person, and provides an appropriate mechanism to consider any factor relevant to the individual case at hand. The Extradition Act is therefore consistent with the rights of equality and non-discrimination, notwithstanding that all protected attributes are not expressly listed in the Extradition Act.
2.79 The Extradition Act provides that the Attorney‑General may determine that a person can be surrendered to an extradition country where the relevant offence is punishable by the death penalty, but only where the Attorney-General is satisfied there is 'no real risk' that the death penalty will be carried out[43] and where the extradition country has given an undertaking that it will not be imposed, or if imposed, will not be carried out.[44] In this regard, the UN Human Rights Committee has cautioned that States Parties must: ensure that they monitor individuals who have been extradited, refrain from relying on diplomatic assurances where they cannot effectively monitor the treatment of people concerned, and take appropriate remedial action where assurances are not fulfilled.[45]
2.80 In this regard, the Attorney-General advised that the grounds for refusal in the Extradition Act practically operate as mandatory grounds for refusal. The Attorney-General advised that there are reputational and relationship consequences for governments in breaching undertakings and no breaches of death penalty undertakings have occurred to date. The Attorney-General advised that he considers each death penalty undertaking on a case-by-case basis in the context of the system of law and government of the country seeking surrender. The advice provided was that the government monitors compliance with undertakings through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and monitors extradited citizens through its consular network. The Attorney-General's Department's annual reports also report to Parliament on extradition matters, including any breaches of undertakings.[46]
2.81 Noting that undertakings are regularly monitored, there has never been a breach of a death penalty undertaking provided to Australia and the requirement that the Attorney-General must be satisfied that there is no real risk that the death penalty will be imposed should the person be extradited, it appears that there is limited risk that the Extradition Act would enable the extradition of a person where there is a real concern they may be subject to the death penalty.
2.82 The Extradition Act also provides that the Attorney-General cannot determine that a person be surrendered to an extradition country if they have substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.[47] The Act also provides a broad discretion for the Attorney-General not to surrender a person in relation to an offence.[48] However, it does not explicitly require the Attorney-General to consider whether there are substantial grounds to believe there is a real risk that a person may be subjected to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and does not explicitly prohibit extradition where such a risk is established.
2.83 In relation to torture, the Attorney-General explains that he may consider a wide range of information that may assist in determining if a person may be subjected to torture and such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the safeguards in the Extradition Act, which are consistent with Australia's international obligations. Given the prohibition in the Extradition Act on surrender if there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, this aspect of the prohibition against torture appears to be appropriately protected.
2.84 However, Australia's non-refoulement obligations apply to the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in its entirety. The Extradition Act does not expressly provide that extradition must be refused where there are substantial grounds for believing a person may be in danger of being subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Attorney-General advised that, in practice, this risk is considered under the Attorney-General's general discretion to refuse extradition as considered on a case-by-case basis.
2.85 However, where a measure limits a human right, discretionary or administrative safeguards alone may not be sufficient for the purpose of a permissible limitation under international human rights law. This is because an administrative or discretionary safeguard is less stringent than the protection of statutory processes as there is no requirement to follow it. This is particularly relevant when considering that the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute and can never be permissibly limited. While it may be that the Attorney-General may refuse extradition on the basis that a person may be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, there is no requirement that extradition be refused on this basis, and as such there is a risk that the Extradition Act is incompatible with this aspect of the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
2.86 The Extradition Act does not provide that the risk of denial of a fair trial in the extradition country is a ground for an extradition objection. Although the Act provides a broad discretion for the Attorney-General not to surrender a person in relation to an offence,[49] it is not clear that such a non-compellable discretion would be a sufficient safeguard to protect the right to a fair trial and fair hearing. While the European Court of Human Rights has found countries should not return a person to a country where there is a real risk of an unfair trial, the UN Human Rights Committee has not definitively ruled on this issue. However, it has said that the risk of an unfair trial is a matter than must be given 'due weight' in considering whether deportation may result in a breach of the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[50] The Attorney-General advised that he do not consider that the right to a fair trial or hearing contains non-refoulement obligations. However, the Attorney-General advised that he may consider such concerns using his general discretionary power to refuse surrender to extradition and as such it is not necessary to include an explicit extradition objection for this concern.
2.87 As noted above, discretionary powers are not as stringent as legislative safeguards, and future Attorneys-General may not consider it necessary to consider such matters when exercising their discretion to allow surrender to extradition. Further, while the UN Human Rights Committee has not considered whether returning a person to face a flagrant denial of justice is a breach of the right to a fair trial, it has not ruled out that returning persons in such circumstances would be incompatible with rights. Given that this is a matter of settled law in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights[51] (which is substantially similar to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), there is a risk that sending a person to a country where they may suffer a flagrant denial of justice would not be compatible with the right to a fair trial. As such, as there is no requirement in the Extradition Act that the Attorney-General consider the right to a fair trial when making decisions regarding surrender for extradition, the Extradition Act may not be compatible with this right.
2.88 In relation to whether not requiring any evidence to be produced before a person can be extradited, and preventing a person subject to extradition from producing evidence about the alleged offence, is consistent with the right to a fair hearing, the Attorney-General advised that this right is not engaged as extradition is an administrative process. The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that while principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights apply to extradition proceedings, the other guarantees do not apply to extradition procedures.[52] As such, the question of not requiring a prima facie case to answer before a person can be extradited is considered below in relation to the right to liberty pending extradition.
2.89 In relation to whether section 45 of the Extradition Act, in applying absolute liability, is consistent with the right to be presumed innocent, the Attorney-General provided a comprehensive explanation of how absolute liability attaches only to a jurisdictional element of the offence, applying to factual pre-conditions rather than the substantive element of the offence. On the basis of this advice, it appears that the application of absolute liability in this context is compatible with the right to the presumption of innocence.
2.90 The Extradition Act establishes a presumption that a person subject to extradition proceedings be held in jail at each stage of the extradition process, unless 'special circumstances' exist. Australian jurisprudence has established that 'special circumstances' are to be interpreted narrowly,[53] and that considerations of whether a person poses a flight risk are not relevant to an assessment of special circumstances.[54]
2.91 The Attorney-General advised that notwithstanding the nature of the 'special circumstances' test, bail is available as a statutory right at various stages of the extradition process and applicants can and do successfully obtain bail in Australia during the extradition process. The Attorney-General argued that the presumption against bail is necessary as it upholds Australia's international obligations to secure the return of alleged offenders to face justice, given the serious flight risk posed in many extradition matters. Further, the Attorney-General refers to the statement of compatibility which states that the Australian Government does not consider that detention pending extradition ordinarily falls within the scope of the prohibition against arbitrary detention in article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[55]
2.92 However, the UN Human Rights Committee in Griffiths v Australia[56] found a breach of the right to liberty in relation to a person detained under the Extradition Act. In this case, the UN Committee noted that extradition is not limited in time under Australian law and as a general rule in extradition cases, persons are to be held in custody whether or not their detention is necessary. It noted the 'special circumstances' test in the Extradition Act and that the length of detention does not amount to 'special circumstances' under the case law of the High Court. Under the right to liberty and the right to an effective remedy, the UN Committee held that judicial review of the lawfulness of detention is not limited to mere compliance of the detention with domestic law but must include the possibility to order a release if the detention is incompatible with these rights, with such a review needing to be, in its effects, real and not merely formal. As there is no opportunity under the Extradition Act to obtain substantive judicial review of the continued compatibility of detention with the rights to liberty and effective remedy, the UN Committee found there was a breach of these rights.[57]
2.93 The limitation on the right to liberty is exacerbated by the fact that the Extradition Act contains no requirement to require the requesting State to produce any evidence to demonstrate there is a case to answer before a person is extradited, and prohibits the person who may be subject to the extradition from producing any evidence to contradict an allegation that the person has engaged in conduct constituting an extradition offence.[58] As such, a person may be subject to lengthy imprisonment pending extradition for an offence of which they ultimately may not have any prospect of being convicted.
2.94 Noting the lack of any time limits on detention pending extradition, the presumption against bail and the UN Human Rights Committee's findings in relation to this matter, the Extradition Act appears to be incompatible with the rights to liberty and an effective remedy. As such, this instrument, by enabling extradition pursuant to the Extradition Act to the Republic of North Macedonia, also risks incompatibility with these rights.
2.95 A person may object to extradition where they will be prosecuted or punished, or may be prejudiced at trial or have their liberty restricted, on account of their 'race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political opinions'. This is an important safeguard against limits on the right to equality and non-discrimination on those grounds. However, the list does not include all the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited under international human rights law, including disability, language, opinions (other than political opinions), or social origin. The Attorney-General advised that while the Extradition Act does not provide an extradition objection where a person may be persecuted because of other personal attributes set out in international human rights law, he would practically consider all relevant protected attributes when determining whether to surrender a person.
2.96 As noted above, discretionary powers are not as stringent as legislative safeguards, and future Attorneys-General may not consider it necessary to consider such matters when exercising their discretion to allow surrender to extradition. As such, there is a risk that a person may be extradited in circumstances where they may be unlawfully discriminated against, and as such, the Extradition Act may not fully protect the right to equality and non-discrimination.
2.97 The committee thanks the minister for this response. The committee notes that in considering this legislative instrument for compatibility with human rights it has been necessary to consider the overall compatibility of the extradition framework under the Extradition Act. The committee notes it has considered the compatibility of the Extradition Act on previous occasions.[59] The committee is concerned that many of the safeguards referred to by the Attorney-General in relation to extradition are discretionary, relying on the Attorney-General to exercise their general discretion not to surrender a person for extradition in the following circumstances:
(a) where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) where there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the person were surrendered to the extradition county, the person would suffer a flagrant denial of justice in the extradition country;
(c) where a person may be prosecuted, punished or detained or restricted in their liberty on the basis of personal attributes such as disability, language, non-political opinions, or social origin.
2.98 Noting the importance of the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the rights to a fair hearing and equality and non-discrimination, the committee is concerned that leaving protection of such matters to ministerial discretion is not sufficient to adequately protect these rights. The committee also considers that the presumption against bail in the Extradition Act, and the lack of any ability to challenge the lawfulness of such continued detention, is incompatible with the rights to liberty and effective remedy. As such, the committee considers that this instrument, by enabling extradition pursuant to the Extradition Act to the Republic of North Macedonia, also risks incompatibility with these rights.
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Suggested action
2.99 The committee considers the human rights compatibility of the
Extradition Act 1988 would be improved were it amended:
(a) to expand the existing prohibition against torture to provide that the
Attorney-General may only determine that a person be surrendered
for extradition
if they do not have substantial grounds for believing that the person would be
in danger of being subjected to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;[60]
(b) to require the Attorney-General to be satisfied that there are no
substantial grounds for believing that, if the person were surrendered
to the
extradition county, the person would suffer a flagrant denial of justice in the
extradition country;
(c) to remove the presumption against
bail[61] and require that detention
pending extradition be subject to ongoing merits review considering the
necessity of the continued detention;
and
(d) to expand the meaning of an 'extradition objection' to include where a
person may be prosecuted, punished or detained or restricted
in their liberty on
the basis of a broader range of personal attributes (such as disability,
language, non-political opinions, or
social origin).
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2.100 The committee draws these human rights concerns to the attention of the Attorney-General and the Parliament.
[1] This entry can be cited as: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Extradition (Republic of North Macedonia) Regulations 2023 [F2023L00447], Report 8 of 2023; [2023] AUPJCHR 80.
[3] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Report 7 of 2023 (21 June 2023), pp. 13-24.
[4] Section 5 of the Extradition Act 1988 provides that an extradition offence means an offence for which the maximum penalty is death or imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for 12 months or more, or conduct which, under an extradition treaty, is required to be treated as an offence for which the surrender of persons is permitted by the requesting country and Australia.
[5] Extradition Act 1988, section 6.
[7] Sections 19 and 22 provide that a magistrate or Judge, or the Attorney-General may consider extradition objections.
[8] Section 7. Further bases include where the extradition is for a political offence, where the conduct would not have constituted an offence under Australian criminal law, where the person has been pardoned or acquitted for the offence, and where the person has already been punished for the offence.
[9] Note that the initial analysis incorrectly stated that the regulations were exempt from disallowance and that no statement of compatibility with human rights was provided, when the regulations are subject to disallowance and a detailed statement of compatibility accompanied the regulations.
[10] Parts of the Extradition Act 1988 apply only to extradition proceedings with New Zealand, and extradition to Australia.
[11] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6(1) and Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 1.
[12] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: article 6 (right to life) (2019) [3]: the right should not be interpreted narrowly and it ‘concerns the entitlement of individuals to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity’.
[13] Judge v Canada, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No.929/1998 (2003) [10.4]; Kwok v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No.1442/05 (2009) [9.4], and [9.7].
[14] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 7; and Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment, articles 3–5.
[15] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment) (1992) [9]; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (2004) [12]. See also UN Committee against Torture, General Comment No.4 on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22 (2018) [26].
[16] Griffiths v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 193/2010 (2014) [6.5].
[17] See, Al Nashiri v Poland, European Court of Human Rights Application No.28761/11 (2014) [562]-[569]; Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights Application No. no. 8139/09 (2012), [252]-[262]; R v Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323, per Lord Steyn at [41].
[18] See, Stoichkov v Bulgaria, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 9808/02 (24 March 2005) at [54].
[19] The question has been raised in several individual complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee; however, the committee has decided these complaints on other bases without ruling on the question: see, for example, ARJ v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 692/1996 ( 1997) [6.15]; Kwok v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1442/2005 (2009) [9.8]; and Alzery v Sweden, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1416/2005 (2006) [11.9].
[20] In 2007 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted the reluctance of states to extend the application of the prohibition of refoulement to articles 9 and 14. However the Working Group continued by stating that 'to remove a person to a State where there is a genuine risk that the person will be detained without legal basis, or without charges over a prolonged time, or tried before a court that manifestly follows orders from the executive branch, cannot be considered compatible with the obligation in article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires that States parties respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and under their control': see Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/40 (2007) [44]–[49].
[21] Model Treaty on Extradition, adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 45/116 as amended by General Assembly resolution 52/88.
[22] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14(2).
[23] See, remand (subsection 15(6)); consent to surrender (subsection 18(3)); determination of eligibility for surrender (subsection 19(9A)); review (section 21); and judicial review (section 49C).
[24] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 9.
[25] Smantser v Belarus, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1178/03 (2008); WBE v the Netherlands, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 432/90 (1992); and Hill and Hill v Spain, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 526/93 (1997).
[26] See, In the Matter of an Application for Bail by Isa Islam [2010] ACTSC 147 (19 November 2010): the ACT Supreme Court declared that a provision of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) was inconsistent with the right to liberty under section 18 of the ACT Human Rights Act 2004 which required that a person awaiting trial not be detained in custody as a 'general rule'. Section 9C of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) required those accused of murder, certain drug offences and ancillary offences, to show 'exceptional circumstances' before having a normal assessment for bail undertaken.
[27] Smantser v Belarus, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1178/03 (2008); WBE v the Netherlands, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 432/90 (1992); and Hill and Hill v Spain, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 526/93 (1997).
[28] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 2 and 26. Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also prohibits discrimination specifically in relation to the human rights contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
[29] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination (1989).
[30] Althammer v Austria, UN Human Rights Committee Communication no. 998/01 (2003) [10.2]. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Under 'other status' the following have been held to qualify as prohibited grounds: age, nationality, marital status, disability, place of residence within a country and sexual orientation. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are often described as 'personal attributes'. See Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, [23.39].
[31] The minister's response to the committee's inquiries was received on 3 July 2023. This is an extract of the response. The response is available in full on the committee's website.
[32] [2005] FCAFC 180; (2005) 145 FCR 269.
[33] Ibid, 275.
[34] Rivera v Minister/or Justice and Customs [2007] FCAFC 123; (2007) 160 FCR 115, 119 [14] (Emmett J, with whom Conti J agreed). This position has been subsequently affirmed by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia: Snedden v Minister for Justice (Cth) & Anor [2014] FCAFC 156; (2014) 145 ALD 273,297 [150] (Middleton and Wigney JJ).
[35] As noted by the Committee in footnote 21 of their report, the question of whether Article 14 contains a non-refoulement obligation has been raised in multiple complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee, and each time the Committee has make their decision on other bases. The question was raised in the Australian immigration context in Kwok v Australia UN HRC No. 1442/2005 (2009) "Having found a violation of article 9, paragraph 1, with respect to the author's detention, and potential violations of article 6 and article 7 ... the Committee does not consider it necessary to address whether the same facts amount to a violation of article 6, paragraph 2, article 9, paragraph 4, or article 14 of the Covenant" [9.8]
[36] Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary, ed William A. Schabas (N.P. Engel, 2019), 48.
[37] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to equality before courts
and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN HRC, 90th session, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007),
para 17.
[38] Ibid, para 62. See further: Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary, ed William A. Schabas (N.P. Engel, 2019), 362-363; Griffiths v Australia, Communication No. 1973/2010, Views adopted 21 October 2012, UN Doc CCPR/C/l l 2/D/1973/2010, paragraph 6.5.
[39] Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers,
page 21.
[40] See, for example Av Australia, Communication No 560/1993, Views adopted 30 April 1997,
UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, paragraph 9.2.
[41] Bakhtiyari v Australia, Communication No. 1069/2002, Views adopted 29 October 2003, UN
Doc CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002, paragraphs 9.2-9.4.
[42] In addition to the statutory rights to bail under the Extradition Act, the Australian Government
recognises that the Federal Court of Australia has the power to grant bail in the context of proceedings for judicial review of an extradition decision under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903. This power arises by virtue of section 23 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (as confirmed in Adamas v The Hon Brendan O'Connor (No 3) [2012] FCA 365, [16]-[17] (Gilmour J)). Further, the High Court of Australia has the power to grant bail in extradition proceedings as an incident of its appellate jurisdiction granted by section 73 of the Constitution (as confirmed in Cabal, 182-183 [44] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ)).
[43] Extradition Act, subsection 15B(3)(b).
[45] See, UN Human rights Committee, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kazakhstan, CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/2 (9 August 2016), at [44].
[46] Statement of compatibility, p. 19.
[50] Kwok Yin Fong v. Australia, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1442/2005 (2009), paragraph [9.7].
[51] See R v Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323, per Lord Steyn at [41].
[52] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN HRC, 90th session, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007), paragraphs [17] and [62]
[53] The High Court of Australia has stated that: '[I]t is an error in a bail application in an extradition matter to take into account that there is "a predisposition against unnecessary or arbitrary detention in custody". The Parliament has made it plain that bail is not to be granted unless special circumstances are proved...[I]t is erroneous to take into account "those circumstances which ordinarily would fall for consideration on an application for bail where a person is charged domestically for the commission of a crime". Those circumstances ...can play no part in determining whether the applicant has established special circumstances.' See, United Mexican States v Cabal [2001] HCA 60 at [72].
[54] See, most recently Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services [2023] FCAFC 58 (13 April 2023).
[55] Statement of compatibility, p. 22, paragraph [53].
[56] Griffiths v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee, Communication no. 1973/2010 (2014).
[57] Griffiths v Australia, UN Human Rights Committee, Communication no. 1973/2010 (2014), paragraphs [7.2] – [7.5].
[58] Extradition Act, subsections 19(5) and 21A(4).
[59] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, First Report of 2013 (6 February 2013), p. 111; Sixth Report of 2013, pp. 149–160; Tenth Report of 2013, pp. 56–75; Twenty-second Report of the 44th Parliament (13 May 2015), Extradition (Vietnam) Regulation 2013 [F2013L01473] pp. 108–110; Report 2 of 2017 (21 March 2017), Crimes Legislation Amendment (International Crime Cooperation and Other Measures) Bill 2016, pp. 8–9; Report 4 of 2017 (9 May 2017), Extradition (People's Republic of China) Regulations 2017 [F2017L00185], pp. 70-73, and Crimes Legislation Amendment (International Crime Cooperation and Other Measures) Bill 2016, pp. 90–98; Report 3 of 2018 (27 March 2018), Extradition (El Salvador) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01581] and Extradition Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No. 1) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01575], pp. 16–29; and Report 5 of 2018 (19 June 2018) Extradition (El Salvador) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01581] and Extradition Legislation Amendment (2017 Measures No. 1) Regulations 2017 [F2017L01575], pp. 77–108.
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