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Australian Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills - Scrutiny Digests |
1.1 The committee comments on the following bills and, in some instances, seeks a response or further information from the relevant minister.
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Purpose
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This bill seeks to amend the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 to modify the organisation’s compulsory
questioning and surveillance device powers
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Portfolio
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Home Affairs
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Introduced
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House of Representatives on 13 May 2020
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1.2 Schedule 1 to the bill seeks to repeal and replace the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation's (ASIO) compulsory questioning framework, including amending the provisions related to questioning warrants, and abolishing questioning and detention warrants.[2]
1.3 The Director-General may apply to the Attorney-General for a questioning warrant in order to question a person about certain matters. For adults the warrant may be issued in relation to matters which relate to protecting Australia from espionage, acts of foreign interference, and politically motivated violence (which would include acts of terrorism, as well as financing terrorism and offences relating to control orders, preventative detention orders and continuing detention orders). For children aged between 14 to 18 years of age, a warrant may be issued in relation to matters that relate to the protection of Australia from politically motivated violence. The Attorney-General may issue a warrant in relation to an adult where they are satisfied that: the person is at least 18 years old; there are reasonable grounds for believing that a warrant will substantially assist in the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to an adult questioning matter; and having regard to other methods (if any) of collecting the intelligence that are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the warrant to be issued.
1.4 On receiving notice of a questioning warrant, a subject may contact a lawyer for legal advice about the warrant, subject to a number of limitations. A questioning warrant may require the subject to appear at a particular time for questioning, or to appear immediately. It may also authorise that a subject be apprehended and searched in order to ensure that they comply with the warrant. A subject may be questioned for up to 24 hours, or 40 hours where an interpreter is being used. Questioning warrants may operate for up to 28 days, and subjects may be prevented from travelling outside Australia during the warrant period and be required to surrender their travel documents.
1.5 The committee considers that the questioning warrant framework established by this bill has the potential to significantly trespass on an individual’s rights and liberties and considers that the inclusion of such provisions should be sufficiently justified and appropriate safeguards surrounding the use of these provisions should be in place. The committee’s consideration of specific aspects of the bill is outlined in the paragraphs below.
1.6 Proposed section 34AD sets out who may be appointed by the Attorney-General as a prescribed authority. This includes:
• a person who has been a judge in a superior court for at least 5 years who no longer holds a commission as a judge;
• a President or Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) who has been enrolled as a legal practitioner for at least 5 years;
• a person who has been a legal practitioner for at least 10 years and holds a practicing certificate.
1.7 The Attorney-General must be satisfied that the person has the appropriate knowledge and experience and must consider whether any conflict of interest may exist. The appointment of a prescribed authority may only be terminated on limited grounds, including misbehaviour, a failure to comply with the requirements to disclose interests or where the Attorney-General considers that a conflict of interest may exist.
1.8 The committee notes that while the statement of compatibility at various points notes the role of the ‘independent prescribed authority’, there is little information on the face of the bill or in the explanatory materials to ensure that a prescribed authority is sufficiently independent. The committee notes that there is no fixed term for a prescribed authority, the prescribed authority is both appointed and terminated by the Attorney-General and persons may be appointed as a prescribed authority who are not part of a body that traditionally maintains a robust independence from the executive branch of government (ie former members of the judiciary).
1.9 The committee’s concerns regarding the independence of prescribed authorities is heightened by the very significant powers that are provided to prescribed authorities under the bill, including allowing for the questioning of children under 14 and the significant limits that can be placed on a person’s choice of legal representation by prescribed authorities.
1.10 As a result, from a scrutiny perspective, the committee is concerned that there are not appropriate safeguards surrounding the use of broad coercive powers by prescribed authorities under the bill. The committee does not consider that the explanatory memorandum adequately addresses this issue.
1.11 The committee therefore requests the minister’s more detailed advice regarding whether appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure that any prescribed authorities are independent, noting the significant coercive powers provided to them.
1.12 As noted above, proposed section 34B provides that the Director-General may request that the Attorney-General issue a questioning warrant for either an adult or a minor. In addition, proposed section 26R provides that the Director‑General may request that the Attorney-General issue a warrant for the recovery of tracking devices.
1.13 The committee has a long-standing scrutiny view that the power to issue warrants or orders relating to the use of intrusive power should only be conferred on judicial officers. In this regard, the committee does not consider that consistency with existing provisions is, of itself, a sufficient justification for allowing warrants or orders relating to the use of intrusive powers to be issued by non-judicial officers.
1.14 In light of the significant coercive powers that flow from the issuing of a questioning warrant or a warrant for the recovery of tracking devices, the committee would expect a detailed justification to be given as to the appropriateness of conferring such powers on the Attorney-General. In this instance, the explanatory memorandum provides no such justification. Additionally, the committee notes, that given the broad discretionary nature of the power, it may be difficult for an affected person to obtain a judicial remedy.
1.15 The committee therefore requests the minister’s more detailed advice as to:
• why it is considered necessary and appropriate to allow the Attorney‑General to issue questioning warrants and warrants for the recovery of tracking devices; and
• whether the bill can be amended to provide that questioning warrants and warrants for the recovery of tracking devices are instead issued by judicial officers.
1.16 Proposed section 34D provides that a person who is due to appear before a prescribed authority for questioning under a warrant may be required to undergo a screening procedure, produce a thing in their possession for inspection or examination and undergo an ordinary search or a frisk search. A police officer may also request the person leave a dangerous item or a communication device with the officer for safekeeping while the person is being questioned. A person who fails to comply with a request from a police officer under proposed section 34D will be taken to have failed to appear and will commit an offence under section 34GD(2). The penalty for this offence is 5 years imprisonment.
1.17 The explanatory memorandum states:
The purpose of this section is to ensure the safety of those involved in questioning and prevent the transmission of sensitive information disclosed during questioning by preventing the possession of dangerous items or communication devices at the questioning place.[3]
1.18 The committee notes that these screening provisions contain no protections for circumstances where a request made by a police officer may be unreasonable or where a person, due to an intellectual disability or for whom English is a second language, may not understand the request being made of them. The committee’s concerns in this instance are heightened by the significant penalty that can be imposed on persons who have failed to appear. The explanatory memorandum contains no information on whether there are appropriate safeguards in place to ensure that requests made by officers are reasonable in the circumstances and that persons who may have difficulty understanding a request that has been made of them are sufficiently informed of both their obligations and the consequences of failing to appear.
1.19 In light of the above, the committee requests the minister’s more detailed advice regarding whether there are appropriate safeguards in place to protect the personal rights and liberties of persons presenting to a place for questioning. In particular, the committee requests the minister's advice as to whether the bill can be amended to include a defence to proposed subsection 34GD(2) so that the offence will not apply in circumstances where the request was unreasonable or the person was not capable of understanding a request made of them.
1.20 A person subject to a questioning warrant is required to give any information or produce any record or other thing requested by ASIO.[4] Failure to comply would be a criminal offence, subject to up to five years imprisonment. As well as being issued in relation to a person not charged with an offence, a questioning warrant may be issued 'post-charge', that is, after a subject has been charged with a related offence which is yet to be resolved, or in cases where such a charge is imminent.[5] A person subject to a warrant is not excused from providing information or producing a record or thing on the basis that it may incriminate them.[6] Although anything said or produced by them is not generally admissible in criminal proceedings against them (which provides a 'use immunity'),[7] this immunity does not extend to information derived from questioning materials (meaning there is no 'derivative use immunity').
1.21 The committee recognises there may be certain circumstances in which the privilege against self incrimination can be overridden. However, abrogating the privilege represents a serious loss of personal liberty. In considering whether it is appropriate to abrogate the privilege against self-incrimination, the committee will consider whether the public benefit in doing so significantly outweighs the loss to personal liberty. In general, however, the committee considers that any justification for abrogating the privilege will be more likely to be considered appropriate if accompanied by a use and derivative use immunity (providing that the information or documents produced or answers given, or anything obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the production of the information or documents, is not admissible in evidence in most proceedings).
1.22 In this instance, the explanatory memorandum states:
It is appropriate that material derived from the pre-charge questioning of a person should be able to be provided to a prosecutor without additional restrictions. The ASIO Act overrides the privilege against self-incrimination in compulsory questioning, but provides that anything said or any record or thing produced by the subject while appearing before a prescribed authority for questioning under the warrant in order to comply with a requirement is inadmissible. While it is appropriate to ensure that there are strict limits on the disclosure of questioning material to a prosecutor of the subject, material derived from the pre-charge questioning of a subject stands in a different category.
The ASIO Act has always intended to authorise the derivative use of questioning material for a number of purposes, including to provide to law enforcement for use in the investigation and prosecution of the subject and other people. This is an important part of enabling ASIO to fulfil its statutory functions, which include communicating intelligence for purposes relevant to security and co-operating with and assisting law enforcement agencies in the performance of their functions.[8]
1.23 The committee draws this matter to the attention of the Senate and leaves to the Senate as a whole whether it is appropriate to not include a derivative use immunity when abrogating the privilege against self-incrimination for persons subject to a questioning warrant.
1.24 Proposed section 34AF provides that the Director-General of ASIO may prepare a written statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority under a questioning warrant. The Director-General must consult with the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police regarding the preparation of the statement and the statement must be approved by the Attorney-General. The purpose of the statement is to set out standard operational procedures in relation to the execution of a questioning warrant, and may include, for example, operational procedures about the transportation of the subject, and matters pertaining to the health and wellbeing of the subject. Proposed subsection 34AF(5) provides that while any written statement of procedures will be a legislative instrument, it will not be subject to disallowance.
1.25 The committee’s view is that significant matters, such as the operational procedures in relation to the exercise of coercive powers, should be included in the primary legislation unless a sound justification for the use of delegated legislation is provided. In this regard, the explanatory memorandum states:
As is the case under existing section 34C, it is appropriate to exclude the statement of procedures from the disallowance provisions because the statement is an instrument that is an internal management tool of government to ensure the basic standards applicable when a person is apprehended and/or questioned under a warrant issued under Division 3. In addition, given the nature of the questioning warrants to which the statement of procedures apply, the statement of procedures is an instrument that provides for the specific security needs in relation to persons who are subject to these warrants. For these reasons, it is appropriate to exempt the statement of procedures from the disallowance regime in the Legislation Act.[10]
1.26 While noting that proposed section 34AF contains a number of measures relating to consultation and approval of the statement of procedures, the committee considers that not making the statement disallowable removes the opportunity for the Parliament as a whole to have oversight and scrutiny over the content of any statement. The committee’s concerns in this instance are heightened by the significant matters that may be included in the statement of procedures and the potential for these matters to have a significant impact on the protection or otherwise of a person’s rights and liberties. As a result, from a scrutiny perspective, the committee does not consider that the explanatory memorandum has sufficiently justified why such a significant element of the questioning warrant scheme has been left to non-disallowable delegated legislation.
1.27 In light of the above, the committee requests the minister’s more detailed advice as to:
• why it is considered necessary and appropriate to leave the statement of procedures, which will contain significant practical information in relation to the execution of questioning warrants, to non-disallowable delegated legislation; and
• whether the bill can be amended to provide that the statement of procedures will be disallowable to allow for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the procedures.
1.28 Proposed section 34FH provides that the regulations may prohibit or regulate access to information, access to which is otherwise controlled or limited on security grounds, by lawyers acting for a person in connection with proceedings for a remedy relating to a questioning warrant or the treatment of a person in connection with that warrant.
1.29 The committee’s view is that significant matters, such as the regulation of access to information by lawyers, should be included in the primary legislation unless a sound justification for the use of delegated legislation is provided. In this instance, the explanatory memorandum contains no information regarding why this matter will be left to delegated legislation.
1.30 The committee notes that a legislative instrument, made by the executive, is not subject to the full range of parliamentary scrutiny inherent in bringing proposed changes in the form of an amending bill. The committee's concerns in this instance are heighted by the potential consequences that may flow from a lawyer not being able to access all relevant information regarding their client's case.
1.31 The committee therefore requests the minister’s more detailed advice regarding:
• why it is considered necessary and appropriate to allow the regulation of access to information by lawyers to be left to delegated legislation; and
• whether the bill can be amended to include at least high-level guidance in this regard on the face of the primary legislation.
1.32 Proposed subsection 34GD(3) provides that the subject of a questioning warrant commits an offence if the subject is appearing before a prescribed authority and fails to comply with a request to give any information or produce any record or thing. Proposed subsection 34GD(4) provides an exemption to the offence (offence-specific defence), which applies if the subject does not have the information. The offence carries a penalty of imprisonment for 5 years. The explanatory memorandum states:
In accordance with subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code, it is the defendant who must adduce evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that he or she does not have the information requested. The evidential burden has been placed on the defendant because the matter is peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge and would be too difficult for the prosecution to prove.[13]
1.33 Proposed subsection 34GD(8) provides that the subject of a questioning warrant commits an offence if the subject makes a statement, that to their knowledge, false or misleading in purported compliance with a request from ASIO. Proposed subsection 34GD(9) provides an exemption to the offence if the statement is not false or misleading in a material particular. The offence carries a penalty of imprisonment for 5 years. The explanatory memorandum states:
A person should not commit a criminal offence by making a false or misleading statement on a matter which is immaterial, but it will often be difficult to determine whether a matter is material. The person best placed to know whether a matter is material or not, and consequently to give evidence on this matter, is the defendant.[14]
1.34 At common law, it is ordinarily the duty of the prosecution to prove all elements of an offence. This is an important aspect of the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Provisions that reverse the burden of proof and require a defendant to disprove, or raise evidence to disprove, one or more elements of an offence, interferes with this common law right.[15]
1.35 The committee notes that the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences[16] provides that a matter should only be included in an offence-specific defence (as opposed to being specified as an element of the offence), where:
• it is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant; and
• it would be significantly more difficult and costly for the prosecution to disprove than for the defendant to establish the matter.[17]
1.36 In this case, it is not apparent that matters such as whether a statement is not false or misleading in a material particular, are matters peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge, and that it would be difficult or costly for the prosecution to establish the matters. Additionally, the committee considers that, in relation to subsection 34GD(4), it may be very difficult to raise evidence to suggest the exemption applies as may be difficult to suggest the existence of a negative. As a result, from a scrutiny perspective, the committee considers that these matters appear to be matters more appropriate to be included as elements of the offence.
1.37 The committee requests the minister's advice as to:
• why it is considered necessary and appropriate to include the specified matters as offence-specific defences; and
• the appropriateness of amending proposed section 34GD so that the matters specified in proposed subsections 34GD(4) and (9) are framed as elements of the relevant offence.
1.38 Proposed section 34GF makes provision for two offences in relation to unauthorised disclosures. Proposed subsection 34GF(1) provides that it is an offence, where a questioning warrant has been issued, for a person to disclose the existence of the warrant, a fact relating to the content of the warrant or to the questioning or apprehension of a person in connection with the warrant, or any operational information, for the life of the warrant. Proposed subsection 34GF(2) provides that it is an offence, in the two years after a questioning warrant has been issued, for a person to disclose operational information that the person obtained as a direct or indirect result of the issue of the warrant.
1.39 Proposed subsection 34GF(3) provides that strict liability will apply to the subject of the warrant and their lawyer in relation to whether the information indicates the fact that the warrant has been issued, or a fact relating to the content of the warrant or to the questioning or apprehension of a person in connection with the warrant or is operational information.
1.40 Under general principles of the criminal law, fault is required to be proved before a person can be found guilty of a criminal offence (ensuring that criminal liability is imposed only on persons who are sufficiently aware of what they are doing and the consequences it may have). When a bill states that an offence or element of an offence is one of strict liability, this removes the requirement for the prosecution to prove the defendant's fault. In such cases, an offence will be made out if it can be proven that the defendant engaged in certain conduct, without the prosecution having to prove that the defendant intended this, or was reckless or negligent. As the imposition of strict liability undermines fundamental criminal law principles, the committee expects the explanatory memorandum to provide a clear justification for any imposition of strict liability, including outlining whether the approach is consistent with the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences.[19] The explanatory memorandum contains no justification for the use of strict liability in this instance.
1.41 The committee therefore requests a detailed justification from the minister for the proposed application of strict liability to certain elements of the unauthorised disclosure offences in proposed section 34GF, with reference to the principles set out in the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences.[20]
1.42 Proposed section 34JE provides that an application for financial assistance may be made to the Attorney-General in respect of the subject of a questioning warrant’s appearance before a prescribed authority for questioning. Proposed subsection 34JE(5) provides that the Attorney-General may determine guidelines that are to be applied in authorising the provision of financial assistance. Proposed subsection 34JE(6) provides that the guidelines are not legislative instruments.
1.43 The committee considers that this provision provides the Attorney-General with a broad power to determine the operation of the scheme for financial assistance in circumstances where there is limited guidance on the face of the primary legislation as to when these powers should be exercised. The committee expects that the inclusion of broad discretionary powers should be justified in the explanatory memorandum. In this instance, there is no such justification in the explanatory memorandum.
1.44 Additionally, the committee is concerned that there will be limited oversight of the guidelines as they will not be a legislative instrument and therefore there is no requirement that the guidelines are published or subject to parliamentary scrutiny or disallowance. The explanatory memorandum states:
The guidelines made under proposed subsection 34JE(5) will not be legislative in character. Section 34JE sets out the circumstances in which financial assistance may be sought and received. It is expected that the guidelines will cover procedural issues such as the process for lodging an application and the level of fees available to barristers and solicitors appearing for a subject. While these guidelines may affect a person’s interests, they will not determine or alter the content of the law. Though eligibility may be determined or assessed by reference to the guidelines, they will not affect a person's right to apply for financial assistance. Accordingly, the guidelines will be administrative in character.[22]
1.45 While noting this explanation, the committee considers that the broad and undefined power to make guidelines could allow the Attorney-General to make guidelines that limit a person’s right to seek financial assistance, and may therefore determine or alter the content of the law. In any event, from a scrutiny perspective, the committee considers, that given the significant nature of the power to grant financial assistance in these circumstances, it is important to allow for additional parliamentary scrutiny and oversight.
1.46 The committee therefore requests the minister’s more detailed advice regarding:
• why it is necessary and appropriate to provide the Attorney-General with a broad discretionary power to determine guidelines regarding the provision of financial assistance in circumstances where there is limited guidance on the face of the primary legislation as to when or how this power should be exercised; and
• whether the bill can be amended to provide that the guidelines are legislative instruments subject to parliamentary disallowance.
1.47 Schedule 2 to the bill seeks to amend ASIO's powers with respect to the use of tracking devices. The ASIO Act currently provides that surveillance devices may only be used pursuant to a warrant issued by the Attorney-General.[24] This bill would expand that power to provide that ASIO may instead obtain internal ASIO authorisation to use a tracking device (or enhancement equipment)[25] to track a person or object.[26]
1.48 Proposed section 26G provides that an ASIO employee or affiliate may request that an authorised officer (the Director-General or an SES-level ASIO employee) give an authorisation for the installation, use, maintenance and recovery of tracking devices in respect of a security matter. A request may be made in writing or orally. The authorising officer must only grant the request if the authorising officer is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the use of a tracking device will substantially assist the collection of intelligence in respect of the security matter.
1.49 The committee notes that the ability for ASIO to obtain internal authorisations for the use of tracking devices may significantly trespass on a person’s rights and liberties. The committee’s scrutiny concerns in this instance are heightened due to a number of factors that appear to reduce or limit the level of oversight in place regarding the use of these powers. This includes that an internal device may be issued orally; that the limits around when it will be considered proportionate for the powers to be exercised will be contained in internal policy guidance that is not subject to parliamentary scrutiny; and the broad test for authorising the use of a tracking device.
1.50 The committee would expect that the inclusion of a broad power to allow for the internal authorisation of the use of tracking devices to be sufficiently justified in the explanatory memorandum. In this instance the statement of compatibility states:
ASIO will now have the ability to internally authorise the use of these devices in circumstances where a warrant is not required – in line with the powers of law enforcement agencies. That is, where ASIO officers are not required to enter a private premises or vehicle to install the device and the device cannot be used to listen or record a person. There are a number of safeguards associated with these internal authorisations, including periodic reporting to the Attorney-General in relation to the number of internal authorisations and information pertaining to those activities, as well as the requirement to maintain a register of this information to allow IGIS oversight.[27]
1.51 While noting this explanation, it remains unclear to the committee that appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure that internal authorisations for the use of tracking devices are appropriate.
1.52 The committee also notes proposed section 34AAB provides that if an internal authorisation is given, the Director-General must give the Attorney-General a written report regarding a number of matters in relation to the issuing of the internal authorisation and the use of the tracking device. The committee considers that while this provides the Attorney-General with oversight of the use of internal authorisations, consideration should be given to amending the bill to require that at least broad guidelines relation to the internal authorisation process should be contained in a legislative instrument to allow for additional scrutiny and oversight.
1.53 In light of the above, the committee requests the minister's more detailed advice regarding:
• why it is necessary and appropriate for tracking devices to be approved for use by ASIO through an internal authorisation process, noting the potential trespass on personal rights and liberties;
• whether proposed subsections 26G(3) and 26H(1) of the bill can be amended to remove the ability to orally request and approve an internal authorisation for the use of a tracking device; and
• whether the bill can be amended to require that at least broad guidelines relating to the internal authorisation of the use of tracking devices are contained in a legislative instrument which is subject to parliamentary disallowance.
[1] Various provisions. The committee draws senators’ attention to this provision pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(i).
[2] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, Part III, Division 3, Subdivision C.
[3] Explanatory memorandum, p. 61.
[4] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed subsection 34GD(3).
[5] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed section 34A. 'Imminent' means: the person is under arrest for an offence, but has not been charged with the offence; or a person with authority to commence a process for prosecuting the person for an offence has decided to commence, but not yet commenced, the process.
[6] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed subsection 34GD(5).
[7] Schedule 1, Part 1, item 10, proposed subsection 34GD(6). This does not prevent such information being produced in specified proceedings, including those related to the offence of providing false or misleading information.
[8] Explanatory memorandum, p. 77.
[9] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed section 34AF. The committee draws senators’ attention to this provision pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(v).
[10] Explanatory memorandum, p. 39.
[11] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed section 34FH. The committee draws senators’ attention to this provision pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(iv).
[12] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed subsections 34DF(4) and (9). The committee draws senators’ attention to these provisions pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(i).
[13] Explanatory memorandum, p. 99.
[14] Explanatory memorandum, p. 101.
[15] Subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 provides that a defendant who wishes to rely on any exception, exemption, excuse, qualification or justification bears an evidential burden in relation to that matter.
[16] Attorney-General's Department, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers, September 2011, pp 50-52.
[17] Attorney-General's Department, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers, September 2011, p. 50.
[18] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed subsection 34GF(3). The committee draws senators’ attention to this provision pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(i).
[19] Attorney-General's Department, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers, September 2011, pp 22–25.
[20] Attorney-General's Department, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers, September 2011, pp 22–25.
[21] Schedule 1, item 10, proposed subsection 34JE. The committee draws senators’ attention to this provision pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(ii).
[22] Explanatory memorandum, p. 113.
[23] Schedule 2. The committee draws senators’ attention to this provision pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(i).
[24] Subdivision D of Division 2 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979.
[25] Section 22 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 defines 'enhancement equipment' to mean 'equipment capable of enhancing a signal, image or other information obtained by the use of the surveillance device'.
[26] Schedule 2, item 8.
[27] Statement of compatibility, p. 15.
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