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Australian Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills - Scrutiny Digests |
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Purpose
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The Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 seeks to propose appropriations
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the ordinary annual services of the
Government in addition
to amounts appropriated through the Appropriation Act
(No. 1) 2021-2022 and the Appropriation (Coronavirus Response) (No. 1)
2021-2022.
The Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022 seeks to propose appropriations
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for services that are not the ordinary annual
services of the
Government in addition to amounts appropriated through
Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2021-2022 and the Appropriation (Coronavirus
Response) Bill (No. 2) 2021-2022.
The bills provides for the appropriation of specified amounts for
expenditure by Australian Government entities, primarily being non-corporate
Commonwealth entities under the Public Governance, Performance and
Accountability Act 2013.
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Portfolio
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Finance
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Introduced
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House of Representatives on 10 February 2022
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1.45 Under section 53 of the Constitution the Senate cannot amend proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the government. Further, section 54 of the Constitution provides that any proposed law which appropriates revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the government shall be limited to dealing only with such appropriation.
1.46 Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 seeks to appropriate money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the ordinary annual services of the government. However, it appears to the committee, for the reasons set out below, that the initial expenditure in relation to certain measures may have been inappropriately classified as ordinary annual services.
1.47 The inappropriate classification of items in appropriation bills as ordinary annual services, when they in fact relate to new programs or projects, undermines the Senate's constitutional right to amend proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for expenditure on all matters not involving the ordinary annual services of the government. This is relevant to the committee's role in reporting on whether the exercise of legislative power is subject to sufficient parliamentary scrutiny.[30]
1.48 The Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations and Staffing[31] has also actively considered the inappropriate classification of items as ordinary annual services of the government.[32] It has noted that the division of items in appropriation bills since the adoption of accrual budgeting has been based on a mistaken assumption that any expenditure falling within an existing departmental outcome should be classified as ordinary annual services expenditure.[33]
1.49 As a result of continuing concerns relating to the misallocation of some items, on 22 June 2010 the Senate resolved:
1) To reaffirm its constitutional right to amend proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for expenditure on all matters not involving the ordinary annual services of the Government; [and]
2) That appropriations for expenditure on:
a) the construction of public works and buildings;
b) the acquisition of sites and buildings;
c) items of plant and equipment which are clearly definable as capital expenditure (but not including the acquisition of computers or the fitting out of buildings);
d) grants to the states under section 96 of the Constitution;
e) new policies not previously authorised by special legislation;
f) items regarded as equity injections and loans; and
g) existing asset replacement (which is to be regarded as depreciation),
are not appropriations for the ordinary annual services of the Government and that proposed laws for the appropriation of revenue or moneys for expenditure on the said matters shall be presented to the Senate in a separate appropriation bill subject to amendment by the Senate.
1.50 The committee concurs with the view expressed by the Appropriations and Staffing Committee that if 'ordinary annual services of the government' is to include items that fall within existing departmental outcomes then:
completely new programs and projects may be started up using money appropriated for the ordinary annual services of the government, and the Senate [may be] unable to distinguish between normal ongoing activities of government and new programs and projects or to identify the expenditure on each of those areas.[34]
1.51 The Appropriations and Staffing Committee considered that the solution to any inappropriate classification of items is to ensure that new policies for which money has not been appropriated in previous years are separately identified in their first year in the bill that is not for the ordinary annual services of the government.[35]
1.52 Despite these comments, and the Senate resolution of 22 June 2010, it appears that a reliance on existing broad 'departmental outcomes' to categorise appropriations, rather than on an individual assessment as to whether a particular appropriation relates to a new program or project, continues. The committee notes that in recent years the Senate has routinely agreed to annual appropriation bills containing such broadly categorised appropriations, despite the potential that expenditure within the broadly-framed departmental outcomes may have been inappropriately classified as 'ordinary annual services'.[36]
1.53 Based on the Senate resolution of 22 June 2010, it appears that at least part of the initial expenditure in relation to the following measures may have been inappropriately classified as 'ordinary annual services' and therefore improperly included in Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022:
• Certifying Australian Cosmetics Exports ($8.5 million over four years);[37] and
• Territories Stolen Generations Redress Scheme ($312.7 million over four years from 2021-22, and $65.8 million in 2025-26).[38]
1.54 While it is not the committee's role to consider the policy merit of these measures, the committee considers that they may have been inappropriately classified as 'ordinary annual services', thereby impacting upon the Senate's ability to subject the measures to an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny.
1.55 The committee has previously written to the Minister for Finance in relation to inappropriate classification of items in other appropriation bills on a number of occasions;[39] however, the government has consistently advised that it does not intend to reconsider its approach to the classification of items that constitute the ordinary annual services of the government.
1.56 The committee again notes that the government's approach to the classification of items that constitute ordinary annual services of the government is not consistent with the Senate resolution of 22 June 2010.
1.57 The committee notes that any inappropriate classification of items in appropriation bills undermines the Senate's constitutional right to amend proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for expenditure on all matters not involving the ordinary annual services of the government. Such inappropriate classification of items impacts on the Senate's ability to effectively scrutinise proposed appropriations as the Senate may be unable to distinguish between normal ongoing activities of government and new programs or projects.
1.58 The committee draws this matter to the attention of senators as it appears that the initial expenditure in relation to certain items in the latest set of appropriation bills may have been inappropriately classified as ordinary annual services (and therefore improperly included in Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 which should only contain appropriations that are not amendable by the Senate).
1.59 Section 10 of Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2021-2022 (Appropriation Act No. 1) enables the Finance Minister to allocate additional funds to entities when satisfied that there is an urgent need for expenditure and the existing appropriations are inadequate. The allocated amount is referred to as the Advance to the Finance Minister (AFM). The additional amounts are allocated by a determination made by the Finance Minister (an AFM determination). AFM determinations are legislative instruments, but they are not subject to disallowance.
1.60 Subsection 10(2) of Appropriation Act No. 1 provides that when the Finance Minister makes such a determination the Appropriation Act has effect as if it were amended to make provision for the additional expenditure. Subsection 10(3) caps the amounts that may be determined under the AFM provision in Appropriation Act No. 1 at $2 billion. Identical provisions appear in Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2021-2022 (Appropriation Act No. 2), with a separate—$3 billion—cap in that Act. The amount available under the AFM provisions in these Acts—$5 billion—is significantly higher than that available in previous annual appropriation bills prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.[41]
1.61 The committee notes that the explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 states that the AFM provisions '...take into consideration the unique and evolving nature of the COVID-19 pandemic. The extraordinary AFM provisions ensure the Government is able to respond to urgent and unforeseen expenditure requirements across the remainder of 2021-22, where it is not possible or not practical to pass further Appropriation Acts.'[42] The committee notes, however, that the use of the AFM provisions to allocate additional amounts is not limited on the face of the Acts to COVID‑19 response measures.
1.62 The committee considers that, in allowing the Finance Minister to allocate additional funds to entities up to a total of $5 billion via non-disallowable delegated legislation, the AFM provisions in Appropriation Acts Nos. 1 and 2 delegate significant legislative power to the executive. While this does not amount to a delegation of the power to create a new appropriation, the committee notes that one of the core functions of the Parliament is to authorise and scrutinise proposed appropriations. High Court jurisprudence has emphasised the central role of the Parliament in this regard. In particular, while the High Court has held that an appropriation must always be for a purpose identified by the Parliament, '[i]t is for the Parliament to identify the degree of specificity with which the purpose of an appropriation is identified'.[43] The AFM provisions leave the allocation of the purpose of certain appropriations in the hands of the Finance Minister, rather than the Parliament.
1.63 Subclause 10(1) of Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 seeks to provide that any determinations made under the AFM provisions in Appropriation Act No. 1 are to be disregarded for the purposes of the $2 billion cap in subsection 10(3) of that Act. The note to subclause 10(1) clarifies that this means that the Finance Minister would have access to the full $2 billion for the purposes of making AFM determinations under section 10 of Appropriation Act No. 1, regardless of any amounts that have already been determined under that section. Clause 12 of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2020-2021 contains identical provisions, which apply to the $3 billion cap in Appropriation Act No. 2.
1.64 In 2021-22 to date, the AFM provisions have been used to allocate funding:
• to support the construction of Centres for National Resilience in Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia to provide additional quarantine capacity for international travellers to Australia in light of the COVID-19 pandemic ($218 million);[44]
• to extend the availability of the Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment until 30 June 2022 ($66 million);[45]
• to further support the construction of Centres for National Resilience in Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia to provide additional quarantine capacity for international travellers to Australia in light of the COVID-19 pandemic ($403 million);[46]
• in relation to the extension of the availability of the Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment until 30 June 2022 ($920 million);[47] and
• to further support the construction of Centres for National Resilience in Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia to provide additional quarantine capacity for international travellers to Australia in light of the COVID-19 pandemic ($200 million).[48]
1.65 As noted above, under clause 10 of Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 and clause 12 of the Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, this amount ($1.8 billion) would be disregarded for the purposes of the $2 billion cap imposed by subsection 10(3) of Appropriation Act No. 1 and the $3 billion cap imposed by subsection 12(3) of Appropriation Act No. 2.
1.66 The explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 suggests that exempting AFM determinations from disallowance '...reflects the need for entities to have certainty of appropriation when making expenditures'.[49] The explanatory memorandum further states that:
Disallowance of an AFM determination would reduce an entity’s appropriation to its original level. Yet the urgent expenditure it has already undertaken validly prior to a disallowance, in reliance upon the determination, would count towards the newly reduced appropriation...
Accordingly, disallowance would leave the entity with a shortfall in the appropriation available to fund the ongoing expenditure for which the Government originally budgeted and which the Parliament approved when it passed the Appropriation Act.[50]
1.67 In Scrutiny Digest 13 of 2021, the committee welcomed advice from the minister that the additional transparency measures applying in relation to AFM determinations made under the 2020-2021 supply bills would continue in relation to future appropriation bills and that details of these transparency measures would be included within explanatory memoranda to future bills.[51]
1.68 The committee welcomes the inclusion of this additional information regarding the AFM provisions, including associated transparency measures, in the explanatory memorandums to the bills. The committee considers that the provision of this additional information provides the Parliament with important details to assist in scrutiny of the AFM provisions.
1.69 However, the committee concurs with the view expressed by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation in relation to the disallowance status of AFM determinations. In particular, the committee agrees that if the AFM is used for a genuine emergency situation, the likelihood of it subsequently being disallowed would be virtually non-existent, and not sufficient to justify an exemption from disallowance. Instead, the potential for disallowance would simply operate to ensure that the AFM is only utilised in genuinely urgently circumstances, as intended by the Parliament.[52]
1.70 The committee thanks the minister for responding constructively to its proposals regarding the provision of additional information about transparency measures applying to AFM provisions within explanatory memoranda to future appropriation bills.
1.71 In light of the matters raised by the committee in relation to the Advance to the Finance Minister provisions in Appropriation Acts No. 1 and No. 2,[53] the committee draws to the attention of senators the proposal to disregard previous expenditure of $1.8 billion for the purposes of the $5 billion cap on amounts that may be determined under the Advance to the Finance Minister in 2021‑22. The committee notes that the effect of this proposal is that $1.8 billion in additional funds will be available for expenditure via non-disallowable legislative instrument.
1.72 Clause 4 of both Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022 and Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022 provide that portfolio statements (in this case known as Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements – or PAES) are relevant documents for the purposes of section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. That is, clause 4 provides that the PAES may be considered in interpreting the provisions of each bill. Moreover, the explanatory memorandums to the bills state that they should be read in conjunction with the PAES.[55]
1.73 Noting the important role of the PAES in interpreting Appropriation Bills No. 3 and No. 4, the committee has scrutiny concerns in relation to the inclusion of measures within the PAES that are earmarked as 'not for publication' (nfp), meaning that the proposed allocation of resources to those budget measures is not published within the PAES. Various reasons are provided for marking a measure as nfp, including that aspects of the relevant program are legally or commercially sensitive.
1.74 Parliament has a fundamental constitutional role to scrutinise and authorise the appropriation of public money. As outlined by the High Court, the appropriation process is intended to 'give expression to the foundational principle of representative and responsible government that no money can be taken out of the consolidated Fund into which the revenues of the State have been paid, excepting under a distinct authorization from Parliament itself.'[56]
1.75 Given the importance of parliamentary scrutiny over the appropriation process, the committee considers that the default position should be to publish the full amount of funding allocated to each Budget measure. However, where it is necessary and appropriate not to publish the total funding amount for a measure, the committee considers that an explanation should be included within the PAES. The committee therefore has significant scrutiny concerns in relation to the inclusion of measures within the PAES that are earmarked as NFP where there is either no, or very limited, explanation as to why it is appropriate to mark the measure as NFP.
1.76 The committee notes that all measures earmarked as NFP within the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook for 2021-22 contain at least a high-level explanation as to why it is necessary not to publish the funding level for that measure. It is not clear to the committee why the PAES does not at least contain similar guidance. For example, MYEFO contains an explanation as to why it is considered necessary not to publish total funding amounts for the COVID-19 Response Package for vaccines and treatments purchases measure,[57] the maintenance of the Former British Nuclear Testing Site at Maralinga measure,[58] and the Northern Endeavour Decommission – additional funding measure.[59] However, there is no equivalent explanation for any of these measures within the PAES. The committee notes that this issue appears to have been at least partly addressed with respect to future portfolio statements, given that the Department of Finance Guide to Preparing the 2022-23 Portfolio Budget Statements has been updated to include a new requirement that a high-level explanation must be included within a portfolio budget statement to describe why a measure has been reported as 'not for publication'.[60]
1.77 The committee welcomes the new requirement to include a high-level explanation within future portfolio statements and considers that the provision of this additional information will provide the Parliament with important details to assist in scrutiny of measures earmarked as 'not for publication'. However, the committee also has scrutiny concerns in relation to the quality of the explanations provided in regard to a number of measures within the PAES and MYEFO. More detailed explanations as to why it is appropriate to mark a Budget measure as NFP would allow for a greater level of parliamentary scrutiny over these explanations. From the explanations provided, it would appear that several of the measures categorised as NFP within the PAES may be inappropriately categorised. For example, it is currently unclear to the committee from the explanations provided why it is appropriate not to publish total amounts in relation to the National Collecting Institutions—preserving Australia’s cultural heritage measure,[61] or the Commonwealth Parliamentary Workplaces—Independent Review and ongoing support measures measure.[62] Both of these measures are earmarked as NFP due to commercial sensitivities. The committee notes that the mere existence of a commercial element in relation to a Budget measure is likely not sufficient, of itself, as a justification for not publishing any of the funding amount for that measure. In this regard, the lack of detailed explanation makes it difficult for the Parliament and others to interrogate the rationale behind this classification.
1.78 The committee reiterates its scrutiny concerns that the Parliament is being asked to authorise appropriations without clear information about the amounts that are to be appropriated under each individual measure.
1.79 In light of these ongoing scrutiny concerns, the committee thanks the minister for updating the Department of Finance Guide to Preparing the 2022-23 Portfolio Budget Statements to reflect the committee's scrutiny concerns as outlined at paragraph 2.50 of Scrutiny Digest 16 of 2021.[63]
1.80 The committee will continue to consider this important matter in its scrutiny of future Appropriation bills.
1.81 Clause 16 of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022 deals with Parliament's power under section 96 of the Constitution to provide financial assistance to the states. Section 96 states that 'the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit'.
1.82 Clause 16 seeks to delegate this power to the relevant minister and, in particular, provides the minister with the power to determine:
• terms and conditions under which payments to the states, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory or a local government authority may be made;[65] and
• the amounts and timing of those payments.[66]
1.83 Subclause 16(4) provides that determinations made under subclause 16(2) are not legislative instruments. The explanatory memorandum states that this is:
because these determinations are not altering the appropriations approved by Parliament. Determinations under subclause 16(2) are administrative in nature and will simply determine how appropriations for State, ACT, NT and local government items will be paid.[67]
1.84 The committee has commented in relation to the delegation of power in these standard provisions in previous even-numbered appropriation bills.[68]
1.85 The committee takes this opportunity to reiterate that the power to make grants to the states and to determine terms and conditions attaching to them is conferred on the Parliament by section 96 of the Constitution. While the Parliament has largely delegated this power to the executive, the committee considers that it is appropriate that the exercise of this power be subject to effective parliamentary scrutiny, particularly noting the terms of section 96 and the role of senators in representing the people of their state or territory.
1.86 The committee leaves to the Senate as a whole the appropriateness of clause 16 of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, which allows ministers to determine terms and conditions under which payments to the states, territories and local government may be made and the amounts and timing of those payments.
1.87 Section 13 of Appropriation Act No. 2 specifies debit limits for certain grant programs. A debit limit must be set each financial year otherwise grants under these programs cannot be made. The total amount of grants cannot exceed the relevant debit limit set each year.
1.88 For 2021-22, Appropriation Act No. 2 specifies the following debit limits:
• General purpose financial assistance to the states—$5 billion;[70] and
• National partnership payments to the states—$25 billion.[71]
1.89 In relation to level of these limits, the explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022 states that:
These debit limits were set to ensure the Government had appropriate provisions in place to fund existing undertakings to the States, new programs that may be required between Appropriation Bills, and to respond to major unexpected events such as large-scale natural disasters.
Due to the ongoing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, the latest forecast for [national partnership] payments under section 16 of the FFR Act indicate that by 30 June 2022 the total is likely to be just under the debit limit established in the Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2021-2022, leaving limited capacity to make other unforeseen payments. Accordingly, the Bill proposes that the national partnership payments debit limit for the purposes of section 16 of the FFR Act is increased on a one-off basis to $35,000,000,000 in total, from its current level of $25,000,000,000. This revised debit limit will be available when the Bill commences as an Act, through to the end of this financial year (30 June 2022).[72]
1.90 In explaining the rationale for the proposed increase in the debit limit for national partnership payments from $25 billion to $35 billion, the explanatory memorandum states:
At the time the Appropriation Bill (No. 2) 2021-2022 was considered, the Australian Government estimated that national partnership payments under section 16 of the FFR Act would be $15.8 billion in 2021-22. However, at the 2021-22 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO), the revised estimates were that national partnership payments would be $24.1 billion by 30 June 2022. This is close to the existing debit limit and would leave insufficient capacity to make other exceptional or unforeseen payments.
The main driver of the increase in payments since the last Budget is that, in response to COVID-19 outbreaks and lockdowns in 2021-22, the Australian Government jointly funded business support payments, administered by each of the States and Territories, with costs being shared on a 50:50 basis. At the 2021-22 MYEFO update, the Australian Government estimated that its share of business support programs across all jurisdictions would constitute $7.3 billion. This was all additional to expected payments at the time the relevant debit limit was initially set.[73]
1.91 Finally, the explanatory memorandum confirms that the 'one-off increase for the remainder of this year reflects unique circumstances and is therefore not intended to set a new benchmark for future years'.[74]
1.92 The committee notes that in light of the expected expenditure of $24.1 billion, the debit limit proposed in this bill would allow an additional $10.9 billion in national partnership payments to be made in 2021-22 without the need to seek further parliamentary approval.
1.93 In relation to setting the debit limit at a high level, the explanatory memorandum states that:
Increasing the debit limit to $35 billion on a temporary basis, through to the end of the financial year, would restore the gap between spending under section 16 and the debit limit, to a level consistent with the Australian Government’s practice since 2014-15. It would ensure that the Australian Government has appropriate provisions in place to respond to any further unexpected events, such as natural disasters. This headroom does not remove any of the usual requirements in relation to Commonwealth expenditure, including in relation to legal authority to make expenditure.[75]
1.94 The committee welcomes the inclusion of additional information regarding the setting of debit limits in the explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022. The committee considers that the provision of this additional information provides the Parliament with important details to assist in scrutiny of the debit limit provisions.
1.95 The committee thanks the minister for responding constructively to its proposals regarding the provision of additional information about the setting of debit limits within appropriation bills and looks forward to these measures continuing for future appropriation bills.
1.96 The committee otherwise leaves to the Senate as a whole the appropriateness of clause 13 of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, which appears to set the debit limit for national partnership payments well above the expected level of expenditure.
[29] Various provisions of Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022. The committee draws senators' attention to these provisions pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(v).
[30] See Senate standing order 24(1)(a)(v).
[31] Now the Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations, Staffing and Security.
[32] Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations and Staffing, 50th Report: Ordinary annual services of the government, 2010, p. 3; and annual reports of the committee from 2010-11 to 2014-15.
[33] Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations and Staffing, 45th Report: Department of the Senate's Budget; Ordinary annual Services of the government; and Parliamentary computer network, 2008, p. 2.
[34] Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations and Staffing, 45th Report: Department of the Senate's Budget; Ordinary annual Services of the government; and Parliamentary computer network, 2008, p. 2.
[35] Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations and Staffing, 45th Report: Department of the Senate's Budget; Ordinary annual Services of the government; and Parliamentary computer network, 2008, p. 2.
[36] See, for example, debate in the Senate in relation to amendments proposed by Senator Leyonhjelm to Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2017-18, Senate Hansard, 19 March 2018,
pp. 1487-1490.
[37] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2021-22, p. 204.
[38] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2021-22, p. 216.
[39] Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Tenth Report of 2014, pp. 402-406; Fourth Report of 2015, pp. 267-271; Alert Digest No. 6 of 2015, pp. 6-9; Fourth Report of 2016,
pp. 249-255; Alert Digest No. 7 of 2016, pp. 1-9; Scrutiny Digest 2 of 2017, pp. 1-5; Scrutiny Digest 6 of 2017, pp. 1-6; Scrutiny Digest 12 of 2017, pp. 89-95; Scrutiny Digest 2 of 2018, pp. 1-7.
[40] Clause 10 of Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022; Clause 12 of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021‑2022. The committee draws senators' attention to these provisions pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(iv) and (v).
[41] For example, subsection 10(3) of Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2019-2020 set a cap of $295 million and subsection 12(3) Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2019-2020 set a cap of $380 million.
[42] Explanatory memorandum, p. 10.
[43] Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 577 [160]; Wilkie v Commonwealth [2017] HCA 40 (28 September 2017), [91].
[44] Advance to the Finance Minister Determination (No. 1 of 2021-2022) [F2021L01581].
[45] Advance to the Finance Minister Determination (No. 2 of 2021-2022) [F2021L01771].
[46] Advance to the Finance Minister Determination (No. 3 of 2021-2022) [F2021L01795].
[47] Advance to the Finance Minister Determination (No. 4 of 2021-2022) [F2022L00028].
[48] Advance to the Finance Minister Determination (No. 5 of 2021-2022) [F2022L00129].
[49] Explanatory memorandum, p. 10.
[50] Explanatory memorandum, pp. 10-11.
[51] Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Scrutiny Digest 13 of 2021, pp. 20-21
[52] Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation, Delegated Legislation Monitor 1 of 2022, 25 January 2022, pp. 4-6.
[53] Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Scrutiny Digest 8 of 2021, pp. 8-11 and Scrutiny Digest 13 of 2021, pp. 20-21.
[54] Clause 14 of Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2021-2022; Clause 14 of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022 . The committee draws senators’ attention to these provisions pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(v).
[55] Explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 2021-2022, p. 2; Explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 2) 2021-2022, p. 2.
[56] Wilkie v Commonwealth [2017] HCA 40; (2017) 263 CLR 487, 523 [61].
[57] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2021-22, p. 245.
[58] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2021-22, p. 265.
[59] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2021-22, p. 266.
[60] Department of Finance, Guide to Preparing the 2022-23 Portfolio Budget Statements, pp. 7 and 36.
[61] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2021-22, pp. 277-278.
[62] Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2021-22, p. 217.
[63] Department of Finance, Guide to Preparing the 2022-23 Portfolio Budget Statements, pp. 7 and 36.
[64] Clause 16 and Schedules 1 and 2 to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022. The committee draws senators' attention to these provisions pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(iv) and (v).
[65] Paragraph 16(2)(a) of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) Bill 2021-2022.
[66] Paragraph 16(2)(b) of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) Bill 2021-2022.
[67] Explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, p. 15.
[68] See Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Seventh Report of 2015, pp. 511-516; Ninth Report of 2015, pp. 611-614; Fifth Report of 2016, pp. 352-357; Eighth Report of 2016, pp. 457-460; Scrutiny Digest 3 of 2017, pp. 51-54; Scrutiny Digest 6 of 2017, pp. 7-10; Scrutiny Digest 12 of 2017, pp. 99-104; Scrutiny Digest 2 of 2018, pp. 8-11; Scrutiny Digest 6 of 2018, pp. 9-12; Scrutiny Digest 4 of 2019, pp. 9-12; Scrutiny Digest 15 of 2020, pp. 16-17; Scrutiny Digest 8 of 2021, pp. 13-14.
[69] Clause 13 of Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022. The committee draws senators' attention to this provision pursuant to Senate Standing Order 24(1)(a)(v).
[70] Subsection 13(1) of Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2021-2022.
[71] Subsection 13(2) of Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2021-2022.
[72] Explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, p. 12.
[73] Explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, p. 13.
[74] Explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, p. 13.
[75] Explanatory memorandum to Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2021-2022, p. 13.
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