Sergiou v Tsirimokos C6/1996 [1997] HCATrans 359 (10 November 1997)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry No C4 of 1996

B e t w e e n -

STANLEY STERGIOU and EKATERINE STERGIOU

Applicants

and

JOHN ROSS REID and DENNIS MARIO BARBARA and GAVIN JOHN LEE trading as VANDENBERG REID PAPPAS AND MACDONALD

Respondents

Registry No C6 of 1996

B e t w e e n -

STANLEY STERGIOU

Appellant

and

ARCHIE TSIRIMOKOS trading as VANDENBERG REID

Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

BRENNAN CJ

TOOHEY J

KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON MONDAY, 10 NOVEMBER 1997, AT 11.41 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

MR S.G. STERGIOU: I appear in person.

MR R.E. WILLIAMS, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the third respondent in the first matter. (instructed by Minter Ellison)

BRENNAN CJ: The Deputy Registrar certifies that he has been informed by Vandenberg Reid, solicitors for the first and second-named respondents, in the above application, that is C4 of 1996, that the first and second-named respondents do not wish to be represented at the hearing of the application nor submit to any order of the Court save as to costs. Then in relation to C6 of 1996, the Deputy Registrar certifies that he has been informed by Vandenberg Reid, solicitors for the respondent in this application, that the respondent does not wish to be represented at the hearing of the application and will submit to any order of the Court save as to costs. Yes, Mr Stergiou.

MR STERGIOU: Your Honours, I seek the indulgence of this Court. I have lost the vision of both of my eyes and that, coupled with co-ordination, I find it difficult to co-ordinate to get things done. Briefly, to get back into how this matter eventuated. Seventeen years ago I was well off, my family was well off, but because the bank did not like me - I had the similar type of business - they decided to get me out of the way. They engaged the local lawyer, whatever, I was serviced to get legal representation, I was denied. We lost our house in 1993; the bank repossessed the house; eventually, we got it back. The lawyer consent he began serious actions against me just to stop me proceeding against the original bank. Later on, in 1989, I had been prosecuted, which is the matter still now I have to pursue. In - - -

KIRBY J: What was that prosecution; I was not entirely clear?

MR STERGIOU: It is a part of the whole thing. I am going to that thing now. No C4 and No C6, it is linked to all of these matters. I went into the respondents to get some legal representation. That was 16 July 1987. Until three years later I did not get that representation. They were relying with the bank. The bank sued us to get possession of the house; they did it. For the short period of time, I went back into that Federal Court, Full Bench of the Federal Court, and we retake the house. Then the legal proceedings progresses. On 28 August last, a few months ago, judgment entered on our behalf against the bank and the bank will pay our costs.

I believe that had stopped the lawyers, because this matter had to do with the lawyers. Whatever did it, whatever proceeded to do it, that was fruitless; I could not do anything. The court became indifferent. The Supreme Court, the Magistrates Court, they were indifferent. As a matter of fact, they publicised, at the Canberra Times, without our knowledge or without sending me authority, that we had 12 cases into the courts and all failed. It was not truth, because we denied that legal justice, we could not proceed with the matter. If we left alone we be able to convince the courts and do it, but because the Supreme Court protect the lawyers and do not want to prosecute them. I write numerous letters to the Registrar of the Supreme Court but to no event; I did not get anything.

TOOHEY J: Mr Stergiou, could I just ask you this? There are two matters before the Court. They are both against solicitors, is that right, and both against the same firm of solicitors?

MR STERGIOU: Yes, the same firm, you are right.

TOOHEY J: But you second matter, that is C6, is against Mr Tsirimokos, is that true?

MR STERGIOU: Mr Tsirimokos, you are right.

TOOHEY J: Let me ask you this. Why is that a separate action to the other action against three of the parties in the firm?

MR STERGIOU: Your Honour, the first matter against Ross Reid and company, they are the ones initially I went to seek advice. But the other matter, I have been malicious prosecuted and Mr Tsirimokos was involved then. There was two different directions but for the same purpose. They tried to discredit me altogether. Now I could not go - now once I have denied legal representation, what do I do? I have no knowledge of law. I have got no idea.

TOOHEY J: In that second matter, Mr Tsirimokos is the only member of the firm whom you are suing, is that right?

MR STERGIOU: Well, the only one. What it did, is whatever case eventuate, not because I wanted it, he was there and the reason is, I had no alternative but to proceed against the lawyers. But, again, you know what I mean, I find a brick wall. When I go into the court I find a brick wall. I did not cope.

TOOHEY J: I am just trying to understand why there are two actions and not just one action against all the solicitors involved in the firm, but I hear what you are saying, thank you.

BRENNAN CJ: Mr Stergiou, if you go to a court you can get some assistance if you can show that there is some legal right which has been not accorded to you, not given to you, some legal right to which you are entitled against somebody else. The problem in this case seems to be that the court has not been able to identify the legal right that you say you have against this firm of solicitors. What is the legal right that you say that you have?

MR STERGIOU: Your Honour, are completely denied. We spent in excess of $100,000 on solicitors' fees. At the end they told us, "Sorry, we cannot do anything about it, we cannot see anything in it". Now, there is advice from Barrister Higgins, now Justice Higgins. He knew that we have announced the position to proceed with the matter but we could not do it. The lawyers we went to, they did not want to proceed because it was Greg Stretton of Sneddon, Hall and Gallop involved in it, in these matters and - - -

BRENNAN CJ: We are not going to sit here and listen to you use language about particular individuals and to say adverse things about them without you being able to demonstrate some legal right. At the moment I do not understand what the legal right is. I understand you to say that you wanted legal representation and you could not get it. But I do not understand what the legal right is. That might be because you are not skilled in law, I do not know, but somehow you have to be able to show some legal right in order to come to a court and say "I want some relief".

MR STERGIOU: Well, I have lost on that particular technical point, your Honour. I have no idea. But, what I say is we have been badly treated by the lawyers.

BRENNAN CJ: I can understand that you and a number of other people sometimes say that they have been badly treated by lawyers but that does not really answer the question of whether there has been some breach of legal right. If you cannot tell us what it is, we cannot deal with the case that you want to present.

MR STERGIOU: Well, your Honour, I believe the right I was seeking to engage a lawyer, instruct a lawyer and proceed with the matter it was important to us. Now, this has not eventuated.

BRENNAN CJ: Are you saying this, that you wanted to instruct lawyers to act for you and the lawyers refused to act for you?

MR STERGIOU: Your Honour, I am completely lost because I cannot hear.

BRENNAN CJ: Is this what you are saying? Are you saying that you wanted to get lawyers to act for you but the lawyers refused to act for you?

MR STERGIOU: Refused, your Honour, yes.

BRENNAN CJ: Is that the complaint that you are making against them?

MR STERGIOU: Well, that is correct. Yes, this is correct.

BRENNAN CJ: There is no legal obligation on the part of a lawyer to act for somebody when they do not wish to act for that person for some reason. There may be some professional obligation but not a legal right to insist.

MR STERGIOU: Yes, I appreciate, your Honour, but the delays, now, I did mention 17 years. It carries on a similar thing. We cannot continue like that because this matter has expired, it has a limitation time. Now, if we do not commence on that particular date, what is the point? May as well abandon it. That is the reason. I have been denied legal justice for these matters and the other thing I found out is that both the registries of Magistrates Court and the Federal Court, there was a bit unjust. I have complained. Now, the registrar of the Federal Court, he was my lawyer right from the beginning and he done nothing. And on the surface to proceed with the matter, I got worse. So this is what I am arguing against. I am not a legal minded person and I seek the assistance of a lawyer.

Now, if a lawyer gets you the money, some of them I paid $10,000, some of them paid $5,000, on and on. I believe they had a legal contract. Once they accepted it they had a contract to proceed with the matter but they did not. And then later on I have been pushed by the bank to change bank. I went into the Citibank, I borrowed some money. And the lawyers, Vandenberg Reid, they did not do their duty proper. They failed to advise me because the Citibank had put on a contract that we are tenants, week after week or day after day. So, this is what we are not happy about. I think the whole matter lies between the lawyers.

BRENNAN CJ: Mr Stergiou, an order has been made against you that you are not to start proceedings again in the Supreme Court.

MR STERGIOU: Yes. Yes, definitely. We have been barred.

BRENNAN CJ: You have been barred?

MR STERGIOU: But they did not tell me, your Honour. They did not write me a letter and say, "Look, Mr Stergiou we don't want you here, you're barred". But they did tell the Canberra community in excess of 100,000, what is its name, inhabitants here. Now, they told them but they did not tell us.

BRENNAN CJ: It may be possible to do something about that order barring you. It may not be possible to do anything about any other orders. Do you want anything done about that order?

MR STERGIOU: Well, all I need, your Honours, consider it, this special application and remit me back to Supreme Court because I believe since we win the matter with the bank, now things have changed. Now, I wrote to Chief Justice, I have wrote to Register of Supreme Court, but it appears to be all these cases involve lawyers and this is what happens. It appears to be I have offended them. I do not mean to offend that ACT - - -

BRENNAN CJ: I am not asking you any question about your personal relationship with the lawyers. I am asking you about whether you wanted anything done about the order that was made barring you from the Supreme Court?

MR STERGIOU: Well, I do appreciate you reverse that and I have to proceed with matters there, sending matters at the moment. Also, I have a matter against the National Bank which I do not know if I manage to go on.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes.

MR STERGIOU: It is a difficult, you know what I mean.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, go on, Mr Stergiou. You keep going, whatever you want to say.

MR STERGIOU: It is difficult, you know what I mean. In my position, I have been denied legal representation and each time I apply into the Supreme Court, I have been told not to do so. So, you know what I mean. I appreciate that your Honours considering and reverse all other orders before and I would like to continue to present my case into the Supreme Case. I believe they learnt something about it. We lost everything we had completely. The Citibank have sold the house, auctioned the house into the market, but we managed at the last minute to retrieve it. It is impossible to do anything with a situation like this, you know what I mean? No lawyer will take us, no court want us, and it is difficult.

I believe that the third despondent in this matter, they were partners in the company of Vandenberg, Reid and Pappas. Now, we believed it that Mr Ross Reid was the lawyer who was supposed to represent us. Now, Mr Brendan Cross is supposed to represent the Citibank, now appears to be Mr Lee was representing the Citibank. What I would like to know, that if this Mr Lee and the Vandenberg, Reid and Pappas was in partnership or not, or the other way around. If Vandenberg, Reid and Mr Lee was in partnership. They had a duty, I believe, to act because they had a contract with us ,accepted $5,000 to act on our behalf. Three years down the track, everything is gone. Can I continue or finish?

BRENNAN CJ: You can continue until the red light comes on, Mr Stergiou.

MR STERGIOU: Right, that is on?

BRENNAN CJ: No, that is the yellow light that is on now.

MR STERGIOU: I cannot recognise between yellow or red.

BRENNAN CJ: We will tell you when the red light comes on.

MR STERGIOU: Can I continue with C6. Mr Tsirimokos was a party. Whatever Mr Stretton was deducted to, he was there. At one stage, I have been malicious prosecuted and they took me to court to get compensation - criminal injuries compensation. Now, the witnesses, it was not the witnesses initially appear into the Magistrates Court, it was somebody else. And, in fact, was an employee of mine working at the travel agency. Their Worship asked me if I had any questions to ask to the witnesses and I said to him, your Worship, the particular person is imposter, is not the same person.

He dropped the charges - they were going for $50,000. Mind you, it was Snedden Hall and Gallop again there. They went for $50,000 compensation but the magistrate dropped it to 10 - dropped this compensation to $10,000. I went into the Federal Court and then the Snedden Hall and Gallop applied to bankrupt me, but they did not manage, that just disintegrate. But most of these cases, the earlier cases, they have been doomed and failed with the Snedden Hall and Gallop. I had, right from the beginning, he chased me, in various actions, but they was unsuccessful to do it. Until this malicious prosecution happens and the bank seize the house, now the bank - it is over, the matter there. I hoped that the others will do the same.

BRENNAN CJ: Now your time is up, Mr Stergiou.

MR STERGIOU: Is up, finished.

BRENNAN CJ: Up, finished, yes.

MR STERGIOU: Thank you.

BRENNAN CJ: Mr Williams, in relation to this second order which was made, I gather, per incuriam, what is the state of the situation? Was the matter remitted to the Supreme Court?

MR WILLIAMS: Yes, it was, your Honours.

BRENNAN CJ: Including the order relating to the barring of Mr Stergiou?

MR WILLIAMS: That was not formally remitted to the Full Court of the Supreme Court. The Full Court heard the appeal in relation to the summary judgment matter and found in Mr Stergiou's favour. Their summary judgment, which was entered by the Master in favour of the third respondent, has been set aside.

TOOHEY J: That is because he had no jurisdiction, is it?

MR WILLIAMS: No, your Honour, that was set aside on its merits.

TOOHEY J: I see.

MR WILLIAMS: The court reviewed the evidence and determined that there was the makings of a case, though not very well expressed in this draft statement of claim, and the court - - -

TOOHEY J: I am sorry, I am confusing it with the situation where there was an application for leave to appeal which should have gone to the Full Court.

MR WILLIAMS: Yes. The court set aside the judgment and made ancillary orders in relation to the filing of fresh statements of claim. In relation to the order restraining the applicant from bringing further action, I am instructed that counsel appearing for the third respondent before the Full Court pointed out to the Full Court the fact that that order was made by the Master in the first instance per incuriam, but the Full Court did not address that issue in its judgment.

BRENNAN CJ: I suppose it was not remitted to them.

MR WILLIAMS: Yes, I think that is probably correct, your Honour.

TOOHEY J: Are you drawing any distinction in that respect between the third respondent, for whom you act, and the first and second respondents? The actual terms of the orders made against the first and second respondents are slightly different from the terms of the order against your client, are they not?

MR WILLIAMS: Yes, they are. The order made in favour of my client is, in effect, absolute in terms; it does not relate to the obtaining of leave to file fresh pleadings. The order in favour of my client requires leave before any action can be brought.

TOOHEY J: Was that an order sought by the third respondent?

BRENNAN CJ: Then, the situation seems to be this, is it, thatthe order was made by Master Hogan, was it challenged before Justice Higgins?

MR WILLIAMS: Yes, it was. The appeal was brought against all of the orders made by Master Hogan.

BRENNAN CJ: Justice Higgins did not set it aside?

MR WILLIAMS: No, that is correct, your Honour.

BRENNAN CJ: Was it then challenged before the Full Federal Court?

MR WILLIAMS: It was not, and not raised; the matter was not adverted to before the Full Federal Court.

BRENNAN CJ: So, if we take it as the order now standing as having been made by Master Hogan and affirmed by Justice Higgins, what would be the procedural step by which it ought then to be set aside, if it were to be set aside? Appeal to what, a Full Court of the Federal Court, or a Full Court of the Supreme Court?

MR WILLIAMS: The Full Court of the Supreme Court.

BRENNAN CJ: By separate proceedings which have not been brought.

MR WILLIAMS: Yes.

KIRBY J: And which would now be out of time, presumably.

MR WILLIAMS: Yes, well out of time.

KIRBY J: It would be the question of why it was not raised in the previous application to Justice Higgins or from Justice Higgins to a Full Court.

MR WILLIAMS: With a litigant in person, of course, it is a matter that ought to have been drawn to the court's attention by those who I represent, and was not until the matter went on remittal back to the Full Court.

BRENNAN CJ: Then, it would be open to Mr Stergiou to seek an extension of time for instituting an appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against that order of Justice Higgins, so far as it relates to the prohibition against the commencement of proceedings against your client.

MR WILLIAMS: It would be open to him, your Honour.

BRENNAN CJ: And then, by consent, to have the order made.

MR WILLIAMS: That would happen.

TOOHEY J: Unless the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court somehow constituted a barrier to that. I am not suggesting that it does, but that might need to be thought about.

MR WILLIAMS: Any appeal from a final order of Master Hogan must go to the Full Court of the Supreme Court. That would include the restraining order.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes.

MR WILLIAMS: In other words, your Honour, the Federal Court would not have been seized with the power to deal with it.

BRENNAN CJ: Now if that intimation was given to Mr Stergiou, would it be possible to explain it to him?

MR WILLIAMS: Yes.

TOOHEY J: You are not concerned, Mr Williams, with C6, are you?

MR WILLIAMS: No, I am not, your Honours.

KIRBY J: And do I take it from what you have told the Chief Justice that your clients would not raise any objection to an extension of time for the purpose of allowing the matter to be ventilated in a Full Court of the Supreme Court in order that the record may be correct?

MR WILLIAMS: My instructions go so far as to give that intimation, your Honour.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes.

TOOHEY J: Then the effect, if that course were pursued and orders were made, the proceedings against the third respondent would still stand dismissed but without the bar to the commencement of further proceedings. Would that be the position, or do you envisage the setting aside of the whole of the orders made in favour of the third respondent?

MR WILLIAMS: The only order that remains in favour of the third respondent is the restraining order. Mr Stergiou has had the summary judgment in the third respondent's favour set aside. There are ancillary orders requiring Mr Stergiou to seek leave before he brings a fresh statement of claim in relation to - - -

TOOHEY J: No, I was thinking of third respondent whereas I understood it the orders were not directed at the pleading, but at the commencement of further proceedings.

MR WILLIAMS: That is so. A curious situation exists where there is presently the present action on foot but an order restraining Mr Stergiou from bringing any other action. We envisage that were Mr Stergiou to apply to the Full Court to have the restraining order vacated or set aside, that would be the only application he would need to make.

TOOHEY J: Why would he need to make that in a sense if the action between him and your client now is alive?

MR WILLIAMS: Because presumably Mr Stergiou is barred from bringing any other action, your Honour.

TOOHEY J: Yes, I understand that, but if the action that is now alive, for instance, embraced all the relief that he sought against the third respondent - I do not know whether it does or not - why would he need to commence further proceedings.

MR WILLIAMS: As a practical matter, I imagine the answer is he would not need to.

TOOHEY J: Yes.

MR WILLIAMS: But nonetheless an order does - and he may not choose to be concerned about it and probably - well I should not presume as to what he might or might not do, but theoretically the order restraining him from bringing further proceedings against Mr Lee remains on foot. As a matter of - - -

TOOHEY J: Yes. I can understand why he might want to have that order removed but in terms of the state of play of the litigation, his proceedings against the third respondent, so far as they are presently on foot, are not precluded by reason of this other order.

MR WILLIAMS: They are not compromised by the restraining order at all and, as a matter of practicality, it is hard to imagine why Mr Stergiou would wish to take up the matter in the Full Court by way of appeal but nonetheless it would be open to him to do so.

TOOHEY J: Well that must be a matter for him, must it not?

MR WILLIAMS: Yes.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, thank you, Mr Williams. Mr Stergiou, you have some more minutes, if you wish to, to say anything that you want to in reply to what Mr Williams has said.

MR STERGIOU: Yes, your Honours. He did mention on, as I did touch into the matter earlier, I have been barred from the Supreme Court of further proceedings. I have some proceedings into the Court. As a matter of fact, last Friday, I had a notice of motion to amend a statement of claim against the Citibank for damages but the Master Connolly - they did not mention anything about it but they adjourned the matter until 21st of this month. I do have in mind to proceed into the court because I have got unfinished business. I have to put - - -

BRENNAN CJ: Now, Mr Stergiou, have you got the application book there in front of you, this book that looks like that? Do you have one of those?

MR STERGIOU: Not with me here.

BRENNAN CJ: Not with you here. Well, have you got a copy of the order that was made by Master Hogan?

MR STERGIOU: Yes, I have, I think.

BRENNAN CJ: Could you find that in your paper? I want to explain something to you.

MR STERGIOU: In the matter C4?

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, although it is headed in this case, of course, SC461 of 1995. It is a Supreme Court document.

MR STERGIOU: Yes. I think Mr Williams has got one there that he can show you, Mr - - -

MR WILLIAMS: Your Honours, I do not have that. Could I interrupt Mr Stergiou for a moment to point out a matter that has been pointed out to me by my instructing solicitor. It touches on something your Honour the Chief Justice said to me a short time ago. When the matter came before the Full Court of the Federal Court the appeal in relation to the restraining order, that order was treated as an interlocutory order and the Federal Court dealt with it by refusing leave to appeal. I am sorry to interrupt, your Honour, but I thought I should at that point having regard to that fact.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, thank you, Mr Williams. Just a moment, Mr Stergiou. I would like to ask Mr Williams some more questions. Would you sit down again please? So the matter was before the Full Court of the Federal Court?

MR WILLIAMS: Yes, the appeal brought to the Full Court of the Federal Court was brought against all of the orders made by the Master in the first instance and then on appeal from Mr Justice Higgins.

BRENNAN CJ: It would be open to this Court to deal with the Full Court's order.

MR WILLIAMS: Yes, it would be.

BRENNAN CJ: What is the attitude of you client to that?

MR WILLIAMS: As I think we indicated in the outline of our submissions, we would consent to any order this Court wanted to make in relation to that matter. I am a little taken aback as to the treatment by the Federal Court of this order as an interlocutory order.

BRENNAN CJ: We do not need to pause to consider the reasons.

MR WILLIAMS: No, your Honours do not.

BRENNAN CJ: If the consent is to the setting aside of that order.

MR WILLIAMS: We so consent, your Honours.

BRENNAN CJ: Then, are you agreeable to having this application treated as the hearing of the appeal for that purpose?

MR WILLIAMS: We are.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes.

TOOHEY J: Could I ask you another question? It does not directly relate to your client but just so that I can try to understand what has happened. Bearing in mind the way in which the Full Court of the Federal Court treated the "appeal" from the court below, where does the current action between Mr Stergiou and the first and second respondent stand?

MR WILLIAMS: The statements of claim against the first and second respondents were struck out and ancillary orders were made requiring Mr Stergiou to bring a notice of motion before the Court with draft statements of claim, I think. Can I just check that? I do not know whether Mr Stergiou has filed fresh pleadings.

TOOHEY J: Really, the point of the question was whether he is barred in any sense from continuing with litigation against the first and second respondents. It is a bit unfair to ask you that question, but just by way of information, how do you understand the situation?

MR WILLIAMS: He is not barred.

TOOHEY J: What, simply because the summary judgment was set aside, do you mean?

MR WILLIAMS: There was no summary judgment entered in favour of the first and second respondents. The orders made in favour of the first and second respondents were that the pleadings against those two parties be struck out.

TOOHEY J: But there was also a bar, was there not, to the filing of a further statement of claim without the leave of the court.

MR WILLIAMS: Correct.

TOOHEY J: I am not sure what the effect of that is. It leaves the action itself, in a sense, on foot but no pleading that may be filed in support of it without leave.

MR WILLIAMS: Which, of itself, does not offend any principle, as I understand it in the - - -

TOOHEY J: I do not want to draw you into that unduly but I am just grateful for any information you can give me.

MR WILLIAMS: Well, as we understand, your Honour, that does not offend any principle that the wholesale restraining order made in favour of my client does, the distinction being that no action can be brought against Mr Lee.

TOOHEY J: Yes, I understand that.

MR WILLIAMS: But what has happened in that regard as to whether or not fresh pleadings have been filed, I cannot assist your Honour. I do not know.

TOOHEY J: Thank you for what you have said.

MR WILLIAMS: I can indicate to you that in respect of the matter against Mr Lee, the Full Court, having set aside the judgment in Mr Lee's favour and striking out the statement of claim and making orders in relation to the filing of a fresh statement of claim, nothing has happened in that regard. I do not think that is of any direct relevance to the Court sitting.

TOOHEY J: Thank you, Mr Williams.

BRENNAN CJ: Mr Stergiou, the order that was made by Master Hogan included an order that the plaintiffs, that is yourself and Ekaterine Stergiou, be restrained from commencing any further action against the third-named defendant. Do you remember that order?

MR STERGIOU: Yes.

BRENNAN CJ: Justice Higgins affirmed that order and then it went to the Full Court of the Federal Court, Mr Williams has just told us. Do you want that order set aside?

MR STERGIOU: Correct, your Honour.

BRENNAN CJ: Now, Mr Williams says that his client, that is the third respondent, will consent to special leave being given to you here and now to appeal against that order, then he further consents to this Court setting aside all the orders that have confirmed Master Hogan's order restraining you. Now, do you want that to happen?

MR STERGIOU: Yes, please. Thank you.

BRENNAN CJ: Now, is there anything you want to say about any of the other orders before your time expires?

MR STERGIOU: Well, I cannot remember anything in mind to express myself on it. But whatever I said, I was very disappointed. We have been taken to the dry cleaners by the lawyers, so I think it was a little bit unfair. I have no grudge against any lawyer, but the way I have been enacted upon was the most unfair. Now, one account we denied legal representation and cost us in excess of $100,000, and the other thing is, each time we went into the court we were hit on the head with a sledgehammer by the ACT judiciary. I think it was most unfair. That is all I have to say.

BRENNAN CJ: Yes, thank you, Mr Stergiou.

MR STERGIOU: Can I say one more thing, your Honour?

BRENNAN CJ: Yes.

MR STERGIOU: The third respondent's matter was remitted from Federal Court, the Supreme Court, and there was a Full Bench there which is - I have been advised within two months to commence proceedings there. But, your Honour, I have been in hospital, hospitalised until January and I hardly recovered since then. I lost my sight of both eyes and I write to the third defendant's or third respondent's lawyer tell them, "I am not able to do because I lost my sight". So, in due course, I said to him I have to prepare, to make leave to the Supreme Court, sick leave, to proceed with the matter. Now, that depends if the whole thing expires and they allow me to proceed. Thank you.

BRENNAN CJ: By consent, this Court grants special leave to appeal against so much of the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court as dismissed the appeal to that court against the order of Justice Higgins in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, affirming the order of Master Hogan so far as that order restrained the applicants from commencing any further action against the third-named respondent. Hereafter I refer to this as the restraining order.

Order that the appeal to this Court be heard instanter and, by consent, set aside so much of the orders of the courts below relating to the restraining order as dismissed the appeals to those courts and set the restraining order aside. Otherwise, in neither of the applications, C4 or C6, has Mr Stergiou been able to demonstrate any ground on which this Court should grant special leave to appeal. Accordingly, special leave to appeal is refused in both of those applications except in so far as I have already indicated. It may be necessary in the drawing up of the order to spell out more precisely the form of the order running through the hierarchy of courts below.

AT 12.30 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED