Crane and ORS v Commissioner of Stamp Duty Exparte: The Attorney General for the State of Queensland B58/1997 [1997] HCATrans 366 (12 November 1997)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Brisbane No B58 of 1997

B e t w e e n -

G.E. CRANE & SONS LIMITED, POSTBURY PTY LTD and G.E. CRANE HOLDINGS LIMITED

Appellants

and

COMMISSIONER OF STAMP DUTIES

Respondent

Ex parte -

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Applicant

Application for removal pursuant to section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903

KIRBY J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM BRISBANE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON WEDNESDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 1997, AT 9.33 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR P.A. KEANE, QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Queensland: If it please the Court, I appear with MR R.J. CAMPBELL for the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland, who is the applicant on the motion. We also appear for the Commissioner for Stamp Duties, who is the respondent to the appeal presently pending in the Supreme Court of Queensland. (instructed by the Crown Solicitor for the State of Queensland)

MR J.A. LOGAN: If it please the Court, I appear for the respondent to today's motion. (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR KEANE: Your Honour, this is an application for removal of part of proceedings pending in the Court of Appeal to this Court under section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 . We read the notice of motion filed on 22 October 1997, and the affidavit of Frederick Charles Litchfield, also filed on the - - -

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Has Mr Logan seen the affidavit? I have already read it.

MR KEANE: Yes, he has, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: There is no need for you to actually read it; I have read it.

MR KEANE: Thank you, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I cannot admit to having read every one of the pages of the annexures, but I have the gist.

MR KEANE: Thank you. Your Honour will have seen that the Court of Appeal has raised the question whether section 90 of the Commonwealth Constitution operates so as to prevent section 54A of the Queensland Stamp Act from exacting duty in respect of consideration payable under an agreement for the sale of a business in respect of the stock in trade of that business. Your Honour will have seen this issue has not been argued by the parties, and that it was raised by the court after the case had been argued.

The excise issue arises because section 54A(2) of the Stamp Act requires that every person who acquires or agrees to acquire a business in Queensland to deliver a statement to the Commissioner in the prescribed form. Under section 54A(5) that statement is charged with duty, as if it were a conveyance or transfer of the property to which it relates, for a consideration equal to the full unencumbered value of the property. Your Honour, it is clear, we would submit, from section 54A(1) that the goods, livestock, vehicles and other movable chattels of the business are to be included in that property.

Now, your Honour, one of the issues that was argued before the Court of Appeal was whether the goods which were agreed to be transferred were required as part of the acquisition of the business or whether that transaction was a transaction separate and distinct from the acquisition of the business. As we say, that was an issue that was argued in the Court of Appeal - - -

HIS HONOUR: That stands for judgment, that issue, does it?

MR KEANE: It does, your Honour, and we do not seek to remove that issue - - -

HIS HONOUR: No, I understand that. The only matter that is sought to be removed is the matter which has been raised by the Court itself.

MR KEANE: That is so, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: And as I understand the affidavit, when it was first raised you or your solicitors consulted with the present respondent, a letter was sent by the Crown Solicitor to the Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal saying that neither party wished to raise the matter but the court persisted with its expression of concern about the matter and directed that a 78B notice be given. It was given and now the present respondent has embraced the issue in its submissions which were next to the affidavit. Is that correct?

MR KEANE: That is correct, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: So that you say that you have a right under the Judiciary Act to have the matter removed into this Court.

MR KEANE: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: I think I should hear the respondent really because, as I understand it, the Judiciary Act gives you that right and if that is a valid provision then there is no need for me to go into detail about the matter at this stage. It just has to come here by way of removal.

MR KEANE: As your Honour pleases.

HIS HONOUR: Is that what would you would be submitting, Mr Solicitor, or not?

MR KEANE: It is, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Let us save time, if necessary, by asking what Mr Logan has to say about it and, if necessary, I can come back to you.

MR KEANE: Thank you.

MR LOGAN: Your Honour, the respondents do not dispute that this Court, faced with an application by the Attorney-General, is bound to order removal. Section 40(1) is cast in imperative terms and it is no part of the respondent's submission that your Honour has a discretion vis-a-vis the question of whether the section 90 point ought to be removed. The discretion which the respondents would point to, though, is that whilst the State as of right can have the Court seized with it, what that does is to engage the Court's power under section 42 of the Judiciary Act, inter alia - - -

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR LOGAN: And whilst the State may, as of right, bring it into the High Court the discretion which the High Court has, once it is there, is to remit it, if the Court thinks fit, straight back down. There are several reasons why it is submitted that this is a case where one would acknowledge the imperative terms of section 40 but, nonetheless, having had the case brought into the Court, send it down to the Court of Appeal for decision.

Those reasons, it is submitted, are these. Firstly, the point is one which has been raised at a very late stage of the proceedings and the genesis of the point really was the Court's own motion. The respondents are something of reluctant brides in the point.

HIS HONOUR: Well, you may have been a reluctant bride, as you put it, originally, but you seem to have risen to the challenge, and now you have embraced the point with some enthusiasm. Your reluctance seems to have been swept aside in the ardour of the moment.

MR LOGAN: Yes. Having embraced matrimony, the case though, nonetheless, it is submitted, is one where were this an endeavour by a private litigant to bring a point of this kind at this stage into this Court, there would be only the most exceptional of cases which would dictate a removal. So, the submission is made that, in such circumstances, it is a relevant consideration in the context of whether one should remit forthwith that this is the type of point at the stage at which it was raised which might not ordinarily warrant removal. The authority for that is a decision of Justice McHugh in a case called Stubberfield 70 ALJR 646, decided last year.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I have that.

MR LOGAN: And your Honour will see there is a very brief comment at page 647, in the last paragraph. Stubberfield's Case was one which, in the end, came on at a time when there was judgement already delivered, but the comments are made in the context of even if judgment had not been delivered, but the case had been argued and decision reserved, that it would be exceptional to remove at that stage.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, but that is within a category where the Court has a discretion and, here, the discretion has been removed by Act of Parliament. So that the matter comes here as of right, and it is to be looked at within that category. The matter having now been raised by the Court, you having embraced it, the Attorney-General says, "I want this determined by the High Court," and he has a right to do so under the statute.

MR LOGAN: Yes, he has, in my respectful submission, a right to have the Court entertain and order removal and then the Court nonetheless still has a discretion as to whether or not it should keep it and, it is submitted, one factor that is relevant in that context is the stage at which - - -

HIS HONOUR: Yes, but what is the purpose of the distinction between the position of a private litigant and the position of an Attorney-General? The purpose is to signal the fact that with a private litigant the Court has the kind of discretion that Justice McHugh dealt with in Stubberfield. But with an Attorney-General, if an Attorney-General wants the constitutional Court of the country to pass upon the matter, he or she has that right. It would, I think, be destructive of that objective of the federal Parliament now to order that the matter go down back to the appellate court of the State, because the federal Parliament has, by an enactment, said that the matter, on the request of the State Attorney-General, shall be dealt with by the High Court. It is a question of the scheme of the Act.

MR LOGAN: With respect, yes, that is so. The removal itself is as of right, that is not disputed.

HIS HONOUR: But what I am saying is it goes beyond that, it goes beyond the removal, that is obvious. But what is the purpose of the removal being as of right? It is so that, at the election of a State Attorney-General, the matter can be determined in the High Court, and if the State Attorney-General so elects, it would seem to me to be destructive of that scheme for the Court then to say, "Well, we do not care about your objection, we are going to send it straight back".

I am not saying that the discretion does not exist but I am saying it does not seem to fit comfortably to exercise that discretion with what seems to be the scheme that, recognising the special position of the States under the Constitution, the procedural enactments in the Judiciary Act have given the State Attorney-General a special right to have the matter brought up here.

MR LOGAN: Yes, that is so, your Honour. The power that the Court has under section 42, though, is not, in my respectful submission, in any way qualified by the special standing of whoever secures removal by whatever means, but is a quite independent and unfettered discretion, and is engaged upon the removal of a case, for whatever cause, rather than drawing a distinction between special removals qua Attorney-General, and removals which have gone through the discretionary hurdle at the behest of a citizen, and there is no distinction in section 42, in my submission.

The other factors, your Honour - they are only brief - which, in my submission, are relevant to whether or not the Court would keep the case at this stage are, firstly the point is one of academic interest unless and until a view is reached concerning the construction of the underlying business sale contract.

HIS HONOUR: Is my understanding not correct, that if the point that you have now belatedly embraced is a good point, it strikes down the provision of the Stamp Act under which you have been levied duty?

MR LOGAN: It only strikes down that part of it which affects goods - if the point is good. It is not part of the respondent's submission that the provision is one incapable of severance. It would only go to strike down section 54A in so far as it affected goods.

HIS HONOUR: There would be nothing inconsistent with removing the matter into this Court with the Court of Appeal of Queensland concluding its part on the balance of the cause which is before it and stands for judgment, would there? I notice that in section 42(1) this Court can give directions as to how the matter is to be dealt with in the court below.

MR LOGAN: Yes; and that would be of, with respect, great assistance to the respondents if that direction - if one were nonetheless minded not to remit downwards, if directions were given vis-a-vis the other aspects.

HIS HONOUR: Would that be futile? As I understand it, the position was reached that the whole appeal was heard and the matter was concluded as far as the parties were concerned, and then this problem arose after the decision of the Court in Ha. Would it be futile for the Court of Appeal to, as it were, be passing upon the statutory issues, if later this Court were to strike down in whole or part section 54A?

MR LOGAN: Yes. Your Honour, there are two substantive points in the stamp duty appeal. One is whether or not, as a matter of construction, the business sale contract was one which embraced the goods. The other point, substantively in the stamp duty appeal, was whether or not the contingency principle and stamp duty law applied to a quite separate aspect of the transaction. That latter aspect would in no way be related to the constitutional point that has arisen. The essence of the two points that are at large in the stamp duty appeal is to be found in questions (a) and (b) on page 15 paragraph 28 of the appeal book from the court below.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I did look at those but there is no suggestion that the whole cause should be removed into this Court, simply the constitutional question.

MR LOGAN: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: It would be unthinkable that we would bring up the whole cause or otherwise interfere in what is being done in the Queensland Court of Appeal except to the limited extent of the constitutional question that it is now being raised.

MR LOGAN: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Can I just say that, looking again at section 42(1), I am not sure that it does give me the powers to give directions to the Court of Appeal. Those directions seem to be posited upon the removal of the matter and to be in respect of the remittal of the matter. Once it is removed, the Court can remit the whole or part with such directions, ie, directions relevant to the remittal to that court and I do not know that it gives a general power to give directions to the Queensland court and I would be loath to do that unless I had the power.

MR LOGAN: Yes. I cannot point to anything other - - -

HIS HONOUR: It may be that, subject to what the Solicitor says, one can say that obviously there is nothing, if the matter were removed, that would prevent the Court of Appeal disposing of so much of it as it felt it could dispose of subject to the matter that has been removed.

MR LOGAN: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: That certainly would be my view.

MR LOGAN: Your Honour, the two points really that are urged on behalf of the respondents are firstly, the stage at which removal is sought and then secondly, the academic nature of the point unless and until a view is reached about the construction of the contract.

HIS HONOUR: The second could be a reason to delay the determination by this Court of the matter removed until after the Queensland Court of Appeal has delivered so much of its decision as disposes of the other points in contest that stand for judgment.

MR LOGAN: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Perhaps it might be helpful if I heard the Solicitor on these subsidiary questions, but on the question of removal you can raise no reasons why, in accordance with section 40 of the Judiciary Act, the matter must now be removed having regard to the application made for the Attorney-General?

MR LOGAN: No, I cannot. The reason for that, your Honour, is that even absent the submission made ultimately by the respondents, as soon as the court below directed Judiciary Act notices, it had formed a view that questions arising under the Constitution had been raised and it is enough if a court alone reaches that view, in my submission. So the foundation for removal is conceded to be present and then it is further conceded that once that foundation is there, the State has an as of right removal entitlement. I did not have anything further, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: You do not contest the constitutional validity of section 40?

MR LOGAN: No, that is not - my clients, with respect, have gone as far down the constitutional path as they would wish.

HIS HONOUR: You will have your order of removal. The question is, what follows?

MR KEANE: Yes, your Honour. Well, in our respectful submission, what follows is from section 40(2), that the Court may or must - and must, in our case, in our respectful submission, for the reasons that your Honour has mentioned - order that the cause be removed. But it may do so on such terms as the Court thinks fit. The position is that the Court of Appeal has indicated it would not proceed further until the 78B notices were given. That has all been done. In our respectful submission, while your Honour, understandably, would be concerned about the existence of a power in your Honour to make directions to the Court, your Honour could order removal on terms that that part of the cause identified in our notice of motion having been removed, the Court of Appeal be at liberty to proceed to the determination of that part of the cause not removed.

HIS HONOUR: I can hardly make that a term of the removal, because it is a term that binds, or affects another party that is not here, namely, the Court of Appeal. I can say, I would think, that the Court of Appeal is at liberty to dispose of so much of the matter as remains with because, by definition, if it remains with it, then the Court of Appeal may, and perhaps should, discharge its part in the unaffected questions that have been argued before it. But what the Court of Appeal would do would really be a matter for its decision, having regard to the way in which it is thinking in terms of its reasons for judgment, which stand reserved.

MR KEANE: Your Honour, with respect, that is probably correct. It is probably, with respect, true to say that all that needs to be done is for it to be recognised on all sides, that there is no longer any inhibition on the court for the appeal proceeding. Certainly, may I say that it would be our expectation that that court would proceed to decide the issues that have been argued before it to the extent that it decides the issue whether the goods which were agreed to be transferred were acquired as part of the acquisition of the business - to the extent that it would decide that issue against us, then that might render the proceedings that have been removed moot, subject, of course, to the possibility of persuading the Court to give special leave. But that being so, all that to one side, our concern is that the excise point be decided in this Court, and that that should not be left to depend upon considerations relevant to the grant of special leave, such as whether section 54A is unique to Queensland, as we apprehend it is.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR KEANE: So, your Honour, as we would see it, with respect, what would follow from removal would be that the Court of Appeal would be, as your Honour says, without any need for it to be declared or directed, that it would simply be at liberty to proceed to exercise its jurisdiction in respect of the matter which is reserved before it. No doubt, as a matter of management of the litigation, we would not expect to bring that part of the cause that is removed into the High Court on for argument until those issues have been resolved.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR KEANE: Might one say, with respect, that the probabilities are that there is not likely to be any serious inconvenience in that course.

HIS HONOUR: Well, I note all that. Is it possible that the Court of Appeal could, in the reasoning to its decision in the matter that would remain with it, take a view that that decision is so intertwined with the constitutional question that it is either necessary or more convenient to await the decision of this Court on the matter removed?

MR KEANE: Your Honour, we would think, with respect, not. It does seem to us, with respect, that the two questions are distinct. That is, the first is a question of construction of the Stamp Act as to whether it strikes at this transaction as one transaction. The second question is whether, assuming it purports to have that operation, it may have that operation in the light of section 90. The issues do seem to us, with respect, to be distinct.

HIS HONOUR: But could the Court of Appeal take the view that, as a matter of seemliness, the matter having been removed into this Court, it would not consider the application and meaning of a section where, even in part, its constitutional validity is being challenged and where the Court itself has obviously had some concern that that matter should be passed upon either by it or by this Court?

MR KEANE: Well, in our respectful submission, it should not. The Court gave directions for the giving of 78B notices which, in turn, has identified this issue as a separate issue. Section 40 itself contemplates the removal of only a part of the proceedings. That seems to imply that what is left to the court below is left to that court to deal with in accordance with the exigencies of the proceedings before it or that part of the proceedings that is left.

HIS HONOUR: Presumably these are matters which the parties could seek to put before the Court of Appeal by asking that the matter be relisted in the light of the issues that have been debated before this Court and seek to persuade the Court of Appeal to discharge so much of its part in the matter remaining before it as it felt it could on the basis that it could be that that decision, if it could be persuaded to give it, might obviate the constitutional question.

MR KEANE: Yes, that could be done. We would propose, in the first instance, with our learned friend's agreement to write to the Court indicating that part of the matter, the issue that is the subject of the 78B notices has been removed, but that so far as the parties are concerned, they would urge the Court to proceed to give judgment on the matters that have not been removed.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, very well. I think I understand the issues now. I would not propose to remit the matter to the Court immediately. That would not, however, exclude the possibility that if Mr Logan or his clients felt that, on the directions hearing, they should make an application or renew that application, they could do that. That could be the subject of further consideration by the Justice dealing with the directions.

MR KEANE: Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, very well, thank you. I will just ask if Mr Logan has anything to add or say in reply to either what the Solicitor said or my last comment.

MR LOGAN: No, but, thank you, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Constitutional questions can sometimes arise in unusual ways and so it is proved in this case. Before me now is an application made by the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland that part of a cause be removed into this Court pursuant to section 40 of the Judiciary Act (Cth). The background of the application can be shortly stated.

G.E. Crane and Sons Pty Limited, and Postbury Pty Limited, and G.E. Crane Holdings Limited (whom I shall call "the Crane interests") are parties to proceedings in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland in which the other party is the Commissioner of Stamp Duties of the State of Queensland ("the Commissioner"). The appeal concerns duty which the Commissioner contends is exigible under section 54A of the Stamp Act 1894 (Qld), in relation to the sale of a business. The agreement for the sale of the business provides, inter alia, for a sale of goods, being stock of the business at valuation. The estimated value of the stock is stated in the agreement to be $23,990,640. The dispute between the parties proceeded to full argument before the Court of Appeal. That court, having heard argument, reserved its decision. The decision still stands reserved.

However, after the decision was reserved, the Senior Deputy Registrar (Appeal) of the Supreme Court of Queensland wrote to the parties inviting their views as to whether the court having, "noted the effect of the High Court decision in Ngo Ngo Ha v State of New South Wales with respect to the validity of State taxes on the value of goods sold", it was necessary for the parties to give a notice under section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) before proceeding further in the matter.

The initial response of the parties was conveyed to the Registrar by the Crown Solicitor. That response indicated that, at that stage, no party wished to raise the constitutional matter or to give the notices which had been referred to in the Registrar's letter.

The Senior Deputy Registrar of the Court then wrote to the parties directing that the notices be given pursuant to section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1984 and inviting submissions in relation to the matter. Notices were duly given, in accordance with this direction. At this stage there is no appearance before me on behalf of any of the law officers save for the applicant Attorney-General and I am unaware of whether any of them, save for the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland, has demonstrated any interest in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal directed the parties to file and serve written submissions in the matter. Such written submissions were filed. The written submissions on behalf of the Crane interests have been placed before me. Those submissions indicate that those parties now raise a constitutional question as to the validity of part of section 54A of the Stamp Act having regard to the terms of the Australian Constitution, s 90.

Immediately after that submission was received the Attorney-General for Queensland made the present application. It was for removal of that part of the proceeding which relates to the constitutional question. The application was made under section 40 of the Judiciary Act. Relevantly, that section reads:

(1) Any cause or part of a cause arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation that is at any time pending in a ... court of a State ... may, at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment, be removed in the High Court under an order of the High Court, which may, upon application of a party for sufficient cause shown, be made on such terms as the Court thinks fit, and shall be made as of course upon application by or on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, the Attorney-General of a State, the Attorney-General of the Australian Capital Territory or the Attorney-General of the Northern Territory.

(2) Where:

(a) ... or

(b) there is at any time pending in a court of a State a cause involving the exercise of federal jurisdiction by that court;

the High Court may, upon application of a party or upon application by or on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment, order that the cause or a part of the cause be removed into the High Court on such terms as the Court thinks fit.

No question as to the validity of s 40 of the Judiciary Act has been raised. It is conceded on behalf of the Crane interests that the application having been made by the Attorney-General, there is no discretion and the matter must be removed into this Court. In due course I will order that it be so removed.

The Crane interests, however, drew my attention to section 42 of the Act. The matter having been removed, they asked that I should immediately remit the matter removed to the Court of Appeal with directions that it dispose of the entirety of the appeal before it, giving this Court the benefit of its opinion on the constitutional question. In support of this application, it was pointed out that the constitutional issue had not been initially raised; had not been initiated by the parties; was raised at a late stage, and depending on the outcome of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal, the Crane interests might not need to rely upon the constitutional challenge in order to succeed in their arguments before the Court of Appeal.

Reference was made to a decision of Justice McHugh in Stubberfield's Application (1996) 70 ALJR 646 at 647 where his Honour indicated that he would not have ordered the removal of a matter where the matter had been heard and stood reserved for judgment before a State court. However, that was an application by a private litigant. The situation is different from the situation which is now before me where, by common consent, the matter must be removed. The only question is what follows.

Whilst I do not doubt that section 42(1) of the Judiciary Act would empower this Court, having removed the matter, to remit it immediately in whole or part to the court from which it was removed, I think that such an order would rarely be made where the matter has been removed upon application by or on behalf of an Attorney-General as provided in section 40(1). The right of a State or Territory (or of the Commonwealth itself) to have this Court decide a constitutional question arising in an Australian court, suggests that such a course would rarely, if ever, be taken if the constitutional question remained alive and the Attorney-General in question sought its determination in this Court.

It is not necessary for me to consider in what circumstances, if any, an order of remittal would be made because, in my opinion, it is not appropriate that it should be made in this case. A constitutional question having been raised by the Court of Appeal and having now been embraced by the Crane interests, it seems to me that on the application of the Attorney-General and the matter now being before the Court, this Court should determine the constitutional question and should determine it for itself.

Having said this, I am conscious of the fact that, as I have been informed, some of the questions which stand for judgment in the Court of Appeal relate to the construction of the Stamp Act and its application to the transaction which was in question here. Because I would propose only to remove so much of the cause as relates to the constitutional question, the remaining matters of statutory interpretation and of fact would remain where they stand in the Court of Appeal. There would be no reason why that court should not feel itself entitled to dispose of the matters remaining with it to the extent that it can properly and conveniently do so. Nothing that is done by the order of removal will prevent the Court of Appeal discharging its function if that be a course available to it.

Nor is my refusal of immediate remittal of the matter removed a final determination of that question. In due course, these proceedings will be listed for directions. At that stage, in the light of developments, it would be open to the Crane interests, to the Commissioner or the Attorney-General, or all of them, to ask that an order of remittal be made. If, in fact, the whole or part of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal are determined before this Court can dispose of the matter removed, it would also be open to the parties, on a directions hearing, to make application in relation to the hearing of any special leave application concerning the statutory questions which stand for judgment in the Court of Appeal. All of these are developments which can await the decision by the Court of Appeal as to whether it feels able to deal with the matters that are before it, or some or any of them.

At one stage, I was asked to give directions under section 42(1) of the Judiciary Act to the Court of Appeal. However, as I read the provision relating to directions in that section, the directions are there confined to directions in respect of matters remitted. As I do not intend to remit the matter that is removed, no occasion for such directions arises.

For these reasons, the proper course is to order that the following question be removed into this Court, namely, whether section 90 of the Constitution prevents section 54A of the Stamp Act (Qld) from validly applying so as to enable the exaction of duty in respect of an agreement for the sale of a business and, in particular, in respect of goods the stock of the business. The costs of the application today should be costs in the matter so removed. I certify that it is appropriate for counsel to have been heard in chambers in respect of this application.

Is there anything else, Mr Solicitor?

MR KEANE: No, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Anything else, Mr Logan?

MR LOGAN: No, thank you, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: They, then, are the orders which the Court makes.

AT 10.17 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED