Luck v Browne & Ors M97/2000 [2000] HCATrans 618 (20 October 2000)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M96 of 2000

B e t w e e n -

GAYE LUCK (FORMERLY KUPERMAN)

Applicant

and

DR ROSS B. HUNTER

First Respondent

R.B. HUNTER (MEDICAL) PTY LTD

Second Respondent

NOCDOC

Third Respondent

DR D. McALPINE

Fourth Respondent

P.W. KERRISK (TOWNSVILLE) PTY LTD T/A AITKENVALE MEDICAL CENTRE

Fifth Respondent

DR PETER BUCHANAN

Sixth Respondent

DR HENRY LAU

Seventh Respondent

CONSULTANT PATHOLOGISTS (TOWNSVILLE) PTY LTD

Eighth Respondent

DR GRANT WITHEY

Ninth Respondent

QUEENSLAND X-RAY SERVICES

Tenth Respondent

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M97 of 2000

B e t w e e n -

GAYE LUCK (FORMERLY KUPERMAN)

Applicant

and

ROSLYN BROWNE ("THE LESSOR")

First Respondent

HONEYCOMBES TOWNSVILLE PTY LTD ("THE LESSOR'S AGENT")

Second Respondent

SIMON HORNE (THE LESSOR'S AGENT'S SERVANT AND AGENT)("THE PROPERTY MANAGER")

Third Respondent

DEBBIE GILCHRIST (THE LESSOR'S AGENT'S SERVANT AND AGENT)("THE MANAGER")

Fourth Respondent

COLIN BROWNE (THE LESSOR'S AGENT AND BROTHER)("THE BROTHER")

Fifth Respondent

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M98 of 2000

B e t w e e n -

GAYE LUCK (FORMERLY KUPERMAN)

Applicant

and

CSR LIMITED (BRADFORD INSULATION GROUP), CSR EXCELLENT DESIGN PTY LTD, BRADFORD INSULATION INDUSTRIES PTY LIMITED, B.I.(CONTRACTING) PTY LIMITED, BRADFORD INSULATION (SA) PTY LIMITED, CRS (GEOMATICS) PTY LTD, INSULCO PTY LTD/TASMAN INSULATION AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED, ACI PTY LTD, ACI WORLDWIDE (PACIFIC) PTY LTD, ACI PINK SUPERBATTS, PETER JAMES HAYES, WATTLEFIELD PTY LTD, PYNEBOARD PTY LTD, AUSTRALIAN GYPSUM LTD, AUSTRALIAN GYPSUM INDUSTRIES LTD, PLASTERGLASS PTY LTD, STANDARD PLASTERGLASS PTY LTD, PILKINGTON (AUSTRALIA) PROPERTIES LIMITED, PILKINGTON ACI LIMITED, PILKINGTON ACI OPERATIONS PTY LTD, PILKINGTON AUSTRALASIA LIMITED, PILKINGTON (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, OWENS CORNING AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED, ACI FIBREGLASS/ACI INSULATION, ACI FIBREGLASS LIMITED/ACI INSULATION, INSULATION SOLUTIONS PTY LTD, ACI GLASS INSULATORS PROPRIETARY LIMITED, ACI SISALATION PTY LTD/SISALATION PTY LTD, ACI OPERATIONS PTY LTD, INSULFLUF AUSTRALIA PTY LTD, AMATEK LIMITED, ROCLA LIMITED, MR K WIENEKE, MRS J WIENEKE, CEILFIX PTY LTD, CEILFIX PTY LIMITED, CEILFIX BUILDING SERVICES PTY LTD, COLIN CAMERON

Respondents

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M99 of 2000

B e t w e e n -

GAYE LUCK (FORMERLY KUPERMAN)

Applicant

and

TOWNSVILLE CITY COUNCIL

First Respondent

WOLF SETZINGER

Second Respondent

MICHAEL COLLARD

Third Respondent

GRANT STEEN

Fourth Respondent

STATE OF QUEENSLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Fifth Respondent

STATE OF QUEENSLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

Sixth Respondent

CHRIS McNAMARA

Seventh Respondent

Application for a stay

HAYNE J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 20 OCTOBER 2000, AT 10.30 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

_______________

MS G. LUCK appeared in person.

MR P.G. CAWTHORN: If the Court pleases, I appear for the first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents in proceeding M96 of 2000 in this Court, which is an appeal in relation to proceeding 392 of 2000 in the Federal Court of Australia. (instructed by Tress Cocks & Maddox)

HIS HONOUR: I hold certificates, firstly in respect of matter M99 of 2000 from the Deputy Registrar that she has been informed by the Crown Solicitor's Office, Queensland, solicitors for the fifth to sixth respondents in that matter, that the fifth to sixth respondents have not been served with the originating Federal Court proceedings to which the High Court matter relates in accordance with the Crown Proceedings Act 1980 , Queensland. The respondents are of the view that they are not party to these proceedings and do not intend to appear at the hearing on 20 October 2000.

I hold a further certificate from the Deputy Registrar, again in matter No M99 of 2000 that she has been informed by Mahonys, solicitors for the first to fourth respondents in this matter, that the first to fourth respondents do not intend to appear at the hearing on 20 October 2000 and will abide by any decision of the Court.

Ms Luck, I have looked at and read the originating applications in the Federal Court of Australia in the four matters. I have looked at and read the transcript of proceedings before Justice Weinberg and his reasons of 8 August 2000. I have looked at and read the transcript of proceedings before the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 23 August 2000. I have looked at and read the reasons for judgment of the Full Court of 23 August 2000. In addition, I have looked at and read your applications for special leave to appeal to this Court in each of the four matters and your Chamber summons and affidavit filed in support of them.

Ms Luck, as I understand it, the immediate purpose of the application this morning is to obtain an order, the effect of which would be to prevent any effect being given to Justice Weinberg's order transferring the proceedings from the Melbourne registry to the Queensland registry of the Federal Court of Australia and to stop that happening until your applications for special leave to appeal to this Court are heard and determined. Is that right?

MS LUCK: Yes, that is right, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. What is it that you would wish to say in support of those applications in each of these four matters?

MS LUCK: Your Honour, I would like to hand these up to you if you would not mind, please.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, of course.

MS LUCK: This being the preliminary preparation I made for the special leave to appeal application which - the summary of argument and draft notice of appeal. As you would have - - -

HIS HONOUR: Yes, just a moment, Ms Luck. Has Mr Cawthorn been given a copy of these documents?

MS LUCK: Yes, he has, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you. Perhaps before you tell me anything further about them I might take a moment and look at them and read them.

MS LUCK: Could I just please, before you look at them, your Honour, mention that due to the very short period of time which I had from the filing of the summons and affidavit, I have done my best to prepare as much as I can to give you some idea but the affidavit basically that I filed the other day, on Wednesday the 17th, was ultimately what this is, what I am relying on here. This is an extension of that affidavit and provides much information in regard to the previous incidences and circumstances leading up to it through the Federal Court generally from the time that I made the applications for all these matters.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you, Ms Luck. Perhaps if you would take a seat while I look at these documents. Yes, Ms Luck, I have read those. Before we come to discuss any of their content, there is one matter I should raise with you. You refer in your - - -

MS LUCK: Excuse me, your Honour, could I make my submission as I have organised it. I am really in pain and I would like to get this over and done with as quickly as possible. I intend to orally give this argument and I would like to read out part of my affidavit that I filed in the Court the other day in relation to my physical circumstances which I am now at the moment suffering severely from.

Your Honour, I appreciate that I have this right to orally submit whatever I have in a court. It seems that I have not been able to do that properly in most of the instances in the courts below and I do not want to have to get this situation where I become so distressed over this, the submissions of my arguments and I just would like to get it out of the way very quickly. If you would not mind, I would be really grateful if I could just submit it and if there is anything that needs to be discussed later, then I could answer any questions that anyone has in relation to the matter.

HIS HONOUR: Well, Ms Luck, the only point I want to make to you is that I do not regard the matter concerning Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs as being before me. Proceed with your submissions.

MS LUCK: Thank you, your Honour. First of all, I would like to submit the affidavit or first couple of paragraphs of the affidavit, the first few paragraphs of the affidavit, to give an understanding of my position in regard to my physical disabilities:

1. I am a subject of the Queen and a Disability Support Pensioner/Student, proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia in person. I suffer from various diagnosed chronic and acute illnesses, including, Spinal Disc Disease, Systemic Scleroderma/Progressive Systemic Sclerosis and Raynaud's Disease. I am also in financial hardship and due to such, I have special needs which require certain economic, physical and social concessions.

2. I have filed and served an Application for Special Leave to Appeal in the High Court of Australia, from the judgments of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia to transfer this proceeding, along with M97, M98 and M99 of 2000 -

that is in the Federal Court of Australia -

(V393, V394, V541/2000) to the Queensland Branch of the Federal Court of Australia on 20 September, 2000 on the grounds specified in the Application for Special Leave to Appeal.

3. I am, due to illness and to the volume of work I am required to do to progress the proceedings I have currently on foot in the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia, unable to cope with any more work and am suffering extreme distress and anxiety as a result, which is worsening my health and causing further damages to accrue in this matter.

4. A directions hearing was listed for 6 October 2000, by the Registrar of the Brisbane Registry of the Federal Court of Australia. On 21 September 2000, I wrote to the Registrar, explaining my circumstances -

of those, that I had, in actual fact, got too much work and could not cope with four proceedings at the one time, that I was unable to appear -

and attached a copy of the Application for Special Leave to Appeal.

5. I received a notice from the Federal Court on 25 September 2000, advising that due to the information provided in paragraph four above, and advice from the High Court, that the directions hearing date of 6 October 2000 had been vacated, and that it was not proposed to be relisted until my applications for leave had been dealt with.

6. I received a notice from the Federal Court on 27 September 2000, advising that it was aware of my applications for special leave to appeal and that the directions hearing was vacated and that it did not propose to relist the matter until the outcome of my High Court applications is known and that the notice was posted to my address for service.

7. On 5 October 2000, I received a notice from the Federal Court advising that the directions hearings set for this matter and all other matters referred to in paragraph two above were vacated, but the docket judge had decided that in the administration of interests of the administration of justice that the matters progress during the intervening months, pending the outcome of the special leave applications and to that end the four matters were listed for a directions hearing at 10.15 am (Brisbane time) on 27 October 2000 at Level 7, Commonwealth Law Courts, 119 North Quay, Brisbane, that the Judge expects all parties to appear and if there is any difficulty with such attendance, I should notify the Court immediately and the judge may permit an alternative mode of appearance such as video-link.

8. On the 5 October 2000, I wrote to the Federal Court (Brisbane) explaining my circumstances yet again, that I would be unable to appear in any mode at the hearing on 27 October 2000, and the anxious and distressed state I found myself in due to the earlier misleading advises received. I sought the identity of the Judge who has information in regard to my circumstances and who is torturing me in this way and requested the proceeding be adjourned as had been advised earlier.

9. On 10 October 2000, due to constant harassment of me by the Brisbane Federal Court, by continuous faxing of documents after hours to my private residence, and to a telephone number not listed as address for service, I attempted to fax file a Notice of Address with the removal of any reference to my fax number and to eliminate further harassment by the Registry and have been informed again that I cannot file my documents that way.

10. On 12 October 2000, I rang and wrote to the Registrar again asking for the Federal Court to cease torturing me.

11. On 16 October 2000, I received a letter from the Federal Court, stating that the Judge was fully aware of my circumstances -

and that he did not make any - he did not vacate or give -

notice indicating that the listing for the directions hearing has been vacated.

12. At this time -

that was on Wednesday, when I was writing this -

on 17 October 2000, I am at my wits end and surely becoming progressively more ill and less able to withstand further abuse of the kind to which I have been subjected. I rely on the Crimes (Torture) Act 1988 (Cth) and the Australian Treaties engendered by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (in particular the ICCPR articles 7, 14 and 19 which will be given the legitimacy of substance provided for by the section 75 of the Constitution to ensure the granting of a stay of proceedings in this matter.

13. Due to the URGENCY of this matter, and the inability to prepare a proper argument in the time available, I request a special consideration of my application for a stay of proceedings and point out that my Summary of Argument and Draft Notice of Appeal, relating to my Application for Special Leave to Appeal to the High Court of Australia, which will contain the evidence and substance required to justify the granting of the stay, are due to be filed tomorrow the 18 October 2000, and because of the number and complexity of the proceedings I have on foot in the Courts, and the unreasonable, impossible and oppressive expectations of me to perform and produce the proper documents and the correct processing of same, by the Courts in I am having difficulty coping with the volume of work, which is all done by me, without any assistance whatsoever.

Your Honour, that is basically why I am here today to prevent this situation occurring any further after the Federal Court in Brisbane had vacated those two sittings and then to force me again, after having explained all those circumstances in detail in the letters is an outrage and it should not occur in this country under our laws and there are laws to prevent it.

Now, your Honour, I will go on to the fundamental reasons for my seeking the stay of proceedings apart from those, the matters of law that you would be assessing to determine whether a stay is granted. Your Honour, first of all, the facts that I have just submitted to you are very few of a great many which have occurred from the day that I first filed my applications in the Federal Court in Melbourne. Three applications were filed which were M96, 97 and 98 and at a later date M99 was added. I was forced by Justice Weinberg in the Federal Court in Melbourne to have an abridged hearing. In a very short space of time I had to prepare anything and I had no choice from the day that I first filed those applications as to whether I wanted them heard separately or not. They were all separate matters with separate facts and the fact that I have been forced to do this, four times as much work for numerous respondents as any person could even begin to imagine actually managing, I have managed and I am here today because of it.

I wanted to point out that the facts involved - this is a new cause, the cause of the torture by the Federal Court of me and this cause involves 50, 60 facts, statements and I have them here in my statement of the factual background of the application. I will obviously not proceed to go through each one but I think that your Honour might have had some idea of the sort of instances that I have experienced.

Firstly, the most important one is the fact that I have never been able to have these heard separately so the volume of work, the preparation of all notices of motion, affidavits, statements of claim are innumerable and are impossible for one person to manage but, one way or another, I have so that I can continue to progress my proceedings without being disadvantaged by that but it has disadvantaged me. It is nearly killing me, your Honour, and I am very, very unhappy and very, very sick from this experience that I have had in front of the courts.

Now, I will go on, your Honour, if you do not mind to my statement here in regard to the considerations of the court in granting a stay of proceedings. I request you see Jennings Construction v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited [No 1] (1986) 161 CLR S68/005. (1) How the extraordinary jurisdiction arises and what are the exceptional circumstances? Firstly, your Honour, I am representing myself. I am also disabled by chronic and acute illness and require consideration of my special needs.

I will now go on to relate in the third person. The applicant is in severe financial hardship and is suffering under economic duress. The applicant has, subsequent to the adverse conditions imposed upon her, including the grossly discriminatory judgments and decisions in the Federal Court, managed to bring by the correct processes of the court the matter before the High Court of Australia today.

The very apparent lack of equality, not through lack of knowledge or ability to present a reasonable case and argument or cope with the unfamiliar labyrinth of the practice and procedures of the Federal Court of Australia, but because of the relentless discriminatory and torturous decisions of the court and the registry in the processing of the applications for which the applicant seeks a remedy by invocation of section 75 of the Constitution, the applicant is forced to represent herself in four separate matters at the one time, all with separate facts and causes and now including the cause of discrimination by the Federal Court of Australia in processing the applicant's applications.

The facts are dealt with in Part 1 of this document, that each of the matters involve human rights issues requiring the interpretation of treaties for which there are no remedies in the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia and which invokes section 75(i) of the Constitution. The application for special leave to appeal would be futile in this case unless a stay is granted, and I cite Justice Toohey in Manfal Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 65 ALJR 256 at 257. His Honour there said:

Whether the question is one of jurisdiction or power, it is clear that the Court will not stay proceedings below, pending the hearing of an application for special leave to appeal, unless satisfied that a stay is required to preserve the subject matter of the litigation, or that refusal of a stay would make it difficult for this Court, in the determination of the appeal, to grant the relief sought -

The applicant would be forced, due to economic duress, your Honour, to forgo appearance at the directions hearing listed at 27 October 2000 and any other future hearings listed at the Federal Court of Australia, Brisbane, and those listings done so at the judge's discretion thereby allowing judgments to be made in her absence or to submit to in total opposition to her religious personal beliefs, opinions and ideas appearing by video-link which would deprive her of the freedom of expression and freedom to impart and receive information through the media of her choice rights which are engendered generally in various Australian treaties, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular articles 19 and 25. The applicant seeks to invoke sections 75(i) and (iv) of the Constitution for remedies by the removal of the cause under section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 .

It would be difficult in this case, your Honour, as cited earlier by Justice Toohey, for the Court in the determination of the appeal to grant relief if the matter continues to be listed in a place to which the applicant has no physical access as a result of being in severe financial hardship and being under economic duress for which she seeks remedies through being granted special leave to appeal under Order 69A of the High Court Rules to invoke sections 75(i) and (iv) of the Constitution for remedies and removal of the cause under section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 . The matter would likely to be dismissed before the special leave to appeal is heard for want of prosecution.

Your Honour, there is absolutely no chance I can get to Brisbane and be at the hearing. My personal beliefs and objections to conducting my proceedings in any form in any stage of the process is just not possible, so I would be eliminated without any chance whatsoever to have my say and the High Court would not be able to make a satisfactory determination on the matter because the special leave to appeal would prove to be futile then.

HIS HONOUR: Was the question of your religious and personal beliefs presenting a bar to your using video-link spoken of in the course of the hearing before Justice Weinberg?

MS LUCK: No, but I did strongly oppose it, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MS LUCK: Your Honour, it is something that is a very personal thing. It is not likely to be something I go around - do you tell people what your religious beliefs are? First of all, I am an astrologer. That is something that I find a lot of people would consider rather trite or trivial and one of my beliefs is that within the media that the video-link would be using, which is electronic media, there is such an extraordinary amount of distortion and ability by those who choose to adulterate the process or the receiving or imparting or the transmission of those images or sounds, whatever they are, and in my case I have not yet had a transcript from the court that has not been adulterated.

So, if I cannot get a transcript that has not been adulterated, then I am afraid I have absolutely no faith and I personally believe that the devil lies in the video-conferencing process. In my case it would, and in that it is a religious belief because I believe in God and I believe in the devil and I believe that there is devilish work going on within this community in regard to whatever my actions are or about. There have been some dreadful circumstances occurring to me that have inspired my total opposition to this matter and I believe that hackers and the people who can change it - I have seen them on television. I have seen the way that images are represented. They can be superimposed. There is no trueness about it and that is my objection to the using of the video-link for conducting very, very important matters in a court. To me that is not justice and it certainly is not equal opportunity.

Then, your Honour, we go on to whether a stay is necessary to preserve the subject matter or integrity of the litigation. Your Honour, in this case I am the subject matter and my health and my rights are the subject matter and the subject matter in this case is immediate and specific and stands here before you today.

The third paragraph of the preamble to the universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that human rights should be protected by the rule of law. The High Court has ultimate authority to make such determinations under Chapter III of the Constitution, see Polyukhovich v Commonwealth [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501. The human rights treaties are many and varied and encompass all facets of human life and in this instance include the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons and the convention concerning discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. On the issue on the right to health, reference can be found in the Declaration of Human Rights International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organisation.

At this stage to begin to identify and argue every breach or deprivation of human rights which the applicant has suffered since the origin of these causes in these proceedings would be impossible as would be an attempt to prepare and submit the brief factual history in two days, which was the time available to the applicant since the time of filing the summons and the hearing date.

The facts are too many in number to enable the applicant to submit only a ten-page summary of argument as is allowed by the High Court Rules. The facts of the matter of discrimination in the processing of the applications are those which support the necessity of a stay to preserve the subject matter and integrity of the proceedings. These four matters all being separate proceedings and having different causes, in addition to the new cause of discrimination in the processing of the applications, relate to life and death issues of one human being who is standing here before you today to seek to have the rights engendered in the aforementioned treaties protected by the ultimate authority of the High Court so that access to equality of opportunity exists for the applicant to progress her proceedings, taking into consideration at all stages of the process her special needs as a disabled person in severe financial hardship and suffering under economic duress, that being, at this time, as a result of the orders and judgments and decisions of officers of the Commonwealth, those having demonstrated non-compliance with rules of natural justice or procedural fairness, non-compliance with statutory procedure, error of law and the most unreasonable exercise of power.

The applicant seeks to invoke the remedies available to her under section 5 of the Constitution, which arises out of the inalienable jurisdiction of that section of the High Court to declare her rights, to direct the officers of the Commonwealth to consider her special needs at all stages of the process and to stop the relentless torture of her and all those like her, see Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth [1948] HCA 7; (1948) 76 CLR 1 for inalienable jurisdiction.

In regard to No 3, the consideration is whether there is a substantial prospect of success of the application for special leave to appeal being granted and whether the applicant has failed to take the necessary steps to seek a stay from the court in which the matter is pending. Your Honour, on the basis that all of the matters fall under the inalienable jurisdiction of section 75 of the Constitution and the matters all include issues that arise under treaty to which remedies are not available elsewhere, it would seem that success in the removal of the causes to the High Court under section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 would be logical and a likely determination, albeit that matters may be adjourned or remitted back to the court below for determination of those issues over which the Federal Court has jurisdiction, see Reg v Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185 at 224. Where a Supreme Court found a matter arising under a treaty jurisdiction was refused because of section 38(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 , Justice McLelland on the Supreme Court in Bluett v Fadden (1956) SR(NSW) 254 explained:

Section 75 must, I think, be taken to refer to cases where the decision of the case depends upon the interpretation of the treaty. In such cases, the matter in question arises under the treaty.

That is:

where the terms of the treaty have by legislation been made part of the law of the land, it is in a very real sense the treaty which is being interpreted.

The applicant draws upon the aforementioned treaties as a direct source and the rights on which her claims are founded depend upon the treaties.

In regard to the removal of the cause of the proceeding, Gaye Luck v Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, V45 of 2000, this particular matter, your Honour, I note you did say earlier that it was not before you today and I agree that it is not before you, but it is intended to join this one by removal of cause to the High Court along with another matter which, in fact, does have extraordinary bearing on all of these matters. They have been as a result, as you will note, of the four matters. There is a medical matter with medical failure to treat. There is a landlord, real estate agent matter in which, naturally, the Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs comes in as it was fought on the basis of rental assistance, your Honour, Austudy rental assistance regulation. It also very, very clearly outlines the position of a person who is in financial hardship according to law and who is under economic duress according to law and often, in my case, because of the law.

In regard to that, it is important that this is brought in amongst these matters because it does define and the evidence involved in that matter are so clearly distinguishing these human rights issues that we are here because of today. In regard to that the jurisdiction of the High Court in this matter arises from section 75(i). The applicant has appealed to the Federal Court from the decisions of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal followed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on the grounds of being discriminated as a result of discriminatory legislation by way of Austudy rules relating to rent assistance and also of Centrelink's negligence.

As a result of the other proceedings on foot in the court and the gross acts of discrimination and torture by the Federal Court in regard to the four matters, M96, 97, 98 and M99 of 2000, FCA V392, V393, V394 and V541, now pending a hearing of an application for special to appeal in the High Court, the applicant has decided to seek to have the cause of V45/2000 removed under section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 to seek remedies which fall under the inalienable jurisdiction of section 75 as the remedies are not available elsewhere. This matter is related directly to and will be used for providing evidence of circumstances of economic duress and of breaches by the Commonwealth government of human rights legislation and it will support the applicant's argument for the removal of the four cases to the High Court.

The four proceedings, M96 to M98 of 2000, are all matters between residents of different States and M99 is a matter between a resident of a different State and a State and they relate to contracts and interpretation of human rights issues engendered by the aforementioned treaties, see New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455 at 458. That was a matter in which there were residents of different States.

The applicant submits that due to the likelihood of these causes being removed to the High Court, there would not be much point in arguing that the proper place be Melbourne and, in that case, your Honour, that was the basis on which Justice Weinberg made his orders in the first place to transfer the four proceedings up to Queensland. However, the matters may be adjourned or remitted back even after removal of the cause to the High Court for the determination of some of the issues, in which case the applicant would still maintain that the proper place is in Melbourne for there was not the manifest preponderance of convenience in that one legal representative for some of the respondents in M99 of 2000 appeared.

His Honour Justice Weinberg made a discretionary decision with nobody, not one respondent, apart from the one legal representative, and he had not filed any notices of motion or whatever or seek by application to have the matters removed. It was done with not a soul, apart from that one person representing four, I think, respondents in the matter of M99, and on that basis and the fact that M98 is a matter which has not been - the respondent in that matter has not been identified. It is not necessarily CSR or the Bradford Insulation Group and I have not been able to obtain any sort of discovery or anything to help me in that matter to discover who they are. But my personal feelings about that matter is that that will not be a Queensland resident and might necessarily not be a Sydney resident. So in that respect there is no real case for transferring that matter.

The two other cases, M96, the respondents whose counsel is here today, they were not there. They did not appear. Anyway, M96 and M97 were not in appearance at all, nor M98, but M99 had one legal representative for all of the respondents out of the seven there, seven or eight. Your Honour, that seems to me, considering that the hearing date was abridged - I had a hearing date due on 23 August, which I was very comfortable with, I had prepared. I had three cases and three matters to prepare for that. On 27 or 28 September Justice Weinberg's associate rang me up and asked me whether it would be appropriate or convenient or all right for an early hearing, at which telephone conversation I said no, it would not, I was sick, and I was not able to cope with all those matters all in one go and I would like to have it brought on in the same time frame as had been previously arranged and listed, which was 23 August.

After having been understood at the end of that phone conversation that that would be the case and that I would then be able to have the four matters heard on 23 August, I get a letter in the mail demanding that I appear on 8 August. Now, I do not know about you, your Honour, but that does not sound very fair or just to a person who is a non-lawyer and not represented, has absolutely no hope under normal circumstances of possibly having any way of dealing with those situations. It is just outrageous. My personal experience here is such that I now have difficulty even making an application, putting words together because of the effect that this has had on my life and the condemnation and the torture that has been forced upon me from the very first day that I filed those applications when I was refused at that time by the Registry to allow to have them heard.

"The applicant has not had the time to complete the summary of this argument", though I have done more than I thought I could for the special leave to appeal, "but submits what is prepared to date, including the facts making up the new cause of discrimination, the processing of the applicant's application." They, your Honour, are in Part 1 there in my questions that are said to arise in my argument for the special leave to appeal, and I would like to go through those actually. They are the questions that are said to arise in this appeal.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I have read all of those, Ms Luck.

MS LUCK: Right, your Honour. The facts are outlined in a statement of factual background to the application in Part 2, page 6, of the applicant's summary of argument.

HIS HONOUR: Again, I have read that.

MS LUCK: I am not going to read those, your Honour, but they are certainly quite an interesting array of breaches of the law and they go from 1 to 60, 60 facts, 60 different instances, 60,000 different pieces of paper that I have had to prepare. The sworn affidavit accompanying the summons filed on 17 October 2000 gives further facts of the new cause which will be referred to in support of this application for a stay of proceedings. The applicant took steps in the court below, and I notice that in Mr Cawthorn's response he maintains that there was no seeking of a stay, but that is not the case. I can actually identify those documents where I filed notices of motion for a stay in the proceedings and they were filed on 18 August, your Honour, in the Federal Court in Melbourne. I fax filed them but they were actually stamp filed. They were fax filed on 14 August and they were stamp filed on the 18th, and that is fact No 25. They are substantiated and evidenced in volume 1 of the application book, Part 1, document No 28, and volume 1, Part 2, document Nos 7, 8, 16, 17, 28, 29, 37 and 38.

HIS HONOUR: Did you ask the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia to stay the orders which it made?

MS LUCK: No, your Honour, because I was denied - I asked to appeal. I am not a lawyer, your Honour. I have no idea what I am supposed to be doing. I have four matters in front of me. I had filed the notice of motion with the intention of seeking those orders or having the Court move to order those things. I have filed the notice of motion. The judge denied me any opportunity of doing anything basically, and then his reasons for argument had no relation or bearing on the actual facts of the reasons for the orders in the first place from Justice Weinberg. I have really got enormous difficulty with what is being done here to me and how I have been victimised by this process of me making claims against four parties, four sets of respondents, and I honestly am beginning to wonder just what is going on, that I cannot be treated even equal to a lawyer. I am given no benefits - - -

HIS HONOUR: Ms Luck, be quiet. I asked you a question. You were good enough to answer it. The question was one of fact. You have answered it. There is no occasion to treat the question as anything more than what it was, namely an inquiry about a question of fact. You were good enough to answer it. There is no occasion to become upset.

MS LUCK: Your Honour, I get upset because I have to stand here and do this. I have not an opportunity. I am exhausted. It is only because of my strength and constitution myself of who I am that I can do this. I have gone into the Internet and I have read some of the matters that come before the High Court of people representing themselves and I can see it is wrong, not here in the High Court but what occurs, that a person ends up in this Court with an application for special leave to appeal. These people have had absolutely no opportunity to prepare. They have never been given time, they are forced to do things that are beyond them, and all because they choose to represent themselves because they are poor and they cannot afford a counsel or cannot afford a lawyer. I am here today and I am going to keep on getting here today, whatever day it is, and if I have to, I will ensure that this does not occur to anybody else in the future. It is wrong and it is illegal. Anyway, I am sorry, but I am so emotionally affected by this, I am lucky to be able to speak or walk.

HIS HONOUR: Ms Luck, just a moment.

MS LUCK: Anyway, I will go on, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Just a moment. Take a moment, compose yourself. If you wish, I will adjourn for 10 minutes so that you may compose yourself, but when you resume, I would ask that you address the questions which are immediately before me. They are whether I should make an order staying the effect of Justice Weinberg's orders for removal of the proceedings from the Melbourne registry to the Brisbane registry. Would it assist you if I were to give you five or ten minutes to compose yourself?

MS LUCK: No, your Honour, I will be right, thank you very much.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, very well, proceed.

MS LUCK: First of all, what you just said, your Honour, is not what I understand this stay of proceedings is. I am not here to argue my case for the special leave to appeal. I am here to argue that between the time of the hearing of the special leave to appeal and today that the stay occurs in the Brisbane registry, Brisbane court.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, that is right. The duration of the order which you seek, as I understand it, is that until your special leave applications are heard and determined, the effect of Justice Weinberg's order should be suspended.

MS LUCK: "Ultimately the applicant's application for special leave to appeal has good prospects of success if only to provide relief by ordering hearings by a Melbourne-based judge, but one way or another the relief sought could be provided in any number of ways that would be appropriate and not deprive the applicant of her rights to stand in front of a judge and conduct her case." I believe that the removal of the causes to the High Court - as I have another matter that is also partially - it is very much an essence of these matters, as will probably please the respondents in V98, because I had an accident in Queensland which damaged my back and was one of the reasons and there will be reason for them to share the liability in regard to - I have mentioned that in my affidavit, your Honour, about a matter in Queensland that I want to have removed into the High Court as well, as it is progressing nowhere. It is also a big mess and I do not want to go into that at the moment.

But these matters, there are six now, that I see as being reasonable to have removed to the High Court. Given that the High Court is an appellate jurisdiction under normal circumstances, I do not know whether they would be hearing if it was to be removed, whether it would be heard in the High Court or whether the High Court would remit it back to the Federal Court in different areas. But the human rights issues that come under section 75(i), ultimately they are the foundation of all of my matters. In that respect there is nowhere else to go. There is no remedies in any of the legislation, in the Commonwealth legislation, for the equal opportunity. There just is not. There is no legislation, so I seek the only place to find those remedies, which is under section 75 of the Constitution and the High Court.

In regard to the considerations, No 4 was whether the grant of a stay will cause loss to the respondents. Quite frankly, I cannot see that there is any loss that can be - apart from - - -

HIS HONOUR: If they point to any, then you may deal with that in reply. For the moment let us assume there is none.

MS LUCK: Right, your Honour. I do appreciate that there may be - if there is nothing happening, there is no professional reputation at stake that is going to cost at that point in time. It may cost them in a bit of emotional distress, your Honour, in the fact that they cannot have a decision or determination in the matter. However, to bring on the matters and force a person - and these people are medical people and know that I suffer from a disease that is worsened quite considerably by stress. They have taken absolutely no stance in regard to that and are quite happy to subject me to continued torture, so my personal feeling about that is that if they suffer a little bit of emotional distress over having to wait till the determination of the matters, then it does not really bother me and I do not consider that a loss in their case because they are the ones that are causing me the pain and suffering that they are. It gets worse as it goes on because they are medical people and it is spread throughout all over Australia. I cannot go anywhere that I am not known and I cannot get medical treatment either, your Honour.

No 5, where the balance of convenience lies. Your Honour, I am not fit to do any more. I cannot; I just cannot. I am physically incapable of doing any more in this matter until the hearing of the special leave to appeal application. A person's life is not something you can weigh up, whether it is convenient for the doctors up there or the respondents up there to have the case heard. It is not that. If need be, I will obtain somewhere a medical certificate that will enable me to adjourn the matters anyway because I am sick and I am in suffering. If I had to strip off in the Court and show the Court what I have to bear, I will. I cannot believe that this is actually where I have to get to to stop this hearing in Brisbane after having related in numerous letters to the judge up there and to the registry, my condition and circumstances.

It is torture and there is no convenience lying in the torture of further infliction of illness due to stress and overwork of the applicant, and the value of a human life does not equate with the balance of convenience and can never be equated with a test of a balance of convenience. My life is more important than their convenience and, if it is not, then we have a big problem in our society and in this country and in our judicial system that that cannot be recognised.

Your Honour, I basically have not much more to say except that I will argue my case for the special leave to appeal basically on the same material, but the manifest preponderance of convenience is really the essence of my argument there and the fact that these exceptional and extraordinary circumstances are as I have related at the beginning of this submission, and that is that I am chronically and acutely ill, representing myself in severe financial hardship and suffering under economic duress. The fact that I have managed to get here today is extraordinary and I think that the instructing solicitor here of the respondent made comment about that at the last hearing, that they could not have done what I did to get to the last one. So I assume that that makes it extraordinary in itself, that a person can actually achieve what I have to come here, but I cannot do any more because I am sick and tired and I would like very much to have a break, your Honour. Thank you very much.

HIS HONOUR: You say you would like a break. Do you mean a break in the immediate proceedings?

MS LUCK: No, I meant a break in the proceedings, your Honour, not here now.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you, Ms Luck. Yes, Mr Cawthorn.

MR CAWTHORN: Your Honour, the application is an application to stay further interlocutory steps being taken from the Brisbane registry of the Federal Court of Australia. There are no special or exceptional circumstances. The only circumstance that has been advanced today, in my submission, is that the applicant represents herself. That is hardly a special or exceptional circumstance. My clients, as your Honour is aware, are medical practitioners. They have been vexed with this litigation. It is based in essence on medical malpractice. They are entitled to have the matter brought to a conclusion as soon as possible. There are no circumstances here that could be described, in my submission, as special or exceptional.

Your Honour, a stay is not necessary to preserve the subject matter of the appeal. The subject matter of the appeal, in my respectful submission, is this: whether the interlocutory steps should be managed from the Brisbane registry. Your Honour will have observed that Justice Weinberg - - -

HIS HONOUR: Why does not the embarking on those steps in Brisbane before the hearing and determination of the special leave application do away altogether with the subject matter of the application?

MR CAWTHORN: Because the judge in the Brisbane registry can accommodate the applicant by providing that she can attend a directions hearing by video-link, and indeed that is something that was foreshadowed in the Full Court. The court itself is able to accommodate any difficulties she might have and the Full Court made that observation that it was quite sure that the judge deciding the interlocutory steps and what directions ought be made would have regard to the applicant's particular difficulties. Indeed, it was pointed out as well that the Federal Court allows parties to file documents at registries other than the registry at which the matter is assigned. So she is able to file documents in the Melbourne registry, she can attend by video-link, and in those circumstances, in my submission, the interlocutory steps can be successfully managed from Brisbane to accommodate her circumstance. So that her right to seek special leave to appeal would not be disturbed by the continuation of the orders of the Full Court.

HIS HONOUR: Do you accept that if it were sufficiently demonstrated that Ms Luck was unable to attend or be represented at the directions hearing, whether in person or by video-link, it would follow that, ordinarily speaking, the directions hearing would then have to be adjourned?

MR CAWTHORN: That is possible, your Honour, but that is - - -

HIS HONOUR: No, I asked you whether you accept that that would follow. That is, are you going to assert that if she demonstrates adequately an inability to attend, that nevertheless the proceedings should be dismissed for want of prosecution because if you are going to assert that, Mr Cawthorn, very different questions emerge.

MR CAWTHORN: No, we could not assert that, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: No. Yes, go on.

MR CAWTHORN: As I said, your Honour, that is ultimately a matter for the docket judge. The docket judge has the whole case, the case in which my client appears, and indeed all the other cases that the applicant has issued, before him. He is charged with the responsibility of managing them in the interests of all the parties - not only the applicant but all the respondents. If he forms the view that her needs can be dealt with by an adjournment or by her application if she wants to make one or whatever directions were required to be made by video-link, then it is a matter that is entirely for him or her to deal with. There cannot be any suggestion of any injustice that could be done to the applicant by that procedure.

Your Honour has been referred to the Jennings Construction v Burgundy Royale decision. I think your Honour has a copy of that with you. The criteria for the granting of a stay were described by Justice Brennan at page 685. I have mentioned the - - -

HIS HONOUR: What do you say about the prospects of success?

MR CAWTHORN: They are weak, your Honour, in the extreme. There is no question of general importance or principle involved. The appeal is against the exercise of a discretion on a matter of practice and procedure. But superadded to that is the fact that it involves a question of case management, concerning which the court managing the case is in a unique position to assess. So that the judge assessing the matter, Justice Weinberg, had the cases before him. He was charged with managing them and he formed the view that there ought be a transfer. The Full Court did not disturb his decision and it is highly unlikely, in my submission, that special leave would be granted.

HIS HONOUR: As I understand Ms Luck's contentions, one of them is that she maintains now that if the proceedings are transferred to Brisbane, effectively that means that they are determined against her because she cannot and will not be able to participate in their further hearing. What do you say about that contention?

MR CAWTHORN: I submit that is incorrect. The overwhelming probabilities are the matter will not come to trial before the special leave application is heard, so then one is dealing with the interlocutory steps which no doubt will involve provision for defences, discovery and the like.

HIS HONOUR: But she maintains that she will not be able to participate in those interlocutory steps.

MR CAWTHORN: In my submission, there is no basis for that. There is no basis to suggest that she could not attend this Court and communicate with the Judge dealing with the matter in Brisbane via video-link.

HIS HONOUR: You have heard what she says about that. What do you say about that contention?

MR CAWTHORN: We say there is no basis to suggest that she ought have any fear of the kind she articulated from the Bar table without the support of any evidence, that warrants her having any fear at all about dealing with the matter by video-link. It is not a question as if her rights will be affected in a substantive way by the directions that will be made between now and February, when I understand the special leave application will be heard. There is no evidentiary basis to suggest that she will be in any way discriminated against or prejudicially affected by the matter being dealt with by the Judge in Brisbane, managing the matter as best he sees fit. She is well able to communicate with the registry of the Federal Court by letter. She is able to articulate concerns she has about the matter in writing, and no doubt she can file an appropriate submission with the Federal Court and the judge is entitled to receive that.

HIS HONOUR: Does the Federal Court do directions hearings by telephone?

MR CAWTHORN: I believe so, your Honour. I believe the Federal Court does.

HIS HONOUR: What else do you want to say, Mr Cawthorn?

MR CAWTHORN: Those are the submissions I make, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Ms Luck, do you wish to say anything in reply to what Mr Cawthorn has said?

MS LUCK: Yes, your Honour, thank you. Mr Cawthorn claims that I can file documents in a registry in Melbourne, say, for instance, in this case in Melbourne for doc 4 matters in Brisbane. That is not the case. In my position as a disabled person in financial hardship, I do not think Mr Cawthorn appreciates the circumstances here. I have not only disability from being physically disabled and ill, but I also have the financial matters to concern myself with and the filing of documents by fax is, in fact, not available to me in Melbourne. You have to file them by the rules to the registry of the - what is it called?

HIS HONOUR: The proper place.

MS LUCK: The proper place, yes. In that respect I have actually attempted to file them at the Melbourne registry by facsimile and I have been denied that access. I would like to hand up to you, your Honour, some of the evidence of the gross abuses I have suffered at the hands of the Brisbane registry which show - - -

HIS HONOUR: Just a moment, Ms Luck. You are in reply to Mr Cawthorn.

MS LUCK: Well, it is about this faxing, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Just a moment. Ordinarily speaking, in reply it would be very irregular to receive further factual assertions. As I understand it, we are presently discussing whether it is possible to file documents by facsimile. That is a matter which I assume is governed by the rules. What would assist me is if either you or Mr Cawthorn could direct me to the relevant rule which permits or regulates the filing of documents in the Federal Court of Australia by facsimile.

MS LUCK: Your Honour, in my application for special leave to appeal you will find I have actually identified the - Order 1, rule 5AB(3) of the Rules of the Federal Court of Australia states:

If the document is in an existing proceeding, it must be sent to an approved facsimile number for the Registry which is the proper place for the proceeding.

Your Honour, I have attempted on numerous occasions - and I was going to provide you - on the basis that I believe that I could demonstrate my honesty in regard to any of the matters I have put before the Court, you may take my word for it that I have - and I was going to show you some journal lists from my fax machine that identify on every single occasion that I have tried to fax any documents - and some of them are quite large because I have also four matters at the same time, which is another thing that Mr Cawthorn does not appreciate, which is the responsibility of the court, not his or the respondents', but I claim this whole issue is over the courts, it is not the respondents' - but now that the respondents have joined in to support the court's actions of torture, then I will obviously be seeking further damages for that, but that is irrelevant at the moment.

I wanted to show you the journal lists of the fax machines where they interrupt every fax that I sent. Some of them are 20 pages, your Honour, and they are refusing to take them and they refuse to accept that I do not want after-hours phone calls by the fax machine. This whole issue is about the torture that I am suffering from the Federal Court and to be subjected to that, the respondents are forcing me to continue to be subjected to that and I cannot stress what effect it has on me. It is just endless and relentless and I just - as far as the evidence that Mr Cawthorn says I have no evidence that there would be any distortion or any interference with the transmissions by video-link, it is against my personal - I do believe the devil is in it and I am not going to submit myself to video-link or telephone hearings either because telephone hearings would be absolutely a denial of basic fundamental rights according to the treaties, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Treaty, the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.

I have evidence, and I can provide physical evidence of the transcripts being adulterated or interfered with and I can show them to him today if he wishes. As I say, if that is going to happen to a piece of paper that is written, can you imagine how easy it is for them to do whatever they want to with my voice, with my image, whatever, and with any particular physical evidence that I want to produce? I am sorry, your Honour, it is just not right and I cannot accept Mr Cawthorn's arguments as being legitimate or valid in regard to my hearing. He has not considered, as per usual with anything to do with this, my special needs and I think that that is one of my special needs, is the requirement in this situation as the subject matter. My illness, my physicality, is the subject matter in this instance. I am a human being and I have the rights set out under those treaties and that is why I am asking you, your Honour, today to make a stay so that those issues can be determined in the special leave to appeal hearing whenever that may be. Thank you.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you, Ms Luck. The parties should understand that in accordance with the ordinary practice of this Court, and I think every other court, the reasons for judgment which I am about to give are subject to revision. The revisions that may occur are not limited to accuracy of transcription. The revisions that may occur are, to the eyes of some, changes in the substance though not the ultimate effect of what is said.

The applicant has instituted a number of proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia. In four of those proceedings, numbered respectively V392 of 2000, V393 of 2000, V394 of 2000 and V541 of 2000, Justice Weinberg ordered on 8 August 2000, in effect, that the matter be transferred to a judge of the Queensland District Registry of the Federal Court.

Each of the four applications in the Federal Court of Australia names a number of respondents. At the risk of some inaccuracy, the respondents and the proceedings can be grouped in the following ways. Proceeding V392 of 2000 is an application brought by Ms Luck against a number of medical practitioners. V393 of 2000 is brought against the lessor and others associated with the leasing to the applicant of certain premises which she occupied at one time in Queensland. V394 of 2000 is brought against a number of parties, some or all of whom are associated with the manufacture or installation of particular products containing fibreglass. Proceedings V541 of 2000 are brought against Townsville City Council, some individuals and the State of Queensland Department of Health and Department of Environment. Each of the applications stems from the applicant's contention that she has become chronically and acutely ill as a result of ingestion of fibreglass particles.

The orders which Justice Weinberg made were made under Order 10 rule 2(f) of the Federal Court Rules in exercise of the power given by Order 10 of those Rules for the court to give such directions with respect to the conduct of a proceeding as it thinks proper.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court from the orders which Justice Weinberg had made in each of the four matters which I have identified. On 23 August 2000 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Justices Burchett, Nicholson and Finkelstein) dismissed the application seeking leave to appeal from the orders to transfer the matters to a judge of the Queensland District Registry. The applicant has now applied for special leave to appeal against the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.

In her application for special leave she makes mention also of applications under section 40 of the Judiciary Act (1903) Commonwealth for the removal into this Court, not only of the four proceedings that I have earlier mentioned, but also two other proceedings, namely a proceeding pending in the Federal Court of Australia between the applicant and secretary, Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, matter V45 of 2000 and a matter pending in the Federal Court of Australia between the applicant and Stephen Blamey & Associates Pty Limited matter V603 of 2000.

The applications for removal are not before me today. What is before me is an application by the applicant in each of the four matters that, pending the hearing and determination of her applications for special leave, further proceedings in the Full Court of Australia be stayed. The occasion for that application is that she has now been notified that it is proposed to hold a directions hearing in each of the four matters on 27 October 2000 at level 7, Commonwealth Law Courts, 119 North Quay, Brisbane at 10.15 am Brisbane time. What she now seeks by her application to this Court is an order, the effect of which would be to stop the orders of Justice Weinberg, to which I have earlier referred, taking effect until the hearing and determination of her applications for special leave.

The principles which are to be applied in relation to applications of this kind are well established. No doubt the discretion which the Court has, to exercise what has been described as its extraordinary jurisdiction to stay proceedings, is not a discretion that is to be fettered by the application of rigid rules. Nevertheless, for present purposes, it is convenient to take the well-known statements by Justice Brennan in Jennings Construction Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited [No 1] [1986] HCA 84; (1986) 161 CLR 681 at 685 as a convenient statement of matters to which reference should be made. There his Honour said that:

In exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction to stay, the following factors are material to the exercise of this Court's discretion. In each case when the Court is satisfied a stay is required to preserve the subject-matter of the litigation, it is relevant to consider: first, whether there is a substantial prospect that special leave to appeal will be granted; secondly, whether the applicant has failed to take whatever steps are necessary to seek a stay from the court in which the matter is pending; thirdly, whether the grant of a stay will cause loss to the respondent; and fourthly, where the balance of convenience lies.

There were two principal strands to the applicant's argument. The first concerned the difficulties attendant upon her conducting any part of the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in the Queensland District Registry of that court. The second strand of her argument concerned the treatment that she contends she has received in the course of her litigation in the Federal Court of Australia, treatment which she contends is, itself, a separate ground engaging the original jurisdiction of this Court and warranting this Court interfering in what has happened in the Federal Court of Australia.

As to this second strand of her argument it is, in my view, important to recall that the process presently before me is her application for stay pending hearing and determination of her application for special leave to appeal. Those applications for special leave to appeal concern the judgments and orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia that were given on 23 August 2000.

There is no originating process in this Court seeking to engage the original jurisdiction of the court. Even if the complaints which are made by the applicant about the way in which she has been treated by the staff of the registry of the Federal Court of Australia were complaints that were to be made out, they are matters which in my view would not ground her present application for stay. The focus of that application must be and remain upon the orders which it is sought to challenge by application for special leave to appeal to this Court and, were that application to be granted, by appeal.

In that connection it is important to bear steadily in mind that the orders which the applicant seeks to challenge in this Court were orders made in matters of practice and procedure in which the judge was called on to exercise a discretion. It has long been established that appellate courts exercise particular caution in reviewing decisions about matters of practice and procedure. Reference is often made to the statement of Sir Frederick Jordan in In re the Will of Gilbert [1946] NSWStRp 24; (1946) 46 SR(NSW) 318 at 323 that:

I am of opinion that.....there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal.

See also Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Incorporated [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177 per Chief Justice Gibbs, Justices Aickin, Wilson and Brennan.

The applicant now contends for the first time that the effect of the orders made by Justice Weinberg will be to determine her substantive rights because she will not be able to pursue her rights if the case is transferred to Brisbane. This she contends is so because she will not be able to participate in a hearing by video link to Brisbane. For the first time in this Court in the course of argument she asserted that to do this would be contrary to her personal beliefs. She acknowledged that this was not a matter that had been raised below or debated there. That being so, that fact cannot in my opinion form a basis for challenging the exercise of discretion which was made below.

The powers of this Court on appeal are to make such order as the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia should have made. This Court would not in my opinion take to account matters of the kind now asserted for the first time in the course of argument on this application for stay.

The applicant referred more than once to the difficulties which she, as an unrepresented and sick litigant, had in pursuing her rights. Those difficulties are not to be minimised. It is important, however, to recall that if the applicant were in a position where she could sufficiently - and I emphasise "sufficiently" - demonstrate some physical incapacity to attend to the matter on the appointed day, it might ordinarily be expected that the proceedings might then be adjourned to a time when she could be physically fit enough to deal with them. In the end then, it is, I think, essential to recall that the application concerns a matter of practice and procedure; indeed, concerning the administrative arrangements made within the Federal Court of Australia.

I should add that the applicant also contended that because she proposes to apply in the two other matters to which I have earlier referred as being pending in the Federal Court of Australia for removal of those causes into this Court, the orders for stay which she seeks should now be made. In my opinion, neither her foreshadowed applications for orders of removal of those two matters nor her foreshadowed or actual applications for removal of the four principal matters before me add weight to her present application for stay.

In my opinion, the applicant does not demonstrate a substantial prospect that special leave to appeal will be granted in any of the four matters now before me. That being so, it is unnecessary to consider the other three matters to which Justice Brennan referred in Jennings Construction. I would add, however, that the applicant did not take any step to seek a stay from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia pending her application to this Court. Questions of possible loss to the respondent or balance of convenience do not, in the circumstances I have described, fall for consideration. In each matter the application will be dismissed.

MR CAWTHORN: Your Honour, I seek the costs of the application.

HIS HONOUR: Ms Luck, are you able to say anything against the making of an order for costs?

MS LUCK: Your Honour, I am afraid that you have made some errors in your judgment.

HIS HONOUR: At the moment, Ms Luck, I wish to - - -

MS LUCK: I did actually make steps for a stay in the court. I filed documents that went to the court with the other application for the - seeking leave to appeal. There are other matters that you mentioned that were not related. In fact I never mentioned Stephen Blamey in this hearing today. I am sorry, but the facts are there and they are wrong.

HIS HONOUR: Ms Luck, my question was: do you have anything to say about costs?

MS LUCK: And you did not mention also the fact that I have been tortured, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Ms Luck, I ask you for the last time - - -

MS LUCK: Thank you very much, no, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: You do not? Very well, the application will stand dismissed. There will be an order for costs in matter No M96 of 2000 in favour - - -

MS LUCK: I would like to say, your Honour, that I cannot pay.

HIS HONOUR: Just a moment, Ms Luck. Be quiet. There will be an order for costs in matter M96 of 2000 that the applicant pay the costs of the first, second, and fifth to ninth respondents.

MS LUCK: I seek to appeal your orders, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I will certify for the attendance of counsel. You had something to say, Ms Luck?

MS LUCK: I seek to appeal your orders, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Ms Luck, that is a matter for you. Is there any other application? Very well, I will adjourn.

AT 12.18 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED